# Connecting a City to the Sea

## THE HISTORY OF THE ATHENIAN LONG WALLS

DAVID H. CONWELL

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# Connecting a City to the Sea

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# Connecting a City to the Sea

## The History of the Athenian Long Walls

*By*

David H. Conwell

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*On the cover*: Long Walls, phase II: hammer-dressed masonry of substructures.
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For Eva

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# PREFACE

Not long ago, V. D. Hanson described the Athenian Long Walls as "the most revolutionary development in the history of Greek strategy."[1] This statement hardly ranks as hyperbole, for descriptions and studies of classical Greece habitually consider the structures due to their universally acknowledged historical importance. Nevertheless, modern appreciation of the Long Walls is generally limited to the significance of their construction in the mid-fifth century, their role during the Peloponnesian War, and the reconstruction of the walls again in the early fourth century. Because of this selective approach, we have yet to recognize the full impact of these fortifications on Greek military and political history. In telling the story of the Long Walls, the present study employs the extant literary, epigraphic, and archaeological sources to document four major building phases, examines the structures' purpose during each of those periods, and establishes the walls' fluctuating prominence in Athenian strategy. My hope is that students, scholars, and others who are historically inclined will find that this volume usefully expands our understanding of classical through early Hellenistic times.

This volume was conceived and written after years of teaching began to show me what doing history is all about. Therefore, although some aspects of what follows originated in my 1992 dissertation, I have researched anew and thoroughly re-thought that earlier work. In addition, having learned from my students that historical inquiry is most worthwhile when the data becomes more than simply an end in itself, I have sought to accomplish a more ambitious goal than I had first envisioned. Originally, this study focused on establishing a firm chronology of the Long Walls' different building phases. As I worked, naturally the written sources did not always support firm conclusions, while I also found that such an approach would lead me to neglect a large number of worthy questions. Good advice from colleagues and mentors eventually produced a fresh perspective based on the premise that the Long Walls were ineffective whenever the Athenians were not

[1] Hanson 2005, 26. Note also Lewis 1992a, 113, holding that the Long Walls "shaped the strategy of the rest of the [fifth] century."

confident in the safety of their ships. The ensuing investigation of Athenian sea power over time both enabled hypothetical answers where specific evidence was lacking and fostered the opportunity to establish the history of the Long Walls from beginning to end.

Moving on to logistical matters, transliterating Greek posed the usual challenge to consistency. Ancient Greek proper names tend to appear in Greek form. Personal preference led to frequent violations of this approach, such as "Alexander," "Plutarch," and "Athens." In addition, regrettably my transliterations of ancient authors' names often conflict with the Latinized abbreviations employed in source citations, which generally follow Liddell-Scott 1940 and Souter *et al.* 1968–1982. Proper names aside, most isolated ancient Greek words are directly transliterated and italicized (*asty*); Greek words in their anglicized forms are not, however, treated this way ("bouleutic"). As for the names of authors, streets, and toponyms in modern Greek, normally I simply transliterate letter for letter, whatever the phonetic qualities may be. However, where a modern source cited in this study transliterates its author's name, I use that version of the name, different though it may be from what I would produce independently (thus "Travlos," rather than "Traulos," appears below).

This study relies heavily on earlier work. While the footnotes document my indebtedness specifically, here I would stress that I have studied the Athenian Long Walls within the established chronological framework. Disputes over specific dates survive, of course, but I possess neither the ability nor the intention to solve them. Accordingly, unless stated otherwise I follow the chronologies published in certain standard works. Classical-period dates follow *The Cambridge Ancient History*, 2nd ed., vol. 5, especially the table on pp. 506–13, and *The Cambridge Ancient History*, 2nd ed., vol. 6, particularly the table on pp. 882–901; for Hellenistic times, I follow Habicht 1997. In addition, generally I have relied on published translations of Latin and ancient Greek sources. Those modern works, mostly in the Loeb Classical Library, are cited briefly in parentheses immediately following each translation. Where no source is cited, the translation is my own.

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Various institutions enabled my work, and I am profoundly grateful to each of them. Of the utmost importance were the formidable resources of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. The School's able staff streamlined my visits, its library collection often seemed too good to be true, and the interested scholars encountered there over the years contributed greatly to the progress of my project. For finding my work worthy of financial support, I am much indebted to Baylor School, the Loeb Classical Library Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the 1984 Foundation. Finally, the staff of the Agora Excavations rendered all sorts of assistance efficiently, effectively, and happily. Please note that any views, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the National Endowment for the Humanities or any other institution identified above.

I am delighted also to acknowledge the scholars, colleagues, and friends who have lent me their support. Aileen Ajootian was invariably willing to chat about walls. Observant and apt to pose incisive questions, she taught me a great deal in the course of my research. John Camp, with his informed responses to my random questions, proved time and again that he is closely acquainted not only with every worked stone in Greece, but also with the epigraphic and literary evidence which brings those stones to life. For some twenty years I have viewed John's facts-first approach to archaeology and history as a virtue to be emulated by the rest of us. Precisely the same comment applies to A. John Graham (†), who frequently urged me to publish my dissertation and, from retirement in Cambridge, worked dutifully to develop my thinking and commented in detail on various chapters. Molly Richardson taught me about both epigraphy and the editorial process. Desperate when my manuscript needed rescuing a few years ago, I turned first to Molly, whose response went well beyond the call of duty. Going back to my first class in graduate school, Ralph Rosen has set an admirable example as both teacher and scholar. Brilliant yet self-effacing, accomplished in his own right but supremely supportive of others, he has fundamentally impacted this study because he believed in me.

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I am indebted also to the colleagues and friends who provided all sorts of valuable assistance. Hans-Heinrich Altfeld clarified the difference between a preface and an introduction. Bob Bridges always made things happen at the American School. Fred Ley patiently revised drawings, all the while refusing to condemn me openly. Björn Loven introduced me to his exciting work at Zea. Beth Morel improved my understanding of ellipsis. Dick Morel was the second person to whom I turned when my manuscript needed rescuing. Jim Stover supported my endeavor and made sense of hyphenation, commas, and capitalization. Jerry White happily provided all sorts of computer assistance. Finally, Charles K. Williams II left his mark on this study because, nearly twenty years ago, he taught me that data ought to serve ideas.

Now, then, to thank my wife and children for their contribution to this project seems superficial. Their role amounts to a great deal more than support of some specific type. In fact, 'support' is manifestly the wrong word, for they in fact sustained me. Consumed as I often was by this project, Eva, Lucas, and Sophia always dragged me back from bouts of confusion or exhaustion. For their perseverance and their love, then, I am profoundly grateful, and now it is time to love them back in equal measure. To have dedicated this work to Eva is just the first step in this direction.

## CHAPTER ONE

# INTRODUCTION

The Athenian Long Walls hardly seem to require an introduction. Built in the mid-fifth century, the first two such structures ran from Athens down to the harbor cities of Phaleron and Piraeus.[1] Soon the Athenians added a third Long Wall. This structure, the Middle Wall,[2] joined Athens with Piraeus, as did one of the original two Long Walls. Facing a Peloponnesian invasion of Attika in 431, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians manned the outer two Long Walls,[3] while refugees from the countryside occupied the fortified space between them as well as open areas in Athens and Piraeus.[4] Safe behind their fortifications, the Athenians endured temporary enemy occupations of Attika almost annually down to 425.[5] Subsequently, the Peloponnesian garrison at Dekeleia forced them to remain behind the fortifications from 413 until Athens surrendered in 404.[6] The peace terms revealed the crucial strategic role of the Long Walls because initially the Spartans demanded that the Athenians destroy those structures alone of all the defenses at Athens and Piraeus.[7] Subsequently the demilitarization of the Long Walls, together with the circuit ringing Piraeus, marked the end of the Athenian Empire.[8]

This account of the fifth-century Long Walls, based on the ancient sources and recounted time and again, has become nearly proverbial. Behind the apparent certitude, however, fundamental questions remain under-studied. For example, did Kimon participate in building the original two structures, as Plutarch suggests, or is that possibility ruled out by chronological, ideological, or other factors? When the Athenians first built the Long Walls (phase Ia), between 462/1 and 458/7, did they

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[1] Thuc. I.107.1.
[2] Pl. *Grg.* 455e; Harp. Δ 44 Keaney (s.vv. Διὰ μέσου τείχους).
[3] Thuc. II.13.7.
[4] Thuc. II.17.3.
[5] Thuc. II.18.1–23.1 (431); II.47.2, 55.1–2, 57.1–2 (430); III.1.1–3 (428); III.26.1–4 (427); IV.2.1, 6.1–2 (425).
[6] Thuc. VII.18.1, 4, 19.1–3, 20.1, 27.3.
[7] Lys. 13.8; Xen. *Hell.* II.2.15.
[8] Thuc. V.26.1.

intend for the structures to function as part of a concept resembling the Perikleian strategy employed some three decades later when the Peloponnesian War broke out? What exactly was the strategic purpose of the phase Ib Long Wall, which dates to the second half of the 440s? And when did the Athenians give up on the Phaleric Long Wall, which had been functioning in 431 but was out of use by 404? These and other fundamental questions have been addressed from time to time, to be sure, but the rarity of systematic analysis has delayed scholarly consensus.

Following the restoration of the Long Walls early on in the Corinthian War (395–386), a prospect which deeply troubled the Spartans,[9] the structures tend to become an afterthought in the historical narrative. Nevertheless, we know from literary and epigraphic sources that the Athenians rebuilt them in the 330s and repaired them some thirty years later. That the Long Walls underwent three building phases during the fourth century prompts a host of important questions, many of them based on the probability that the Long Walls became ineffectual when the Athenian navy was weak. How, for instance, did fluctuations in Athenian sea power, including the naval demobilization prompted by the King's Peace of 386 and the formation eight years later of a new maritime alliance led by Athens, impact the role of the Long Walls in Athenian defensive strategy? Why did the Athenians rebuild the Long Walls in the 330s, when they were not ascendant at sea and when such vulnerable structures were seemingly incapable of withstanding the advanced siege techniques of the day? In restoring the Long Walls during a final construction phase at the end of the fourth century, at a time when their navy did not exercise control of the Aegean sea routes, were the Athenians naive? And when, finally, did the Athenians abandon the walls which joined the *asty* with its harbors?

In short, despite many ancient testimonia concerning the Long Walls and continuing reference to them in specialist studies and handbooks alike, our understanding of the structures' role in history remains substantially incomplete. If the Long Walls truly "formed the cardinal feature of Athenian defence,"[10] then a full picture of the history of Athens and, more generally, Greece, cannot be had without answers to

[9] Xen. *Hell.* IV.8.9–10.
[10] Gomme 1945, 228 *ad* Thuc. I.69.1.

the sorts of questions posed above. More concretely, since the Athenians believed that the massive Long Walls, each about 6 km in length, warranted four building phases over more than a century and a half, we ought to examine their history in its entirety.

### *Physical Characteristics of the Long Walls*

That story will benefit, however, from the context established by a description of the actual structures, their topographical setting, and the names by which they were known. To begin with the physical remains, the Long Walls shared similar basic characteristics through four major building phases spanning more than a century and a half.[11] Below ground were the stone foundations, which supported socles, also made of stone, beneath the mudbrick superstructures (cf. fig. 1). The curtain walls were pierced by gates and augmented by towers, while stairways gave access to wall-walks protected by parapets. Not long before the Long Walls passed out of use in early Hellenistic times, the Athenians began to install roofs over the wall-walks. The roofing project began, perhaps, during the construction of the phase III Long Walls after the battle of Chaironeia (338). With the work still incomplete by the time the Athenians resolved to renovate the structures in the late fourth century, finishing these roofs was a primary aim of the fourth phase of work.

The known remains belong exclusively to the two walls joining the *asty* with Piraeus (figs. 2–4).[12] Of the third structure, which crossed the plain between Athens and Phaleron (figs. 2–3), no convincing traces have ever been identified.[13] After becoming obsolete late in the Peloponnesian War, it was probably just left to deteriorate.[14] The published remains of the Athens-Piraeus Long Walls consist exclusively of stone substructures,

[11] For a description of the general character of the Long Walls during each building phase, see Conwell 1992, 397–413.

[12] On the word *asty*, used in the present study of the urban center at Athens, see Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 47.

[13] For alleged remains of the structure, see Conwell 1992, 247–66.

[14] Some scholars speculate that the Phaleric Wall was actually destroyed, whether (1) during the Peloponnesian War: Frazer 1898, 39; Garland 2001b, 169; (2) at the end of that conflict: Ulrichs 1847, 13; Ulrichs 1863, 167; Judeich 1931, 155; Kalogeropoulou 1969 211 n. 1; Wycherley 1978, 16; or even (3) during Sulla's activities at Athens in 87/6: Bires 1962, 7. Be that as it may, one may assume that the stones of the wall were pillaged over time for use in other constructions.

including foundations and socles.[15] The three known styles of construction may be assigned to the first three building phases. The scant remains of the Long Walls belonging to phases Ia and Ib include substructures with faces composed of polygonal and, perhaps, trapezoidal, masonry (fig. 5). Of the three structures built in this style, the first two belong to phase Ia, dating from the period 462/1–458/7 (fig. 2); the third, phase Ib wall dates from ca. 443/2 (fig. 3). Phase II, built from 395/4 to the later 390s, involved only the two Athens-Piraeus Long Walls (fig. 4). The substructures of these walls were faced with courses of distinctive hammer-dressed blocks (fig. 6). During phases Ia/Ib and II, the masonry faces of the walls had encased a fill of unfinished stone and earth, but the phase III structures were characterized by solid-block construction. That is to say, the substructures built from 337 to ca. 334 were composed entirely of orthogonal masonry (fig. 7). The fourth and final phase of the structures (307–304) was limited in scope and has never been identified in the archaeological record.

## *Local Topography*

The Long Walls traversed the coastal plain between Athens and the Bay of Phaleron.[16] Of the two phase Ia structures, one joined Athens to Phaleron, while the other ran from the *asty* down to Piraeus (fig. 2). The walls were, respectively, ca. 5.94 km and ca. 6.18 km in length,[17] and they sealed off a triangular area totaling some 11.86 km$^2$. The phase Ib Long Wall ran for about 5.98 km across the plain,[18] generally just 183 m south of the phase Ia structure joining those cities (fig. 3).[19] In subsequent phases (II–IV), the Long Walls included only the two structures located between Athens and Piraeus (fig. 4), protecting a corridor with an area of only ca. 1.51 km$^2$. For the most part defined by distinct natural features, the coastal plain formed the southern part of

[15] Conwell 1992, 292–396 describes and dates the physical remains known as of the early 1990s.

[16] For an artist's rendering of the region, see Connolly and Dodge 1998, figs. pp. 13, 20, 58; Camp 2001, fig. 277.

[17] Conwell 1992, 269, 288 n. 58.

[18] Conwell 1992, 289 n. 63.

[19] On the distance between the Athens-Piraeus walls, see See Liangouras and Papachristodoulou 1972, 345, plan 2; Travlos et al. 1972, 7; Travlos 1988, 288, 341; Conwell 1992, 530–31.

the Athenian plain.[20] To the northeast, it reached the base of Athens' Pnyx Range, which included the Hill of the Nymphs and Mouseion Hill (fig. 8 nos. 1, 3, 4). The foothills of Mt. Hymettos delimited the eastern side of the coastal plain, while low hills at Phaleron and Piraeus together with the curving coastline between these demes marked its southern extent.[21] To the west, the coastal plain merged imperceptibly with the broader Athenian plain, which stretched off to the north towards Mt. Aigaleion and Mt. Parnes.

Ancient literature preserves a variety of place-names associated with the region crossed by the Long Walls (figs. 2–4). The deme Xypete, the exact location of which remains a matter of debate, was located in the plain roughly midway between Piraeus and Athens.[22] Stretching southwest from Xypete to Piraeus was the district of Echelidai.[23] As well, various toponyms, including Halipedon,[24] Halmyris, Paralia, and Schoinous, labeled areas immediately north and northeast of ancient Piraeus.[25]

The coastal plain possessed few prominent topographical features (figs. 2–4). Apart from Sikelia Hill, which rose sharply from the plain just south of Athens, it was almost uniformly low and flat. Two rivers ran across the region. After passing west of Athens, the Kephissos ran south to the Bay of Phaleron.[26] Another river, the Ilissos, pursued a course between southern Athens and Sikelia Hill, then turned to the southwest and likewise ran down to the bay.[27] Ravines (*revmata*), which

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[20] For the Athenian plain generally, see Higgins and Higgins 1996, 26, 28, figs. 3.1–3.2; Connolly and Dodge 1998, fig. p. 14; Camp 2001, 7–8, fig. 7.

[21] Modern activity has completely altered the natural line of the coast; for an early view, see Müller 1987, 686–87 s.v. Pháleron. For the location of Phaleron towards the east side of the Bay of Phaleron, see Papachatzes 1974, 96 n. 2 *ad* Paus. I.1.2; Traill 1975, 53; Conwell 1992, 178–92. Whitley et al. 2006, 12 report a recent discovery of harborworks near modern Palaio Phalero.

[22] Conwell 1993, 50–52.

[23] St. Byz. pp. 291–92 Meineke (s.v. Ἐχελίδαι); Conwell 1993, 58. Stephanos erroneously identified Echelidai as a deme; see Milchhöfer 1881, 36; Milchhöfer 1905, 1911; Traill 1975, 86, 114 no. 10.

[24] According to some of Harpokration's sources, the entire coastal plain was called "Halipedon"; see Harp. A 71 Keaney (s.v. Ἁλίπεδον). During Classical times, however, the label applied to a more limited area north of Piraeus; see Xen. *Hell.* II.4.30; Conwell 1993, 52; Panagos 1997, 64–66.

[25] For these places, see Conwell 1993, 52–56; Panagos 1997, 219–21.

[26] For the course of the Kephissos, see Conwell 1992, 203–9.

[27] For the course of the Ilissos, see Conwell 1992, 209–13. Some modern opinion holds that the Ilissos River met the Kephissos at the west side of the coastal plain; see Milchhöfer 1883, 5; Kolbe 1914, 1067; Travlos 1971, fig. 213; Papachatzes 1974, 98

became torrents during the rainy season, descended from the hills at Athens, Piraeus, and Phaleron to cut through the coastal plain.[28]

A marsh adjacent to the Bay of Phaleron formed an important element of the local topography (figs. 2–4).[29] One finds general evidence of this feature in written sources. According to Plutarch, wet ground had impeded the construction of the original Long Walls (Ia), and the Athenian leader Kimon sponsored work intended to shore up the structures with gravel (*chalix*) and heavy stones.[30] From the lexicographer Stephanos, one learns that the name for the region reaching off to the northeast from Piraeus, Echelidai, derived from the word *helos*, "marsh."[31] Xenophon locates the swampy ground more precisely. Northeast of Piraeus he identifies a muddy region called "Halai".[32] In addition, Xenophon knows of a "Phaleric marsh" in a different location, no doubt at the eastern end of the bay near the deme of Phaleron,[33] although the existence of an ancient cemetery in that area means that the ground was hardly impassable.[34] Assuming that the low-lying region between these two areas also consisted of wet ground, then one ought to envision a continuous marsh similar to the brackish coastal swamp Misia, which was observed in early modern times.[35] Archaeological evidence may indicate that the swamp reached well into modern Neo Phalero. Here, beneath the foundations of a section of the northern

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n. 1, *ad* Paus. I.1.2, figs. 24, 58; von Eickstedt 1991, fig. 1; Connolly and Dodge 1998, figs. pp. 13, 20, 58; Camp 2001, fig. 277. However, Strabo (IX.1.24) shows that the river actually reached the Bay of Phaleron; so also Wachsmuth 1874, 117 n. 2; Judeich 1931, 48; Meyer 1967, 1365; Müller 1987, 630; cf. Leake 1841b, 9.

[28] Cf. Doxiades 1971, figs. 11–12; Lygouri-Tolia 1985, 16–18 no. 5 (Aioleon 54 and Psamathes: Athens-Ano Petralona); Panagos 1997, 65. For a modern example called "Chamosternas," see Schilardi 1975, 121 n. 4.

[29] On the swamps in this area, both ancient and modern, see Ulrichs 1863, 157–58; Wrede 1938, 1663–64; Travlos 1988, 340; Conwell 1992, 213–17.

[30] Plut. *Cim.* 13.6.

[31] St. Byz. pp. 291–92 Meineke (s.v. Ἐχελίδαι); see also EM, cols. 1154–55 Gaisford (s.v. Ἔχελος).

[32] Xen. *Hell.* II.4.34; Conwell 1993, 52–54.

[33] Xen. *Oec.* 19.6.

[34] The cemetery was at the south end of today's Syggrou Blvd.; Papachatzes 1974, fig. 23 shows the location of the cemetery relative to the modern street plan. Burials were made primarily during the seventh century, although the site continued in use down to the mid-fourth century; see Pelekides 1916, passim; Young 1942, passim.

[35] For Misia, see Leake 1821, 352; Leake 1841a, 418 ("Phaleric marsh" northeast of Piraeus), cf. 231; Leake 1841b, 9; Ulrichs 1863, 157–58; Judeich 1931, 425; Conwell 1992, 213–14; Conwell 1993, 49–50. For the location of this swamp, which is now dry land occupied by suburban Athens, see Stuart and Revett 1827, pl. III; Curtius and Kaupert 1881–1903, sheet III; Judeich 1931, fig. 13; Conwell 1992, fig. 7.

Athens-Piraeus Long Wall, excavation located a thick bedding of fine sand and gravel (*ammos lepte kai chaliki*);[36] although the Greeks typically established fortification walls on bedrock, wet ground in this area may have forced the builders of the structure to introduce materials which would ensure stability.[37] Not far from this location, deposits of gravel and sand near the southern Athens-Piraeus Long Wall have been recognized as remnants of the work supported by Kimon,[38] but the deposits are probably natural.[39]

In the region between Athens and its ports, the soil consists primarily of a thick layer of alluvial deposits.[40] Although the soil of Attika is generally poor,[41] a variety of sources both ancient and modern suggest that the coastal plain was productive during antiquity. Ancient authors refer to trees, cultivated crops, and pasturage in that area.[42] In early modern times, although Mark Twain described the region as "a barren, desolate, unpoetical waste,"[43] W. Leake found that the southern Athens-Piraeus Long Wall passed through a "deep vegetable soil."[44] In addition, many different modern observers—Twain included—saw trees, vineyards, olive groves, fields of wheat, corn, cotton, and gardens.[45]

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[36] Known from an unpublished drawing in the John Travlos Archive of the Greek Archaeological Society, File no. 46 Athens, Sub-File no. 5, Drawing no. III, dated 27 October 1971. The find was made in the section of the structure which extends east beneath Peiraios St. from the intersection with Karaole-Demetriou; see Conwell 1992, 215, 303 wall-section N5. I would like to thank the Archaeological Society, particularly Mrs. I. Ninou and Mrs. H. Papanicolaou, for their assistance in locating this drawing.

[37] Conwell 1992, 215, 344 with n. 7.

[38] Papademetriou 1953, 296–97. For the approximate location of the deposits, see Staes 1909, pl. 2 A with cols. 240–41; Papademetriou 1953, fig. 1 A with pp. 294–95; Travlos 1988, fig. 364 A.

[39] The excavator believes that the deposits are alluvial; see Staes 1909, 241. In addition, based on Staes 1909, pl. 2, they were found some 25 m north of the Long Wall, too far away for them to have served as construction fill for that structure.

[40] Lepsius 1891, sheet 4; Judeich 1931, fig. 6; Higgins and Higgins 1996, 28–29, fig. 3.1; Panagos 1997, 65. For alluvial deposits in the archaeological record, see Liangouras 1972, 166–68 no. 1 (Peiraios 52 and Athenas: Moschato); Petritake 1997, 80 (Konstantinoupoleos 105: Moschato); cf. Papachristodoulou 1971a, 37, fig. 2 B and 1973, 209, 214 (Chrysostomou Smyrnes and Thermopylon: Moschato).

[41] Thuc. I.2.5; Higgins and Higgins 1996, 26.

[42] Hdt. V.63.4; *IG* II$^2$ 2498 lines 9–11, 15–22; cf. Hsch. Φ 101 Schmidt (s.v. Φαληρικαί). See also Leake 1841a, 397; Day 1928, 175; Goette 2001, 2, 353.

[43] Twain 1996, 343.

[44] Leake 1841a, 418.

[45] Wheler 1682, 418, 420; Stuart and Revett 1794, map following p. xv; Hobhouse 1813, 361, 366, but cf. 367; Chandler 1817, 25, 27, cf. 124–25; Dodwell 1819, 418;

Despite ancient complaints,[46] the nearby city of Athens was "moderately well watered,"[47] and, based on both physical and written evidence, one might characterize the water supply in the coastal plain similarly. Natural belowground sources are attested by wells discovered in the region, whatever their dates may be.[48] In addition, post-classical commentators suggest that the waters feeding the Klepsydra spring on the northwest slope of the Akropolis also reached the region of the deme Phaleron.[49] Improbable though this claim may be,[50] there is no reason to reject the implication that ground water was available in that area. The existence of swampy land near the coast during the life of the Long Walls perhaps suggests an elevated water table in the southwestern part of the plain,[51] so the subsurface water supply in the coastal plain may have been relatively plentiful.

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Leake 1841a, 418, cf. 231; Curtius 1868, 33; Lepsius 1893, pl. I/1 ("Oelwald"); Judeich 1931, fig. 7 ("Pliocäner Lehm u. Gerölle"); Twain 1996, 343 ("luxurious vineyards"), 349–50. Most of these references are limited to the area between Athens and Piraeus, but cf. Hobhouse 1813, 366.

[46] Pl. *Criti.* 111c–d; Herakleides Kritikos = [Dicaearch.] *Περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι πόλεων*, 1.1 Pfister. Camp 1977, 281–355 provides a valuable collection of ancient testimonia concerning the Athenian water supply.

[47] Camp 1977, 20–21. For the Akropolis, which possessed copious supplies of water, see Crouch 1993, 255–77. In addition to these sources, see the summary of the city's ancient water supply, both public and private, by Leigh 1998, 10–28.

[48] For wells generally, see Chandler 1817, 141: "Many wells also occur on Lycabettus, at the Piraeus, in the plain, and all over Attica." For known but undated examples in the region between Athens, Piraeus, and Phaleron, see W. Kinnard in Stuart and Revett 1827, 7 n. c; von Alten 1881, 17; Curtius and Kaupert 1881–1903, sheet II; Judeich 1931, map III E/1; Third Archaeological District 1963, 41–42 (in front of the church of Agios Andreas: Athens-Ano Petralona); Andreiomenou 1966, 85–88 no. 28 (Demetrakopoulou 50: Athens-Koukaki); Alexandre 1967, 70 (Gennaiou Kolokotrone 108 and Plateia Merkoure: Athens-Ano Petralona); Liangouras 1973/74, 41–43 (Kyklopon 16–18: Athens-Ano Petralona); Alexandre 1975, 39 (in the intersection of Euripidou and Xenophontos: Kallithea-Tzitziphies); Spathatou 1979, 66 (Boulgare 44: Piraeus); Stauropoulou 1980, 28 no. 12 (Demetrakopoulou 44–46 and Drakou: Athens-Koukaki).

[49] Ister, *FGrHist* 334 F 6; schol. *ad* Ar. *Lys.* 913; Hsch. K 2941 Latte (s.v. Κλεψύδρα), cf. K 2940 (s.vv. κλεψύρρυτον ὕδωρ).

[50] Parsons 1943, 205.

[51] Since alluvial deposits are characteristic of the region between Athens and the Bay of Phaleron, it is improbable that a localized layer of impervious material raised the water table only in the limited area of the swamp. For fielding my questions about the relationship between swamps and the local water table, I would like to thank Mr. Larry Roberts.

Residents of the region supplemented the natural supply with water collected artificially. Many cisterns are known in the area,[52] and a fountain southwest of Athens was fed by a branch of the Peisistratid supply network.[53] The Kephissos and Ilissos rivers will also have served as sources of water. Since the climate and geology of classical and modern Attika are comparable,[54] the rivers would have been available to the ancient residents of the coastal plain just as they were more recently. Essentially dependable,[55] these rivers were tapped for reservoirs, public fountains, and irrigation in the Athenian plain during the early modern era,[56] so they likely served similar purposes in ancient times.[57] Lastly, during Roman times the ruins of the northern Athens-Piraeus Long Wall apparently supported an arcaded aqueduct.[58] Although it is likely that this structure primarily served Piraeus, residents of the plain may also have drawn water from it.

Whatever the truth of the suggestion by Dio Chrysostomos that the coastal plain was uninhabited in early times (*palai*),[59] by the Classical period a range of settlements dotted the region. The deme Xypete was located between Athens and Piraeus, while a smaller settlement cluster

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[52] For cisterns, mostly undated, see Hobhouse 1813, 366; Curtius in Curtius and Kaupert 1878, Text, 33, with sheet X/4; von Alten 1881, 17; Curtius and Kaupert 1881–1903, sheets I, III; Judeich 1931, maps III D–E/1 and E/2, IV (which also locates an "Ant. unterird. Wasserleitung" south of the city in the area which was certainly behind the Phaleric Long Wall); Alexandre 1970, 69 no. 27 (Koiles 5–7–9: Athens-Ano Petralona); Liangouras 1973/74, 41–43 (Kyklopon 16–18: Athens-Ano Petralona); Alexandre 1976, 35 (Kyklopon 27: Athens-Ano Petralona); Spathatou 1979, 65 (Kolokotroni and Omeridou Skylitse: Piraeus), 66 (Boulgare 44: Piraeus); Orphanou 1992, 29 no. 8 (Kallisthenous 54 and Tritonos 12: Athens-Ano Petralona); Kokkoliou 1996, 49–50 no. 10 (beneath the sidewalk at Phalerou 7: Athens-Koukaki); Stoupa 1998, 73–75 no. 13 (Markou Mpotsare 35: Athens-Koukaki).

[53] Tölle-Kastenbein 1994, 26, 79 with n. 230, figs. 124–27, maps 2, 3 B/7, 9. This fountain, Tölle-Kastenbein's "Vorstadt-Krene," has been located at Kolokotrone Gennaiou and Antaiou Streets, but the traces remain unpublished (Tölle-Kastenbein 1994, 114 n. 230).

[54] Bintliff 1977, 51; Leigh 1998, 40.

[55] During the nineteenth century, Leake 1841b, 7 found that the Kephissos maintained its flow in summer, although it tended to become dry in the lower part of its course (cf. Str. IX.1.24). As for the Ilissos, Leake 1841b, 9 records that, while a stream rarely flowed along the riverbed, a vein of water always existed beneath the dry channel.

[56] Leake 1841b, 7, 9.

[57] Whether or not the ancient residents of Attika employed irrigation is unclear; see Krasilnikoff 2000, 178 with n. 6.

[58] Travlos 1988, 289; Conwell 1992, 538–40; Leigh 1998, 92.

[59] D. Chrys. *Or.* 6.4.

existed in what is now the modern district of Ano Petralona,[60] just outside gate XVII in the city wall of the *asty* (fig. 8 no. XVII).[61] Given the local evidence for ceramic production[62] and, perhaps, bronze-working,[63] craftsmen and their families may have occupied the area. Isolated farmsteads seem also to have been scattered about the region between Athens, Phaleron, and Piraeus during the Classical period, as they were elsewhere in rural Attika.[64] A late-fourth-century inscription mentions a house northeast of Piraeus, and Pseudo-Demosthenes refers to a house on a farm in the same region.[65] Lastly, archaeologists have discovered many burials and pyres in the area between Athens and its port cities;[66]

[60] For remains apparently associated with classical-Hellenistic habitation here, see Alexandre 1970, 69 no. 29 (Kyklopon and Trion Ierarchon 12: Hellenistic house); Threpsiades 1971, 32–35 no. 30 (plot at southeast corner of intersection between Achaion and Demophontos: fourth-century house); Alexandre 1975, 18 (Dorieon 16: late classical house); Alexandre 1975, 23 (Kyklopon 23: Hellenistic house); Alexandre 1976, 35 (Kyklopon 27: Hellenistic structure). Cf. Chatzepouliou 1996, 51 no. 13 (Dryopon 35–37: Classical-period deposit), and discoveries of constructions which conceivably belong to classical or Hellenistic houses but whose function has not been established: Alexandre 1970, 69 no. 27 (Koiles 5–7–9: Hellenistic wall); Alexandre 1973/74a, 90 (Kyklopon and Trion Hierarchon: Hellenistic wall); Lygouri-Tolia 1985, 16–18 no. 5 (Aioleon 54 and Psamathes: walls dating to the second half of the fourth century); Tsirigote-Drakotou 1990, 43 no. 9 (Tritonos 3: fourth-century walls).

[61] Physical traces of this gateway have never been identified. For its approximate position, see Judeich 1931, map I B/7; Travlos 1988, fig. 29 (southwest of gate XIV); Lazaridou and Dakoura-Vogiatzoglou 2004, map pp. 20–21 no. 39 ("West Gate"). Dr. Leda Costaki has pointed out to me (pers. comm., June 2007) that a probable road running northeast-southwest near the line of the Classical-period city wall might indicate the existence of another gate in this part of the circuit; see Kolonas 1981, 23 no. 14 (Pallenaion 37).

[62] Third Archaeological District 1963, 41–42 (in front of the church of Agios Andreas); Alexandre 1968a, passim (Demophontos 5); Alexandre 1969, 37–41 no. 15 (Demophontos 5); Karagiorga-Stathakopoulou 1979, 18 no. 11 (Balabane 10); Kolonas 1981, 23 no. 14 (Pallenaion 37); Tsouklidou-Penna 1982, 24 no. 8 (Blassopoulou 7); Mpaziotopoulou-Balabane 1994, 51 with n. 30, fig. 46 no. 10; Kokkoliou 1996, 50–51 no. 12 (Demophontos 121); cf. Chatzepouliou 1996, 51 no. 13 (Dryopon 35–37).

[63] Orphanou and Kaletze 1994, 40–41 no. 8 (Dorieon 15: fourth-century structure and associated trench).

[64] There is now no doubt that isolated farmsteads existed in Attika during Classical times, see Langdon 1990–91, passim; Lohmann 1992, 35, 39–51, 58–60; Lohmann 1993, 126–28, 136, 292–94; Goette 1995, passim, esp. 182–92; Lohmann 1995, 526–28; Jones 2000, passim; Goette 2001, 195, 210; Jones 2004, 19–47; Hansen 2006, 67–72. For the opposing view, see Osborne 1985, 15–36, 190–91; Osborne 1992, passim.

[65] *IG* II$^2$ 2498 lines 22–23; [Dem.] 47.53, 62, 76.

[66] For burials, see Curtius and Kaupert 1881–1903, sheets I, III; Third Archaeological District 1961/62, 25–26 (along Mirztephsku and Mouson: Athens-Ano Petralona/Koukaki); Alexandre 1968b, 39 no. 12 (in Thessalonikes near its intersection with Antistratou: Athens-Kato Petralona), 50–53 no. 20 (Gennaiou Kolokotrone 7: Athens-Koukaki),

at least some of the deceased no doubt lived outside these population centers.

In addition to settling in the coastal plain, the Athenians also engaged in religious activities and staged horse races there. Most of the published evidence has to do with sanctuaries. Along the Athens-Phaleron road, Pausanias saw the ruins of a Hera temple which, he was told, had never been repaired after the Persians damaged it.[67] Between Athens and Piraeus were sanctuaries of Akamas,[68] Athena Polias,[69] Echelos,[70] Herakles Tetrakomos,[71] Kybele,[72] and Theseus (figs. 2–4).[73] Physical remains of these cult places are certain only in the case of the Kybele sanctuary in modern Moschato, where excavation yielded a Classical-period statue of the goddess.[74] Substantial traces on a bluff just northeast of Piraeus' circuit wall perhaps functioned as a sacred precinct,[75] often

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88 no. 69 (in Pramanton at plot 8, near the intersection with Kallirroes: Athens-Ano Petralona), 97 no. 86 (Chelntraïch, in courtyard of the factory ΚΟΜΔΕ Kallithea); Alexandre 1970, 44–49 no. 9 (Beïkou 123–125 and Aglaurou: Athens-Koukaki), 66 no. 24 (Kallirroes 122: Athens-Koukaki); Alexandre 1975, 38–39 (in front of Homerou 3: Tauros); Schilardi 1975, 66–117 (north of Agias Sophias, between Chrysostomou Smyrnes and Thrakes: Tauros), 120–21 (coastal plain, generally); Kraniote and Rozake 1979, 67–68 (Demosthenous 266: Kallithea); Garland 1982, 158–59 (various funerary *periboloi* in the area of the Athens-Piraeus Long Walls); Orphanou 1992, 29–30 no. 9 (Agamemnonos 6: Athens-Ano Petralona). For pyres, near which cremated remains were presumably buried (see, generally, Garland 2001a, 36), note Alexandre 1970, 44–49 no. 9 (Beïkou 123–125 and Aglaurou: Athens-Koukaki); Schilardi 1975, 66–117 (north of Agias Sophias, between Chrysostomou Smyrnes and Thrakes: Tauros). For the many *in situ* discoveries beside the Athens-Piraeus and Athens-Phaleron roads, see the discussion of those routes below.

67 Paus. I.1.4.

68 *SEG* 23 no. 78b lines 10–11 (Epig. Mus. no. 13354a), found in Plateia Dabake, Kallithea.

69 *IG* II$^2$ 1035 line 48.

70 Hsch. E 2981 Latte (s.v. ἐν Ἐχελιδῶν); EM, cols. 1154–55 Gaisford (s.v. Ἔχελος).

71 Papagiannopoulos-Palaios, 1929, 44–52, 107–11, 232–37; Papagiannopoulos-Palaios, 1947/48, 17–20; Travlos 1988, 288; von Eickstedt 1991, 119–20; Conwell 1992, 177–78 with n. 3.

72 Papachristodoulou 1971b, 140–43; Papachristodoulou 1973, passim; Travlos 1988, 288, with a full list of excavation reports on p. 289; Steinhauer 1998, 57–58.

73 Andoc. 1.45.

74 Piraeus Museum no. 3851; Papachristodoulou 1973, 190–202, fig. 5, pls. 89–93, 94b, 95a, 96a; Travlos 1988, figs. 370, 372–73; Steinhauer 1998, 57, fig. p. 56; Steinhauer 2001a, 227–28, fig. 319. For the exact location of the sanctuary in relation to the modern street plan of Moschato, see Papachristodoulou 1973, fig. 4 no. 1.

75 For the remains, see Milchhöfer 1881, 38; Curtius and Kaupert 1881–1903, sheet II; Wachsmuth 1890, 194–95; Frazer 1898, 149; Judeich 1931, 455–56, map III E/1.

identified as the Theseion known to have existed between the Long Walls.[76] No specific evidence ties the remains to Theseus, however, so the identification is speculative.[77] Epigraphic evidence published by A. Papagiannopoulos-Palaios, cited immediately above, establishes the location of the Tetrakomeian Herakleion at the church Zoodochos Pege in modern Apollonos. The Echelos sanctuary may have been located in northern Neo Phalero,[78] a little more than a kilometer northeast of Piraeus' circuit wall, near the findspot of two late-fifth-century reliefs with inscribed bases.[79] B. Staes associates the material with a sanctuary and supposes that the site of the discovery marks the actual location of the precinct,[80] but the site has also been associated with other deities, including Kephissos,[81] Kephissos and Echelos,[82] as well as the Nymphs and Kephissos.[83] In addition to building sanctuaries in the plain, the Athenians also located a horse-racing track there. A late source identifies Echelidai, northeast of Piraeus, as the location of the hippodrome.[84] This facility is now generally thought to have been located in the vicinity of modern Neo Phalero,[85] but no physical traces are known. Finally, excavation has located certain other Classical-period structures in the plain,[86] but their exact function is not clear.

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[76] Andoc. 1.45. For the identification of the remains with the precinct mentioned by Andokides, see Milchhöfer 1881, 37–38; Curtius and Kaupert 1881–1903, sheet IIa; Milchhöfer 1887, 1200; Frazer 1898, 149; Lenschau 1937, 89; Culley 1973, 174 with fig. 2; Papachatzes 1974, 119 n. 1 *ad* Paus. I.1.4, fig. 25.

[77] See also Judeich 1931, 456, pointing out that the remains might just as well belong to the Thesmophorion attested by *IG* II$^2$ 2498 line 12; von Eickstedt 1991, 118–19, with 118 nn. 499–500; Garland 2001b, 162–63.

[78] Travlos, 1988, 288; Kearns 1989, 165 s.v. Ἔχελος.

[79] Nat. Mus. nos. 1783, 2756. For the findspot, see Staes 1909, pl. 2 A; Papademetriou 1953, fig. 1 A; Travlos 1988, fig. 364 A. For Nat. Mus. no. 1783, see Mitropoulou 1977, 64–66 no. 128, 108 no. 6; Travlos 1988, figs. 376–77. For Nat. Mus. no. 2756, see Mitropoulou 1977, 43–45 no. 65. Vikela 1997, 222 n. 228 and 223 n. 231 lists modern sources for these reliefs. The associated inscriptions are published as *IG* II$^2$ 4546 and *IG* II$^2$ 4548.

[80] Staes 1909, 242.

[81] Walter 1937, 98.

[82] Kossatz-Deissmann 1986, 674–75; Vikela 1997, 223.

[83] Staes 1909, 242–43; Salda 1989, 102–3.

[84] EM, col. 976 Gaisford (s.v. Ἐνεχελιδῶ).

[85] Ferguson 1938, 25–26; Kyle 1987, 95–97.

[86] Philippake 1966, 69 no. 13 (Beïkou 35: Athens-Koukaki); Petritake 1997, 80 (Konstantinoupoleos 105: Moschato). Other documented but ill-understood remains between Athens and the coast include undated "houses" towards the western side of Phaleron Bay (Milchhöfer 1881, 24; Ludlow 1883, 197 n. 1) and a cluster of "Grundmauern" located just northeast of the Karaïskakes Monument (Curtius and Kaupert 1881–1903, sheets II–III).

Of the major and minor roads which passed through the coastal plain, the most prominent thoroughfares joined Athens with its port cities. An important artery crossed the level terrain just beyond the northernmost Long Wall (figs. 2–4).[87] This route is typically recognized as the primary route of communication between Athens and Piraeus, the *hamaxitos* road known from Xenophon.[88] Its two endpoints are fixed by the position of prominent gates in the city circuits at either end. The road departed Athens through the Piraeus Gate (fig. 8 no. II).[89] One could also reach this thoroughfare from the area of the Sacred and Dipylon Gates further north (fig. 8 nos. III and IV),[90] and W. Judeich supposes that the Dipylon Gate, upon being monumentalized during the fourth century, became the primary point of departure for Piraeus-bound traffic.[91] A road located in the region outside the Piraeus Gate corresponds to the Athens-Piraeus *hamaxitos*;[92] beyond this known stretch, however, there are no physical traces of the road, and it is assumed that the line of the ancient thoroughfare survives in the route of modern Peiraios Street.[93] Out in the plain, the road from Athens to Piraeus road ran alongside the Northern Long Wall,[94] ultimately entering the port city via the Asty Gate.

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[87] For this road, see Curtius 1881, 7; Frazer 1898, 41; Judeich 1931, 152, 186–87; Papachatzes 1974, 140 n. 2 *ad* Paus. I.2.2, fig. 58; Siewert 1982, 39; Conwell 1992, 226–30; Stroud 1998, 104–5, fig. 7; Garland 2001b, 144–45; Costaki 2006, 61, 196.

[88] Xen. *Hell.* II.4.10. Costaki 2006, 61 defines a *hamaxitos* as a "major or wide public street" which "could accommodate wheeled traffic." See also Lolos 1998, 273.

[89] Judeich 1931, 186; Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 316; Young 1951b, 149; Wycherley 1978, 256. For the Piraeus Gate, located northeast of the intersection between Herakleidon and Erysichthonos Sts., see Philippake 1966, 55–57 no. 1 (Erysichthonos 15); Travlos 1971, 159 no. II, figs. 219 no. II, 417; Spathari 1982, 23–24 no. 7 (Herakleidon 50); Lygouri-Tolia 1985, fig. 3; Travlos 1988, 23, figs. 29 no. II, 32; Stroud 1998, 105 n. 45, 107.

[90] Paus. I.2.4. The road passing out of Athens via the Sacred Gate forked at the Tritopatreion, the one branch becoming the Sacred Way and the other branch, the so-called Street of the Tombs, ultimately joining the Athens-Piraeus *hamaxitos*. See Travlos 1971, 299, fig. 417 nos. 174 and 175; Papachatzes 1974, 145 n. 1 *ad* Paus. I.2.3, fig. 60; Wycherley 1978, 256; Knigge 1988, 95, fig. 165; Costaki 2006, 140–41, 196, 493–98 no. VI.16 (Sacred Way), 501–4 no. VI.19 (Street of the Tombs).

[91] Judeich 1931, 186–87.

[92] Andreiomenou 1966, 74 no. 18 (Poulopoulou 43); Philippake 1966, 55–57 no. 1 (Erysichthonos 15); Alexandre 1969, 64–68 nos. 46–47 (Poulopoulou 45–47); Spathari 1982, 23–24 no. 7 (Herakleidon 50); Lygouri-Tolia 1985, fig. 3; Costaki 2006, 131, 140, 507–8 no. VII.1, 508 no. VII.2, 508–9 no. VII.3.

[93] See especially Curtius and Kaupert 1881–1903, sheets I–Ia; also Travlos 1971, fig. 213.

[94] Pl. *R.* 439e; cf. Paus. I.2.2.

Although ancient testimony shows that the Athens-Piraeus *hamaxitos* paralleled the Long Wall for some distance, one does not know precisely where, for the traveler going to Piraeus, this road actually met the structure. In 1969, D. Schilardi located a stretch of ancient road in the modern Tauros district, just outside the northern Athens-Piraeus Long Wall.[95] About 5 m wide, the roadway was an important route, but its exact relationship to the nearby Long Wall is not clear. On the one hand, if the road formed part of the *hamaxitos* which joined Athens with Piraeus, then simply by extending its course to the south one might establish the point at which that route met the Long Wall. On the other hand, conventional opinion holds that the Athens-Piraeus *hamaxitos* began running parallel to the Long Wall well southwest of Schilardi's road;[96] in this case, the latter roadway would have had no association with the *hamaxitos* in the area of the Long Wall, and it would probably have simply passed through a gate in that structure.[97]

Adjacent to the *hamaxitos* stood prominent memorials. During his journey from Piraeus to Athens, for example, Pausanias saw the burial site of Menander and Euripides' cenotaph.[98] Over the years, excavations have turned up funerary monuments just outside the northern Athens-Piraeus Long Wall and, therefore, probably adjacent to the road.[99] If the so-called Kallithea Monument originally stood near its findspot in the modern district for which it is named,[100] then it, too, probably bordered the *hamaxitos*.[101] Travelers will also have passed by more typical burials.[102]

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[95] Schilardi 1975, esp. 117–21, figs. 1 no. 1, 2; cf. also Conwell 1992, 410–11.

[96] See, for example, Travlos 1971, fig. 213; Connolly and Dodge 1998, figs. pp. 13, 20, 58; Camp 2001, fig. 277

[97] For the evidence of a gateway at the point where Schilardi's road would have met the northern Athens-Piraeus Long Wall, see Schilardi 1969, 334; Schilardi 1973, 54; Schilardi 1975, 120; Conwell 1992, 410–411. As pointed out by Costaki 2006, 164–65, the existence of a road running towards a fortification wall does not necessarily mean that the structure possessed a gate where the two met.

[98] Paus. I.2.2. For the burials of other prominent individuals along this road, including ancient references, see Judeich 1931, 403.

[99] Amandry 1949, 525–26 (ca. 500 m west of the modern course of the Kephissos River: Neo Phalero); Steinhauer 1989, 54–55 (Peiraios 75: Moschato); cf. Steinhauer 1989, 55 (Kyprou and Hydras: Moschato).

[100] Tsiribakos 1971, 110; Schilardi 1975, fig. 1 no. 3 marks the site of the excavation in relation to the modern street plan (near Archimedous and Kyprous Streets).

[101] For the Kallithea Monument, see Garland 1982, 158–59 L2; Ridgway 1990, 31–32 with n. 15; Steinhauer 1998, 83, pl. 24; Steinhauer 2001a, 305–9, figs. 458–59; Winter 2006, 289 n. 2.

[102] For an example near Piraeus, see Judeich 1931, map III D/1.

Another road joining Athens and Piraeus was more direct than the *hamaxitos*. This route left southwestern Athens and, upon the construction of the Long Walls, was located behind the structures connecting the *asty* with its harbors (figs. 2–4).[103] Discoveries in modern Ano Petralona, including both the road itself[104] and a concentration of graves,[105] show that, after departing Athens through gate XVII (fig. 8 no. XVII), this route ran through the small settlement outside the gateway before reaching the northern Athens-Piraeus Long Wall. Thereafter, at least during the life of the Long Wall, the road ran down to Piraeus adjacent to the interior face of the structure. Its course is evident from the discovery of the actual road surface as well as burials probably made next to it.[106] Near Piraeus, the road, lined by wells and graves, could once be traced for some distance.[107] It climbed a gentle incline in order to reach the "Long Walls Gate" in northern Piraeus.[108] That this route was well traveled is clear from the deep wheel ruts of the Road through Koile

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[103] See Judeich 1931, 186; Conwell 1992, 230–33.

[104] Andreiomenou 1966, 90–91 no. 31 (Antaiou 19). Costaki 2006, 140, 584 no. XV.5 locates this road surface on the city side of Athens' circuit wall.

[105] Curtius and Kaupert 1878, sheet III A–B/4; Judeich 1931, map I A–B/7; Third Archaeological District 1963, 41–42 (in front of the church Agios Andreas); Stauropoullos 1965, 97 no. 31 (in the intersection of Kallisthenous and Achaion), 98 no. 32 (in Dorieon between Troon and Kallisthenous); Andreiomenou 1966, 90–91 no. 31 (Antaiou 19); Alexandre 1967, 70 (Gennaiou Kolokotrone 108 and Plateia Merkoure); Alexandre 1969, 37 no. 14 (Deinocharous 15); Threpsiades 1971, 32–33 (plot at southeast corner of intersection between Achaion and Demophontos); Alexandre 1972a, 53–54 no. 24 (in Demophontos at plot 146); Alexandre 1972b, 89 no. 5 (in the intersection of Antaiou and Gennaiou Kolokotrone), 140 no. 56 (in Troon at plot 68); Liangouras 1973/74, 41–43 (Kyklopon 16–18), 43 (Kyklopon and Demophontos); Alexandre 1976, 29 (in Demophontos near its intersection with Kyklopon). For the remains of a late classical to early Hellenistic pyre in this area, see Liangouras 1973/74, 54 (in Troon between plots 68–70 and the intersection with Kyklopon). On the common occurrence of burials adjacent to roads, see Kurtz and Boardman 1971, 92–96; Garland 1982, 133 with n. 37; Lohmann 2002, 78–79; Costaki 2006, 230–38.

[106] Excavated evidence for the road: Liangouras 1972, 166–68 no. 1 (Peiraios 52 and Athenas: Moschato); Liangouras and Papachristodoulou 1972, 344 (in Peiraios St. directly east of the intersection with Karaole-Demetriou: Neo Phalero), fig. 5 (with caption misplaced to fig. 6); Steinhauer 1989, 55 (Kyprou and Hydras: Moschato); cf. Mastrokostas n.d., 694. The Archaeological Service has excavated a variety of graves which were presumably in the vicinity of this road as it ran alongside the Long Wall: Liangouras 1972, 166–68 no. 1 (Peiraios 52 and Athenas: Moschato); Steinhauer 1989, 55 (Kyprou and Hydras: Moschato). For a fourth-century enclosure identified as a burial *peribolos*, see Petrakos 1977, 38–40 (Kyprou and 25es Martiou: Kallithea); the findspot, however, may be outside rather than inside the northern Athens-Piraeus Long Wall.

[107] Kaupert 1879, 622; von Alten 1881, 17; Wachsmuth 1890, 178–79; Judeich 1931, map III D/1.

[108] For the gateway, see von Eickstedt 1991, 51–55.

in western Athens (fig. 8 no. 10), which brought traffic down to gate XVII.[109] Nevertheless, due to the sometimes difficult terrain of the Road through Koile, in normal times the road between the Long Walls will have been less popular than the *hamaxitos* not far to the north, which crossed uniformly level ground.[110] During the life of the Long Walls, however, most traffic doubtless preferred the road protected by those structures when an enemy was near enough to mount a siege.

A second major road, or *hamaxitos*, ran southwest from Athens to the deme and port of Phaleron (figs. 2–4).[111] Many years ago, observers recognized tombs and other physical remains along the modern road between Athens and the promontory forming the east side of the Bay of Phaleron.[112] These finds suggested that the ancient and modern routes between the two areas followed a similar course. With Phaleron located at the eastern end of the bay, one may recognize this road as the artery which connected the *asty* with that port city. More recently, archaeologists have found both the actual roadway and the remains of many burials as well as some funeral pyres beside it, especially in the area where the road approaches the ancient city wall of Athens.[113] The orientation of the ancient road suggests that it departed

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[109] For that road, see Hdt. VI.103.3; Curtius 1868, Text, 15; Curtius in Curtius and Kaupert 1878, Text, 17; Judeich 1931, 180, 186, map I C-D/6 and B-C/7; Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 313–16 with fig. 27; Lauter 1982, 45–48, fig. 2; Conwell 1992, 230–33; Lazaridou 1997, 42–43 (Demos Koiles); Triante 1999, 16, fig. 9; Hellenic Ministry of Culture 1998, 68; Hellenic Ministry of Culture 1999, 80; Choreme-Spetsiere 2003, 8, fig. 6; Lazaridou and Dakoura-Vogiatzoglou 2004, 16–18, map pp. 20–21 no. 8, figs. 21–22; Choreme-Spetsiere 2005, 11; Costaki 2006, 57, 129–30, 140, 204, 207, 581–84 no. XV.3.

[110] Day 1928, 174; Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 316; Stroud 1998, 104–5; Papadopoulos 2003, 286–87; Lalonde 2006, 115.

[111] Kaupert 1879, 633; Day 1928, 173–74; Travlos 1971, 160; cf. Kalligas 2000, 32. For the course and importance of this route, see Conwell 1992, 217–26; Costaki 2006, 139–40.

[112] Curtius in Curtius and Kaupert 1878, Text, 14, with sheets I and III E/5; Curtius and Kaupert 1881–1903, sheet I ("Antike Grundmauersteine" parallel to the modern road where it crosses the Ilissos at point 42.8); cf. sheet III. Closer to Phaleron, Keramopoullos 1923, 6 n. 2 found a grave, perhaps dating to the fourth century, in an area through which, due to the local topography, he thought the Athens-Phaleron road would have run.

[113] For traces of the ancient road, see Philippake 1966, 69 no. 12 (Phalerou 20); Alexandre 1967, 117–18 (in Phalerou at plot 18); Alexandre 1969, 73–74 no. 59 (in Phalerou at plot 22); Costaki 2006, 411 no. II.72, 412 no. II.73, 412 no. II.74. Note also the discovery of a bath adjacent to the road, for which see Karagiorga-Stathakopoulou 1979, 17 no. 8 (Phalerou 52 and Androutsou 3); Leigh 1998, 168–69. Classical and Hellenistic burials include Third Archaeological District 1964, 57–58 (Demetrakopoulou 85); Andreiomenou 1966, 85–88 no. 28 (Demetrakopoulou 50); Alexandre 1967, 73 (Demetra-

the Athenian city circuit through a gate located at the intersection of modern Phalerou and Spirou Donta Streets (fig. 8 no. XII).[114]

Given the probable layout of the Phaleric Long Wall (figs. 2–3),[115] this route will have been unprotected for part of its course south of Athens, so there must have been a fully secure connection between Athens and Phaleron.[116] Although no physical traces have been recognized, such a road would likely have exited Athens through gate XVI, located west of the Mouseion (fig. 8 no. XVI).[117] From there it would have run south-southwest through the plain towards Phaleron, perhaps joining the main road to the port city along the secure part of that route behind the Phaleric Wall.

In addition to the major arteries joining the *asty* with its port cities, secondary roads and simple footpaths will have provided access to the houses, sanctuaries, and fields of the coastal plain. One such route approaching 5 m in width has been excavated not far south of ancient Athens,[118] and I. C. Papachristodoulou reports probable traces of a road at the Kybele sanctuary.[119] Other physical remains include a stretch of Hellenistic wall running east-west at a location not far southwest of the city circuit at Athens, which has been identified as

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kopoulou 7 and Phalerou 8); Alexandre 1970, 53–55 no. 14 (Demetrakopoulou 95), 55–58 no. 15 (Demetrakopoulou 110); Nikopoulou 1970, 177–78 (Demetrakopoulou 110); Liangouras 1973/74, 43–44 (Markou Mpotsare 47 and Phalerou); Alexandre 1973/74a, 98 (in Phalerou at plot 27); Alexandre 1973/74b, 134 (G. Olympiou 15); Alexandre 1977, 18–20 (Drakou 19); Stoupa 1998, 73–75 no. 13 (Markou Mpotsare 35); Lygouri-Tolia 2000, 119–21 (Phalerou and Petmeza); cf. Third Archaeological District 1964, 58 (Demetrakopoulou 45 and Drakou), 58 (Note Mpotsare 21); Alexandre 1970, 71 no. 32 (Markou Mpotsare 41 and Demetrakopoulou 47). For pyres from classical times, see Third Archaeological District 1964, 57–58 (Demetrakopoulou 85); Alexandre 1970, 55–58 no. 15 (Demetrakopoulou 110); Nikopoulou 1970, 177 (Demetrakopoulou 110); Stoupa 1998, 73–75 no. 13 (Markou Mpotsare 35); Lygouri-Tolia 2000, 119–21 (Phalerou and Petmeza). In general, burials and pyres in this list were found within about a city block of the line of modern Phalerou St.

[114] For this gateway, typically labeled the "Halade Gate," see Travlos 1971, 160 no. XII, fig. 219 no. XII; Wycherley 1978, 17; Kalligas 2000, 32.

[115] See Conwell 1992, 234–69, following the solution of E. Kirsten in Philippson 1952, maps entitled "Die Ebene von Athen im Altertum" and "Athen im Themistokleischen, Hellenistischen, Hadrianischen Mauerring."

[116] See also Day 1928, 174; Judeich 1931, 189.

[117] For the approximate location of the road and the gateway, see also Judeich 1931, 140, map I C/7–8 and B/8 ("Melitisches Thor" and road "nach Phaleron").

[118] Alexandre 1969, 60 no. 33 (Meïntane 11).

[119] Papachristodoulou 1971a, 37; Papachristodoulou 1971b, 143; Orlandos 1973, 10.

the retaining wall of a road.[120] Less easily interpreted are finds made many years ago between the modern bed of the Kephissos River and Piraeus.[121] Excavating in separate locations in 1908, B. Staes found two walls which shared a similar north-south alignment and may have run parallel to each other at a distance of about 10 m.[122] Forty years later, working not far to the north of Staes' excavations, I. Papademetriou discovered walls which appeared to belong to the same structures as the two located in 1908.[123] Whereas Staes believes that the walls he had observed once confined the bed of the Kephissos, Papademetriou concludes instead that all these finds were *analemmata*, or retaining walls,[124] for a passageway joining the regions north and south of the Athens-Piraeus Long Walls. A road on the order of 10 m wide would have been exceptionally broad, however, even by the standards of Athens itself.[125] Therefore, let us retain Staes' hypothesis that the walls lined the Kephissos River.

That the Long Walls had gates also attests to the existence of roads in the coastal plain. In modern Neo Phalero, archaeologists have located physical traces of gateways in both of the Athens-Piraeus structures,[126] and an inscription refers to a gate in the northern of those two Long Walls.[127] The same line of that document refers also to *diodoi*, which must have been passages of some sort.[128] The literal meaning of the term's two components suggests that these features involved passage

[120] Threpsiades 1971, 33 (plot at southeast corner of the intersection between Achaion and Demophontos), fig. 14; Costaki 2006, 140, 579 no. XIV.1.

[121] For another discussion of the finds and their interpretation, see Conwell 1992, 204–8.

[122] Staes 1909, 241–42, pl. 2 A and B; for the findspots, see also Papademetriou 1953, 294–95, fig. 1 A and B; Travlos 1988, fig. 364 A and B.

[123] Papademetriou 1953, 294–97.

[124] For *analemmata* at Athens, see Costaki 2006, 63–71.

[125] For road-widths at Athens, see Thompson and Wycherley 1972, 193–94; Conwell 1992, 207; Costaki 2006, 87–92. To be sure, certain special arteries of the *asty* would have dwarfed Papademetriou's possible road; see Costaki 2006, 87–88 with n. 161, 455–59 no. V.16 (Dromos: Dipylon Gate to Academy, 40.65 m), 464–66 no. V.24 (Panathenaic Way, 29 m), 570–71 no. X.26 (perhaps bordering the Demosion Sema, 40 m).

[126] Liangouras and Papachristodoulou 1972, 343–44, fig. 2; Travlos 1988, 289; Conwell 1992, 303, 330, 353–54, fig. 29.

[127] *IG* II$^2$ 463 col. I line 122.

[128] Cf., generally, Liddell and Scott 1940, 432 s.v. δίοδος; Lolos 1998, 287 s.v. δίοδος, who recognizes an urban *diodos* as an alley or narrow street. For an earlier discussion of the *diodoi*, see Conwell 1992, 408–10.

through the Long Walls, whether via gateways or postern gates.[129] Other evidence for gates in the Long Walls is more speculative. E. Tsiribakos suggests that the Kallithea Monument stood adjacent to a gate in the northern Athens-Piraeus Long Wall.[130] It is conceivable that a road crossed that structure near the findspot of the monument, but no published evidence supports the point. As already mentioned, the road identified by Schilardi may have crossed the line of the same Long Wall, but the excavated evidence is inconclusive.

The coastal plain was no doubt overshadowed by the two great cities between which it was located. Nevertheless, anyone moving between the *asty* and its port cities at Piraeus and Phaleron will have become familiar with the region and welcomed the unimposing topography of the region. Both written sources and archaeological remains show that by the Classical period it resembled other rural settings in Attika. Living in nucleated settlements and isolated farmsteads, the residents of the coastal plain moved along roads major and minor, farmed the not infertile land, visited local sanctuaries, and buried their dead. The construction of the Long Walls will have interrupted the rhythm of life in the plain, for the straight sections of the structures obviously ignored the borders of individual farm plots, and they probably turned some roads into dead ends. Still, after adapting to the new reality, the plain's inhabitants no doubt resumed their simple lives, to be interrupted again when an emergency resulted in the settlement of refugees in their midst.[131]

## *Nomenclature: Phase Ia*

Since the nomenclature of the walls joining Athens with its harbors changed over time, the ensuing discussion proceeds chronologically.[132]

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[129] Wachsmuth 1890, 192–93, followed by Judeich 1931, 160 n. 2 and Papademetriou 1953, 296, supposes that the *diodoi* were "niedrige Durchgänge" which facilitated communication through the walls, although not necessarily at gates. Travlos 1988, 288–89 recognizes them as routes through gateways; cf. Garlan 1974, 352 on Philo's usage of the term. Long ago, K. O. Müller (1836, 74) suggested that *diodoi* were passages through towers at wall-walk level.

[130] Tsiribakos 1971, 110.

[131] Thuc. II.17.3 (431); Xen. *Hell.* II.2.3 (405); Just. *Epit.* V.9.12 (404/3).

[132] No study has ever comprehensively analyzed the names applied to the Long Walls in antiquity. For a summary, see Judeich 1931, 155 with n. 1. Note also Wachsmuth 1874, 328–29 with nn. 2–3; Wordsworth 2004, 103–4.

Collectively, the phase Ia structures were likely known as the "Long Walls," while a metaphorical label, the "Legs," may likewise have applied to them. Individually, each phase Ia structure was called a "Long Wall" but also likely had a more specific name. The Athens-Phaleron structure was probably known as the "Phaleric Wall," so the structure joining Athens with Piraeus may have been the "Piraic Wall."

Thucydides is the earliest source to use the collective label τὰ μακρὰ τείχη, "the Long Walls," of the original two structures. The historian reports several times in short succession on their construction.[133] His first statement, which addresses the initiation of the project, runs as follows:

> Ἤρξαντο δὲ κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους τούτους καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς θάλασσαν οἰκοδομεῖν, τό τε Φαληρόνδε καὶ τὸ ἐς Πειραιᾶ.[134]
>
> About this period the Athenians began to build their long walls to the sea, one to Phalerum, the other to the Peiraeus. (Loeb: C. F. Smith)

Thucydides wrote this report decades after the work in question—and in fact after the phase Ib wall had been added to the original two structures. Conceivably, then, his testimony is anachronistic. It is reasonable to assume, however, that the names by which Thucydides knew the Long Walls reflected the nomenclature with which he had became familiar in his youth, beginning before the third wall was built. Thus, one may suppose that the name "Long Walls" applied early on to the structures joining the *asty* with its harbors.[135]

The Athenians may also have employed a second collective label for the original two Long Walls, τὰ σκέλη, "the Legs." An old suggestion holds that the name developed only after the early-fourth-century reconstruction of the Long Walls (II).[136] Plutarch, however, applies it to the original structures.[137] Although no earlier source refers to the phase Ia walls as the "Legs," the characterization no doubt applied when the structures were two in number, and it was used of the Megarian Long

[133] Thuc. I.107.1, 4, 108.3. For another clear instance, see Plut. *Cim.* 13.6.
[134] Thuc. I.107.1.
[135] A scholiast *ad* Ar. *Eq.* 815 explains this obvious name, although with reference to the two walls joining Athens with Piraeus: μακρὰ δέ ἐλέγοντο διὰ τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως διήκειν μέχρι τοῦ Πειραιέως.
[136] Wilcken 1910, 207; cf. Krüger 1836, 171 n. 1.
[137] Plut. *Per.* 13.6.

Walls by the later fifth century.[138] Thus, although Plutarch's usage may be anachronistic, it is possible that the biographer, well versed in the original sources,[139] was following a trustworthy authority.

As for the names applied to the phase Ia structures individually, the above statement by Thucydides indicates, not surprisingly, that the Athenians knew each one as τὸ μακρὸν τεῖχος, "the Long Wall." This form of reference does not distinguish between the structures, but Thucydides' usage shows that the addition of a prepositional phrase made the label more specific.

Each phase Ia wall was probably also named after the city which served as its endpoint. In the context of the year 431, Thucydides refers to the Athens-Phaleron structure as τὸ Φαληρικὸν τεῖχος, "the Phaleric Wall."[140] If, as already assumed, Thucydides uses terminology with which he became familiar in his youth, then this label would have applied to the original wall joining Athens with Phaleron. The other phase Ia Long Wall, which ran from Athens down to Piraeus, was presumably known by the analogous term, τὸ Πειραϊκὸν τεῖχος, "the Piraic Wall," although no ancient author uses the label of that structure.[141]

Some ancient sources may suggest that the original Athens-Piraeus Long Wall was also named τὸ βόρειον τεῖχος, "the Northern Wall," based on its position relative to its twin to the south.[142] This label occurs in two closely related accounts of fifth-century history: the *De pace*, which is normally attributed to Andokides (391), and the *De falsa legatione*, which

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138 Ar. *Lys.* 1170, produced in 411 (τὰ Μεγαρικὰ σκέλη).

139 Ziegler 1972, 950; Pelling 2000, 45; Lamberton 2001, 14–16.

140 Thuc. II.13.7. For other instances of this name, see Harp. Δ 44 Keaney (s.vv. Διὰ μέσου τείχους), followed by Phot. Δ 383 Theodoridis (s.vv. Διὰ μέσου τείχους) and Suda, Δ 652 Adler (s.vv. Διὰ μέσου τείχους); Aristodem. *FGrHist* 104 F 1.5 §4; cf. Anon. Periegete, *FGrHist* 369 F 1, col. II §5 line 25 (restored). For the entry in the Suda, see Whitehead, D., et al., eds., "Suda on Line: Byzantine Lexicography," Stoa Consortium, http://www.stoa.org/sol (accessed July 23, 2007).

141 That this designation is ancient has been assumed by Gardner 1902, 57 and Liddell and Scott 1940, 1767 s.v. τεῖχος, I/2. Only one ancient source, *Anth. Pal.* [Theodorid.] VII no. 406, employs the adjective *peiraïkos* with reference to the Long Walls, but that passage has to do with the phase IV structures; in addition, it applies not to a single wall, but rather to the two walls which ran from Athens down to Piraeus during that phase.

142 No preserved ancient testimony uses the corresponding term, τὸ νότιον τεῖχος, "the Southern Wall," of the structure linking Athens with Phaleron. Cf., however, Briscoe 1973, 124–25 *ad* Liv. XXXI.26.8; Bury and Meiggs 1975, 205, 235–36, map 20; Lawrence 1979, 156; Nouhaud 1982, 233–34; McGregor 1987, fig. 7; Anderson 2003, pl. 1.

was delivered by Aischines (343). Given the supposed chronological priority of the *De pace*, it is regularly assumed that Aischines was following that source. In recent times, however, E. M. Harris has argued authoritatively that the *De pace* is a Hellenistic forgery which combines and confuses information from earlier authors, Aischines included.[143] In this study, therefore, references to the parallel material from these two speeches focuses on Aischines' testimony. In his account of fifth-century history, the orator places the construction of the Northern Wall after the conclusion of a truce between Athens and Sparta, normally recognized as the Five Years' Truce of 451:

> But when certain men had stirred up trouble and finally caused us to become involved in war with the Lacedaemonians, then, after we had suffered and inflicted many losses, Miltiades, the son of Cimon, who was proxenus of the Lacedaemonians, negotiated with them, and we made a truce for fifty years, and kept it thirteen years. During this period we fortified the Peiraeus and built the Northern Wall [τὸ βόρειον τεῖχος].[144] (Loeb: C. D. Adams)

One may interpret Aischines' statement in two ways. On the one hand, the orator seems to suggest that the first Athens-Piraeus structure was known as the "Northern Wall" when it was built. On the other hand, Aischines—speaking in 343—might inaccurately employ a name which was current in his own time but had not originally applied to the structure. Although the first of these alternatives would support the belief that one of the phase Ia Long Walls was called the "Northern Wall," the second alternative is no less likely. Aischines sought to persuade, after all, so one need not expect that he will have sacrificed the potential success of his rhetoric to pedantic matters of nomenclature. Moreover, Aischines' reference to the Northern Wall occurs in a narrative context which is universally understood to contain fundamental errors concerning fifth-century history.[145] Therefore, although one cannot prove that Aischines' testimony is anachronistic, at the same time

[143] Harris 1999, 128; Harris 2000, passim.

[144] Aeschin. 2.172–73; see also [Andoc.] 3.5. Note that this translation departs from the original in its rendition of the words τὸ βόρειον τεῖχος, translated by Adams as "the north wall."

[145] Aeschin. 2.172–76; cf. [Andoc.] 3.3–9. On the errors in Aischines' report, as well as the mistakes in the related account by [Andokides], see Nouhaud 1982, 230–34; Thompson 1984, 216–18; Carey 2000, 153 n. 227 *ad* Aeschin. 2.171, with subsequent notes, pp. 153–56, identifying specific errors in this part of the *De falsa legatione*; Harris 2000, 480–87.

its legitimacy is suspect and cannot by itself show that the designation "Northern" originally applied to the phase Ia Long Wall linking Athens with Piraeus.

A statement by the lexicographer Harpokration might also suggest that the original Athens-Piraeus Long Wall was known as the "Northern Wall." Under the *lemma* Διὰ μέσου τεῖχος, he preserves the following information:

> Ἀντιφῶν πρὸς Νικοκλέα. τριῶν ὄντων τειχῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ, ὡς καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης φησὶν ἐν Τριφάλητι, τοῦτε βορείου καὶ τοῦ νοτίου καὶ τοῦ Φαληρικοῦ, διὰ μέσου τῶν παρ' ἑκάτερα ἐλέγετο τὸ νότιον, οὗ μνημονεύει καὶ Πλάτων ἐν Γοργίᾳ.[146]
>
> Antiphon, *In Nicoclem*. There were three walls in Attika, as Aristophanes also says in *Triphales*, the Northern and the Southern and the Phaleric; the Southern Wall was said [to run] in between those on each side, which Plato also recalls in *Gorgias*.

Harpokration does not explicitly state that he has the fifth-century Athenian Long Walls in mind. We may, however, establish the chronological context based on the authors he cites. Harpokration or some earlier source drew together information derived from multiple authorities dating to the later fifth through earlier fourth centuries: Antiphon, Aristophanes, and Plato.[147] Any testimony found in the speech by Antiphon of Rhamnous, who was executed in 411, or in Aristophanes' play *Triphales*, likely produced shortly after 411,[148] must belong to the fifth century. The reference to Plato involves a known passage set in a fifth-century context.[149] That Harpokration mentions the Phaleric Wall shows that his information refers specifically to the Long Walls, for other ancient sources, above all Thucydides, demonstrate that the Phaleric Wall was one of those structures. Thus, unless one supposes that the lexicographer or an earlier source drew false connections between unrelated fragments of information, then Harpokration rightly associates the Northern Wall with the fifth-century Long Walls at Athens.

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[146] Harp. Δ 44 Keaney; cf. also the derivative entries in Phot. Δ 383 Theodoridis (s.vv. Διὰ μέσου τείχους) and Suda, Δ 652 Adler (s.vv. Διὰ μέσου τείχους). Harpokration's references to Antiphon and Aristophanes correspond, respectively, to *Nic.* fr. 37 Blass and *Triph.* fr. 569 K-A.

[147] On Harpokration's sources, see Tosi 2004, 1151.

[148] Henderson 1998, 6 (ca. 410–409); Nesselrath 2002, 1128; cf. Kassel and Austin 1984, 289–90 *ad* Ar. *Triph.* frr. 563–564.

[149] Pl. *Grg.* 455e. This passage is fully discussed below.

Nevertheless, Harpokration's testimony does not show that the phase Ia Athens-Piraeus Long Wall was called the "Northern Wall." Since Harpokration is obviously writing about three different structures, his testimony does not apply to the original Long Walls, which were two in number. Instead, it has to do with the structures which existed following the addition of the third Long Wall (Ib). Thus, while the phase Ia wall which joined Athens with Piraeus may eventually have become known as the "Northern Wall," Harpokration's usage does not demonstrate that such a designation existed from the time when the structure was built.

### *Nomenclature: Phases Ia/Ib*

Another stage in the nomenclature of the Long Walls began with the construction of the phase Ib structure, which ran down to Piraeus not far from the original wall joining Athens with that city. The original walls remained in use, so the old names, both collective and individual, survived. The existence of a new Long Wall, however, led to some changes. Now the old collective label "Long Walls" became flexible, for it could include the new structure and often excluded the Athens-Phaleron wall. The metaphorical designations "Legs" and "Long Legs" developed while the structures of phases Ia/Ib were functioning, if not before. The modified layout of the Long Walls also produced entirely new individual names. The northernmost of the Athens-Piraeus structures became known as the "Northern Wall" and the "Outer Wall," while its twin to the south acquired the names "Southern Wall" and "Middle Wall."

After the construction of the phase Ib structure between Athens and Piraeus, the label "Long Walls" survived, but it did not invariably apply to the same structures. Typically, the extant written sources identify the two Athens-Piraeus structures as the "Long Walls." In some cases, specific topographical references demonstrate that the name excludes the Athens-Phaleron wall.[150] For example, in reporting Perikles' description of Athenian resources directly before the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides writes as follows:

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[150] Thuc. II.13.7; Str. IX.1.15; Aristodem. *FGrHist* 104 F 1.5 §4; schol. *ad* Ar. *Eq.* 815 and 816; cf. also schol. *ad* Thuc. II.13.7.

> For the length of the Phalerian wall was thirty-five stadia to the circuit-wall of the city, and the portion of the circuit-wall itself which was guarded was forty-three stadia (a portion being left unguarded, that between the Long Wall [τοῦ τε μακροῦ] and the Phalerian); and the Long Walls [τὰ μακρὰ τείχη] to the Peiraeus were forty stadia in extent, of which only the outside one [τὸ ἔξωθεν] was guarded; and the whole circuit of the Peiraeus including Munichia was sixty stadia, half of it being under guard.[151] (Loeb: C. F. Smith)

Here Thucydides distinguishes between the Phaleric Wall, on the one hand, and the Long Walls running down to Piraeus, on the other.

Certain other references to the "Long Walls" must have to do specifically with the Athens-Piraeus walls due to the historical context.[152] By the time the Peloponnesian War finally drew to a close at the end of the fifth century, one of the original three structures had apparently ceased to function, for initially the peace terms dictated by the Peloponnesian victors called for the destruction of each one (ἑκάτερος) of them.[153] In standard Greek usage the adjective *hekateros* identifies one of two elements, so in 404 the Athenians were ordered to tear down two Long Walls. Identifying which of the original structures survived to the end of the Peloponnesian War follows from a passage in Xenophon's *Hellenica*. In describing how the Athenians learned of the disastrous defeat at Aigospotamoi in 405, the historian states that:

> It was at night that the Paralus arrived at Athens with tidings of the disaster, and a sound of wailing ran from Piraeus through the long walls [τῶν μακρῶν τειχῶν] to the city, one man passing on the news to another.[154] (Loeb: C. L. Brownson)

Simple topographical considerations indicate that the walls in question were the two Athens-Piraeus structures. Since these walls were in service as the war was ending, one may assume that, when the Peloponnesians required the destruction of two Long Walls shortly afterwards, the order pertained to those structures. Later authors confirm this conclusion, for

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[151] Thuc. II.13.7.

[152] Thuc. V.26.1; Lys. 13.8, 14; Xen. *Hell.* II.2.3, 15, 20, 3.11; Plut. *Alc.* 37.5; Arr. *Anab.* I.9.3; App. *Pun.* 87.409.

[153] Lys. 13.8; Xen. *Hell.* II.2.15. This reasoning, to be sure, constitutes an *argumentum ex silentio* (cf. Gomme 1945, 312 *ad* Thuc. I.107.1); however, it is reasonable to suppose that the Peloponnesians would have sought to demilitarize as many Long Walls as were still functional.

[154] Xen. *Hell.* II.2.3.

Strabo and Justin report that in 404 the Spartans destroyed the walls joining Athens and Piraeus.[155] One may therefore suppose that, in the context of the end of the Peloponnesian War, ancient references to the "Long Walls" have to do with the Athens-Piraeus structures.

Even in the singular, that label could serve as a collective reference involving the twin Athens-Piraeus Long Walls. In what undoubtedly involves more than a single structure, the orator Andokides recounts how, during the panic at Athens following the mutilation of the Herms (415), the Council ordered the Athenians to muster at three locations, depending on their place of residence:

> Then they summoned the Generals and bade them proclaim that citizens resident in Athens proper were to proceed under arms to the Agora; those between the Long Walls [ἐν μακρῷ τείχει] to the Theseum; and those in Peiraeus to the Agora of Hippodamus.[156] (Loeb: K. J. Maidment)

Andokides' references to Athens and Piraeus demonstrate that the passage has to do with discrete areas. The singular *en makroi teichei* therefore refers not to the Long Walls *per se*, but rather to the fortified zone created by those structures.[157] Such usage corresponds to a known meaning of the word *to teichos.*[158] Since all three Long Walls were still functioning in 415 (below, chapter 4), it is not immediately clear which of them defined the area distinguished by Andokides. However, it is unlikely that the orator has in mind a fortress lined on one side by the Athens-Phaleron wall, for the defensive configuration involving that structure was unwalled along the coastline of the Bay of Phaleron (fig. 2). In contrast, the two Athens-Piraeus Long Walls, together with the sections of city circuit at either end (*diateichismata*), did form a distinct fortified zone—however unconventional its elongated

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[155] Str. IX.1.15, XIV.2.9; Just. *Epit.* V.8.5.

[156] Andoc. 1.45; see also schol. *ad* Aristid. 1.267 L-B.

[157] See also Judeich 1931, 155; Liddell and Scott 1940, 1767 s.v. τεῖχος, I/2; Theophaneides n.d., 543. Cf. Harris 2000, 484–85 for a similar interpretation of *to makron teichos* in Aischin. 2.174 and [Andoc.] 3.7.

[158] In ancient Greek the singular τὸ τεῖχος often refers to a city circuit, but may also describe a fortress, on which see Maier 1961, 78 s.vv. τεῖχος-τείχη, with n. 39; Martin 1965, 375 n. 9; Robert 1970, 600–1; Lawrence 1979, 173, 443 n. 1; Orlandos and Travlos 1986, 246–47 s.v. τεῖχος; Rusch 1997, 707–9; Lolos 1998, 293–96 s.v. τεῖχος. Ginouvès 1998, 20 lists the term under *Enceinte fortifiée*. In the case of the Long Walls, note the usage of the singular *murus*; examples include Liv. XXXI.26.8, on the phase IV structures, and Just. *Epit.* V.8.5, 9.12, concerning the Long Walls of phases Ia/Ib.

shape may have been.[159] Thus, not only did the Athenians know those two structures as "Long," but also they employed a similar designation for the space defined by them.

Although the collective designation "Long Walls" often applied exclusively to the Athens-Piraeus structures after the Athenians had built the phase Ib wall, Thucydides suggests that the name could still include the Phaleric Wall.[160] As the enemy advanced into Attika at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (431), the country residents fled to Athens. Thucydides reports that some of them settled in the region between the "Long Walls."[161] Since the Phaleric Wall was functioning at that time,[162] the refugees likely did not confine themselves to the narrow space defined by the Athens-Piraeus structures. Thus, in 431 the label "Long Walls" could include the Athens-Phaleron wall.[163]

Whether or not the collective label "Legs" had been used of the original two Long Walls, it became current before the end of the fifth century. According to Plutarch, the Spartan decree detailing the peace terms at the end of the Peloponnesian War (404) had included an order to tear down τὰ μακρὰ σκέλη.[164] Other post-fifth-century authors likewise identify the first-phase walls as the "Legs" or the "Long Legs,"[165] and the analogous term *bracchia*, "Arms," occurs in the text of a Latin author.[166] In all but one of these sources, the "Legs" or "Arms" were certainly the two Athens-Piraeus Long Walls because the context is

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[159] See also Paus. I.25.5 concerning the phase III structures.

[160] Cf., however, Winter 1971, 87 n. 47, fig. 84; Rusten 1989, 120 *ad* Thuc. II.13.7, map 1; Strassler 1996, xxvii map 2.19, 58 map 1.107, 102 map 2.19, 524 map 8.75, 535 map 8.92; Wordsworth 2004, 103; Hanson 2005, map p. 69.

[161] Thuc. II.17.3.

[162] Thuc. II.13.7.

[163] Another contemporary source potentially refers to the Phaleric Wall as one of *ta makra teiche* following the construction of the third Long Wall. Using the dual number, the comic poet Eupolis alludes to Athenians who were *en makroin teichoin* during the Peloponnesian War (*Demoi*, fr. 99 lines 12–13 K-A). Whether one supposes the play was produced early in the Dekeleian War, as is typical, or follows I. C. Storey (2003, 66), 112–14 in dating it to 417 or 416, Eupolis' reference could have to do with the outer two, phase Ia Long Walls, including the structure joining Athens with Phaleron. In any event, the lower dating of the *Demoi* is preferable because an apparent reference in the play to the profanation of the Mysteries in spring 415 establishes a sound *terminus post quem* (Furley 1996, 133; Telò and Porciani 2002, 25–26). This study, then, accepts the conventional date in 412, although the alternative 411/10 has recently been suggested (Telò and Porciani 2002, passim; Telò 2004, 3; cf. Telò 2003, 23–24 with 23 n. 56).

[164] Plut. *Lys.* 14.8.

[165] For *ta makra skele,* see Diod. XIII.107.4, XIV.85.2. For *ta skele,* note Str. IX.1.15, XIV.2.9; Polyaen. I.40.3.

[166] Just. *Epit.* V.8.5, 9.12.

the end of the Peloponnesian War, and the Phaleric Wall had passed out of use by that time (below, chapter 4).[167] These reports establish 404 as a *terminus ante quem* for the label "Legs." Logically, the Athenians will not have begun to characterize the Long Walls metaphorically in this way during the period when three structures joined the *asty* with its port cities.[168] Accordingly, the label probably did not apply to the Long Walls of phases Ia/Ib until the demise of the Athens-Phaleron structure, in or not long after 413, left just two Long Walls in place.

After the construction of the phase Ib Long Wall, some of the earlier names for the individual structures continued in use. The Athens-Phaleron wall was still known as the "Phaleric Wall," since Thucydides used it in reference to the year 431.[169]

Thucydides also suggests that the singular name, the "Long Wall," could still label one or the other of the original two Long Walls. In a passage translated above, he describes the status of Athens' fortifications in 431, noting that the Athenians did not guard the circuit of the *asty* between the Phaleric Wall and *to makron (teichos)*.[170] This "Long Wall" almost certainly corresponds to the northernmost of the two Athens-Piraeus walls, the phase Ia structure (fig. 3).

Such influential scholars as W. Judeich and A. W. Gomme, however, recognize Thucydides' 'Long Wall' as *both* of the structures joining Athens with Piraeus (phases Ia and Ib).[171] This interpretation might

[167] The one possible exception also very likely refers to the two structures joining Athens and Piraeus. For Polyainos (I.40.3), the elements of the Athenian fortification system in 407 included the city walls at Athens and Piraeus, together with the Long Walls. Apparently Phaleron, and therefore the Phaleric Long Wall, was out of the picture. One may assign Polyainos' reference to 407 (or perhaps 408, if one follows Bleckmann 1998, 293–301 and Munn 2000, 165–69, 335–39) because it involves Alkibiades, who in the period of the Dekeleian War was back in Athens only during that year; on the circumstances of his return, see Kagan 2003, 432–36.

[168] Wordsworth 2004, 103–4 suggests that the two Athens-Piraeus Long Walls were "naturally connected as a pair," so that they became known as *ta makra skele.* Were this correct, the designation might have appeared as early as the second half of the 440s, when the Athenians built the second structure between Athens and Piraeus. Munn 2000, 202 detects an allusion to the Long Walls in a reference to *skele* by Aristophanes, *Eq.* 74–79, although the passage contains no clear reference to fortifications.

[169] Thuc. II.13.7.

[170] Thuc. II.13.7.

[171] Judeich 1931, 155 n. 1; Gomme 1945, 313 *ad* Thuc. I.107.1; see also Steup in Classen and Steup 1914, 40 *ad* Thuc. II.13.7; Steup in Classen and Steup 1919, 280 *ad* Thuc. I.107.1; Bundgaard 1976, 155.

find some support in Andokides' use of the singular for the space defended by the two Piraic Long Walls, as described above, but there is little reason to identify a similar usage in Thucydides. In the first place, in the same sentence as his reference to the "Long Wall," the historian employs the plural for the structures joining Athens and Piraeus. Closely juxtaposing singular and plural references to the same structures would be confusing, to say the least. Although Thucydides' text is not invariably straightforward, in a separate discussion with multiple references to one or both of the Megarian Long Walls, clarity is maintained because singular and plural designations do not occur in the same sentence.[172]

Next, military logic suggests that Thucydides did not identify both structures joining Athens and Piraeus as the "Long Wall." Had he done so, then the unguarded stretch of the city circuit "between the Long Wall and the Phaleric Wall" would have run east from the southern of the two structures (fig. 8 no. 9) to the point where the Athens-Phaleron wall met the fortification wall of the *asty* (fig. 3). In other words, one would have to imagine that in 431 the Athenians were guarding some 0.75 km of the city circuit between the two Long Walls to Piraeus, even though they controlled both structures. Such a scenario would have been wasteful of manpower and, of course, pointless.[173] No doubt the unguarded stretch of Athens' defenses "between the Long Wall and the Phaleric Wall" corresponds to the section between the northern Athens-Piraeus Long Wall and the Phaleric Wall (figs. 3, 8 no. 8). Therefore, Thucydides' designation, the "Long Wall," refers to just one structure.

The singular name "Long Wall" also probably applied to the Athens-Phaleron structure after the phase Ib wall was built. Returning to the passage just discussed, Thucydides there refers to the Long Walls πρὸς τὸν Πειραιᾶ, "to the Peiraeus."[174] Had the label "Long Walls" always applied to the Athens-Piraeus structures, then the prepositional phrase would have been unwarranted. Its presence therefore suggests that the historian wished to distinguish the Long Walls running down to Piraeus from another Long Wall, the one extending from Athens πρὸς τὸν Φαληρόν, "to Phaleron."

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172 Singular: Thuc. IV.67.1, 3, 68.1, 69.2; plural: Thuc. IV.66.4, 68.4, 69.4, 73.4.
173 See also Day 1928, 172 n. 32.
174 Thuc. II.13.7.

While the nomenclature of individual Long Walls remained unchanged in some respects after the construction of the third Long Wall, the new structure also prompted certain developments. Presumably the label "Long Wall" now applied to the new structure.[175] At the same time, if the original Athens-Piraeus Long Wall had ever been known as the "Piraic Wall," then it probably lost this designation after the construction of a second structure with the same endpoint. Conceivably the phase Ia wall to Piraeus now became known as τὸ ἔξωθεν τεῖχος, "the Outer Wall."[176] Extant only in the text of Thucydides, as translated above, this label would have made sense only after the construction of its twin to the south.

The names τὸ βόρειον τεῖχος, "the Northern Wall," and τὸ νότιον τεῖχος "the Southern Wall," likely also developed upon the addition of the phase Ib Long Wall.[177] The evidence is found in the works of Aischines and Harpokration. In 343, Aischines used the labels "Northern" and "Southern" of the phase Ia and phase Ib Athens-Piraeus walls respectively.[178] As shown above, however, the chronological accuracy of his terminology for the original Athens-Piraeus Wall is suspect, so one might also question the value of his evidence for the second such structure. More useful is the nomenclature transmitted by Harpokration, who employs the labels "Phaleric Wall," "Northern Wall," and "Southern Wall."[179] As already discussed, the lexicographer has the Long Walls in mind and—however great Harpokration's chronological distance from the Classical period—his information about those structures derives from multiple authors who were contemporaries of the fifth-century Long Walls. Already before the end of the fifth century, then, the Athenians were using these terms for the two walls which, together, formed a discrete fortress between the *asty* and Piraeus. Since the terms "Northern" and "Southern" had not applied to the phase Ia

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[175] As employed, for example, in Plut. *Per.* 13.7. That Plutarch here alludes to the phase Ib Long Wall is clear from his allusion to Pl. *Grg.* 455e.

[176] Thuc. II.13.7. For acceptance of this label as a formal name, see Ulrichs 1863, 166; Wachsmuth 1874, 328 with n. 2; Marchant 1891, 151; Busolt 1897, 310 with n. 1; Liddell and Scott 1940, 1767 s.v. τεῖχος, I/2; Rusten 1989, map 1.

[177] Some earlier scholars suppose that these labels did not appear until the construction of the phase II structures in the early fourth century; see Wachsmuth 1874, 329; Wilcken 1910, 206, 220. At present, however, it is commonly assumed that the names existed before the end of the fifth century.

[178] Aeschin. 2.173 (τὸ βόρειον τεῖχος), 174 (τὸ μακρὸν τεῖχος τὸ νότιον). See also [Andoc.] 3.5 (τὸ μακρὸν τεῖχος τὸ βόρειον), 7 (τὸ τεῖχος τὸ μακρὸν τὸ νότιον).

[179] Harp. Δ 44 Keaney (s.vv. Διὰ μέσου τείχους).

Long Walls, one may assume that they developed in connection with the phase Ib Athens-Piraeus structure.

The southernmost of the two Athens-Piraeus structures also acquired the name τὸ διὰ μέσου τεῖχος, which literally means "the wall in between" but is typically translated as "the Middle Wall." The phrase occurs with some frequency in ancient sources,[180] but there are only a few independent references. The lexicographical entries in Photios and the Suda derive from Harpokration, who in turn is seeking to elucidate the references in works by Antiphon (now lost) and Plato. In addition, the statements by the two commentators on the *Gorgias*, which have their origin in Plato's use of the name, amount to a single occurrence of the label *to dia mesou teichos*, because the texts are virtually identical.[181]

The earliest extant reference to the Middle Wall occurs in Plato's *Gorgias*. During a debate as to what a rhetorician actually does, one finds the following exchange:

> *Gorgias*: Well, I will try, Socrates, to reveal to you clearly the whole power of rhetoric: and in fact you have correctly shown the way to it yourself. You know, I suppose, that these great dockyards and walls of Athens, and the construction of your harbours, are due to the advice of Themistocles, and in part to that of Pericles, not to your craftsmen.
> *Socrates*: So we are told, Gorgias, of Themistocles; and as to Pericles, I heard him myself when he was advising us about the middle wall [τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους].[182] (Loeb: W. R. M. Lamb)

Identifying Plato's Middle Wall follows from two ancient sources which allude specifically to Plato's remark in the *Gorgias*. Although their testimony dates to Roman times, the authors state that they were familiar with references to the Middle Wall not only by Plato, but also by Kratinos and Antiphon, both of whom were likewise contemporaries of the fifth-century Long Walls. Let us begin with the testimony of Harpokration discussed above. Commenting on Antiphon's usage of

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180 Antiph. *Nic.* fr. 37 Blass; Pl. *Grg.* 455e; Plut. *Mor.* 351a (transmitting Cratin. fr. inc. 326 K-A and suggesting that Kratinos, a fifth-century comic poet, had almost certainly referred to *to dia mesou teichos;* so also Judeich 1931, 155 n. 1; Dodds 1959, 210 *ad* Pl. *Grg.* 455e6); Harp. Δ 44 Keaney (s.vv. Διὰ μέσου τείχους); schol. *ad* Pl. *Grg.* 455e; Olymp. *in Grg.* 7.3; Phot. Δ 383 Theodoridis (s.vv. Διὰ μέσου τείχους); Suda, Δ 652 Adler (s.vv. Διὰ μέσου τείχους).

181 On the relationship between the two passages, see Beutler 1938, 389–90; Dodds 1959, 61–62.

182 Pl. *Grg.* 455d–e. Whereas the Loeb translation renders the Greek word νεώρια as "arsenals," here it is translated as "dockyards."

the phrase διὰ μέσου τείχους, Harpokration transmits the following information:

> Antiphon, *In Nicoclem*. There were three walls in Attika, as Aristophanes also says in *Triphales*, the Northern and the Southern and the Phaleric; the Southern Wall was said [to run] in between [διὰ μέσου] those on each side, which Plato also recalls in *Gorgias*.[183]

We have already seen that the subject here is the fifth-century Athenian Long Walls. Thus, Harpokration found testimony, reinforced in his view by Plato, which stated that one of those structures was located between two others.[184]

Plutarch shows that the Middle Wall post-dates the phase Ia structures crossing the coastal plain. Referring directly to the *Gorgias* passage, the biographer remarks:

> For the long wall, concerning which Socrates says he himself heard Pericles introduce a measure, Callicrates was the contractor. Cratinus pokes fun at this work for its slow progress.[185] (Loeb: B Perrin)

According to Plutarch, Sokrates had heard Perikles lobby for the Middle Wall at a meeting of the Athenian Assembly.[186] Sokrates cannot have

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183 Harp. Δ 44 Keaney (s.vv. Διὰ μέσου τείχους).

184 In the past, the nature of *to dia mesou teichos* has been understood differently based upon an alternative usage of the adverbial phrase *dia mesou* relative to the Long Walls. As translated by J. W. Cohoon (Loeb), Dio Chrysostomos (*Or.* 6.4) employs this phrase to locate the Long Walls between Athens and Piraeus: "The circumference of Athens was two hundred stades, now that the Peiraeus and the connecting walls [τῶν διὰ μέσου τειχῶν] had been added to the compass of the city." Some early modern scholars preferred Dio Chrysostomos' usage over Harpokration's in order to support one or the other of two hypotheses about the fifth-century Long Walls to which few scholars have subscribed in recent times. On the one hand, it was suggested that the Athenians only built two such structures; see Wheler 1682, 420; Chandler 1817, 23; Kinnard in Stuart and Revett 1827, 7 n. c; Barthélemy 1839, 646 n. xiv; Hanriot 1853, 21 n. 13; Burnouf 1877, 137; Gardner 1902, 68–71; Carroll 1904a, 91; Carroll 1904b, 88–90; Carroll 1907, 228, cf. 231; Caspari 1914, 242–48; Holmberg 1978, 26, 29, cf. 100. On the other hand, some scholars supposed that three structures did indeed exist, but that the Athenians built them all simultaneously; see T. Gray, as quoted by Thompson 1871, 21 *ad* Pl. *Grg.* 455e; Steup in Classen and Steup 1919, 280 *ad* Thuc. I.107.1; Bundgaard 1976, 155–56; Spathari 1987, 21. Both of these theories strain the evidence, beginning with the rejection of the usage of διὰ μέσου found in Harpokration, an author who was in fact familiar with testimony by contemporaries of *to dia mesou teichos.* For detailed discussion of these obsolete hypotheses, see Conwell 1992, 514–21.

185 Plut. *Per.* 13.7.

186 This report has been accepted by Judeich 1931, 76 n. 1; Gomme 1945, 313 *ad* Thuc. I.107.1 with n. 1; Schwarze 1971, 87–88; Meiggs 1972, 188 n. 1; cf. Ehrenberg 1954, 85 n. 1, finding that Perikles was "speaking to the people."

legally attended such a session until 452 or 451,[187] so he would not have heard Perikles discuss building the phase Ia structures, which were completed in 458/7.[188] The structure, then, must have been a third Long Wall. Combining the testimony of Harpokration and Plutarch, we know that the Middle Wall was built later than and between the original two structures,[189] a separate phase of construction assigned in the present study to phase Ib.

[187] According to Hansen 1987, 7, adult male Athenian citizens became eligible to attend the Assembly upon reaching the age of eighteen. Since Sokrates was seventy years old when he died in 399 (Pl. *Ap.* 17d), he was born in 470 or 469; therefore, he did not have the right to attend Assembly meetings until 452 or 451.

[188] Some scholars associate the Middle Wall with the phase Ia Long Walls and, therefore, question the integrity of Plutarch's report. Adherents of two obsolete theories about the fifth-century Long Walls, mentioned in a note immediately above, equate *to dia mesou teichos* with the original structures, whether two or three in number; see especially Gardner 1902, 57 with n. 1, 69; Bundgaard 1976, 156; also Carroll 1904b, 88; Caspari 1914, 243. Although they accept the statement by Plato (*Grg.* 455e) that Sokrates had heard Perikles lobby for the original Long Walls, they reject Plutarch's report that the setting had been a meeting of the Assembly. In a separate argument, Gomme 1945, 313 *ad* Thuc. I.107.1 with n. 1 identifies the Middle Wall as a single structure, the original Athens-Piraeus Long Wall. Gomme accepts the statement by Plutarch that Sokrates had heard Perikles speak in favor of the Long Walls during an Assembly meeting; however, rejecting the biographer's specific testimony that the subject had been the Middle Wall, he suggests that Perikles had simply supported the Long Walls generally and, one assumes, at a time when Sokrates was legally old enough to attend the Assembly. Both of these alternatives entail, first, understanding the phrase *to dia mesou teichos* based on Dio Chrysostomos' usage of *dia mesou* in connection with the Long Walls (*Or.* 6.4) rather than Harpokration's usage; that we ought to prefer Harpokration's testimony in this matter has already been argued. Second, these theories treat the evidence arbitrarily. Believing, after Plutarch, that Sokrates had heard Perikles discuss the Long Walls at an Assembly meeting, Gomme must assert that Plato anachronistically places Sokrates in that context during the early 450s. Gardner and Bundgaard, who reject Plutarch, assume that, as a young boy ca. 460, Sokrates interested himself in the nuts and bolts of Athenian policy-making and managed to learn about it directly and accurately. There are, however, no clear grounds for doubting either Plato, a contemporary of the Middle Wall, or Plutarch, who derived information about that structure not only from Plato, but also from Kratinos. Accepting the veracity of these sources, then, is at least as reasonable as accusing them of distorting the facts. For earlier discussion of Gomme's view, see Dodds 1959, 210 *ad* Pl. *Grg.* 455e6; also Ehrenberg 1973, 444 n. 62.

[189] Such is the predominant modern view, as expressed recently by Lewis 1992b, 138–39; Wycherley 1992, 208; Dillon and Garland 1994, 232; Edwards 1995, 171 *ad* Andoc. 1.45; Cartwright 1997, 66 *ad* Thuc. I.107, 100 *ad* Thuc. II.13; Krentz 1997, 63 with n. 11; Panagos 1997, 286; Podlecki 1998, 99; Steinhauer 1998, 16; Phoca and Valavanis 1999, 66; Harris 2000, 485; Munn 2000, 202.

### *Nomenclature: Phases II, III, and IV*

Following phases Ia/Ib, the Long Walls consisted only of the two structures joining Athens and Piraeus (fig. 4), for the Phaleric Wall had become obsolete during the Dekeleian War (413–404). The modified layout of the Long Walls led to certain changes in nomenclature, although some of the old designations survived. Thereafter, both the layout and the labels of the Long Walls remained static, so one may combine discussion of the nomenclature employed during the second, third, and fourth phases.[190]

Many of the designations for the first three Long Walls (Ia/Ib) remained current during subsequent phases. Naturally authors continued to employ the collective name "Long Walls,"[191] and Roman authors used the corresponding Latin term *longi muri*.[192] In addition, the old metaphorical labels, "Legs" and "Long Legs," survived;[193] and Romans on occasion referred to the post-fifth-century Long Walls as "Arms."[194] Among the labels for individual structures, "Northern Wall"[195] and "Southern Wall"[196] remained in use.[197]

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[190] References to the rebuilding of the destroyed Long Walls of phases Ia/Ib, i.e. the construction of the phase II structures, are covered in this section, even though they might designate the original walls.

[191] Xen. *Hell.* IV.8.9; *IG* II$^2$ 244 line 34; Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 146 (restored); *IG* II$^2$ 463 lines 2–3 (restored), 7 (restored), 37, 54 (restored), 70, 95 (restored); *IG* II$^2$ 774b–c line 9; Str. IX.1.15; *IG* II$^2$ 1035 line 48 (τὰ μακρὰ τίχη); Arr. *Anab.* I.9.3, *Epict. Diss.* III.24.73; Paus. I.25.5; Philostr. *Ep.* 70; scholia *ad* Aristid. 1.267, 351 L-B.

[192] Plin. *Nat.* 13.129.

[193] [Scyl.] *Perip.* 57; Anon. Periegete, *FGrHist* 369 F 1, col. II §4 line 23 (restored); *Anth. Pal.* [Theodorid.] VII no. 406; Str. IX.1.24; App. *Mith.* 30.121; Eust. *Il.* 2.356.

[194] Liv. XXXI.26.8; Prop. III.21.24.

[195] Pl. *R.* 4.439e; *IG* II$^2$ 463 col. 1 line 120 (restored); Anon. Periegete, *FGrHist* 369 F 1, col. II §4 line 22 (restored).

[196] *IG* II$^2$ 463 lines 117–18 (restored), col. II line 120 (restored), col. III line 121 (restored); *IG* II$^2$ 505 lines 34–35 (restored); Anon. Periegete *FGrHist* 369 F 1, col. II §4 line 23.

[197] It is possible that the references by the anonymous third-century traveler cited in the previous two notes have to do with the Long Walls of phases Ia/Ib rather than the fourth-phase structures standing when he wrote. Supposing the author, col. II §5 line 25 (restored), does refer to the Phaleric Wall, then that structure's fifth-century context may suggest that his statements about the Northern and Southern Walls likewise have to do with the original Long Walls. However, in reference to the Northern and Southern Walls, the traveler employs the present tense, which suggests to Wilcken 1910, 220–21 that the author was thinking of structures belonging to his own time.

Some names had become obsolete by the time the Athenians built the phase II Long Walls. The Athens-Phaleron structure had gone out of use, so the label "Phaleric Wall" dropped out. As well, since the second Athens-Piraeus structure (phase Ib) was no longer positioned between two others, it lost its status as the "Middle Wall."

### *Nomenclature: Summary*

The original two Long Walls were know by a limited range of names. The great length of the two structures suggested the obvious collective label "Long Walls" and, perhaps, the more colorful designation "Legs." Individually, each one was known as a "Long Wall," a label which could be clarified with a prepositional phrase so as to show whether the wall joined Athens with Phaleron or Piraeus. The Athenians probably also identified the Athens-Phaleron structure as the "Phaleric Wall," so the wall joining Athens with Piraeus was conceivably known as the "Piraic Wall."

The construction of the phase Ib wall joining Athens with Piraeus brought about significant changes in the nomenclature of the Long Walls. The collective label "Long Walls" remained in use after the construction of the new wall, but it did not invariably designate the same structures. In the surviving sources, this designation tends to refer to the Athens-Piraeus walls, although it probably also could include the structure running from Athens to Phaleron. The singular form, "Long Wall," could also be used of more than one structure, but it applied specifically to the area between the walls rather than the structures themselves. Different collective names, the metaphorical "Legs" and "Long Legs," had become current by 404 at the latest. Many labels applied to individual Long Walls while the structures of phases Ia/Ib were in service, beginning with the generic "Long Wall." More informative names included the "Phaleric Wall" for the structure joining Athens with Phaleron, "Outer Wall" and "Northern Wall" for the phase Ia Athens-Piraeus structure, and "Middle Wall" along with "Southern Wall" for the phase Ib Long Wall between Athens and Piraeus.

By the time they began building the phase II structures in 395/4, the Athenians had abandoned the Phaleric Long Wall, which led to certain adjustments in the nomenclature of the two surviving structures. The old collective designations, "Long Walls," "Legs," "Long Legs," and "Arms," were retained. Certain labels for particular structures, such as

"Northern Wall" and "Southern Wall," also survived, but others, including "Phaleric Wall" and "Middle Wall," had become obsolete. Since the layout of the Long Walls remained the same during subsequent phases of construction (III–IV), their nomenclature did not change after the construction of the phase II structures early in the fourth century.

CHAPTER TWO

# PHASE IA

One might suppose that the Athenians had little to fear in the mid-fifth century BC. They had recently played a vital role in the astonishing defeat of the Persians, secured Athens and Piraeus behind fortification walls, and become the unchallenged leaders of the Delian League. Nevertheless, located 6 to 7 km inland from the harbors on which its military might depended, Athens was fundamentally vulnerable. However strong the existing urban defenses, an enemy could cripple the Athenians by occupying the coastal plain between the *asty* and the sea. Seeking to do away with this danger, at the end of the 460s the Athenians began building the phase Ia Long Walls. Completed in about four years, these structures physically connected the *asty* with the port cities of Phaleron and Piraeus (fig. 2). In subsequent years, the Athenians controlled sufficient sea power to justify incorporating the structures in their plans for defending Athens. The walls crossing the coastal plain would play no direct role in military affairs at midcentury, however, so they stood untested right down until the modification of the system in the later 440s.

## *462/1–458/7*

Dating the beginning of work on the Long Walls (Ia) depends on reports in Thucydides, Aischines, and Plutarch. During his narration of the early years of the First Peloponnesian War, Thucydides describes battles at Halieis, off Kekryphaleia and Aigina, and at Megara,[1] all of which occurred in 459. He then states that:

> About this period [κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους τούτους] the Athenians began to build their long walls to the sea, one to Phalerum, the other to the Peiraeus.[2] (Loeb: C. F. Smith)

[1] Thuc. I.105.1–106.2.
[2] Thuc. I.107.1.

From this point, Thucydides goes on to discuss events which resulted in the battle of Tanagra (458), including the Phokian expedition against the Dorians, Spartan assistance for the Phokians, and the Spartans' subsequent delay in Boiotia.[3]

Assigning an absolute date to the reference in Thucydides seems to follow from two essential considerations. The first is the modern belief that in his account of the Pentekontaetia Thucydides describes events in the correct relative chronological order, i.e. a particular development may have occurred contemporary to or after—but not before—an event or events just narrated.[4] If in the above passage Thucydides has maintained this principle, then the Athenians did not begin the Long Walls (Ia) before any of the events described immediately before, ending with the Athenian defeat of the Corinthians in the Megarid in 459. They may, however, have begun the construction project at about the same time as some of those events or else after the last of them. Having established the general relative chronological position of the work, one might examine the phrase κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους τούτους, "about this period," in order to establish a specific absolute date. This formulation is one of a variety of phrases with which Thucydides relates events chronologically to what he has already described. If the words *kata tous chronous toutous* place the start of the project at the same time or after, let us say, the battles dating to 459, then the principle of correct relative order dictates that work did not start before that year. However, since it might have begun after everything described by Thucydides before I.107.1 but was underway as events progressed towards the battle of Tanagra,[5] the project could have started as late as 458. Based on Thucydides, then, the Athenians seem to have begun building the Long Walls (Ia) in 459 or early 458.

In a speech delivered in 343, Aischines also refers to the construction of the phase Ia Long Walls. During a summary of fifth-century history, the orator states the following:

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[3] Thuc. I.107.2–4. Whether or not Tanagra took place in 458 or 457 remains a disputed matter. The present study follows Lewis et al. 1992 in dating the battle to 458; in addition to the chronological chart on p. 508 of that volume, see Lewis 1992a, 114–15; Lewis 1992d, 500–1 §5 with n. 3; note also Meritt et al. 1950, 171–73.

[4] Some scholars consider this principle fundamental to Thucydides' account of the Pentekontaetia; see Gomme 1945, 391–92; Meritt et al. 1950, passim, esp. 162. Others, however, doubt that it applies invariably; see Hammond 1955, 397; Unz 1986, 75 n. 33, 78 with n. 46; Badian 1993, 6, 78–80; Hornblower 1991, 173 *ad* Thuc. I.109.1–3; Lewis 1992d, 500 §4; Hornblower 2002, 105; cf. even Gomme 1945, 392 n. 1.

[5] Thuc. I.107.2–4.

> But when certain men had stirred up trouble and finally caused us to become involved in war with the Lacedaemonians, then, after we had suffered and inflicted many losses, Miltiades, the son of Cimon, who was proxenus of the Lacedaemonians, negotiated with them, and we made a truce for fifty years, and kept it thirteen years. During this period we fortified the Peiraeus and built the Northern Wall.[6] (Loeb: C. D. Adams)

As described in chapter 1, the name "Northern Wall" labels the first of the two Athens-Piraeus Long Walls. The truce to which Aischines refers is typically recognized as the Five Years' Truce, which was concluded in 451.[7] Thus Aischines dates the completion of one of the original Long Walls some years later than does Thucydides.

Writing long after Thucydides and Aischines, Plutarch states that the Athenian general and statesman Kimon contributed to the Long Walls (Ia). After describing Kimon's victory over the Persians in the battle of the Eurymedon River and discussing the peace of Kallias, Plutarch reports that:

> By the sale of the captured spoils [from the Eurymedon] the people was enabled to meet various financial demands, and especially it constructed the southern wall of the Acropolis with the generous resources obtained from that expedition. And it is said [λέγεται δὲ καί] that, though the building of the long walls, called "legs," was completed afterwards, yet their first foundations, where the work was obstructed by swamps and marshes, were stayed up securely by Cimon, who dumped vast quantities of rubble and heavy stones into the swamps, meeting the expenses himself. He was the first to beautify the city with the so-called "liberal" and elegant resorts which were so excessively popular a little later, by planting the market-place with plane trees, and by converting the Academy from a waterless and arid spot into a well watered grove, which he provided with clear running-tracks and shady walks.[8] (Loeb: B. Perrin)

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6 Aeschin. 2.172–73; cf. [Andoc.] 3.5. As stated in chapter 1, the words "the Northern Wall" in this translation represent a modification of the passage as rendered by Adams.

7 See, for example, Adams 1919, 291 n. 4 *ad* Aeschin. 2.172; Carey 2000, 153 n. 231 *ad* Aeschin. 2.172; Harris 2000, 481. Ancient sources for the Five Years' Truce, collected by Bengtson 1975, 46 no. 143, include Thuc. I.112.1; Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 88; Plut. *Cim.* 18.1, *Per.* 10.4. For modern discussion of the pact, see Kagan 1969, 104–5; Meiggs 1972, 124–25.

8 Plut. *Cim.* 13.5–7. One might prefer an alternative translation of the words εἰς τόπους ἑλώδεις καὶ διαβρόχους τῶν ἔργων ἐμπεσόντων, since the verb ἐμπίπτειν, here translated "was obstructed by," conceivably has the sense of "to fall in/on" (Gomme 1945, 311 *ad* Thuc. I.107.1; Garlan 1974, 48). Were the verb to have that sense here, then the passage would suggest that the Long Walls (Ia), already under construction, had collapsed in the wet ground. However, after Liddell and Scott 1940, 545 s.v. ἐμπίπτω, 1a, if used in this way the verb would likely take an object in the dative case rather

According to Plutarch, Kimon's role in the construction of the Long Walls (Ia) was limited to a specific part of the project. His contribution came at a relatively early stage, as is emphasized by the nature of work he supported and by Plutarch's explicit contrast between the timing of Kimon's assistance and the period when the walls were completed. Since modern consensus holds that Kimon was ostracized in spring 461, Plutarch's evidence suggests that the work on the Long Walls (Ia) had begun earlier than Thucydides and Aischines seem to indicate.

The construction of the phase Ia Long Walls is frequently assigned to one or more years between 461 and 456.[9] The appearance of general agreement on the matter, however, masks enduring dispute about when exactly the Athenians began building the structures. Fundamentally, scholars agree in accepting what Thucydides says and rejecting the testimony of Aischines, which is often simply ignored.[10] There is no such agreement, however, about Plutarch's testimony, which many scholars have accepted, either wholly[11] or in part,[12] and others have rejected. The integrity of the report has been questioned on several counts, including the perception that Plutarch himself did not trust it,[13] concerns about its chronological plausibility,[14] and the supposed

than the preposition εἰς plus the accusative. Thus, one need not suppose that Kimon contributed to a project which had, before he became involved, already resulted in the construction of the foundations.

[9] See, recently, von Eickstedt 1991, 277 (ca. 460); Hornblower 1991, 113 *ad* Thuc. I.69.1 (ca. 457); Dillon and Garland 1994, 232 (before the battle of Tanagra to after the battle of Oionophyta); Höpfner and Schwandner 1994, 22 (after 461); Edwards 1995, 195 *ad* Andoc. 3.5 (458–456); Corso 1997, 379 (458); Panagos 1997, 338 (461–456); Müller 1999, 21 (456); Podlecki 1998, 99 (458–456); Roberts 1998, 19 (early 450s); Steinhauer 1998, 16 (460); Meier 1999, 315 (ca. 459); Phoca and Valavanis 1999 (459); Munn 2000, 202 (early 450s); Powell 2001, 65 (early 450s), 112 (458 or 457); Raaflaub 2001, 315 (458/7); Schubert 2003, 97 (460/59); Pomeroy et al. 2004, 144 (459); Hanson 2005, 26, 45 (461–456); Lalonde 2006, 115 (ca. 460).

[10] On Thucydides, cf., however, Maddalena 1952, 234.

[11] Curtius 1891, 112–13; de Romilly 1953, 70 n. 1; Carpenter 1970, 83; Travlos 1971, 158; Travlos et al. 1972, 7; Schilardi 1975, 118–19, 121; Steinbrecher 1985, 158 with n. 155; Corso 1986, 59–60; Blamire 1989, 152–53 *ad* Plut. *Cim.* 13.6; Corso 1997, 379; Schreiner 1997, 29; Meier 1999, 281; von Eickstedt 2000, 474; Harris 2000, 483; Martin 2000, 108, 152; Camp 2001, 67–68, 72.

[12] Gomme 1945, 311 *ad* Thuc. I.107.1; Boersma 1970, 58; Garlan 1974, 48; Delvoye 1975, 805; Garland 2001b, 23–24; cf. also Krentz 1997, 62 n. 9.

[13] Oncken 1865, 72; Wachsmuth 1874, 557 with n. 2; Keil 1902, 100 n. 2.

[14] Oncken 1865, 72; Wachsmuth, 1874, 557; Curtius 1868, Text, 33 with note; Keil 1902, 100 n. 2; Weller 1913, 72; Gomme 1945, 311 *ad* Thuc. I.107.1; Boersma 1970, 58; Stadter 1989, 171 *ad* Plut. *Per.* 13.7; Krentz 1997, 62 n. 9.

incompatibility of Kimon's politics with the policy symbolized by the Long Walls (Ia).[15]

Let us first consider Aischines' testimony. That report belongs to a narrative of fifth-century history which is well known for its confused treatment of facts established on the basis of other, more reliable sources. Examples of this point, already made above, are easy to find. Aischines reports that Miltiades, son of Kimon, concluded a truce with the Spartans which was to last for fifty years. According to more reliable sources, this pact—the Five Years' Truce—was arranged by Kimon, son of Miltiades, and it was to last for five years. Additionally, Aischines assigns the construction of Piraeus' circuit wall to the period after that truce, whereas that project began in 493/2 and continued after the Persian Wars.[16] Given the presence of these and other glaring errors, one may simply disregard Aischines' statement.

In contrast, Plutarch's account deserves fuller consideration. The biographer's own judgement about the information offers a logical starting point. Declining to name his source,[17] Plutarch instead introduces the report with the anonymous phrase λέγεται δὲ καί, "it is said." This phrase is one of many variations on a stock formula frequently used by Plutarch.[18] The anonymous formulation centers on a verb of speaking in the third person singular or plural, active or passive voice, and, normally, the present tense. Additional components of these citations can include the pronoun οἱ, the particle δέ, adverbs such as ὡς, οὕτω, and πως, as well as the adjectives ἔνιοι and πλεῖστος. Even though such anonymous phrases do not specifically identify the information's origin, they need not suggest that Plutarch is ignorant of the

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[15] Oncken 1865, 72; Keil 1902, 100; Miltner 1937, 755; Frisch 1942, 67; Papachatzes 1974, 140 n. 3 *ad* Paus. I.2.2; cf. also Grote 1849, 438; Judeich 1931, 75–76; Maddalena 1952, 234; Boersma 1970, 58; Delvoye 1975, 805; Fornara and Samons 1991, 131; Garland 2001b, 23–24.

[16] For the beginning of work in 493/2, see Thuc. I.93.3; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* VI.34.1; Paus. I.1.2; Eus. *Chron.* (*vers. Arm.*) vol. II, p. 100 Schoene. For the fortification project at Piraeus during the early 470s, see Thuc. I.93.3–6. Although Diodoros (XI.41.2, 43.1–2) assigns the post-Persian Wars project to 477/6, there is no certain evidence for an exact date. Others who decline to assign this work at Piraeus to a specific year or years include Judeich 1931, 72; Bengtson 1977, 191; Rhodes 1988, 197 *ad* Thuc. II.13.7; Davies 1992, 298. For further discussion, see Garland 2001b, 21.

[17] Busolt 1897, 310 n. 1 suggests Theopompos.

[18] Other examples include λέγεται, λέγεται δέ, οὕτω πως λέγεται, ὡς λέγεται, λέγουσι(ν), λέγουσι δέ, ἔνιοι λέγουσι(ν), οἱ λέγουσι(ν), οἱ πλεῖστοι λέγουσι(ν), οἱ λέγοντες, φασί(ν), ἔνιοι φασί(ν), οἱ φασί(ν), ὡς φασί(ν). Cf. also Cook 2001, 331 with n. 9.

exact source or that he is relying on oral tradition. In the *Dion*, for example, Plutarch introduces information with the phrase *legetai de kai*, then identifies Theopompos as his source.[19] Nevertheless, to the modern ear such a citation may seem to dismiss the information as dubious.[20]

Generally, the use of anonymous citations by ancient authors is complicated and by no means necessarily heralds their doubts about the evidence. To be sure, Arrian, a younger contemporary of Plutarch, tends to employ such formulations to convey caution.[21] Diogenes Laertios, however, employs anonymous references like *legetai* to introduce all types of historical information, thus forcing one to guess at the quality of the source but not automatically conveying his disapproval.[22] Moreover, for authors in Roman imperial times, such as Arrian and Dionysios of Halikarnassos, *legetai* can serve simply as a conventional introductory formula.[23] Similarly, H. D. Westlake finds that earlier on, in the works of Herodotos and Thucydides, "legetai phrases" serve various purposes and thus "should not be interpreted, as modern scholars tend to assume, as though in every instance their sole function was to convey uncertainty."[24] Although Plutarch belonged to a different era than these Classical-period writers, he was undoubtedly familiar with their methods of source documentation.

Turning to Plutarch's usage specifically, one finds that his anonymous citations often transmit material which he accepts.[25] During a discussion of conflicting reports about Themistokles' educational background, for instance, Plutarch employs nothing more than the participle of the verb *legein* in order to introduce trusted information concerning the role of Mnesiphilos.[26] In the *Aemilius Paulus*, Plutarch explicitly approves of the account, introduced with the phrase *legetai de kai*, that word of an Archaic-period battle in Italy had reached the Peloponnesos on the day

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[19] Plut. *Dion*, 24.5.

[20] See also Cook 2001, 332–33, cf. 329 n. 1.

[21] Arr. *Anab.* praef. 3; see Bosworth 1980, 20; Bosworth 1988a, 39–40, 62–63.

[22] See Gomme et al. 1981, 438.

[23] Bosworth 1980, 20, 45 *ad* Arr. I.1.1; Bosworth 1988a, 63 n. 13.

[24] Westlake 1977, 346, 361–62; cf. also the note by W. J. Verdenius on p. 423 of the same volume.

[25] See also Cook 2001, passim, holding that Plutarch uses anonymous citations not to convey skepticism but, rather, to signal the introduction of significant material drawn from valid sources. For Cook, then, Plutarch uses phrases like *legetai de kai* to make his themes more—not less—convincing, contrary to the common modern assumption.

[26] Plut. *Them.* 2.6.

it took place.[27] Finally, on a variety of occasions, Plutarch implicitly accepts information reported with an anonymous phrase, since that material becomes the basis for further discussion. In his biography of Lysandros, for example, the phrase *legetai de kai* introduces the text of an oracle received by the Thebans during the Peloponnesian War.[28] Plutarch completes the account by supplying his own commentary to clarify the oracle's meaning. Thus, while phrases like *legetai de kai* could convey Plutarch's skepticism,[29] one should not recognize every such locution as a harbinger of doubt. On those occasions when he accepted information introduced anonymously, Plutarch may not have known the name of his source or else wished to avoid excessive source references.[30] That Plutarch uses an anonymous formulation with regard to Kimon's contribution to the Long Walls (Ia), then, need not suggest that he doubts the information.

Scholars have also objected on chronological grounds to the possibility that Kimon was associated with the Long Walls (Ia). Both arguments from this perspective hold that the report contradicts Thucydides' statement about the beginning of the work. The first chronological objection has to do with Kimon's ostracism. Having been sent into exile in spring 461, Kimon did not to return to Athens until he was recalled—after the battle of Tanagra (458), at the earliest.[31] Since the Long Walls (Ia) were nearly completed by that time,[32] then Kimon was not in Athens when, according to Thucydides, the Athenians began building the Long Walls (Ia). This seems to represent a serious challenge to Plutarch's testimony, but a closer reading of Thucydides suggests that it allows the possbility that the Athenians began building the Long Walls (Ia) earlier than is often recognized.

As already noted, Thucydides states at I.107.1 that work on the Long Walls (Ia) began at about the time of certain events already described in his narrative. Unfortunately, there is no common agreement as to the meaning of the chronological phrase, *kata tous chronous toutous*, employed in

[27] Plut. *Aem.* 25.1.

[28] Plut. *Lys.* 29.10; see also Plut. *Per.* 6.2, 30.1, *Luc.* 18.8, *Sert.* 22.3, *Dem.* 15.1.

[29] Plut. *Thes.* 27.6, *Publ.* 9.9, 11, 16.7.

[30] For the suggestion that Plutarch sought to avoid clutter, see Lamberton 2001, 13.

[31] On the recall of Kimon, see Meiggs 1972, 111, 422–23; Unz 1986, 76–82; Fornara and Samons 1991, 138–39; Lewis 1992a, 115; Rhodes 1992b, 75; Badian 1993, 17–19, 191–92 n. 25; Podlecki 1998, 43–45.

[32] Thuc. I.108.3.

that passage. Some scholars suppose that it means that the project began at about the same time as events previously described by Thucydides, but they identify those events differently.[33] In contrast, based on this passage it is often supposed that the Athenians began building the Long Walls (Ia) after all the events narrated immediately before I.107.1.[34] Finally, certain scholars hold that the phrase is simply too vague for precise interpretation.[35] This lasting difference of interpretation is a particular manifestation of a broader problem: although Thucydides consistently provides clues as to the chronological relationship between events, there is no guarantee of precision.[36]

In the present case, achieving an objective interpretation of the phrase *kata tous chronous toutous* is difficult. One might hope to find guidance from the manner in which Thucydides uses the phrase in other contexts. Unfortunately, while similar chronological phrases do occur in his narrative,[37] this one is unique.[38] Since we cannot interpret the phrase based on parallel usage, our single recourse is the Greek itself. Only the demonstrative adjective *toutous*, a form of *houtos*, limits the phrase in any way. Since that word typically refers to something which precedes it,[39] at I.107.1 it aligns the beginning of work on the Long Walls (Ia) with some earlier event or events. Nevertheless, the phrase *kata tous chronous toutous* cannot point an unlimited distance backwards because *houtos* typically

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[33] Alternatives include (1) the Athenians' loss at Halieis, naval victories off Kekryphaleia and Aigina, siege of Aigina, and defeat of the Corinthians in the Megarid (Thuc. I.105.1–106.2): Milchhöfer 1887, 1195; Deane 1972, 39; Ehrenberg 1973, 216; cf. Miltner 1937, 755; and (2) the fighting between the Athenians and the Corinthians in the Megarid (Thuc. I.105.3–106.2): Clinton 1841, 50; Dyer 1873, 123–24; Busolt 1897, 309; Judeich 1931, 76 n. 1; Gomme 1945, 311 *ad* Thuc. I.107.1.

[34] Krüger 1836, 166–67; Bury et al. 1927, chronological table following p. 485; Meritt et al. 1950, 177; Bickerman 1980, 171; Lamprinoudakes 1986, 52–53; McGregor 1987, 52; Lewis 1992a, 113; Garland 2001b, 23; cf. Will 1972, 157–58.

[35] Keil 1902, 100 n. 2; de Romilly 1953, 70 n. 1; Krentz 1997, 62 n. 9; cf. Bengtson 1977, 191, 202.

[36] Meritt et al. 1950, 173. On the ambiguity of some of Thucydides' chronological markers, including *kata tous chronous toutous*, see also Badian 1993, 188–89 n. 10. A notorious example is the phrase *chronoi de hysteron* at Thuc. I.100.2, which has fostered lasting debate as to the chronological relationship between the battle of the Eurymedon River and the revolt of Thasos; cf. Badian 1993, 5–10.

[37] See, for example, Thuc. I.25.4 (κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον), I.117.3 (κατὰ χρόνους), II.10.2 (κατὰ τὸν χρόνον). Gomme 1945, 361 and Meritt et al. 1950, 173 list typical chronological connectives used by Thucydides.

[38] In fact, the phrase occurs three other times in Greek literature: Str. XIII.2.3; Gal. *In Hipp. Epid. VI*, 811; Epiphanios, *Panarion*, XXIX.5.4.

[39] Smyth 1956, 307 §1245.

indicates nearness.[40] Based on the Greek, then, Thucydides thought the Long Walls (Ia) were begun at the same time as one or more recent events.

This reading of the phrase is necessarily imprecise. Nevertheless, it shows that the building project did not begin *after* all the events described in the preceding narrative. Accordingly, the Athenians started building the Long Walls (Ia) at least as early as the last event narrated before I.107.1, so the project was underway no later than the Athenian-Corinthian engagement in the Megarid during the year 459. Conceivably the phrase *kata tous chronous toutous* reaches further back in time than this—beyond the various land and sea battles during 459 to earlier events mentioned by Thucydides, including the Athenians' alliance with Argos after the Mt. Ithome debacle as well as their alliance with Megara and construction of Long Walls joining Megara with Nisaia, all dated to 462.[41] Since Thucydides' Greek is chronologically flexible, it allows the participation of Kimon in work on the Long Walls (Ia) before his exile in 461.

Arnold Gomme has lodged the second chronological objection to Kimon's participation in work on the Long Walls (Ia).[42] For Gomme, Plutarch's report suggests that, first, the project had been underway even before Kimon became involved, and, second, Kimon's contribution came from the spoils of the battle of the Eurymedon River.[43] Thus, Plutarch's account would date the beginning of the Long Walls (Ia) before the Eurymedon, which had occurred by the year 466.[44] On that basis, Gomme concludes that the work on the structures cannot have begun so much earlier than Thucydides seems to suggest. No doubt this last point is correct, but one need not, accordingly,

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[40] Smyth 1956, 307 §1240.

[41] Thuc. I.102.4 (Argive alliance), 103.4 (Megarian alliance and construction of Long Walls). In this part of his text, Thucydides also describes the beginning of the Egyptian expedition (I.104.1–2), dating to 460 or 459 (Lewis 1992d, 500–1 §5), and the end of the Helots' revolt at Mt. Ithome (I.103.1–3), which belongs to the mid-450s (Lewis 1992a, 110; Lewis 1992d, 500 §4).

[42] Gomme 1945, 311 *ad* Thuc. I.107.1.

[43] For the association between Kimon's contribution to the Long Walls and the battle of the Eurymedon River, see also Meyer 1939, 509; de Romilly 1953, 70 n. 1; Carpenter 1970, 83, 166; Stadter 1989, 171; Meier 1999, 281; Harris 2000, 483; Camp 2001, 67; Garland 2001b, 23, 171.

[44] Although the chronology of this period is problematic, the fighting at the Eurymedon will have taken place at some point between 469 and 466; see Meiggs 1972, 75–82.

reject the possibility that Kimon participated in the construction of the Long Walls (Ia).

Plutarch's reference to the Long Walls (Ia) belongs to a digression from a broader theme, Kimon's humbling of the Persian king.[45] After noting that the spoils of the Eurymedon victories—essentially a benefaction by Kimon—were used to build the Akropolis' southern wall,[46] Plutarch lists the general's other contributions to the city's physical improvement. These included shoring up the Long Walls (Ia), landscaping the Agora, and various projects in the Academy.[47] The account explicitly contrasts the sources of the funds allocated for the Akropolis, on the one hand, and the Long Walls (Ia), on the other. The Eurymedon spoils won by Kimon had supported the former, whereas Kimon contributed to the latter from his *own* means[48]—as is emphasized by the redundant Greek, *ekeinou chremata porizontos kai didontos*. If Kimon's contribution to the Long Walls (Ia) had nothing to do with the battle of the Eurymedon, then Plutarch's report need not place the beginning of the Long Walls (Ia) before those battles. Therefore, it is not necessary to follow Gomme in rejecting Plutarch's testimony because it stretches Thucydides' chronological formulation, *kata tous chronous toutous*, beyond what is reasonable.

Finally, some scholars reject the association of Kimon with the Long Walls (Ia) on the basis that his political outlook would have excluded it. Such an argument is entirely hypothetical because no ancient evidence specifically suggests that Kimon opposed the Long Walls (Ia). Most scholars who argue against Plutarch's testimony on ideological grounds focus on Kimon's view of the Athenian democracy. It is well known that some conservatives at Athens adamantly opposed the Long Walls (Ia). First they tried to prevent the completion of the structures;[49] then, at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War (404), like-minded elements supported their destruction.[50] This opposition to the Long Walls (Ia) doubtless derived from their fundamental connection with Athens' naval strategy. The city's reliance on its navy enhanced

[45] Plut. *Cim.* 12–14.1. On the thematic unity of the campaigns against the Persians in this portion of the Plutarch's biography of Kimon, see Kolbe 1937, 249.

[46] Plut. *Cim.* 13.5, cf. *Comp. Cim. et Luc.* 1.5.

[47] Plut. *Cim.* 13.5–7.

[48] See also Shear 1966, 60, 62.

[49] Thuc. I.107.4.

[50] Lys. 12.63, 13.5–14; Isoc. 7.64.

the political influence of the *demos*[51] because, down to the later fifth century, at least, the poor or landless citizens (*thetes*) provided much of the manpower to row the ships.[52] A naval strategy therefore threatened Athenian opponents of democracy.[53] Connecting Athens to the sea as they did, the Long Walls (Ia) were an essential element of the maritime focus which boosted the *demos*, so they naturally became a target of the anti-democratic opposition at Athens. That certain extremists opposed the Long Walls (Ia) does not, however, rule out Kimon's association with the structures.

Certainly Kimon was conservative and aristocratic, as modern assessments typically point out,[54] but this need not mean that he was an enemy of his city's democratic constitution. In the first place, wealthy aristocrats led the Athenian democracy.[55] As one of them, Kimon did not advocate the end of the current political order but, rather, was fully engaged in it.[56] His repeated election as general, probably without a break from the early 470s down to 461,[57] demonstrates both that Kimon was devoted to the defense of his country and that he worked within Athens' democratic system. Although he opposed the radical democratic reforms of 462,[58] even after suffering ostracism for that stance Kimon served Athens as leader of the Cyprus expedition ca. 450.[59] Second, according to various ancient authors, Kimon, generous as he was while pursuing political primacy, became popular among the *demos*.[60] That Kimon both realized

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[51] Ar. *Ach.* 161–163; [Xen.] *Ath.* 1.2; Isoc. 12.116; Pl. *Leg.* 707a–b; Arist. *Pol.* 1304a; [Arist.] *Ath.* 27.1; Plut. *Them.* 19.5. Modern scholars typically accept this ancient proposition; see, for example, Martin 2000, 107, 108–9; Munn 2000, 64; Ober 2000, 125–26; Hanson 2001, 10; Pomeroy et al. 2004, 143; Hanson 2005, 8, 26, 266–67.

[52] On the composition of the crews which rowed Athens' ships, see Rosivach 1985, 53–54 with n. 63, 55 with n. 72; Gabrielsen 1994, 107–9; Burckhardt 1995, 110, 120–26; Graham 1998, 108–10; Jordan 2000, 99–100, cf. 89–95; Morrison et al. 2000, 115, 117–18; van Wees 2000, 92; Hanson 2005, 264.

[53] Burke 2005, 14–17 discusses the opposition to Athens' democracy during the mid-fifth century.

[54] Hignett 1958, 190–91; Kagan 1969, 59, 68 n. 40; Bury and Meiggs 1975, 213; McGregor 1987, 96; Stein-Hölkeskamp 1999, 462; Ober 2000, 123. See also the sources listed by Steinbrecher 1985, 155 n. 146.

[55] Kagan 1987, 106; Lewis 1992c, 384.

[56] See also Gomme 1945, 314 *ad* Thuc. I.107.4; Ehrenberg 1954, 139; Hignett 1958, 191; Kagan 1969, 59, 87–88; Bengtson 1977, 194; Stockton 1990, 141.

[57] Hignett 1958, 191; Stein-Hölkeskamp 1999, 461; Kagan 2003, 12.

[58] Plut. *Cim.* 10.8, 15.3. For the character of the reforms, see, recently, Burke 2005, 8–9.

[59] Thuc. I.112.1–4; Diod. XII.3.1–4.6; Plut. *Cim.* 18.1–19.1.

[60] [Arist.] *Ath.* 27.3; Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 89; Nep. *Cim.* 2.1; Plut. *Cim.* 5.4–5, *Comp. Cim. et Luc.* 1.5; schol. *ad* Aristid. 3.13 L-B. Rhodes 1993, 338–39 *ad* [Arist.] *Ath.* 27.3 reviews and accepts the ancient evidence for Kimon's generosity.

the necessity of appealing to the people in order to fulfill his ambitions and was able to acquire and maintain the broad popularity required for lasting electoral success is borne out by his election as general year after year. If one tempers the evidence for his privileged background and relatively conservative outlook with the tradition which records his broad appeal, Kimon emerges as a political moderate who understood that fulfilling his ambitions in the public arena required appealing to the *demos*.[61] Third, there is no doubt that Kimon's leadership at sea, both in extending Athenian power in the Aegean and in continuing the war against Persia,[62] effectively enhanced the political power of the *demos*. Explaining this fact as a development with which Kimon was essentially comfortable is preferable to supposing that over many years his actions contradicted his own world view.[63] Maritime strength, after all, enabled the maintenance of the Athenian Empire,[64] which few citizens opposed because it benefited all levels of society.[65] Having devoted his career to succeeding within the Athenian democratic system and building Athens' empire by sea, Kimon would have recognized the Long Walls (Ia) as part of a strategy which suited his own goals.

Another ideology-based perspective, this one focused on Kimon's pro-Spartan politics, has also been found to rule out his participation in building the Long Walls (Ia). The view was discussed at greatest length long ago by Wilhelm Oncken.[66] Perceiving that the construction of the Long Walls (Ia) was a specifically anti-Spartan act, he argued that Kimon would not have participated in the project. While most scholars would agree that the statesman maintained pro-Spartan views,[67] there was a time when one might expect him to have spurned that inclination.

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[61] See Kagan 1969, 66–67, 133, 135–36; de Ste. Croix 1972, 184 n. 58; Stein-Hölkeskamp 1999, 462; Strauss 2000, 320; cf. Connor 1963, 114.

[62] See Bury and Meiggs 1975, 208–10; Podlecki 1998, 37–38; Stein-Hölkeskamp 1999, 461; Hornblower 2002, 22–23.

[63] Cf. Will 1972, 135, who finds that Kimon "a aussi compris que la flotte, outil de son action, est liée à l''isonomie' clisthénienne: sans doute cette flotte, et l'hégémonie quelle a permis d'acquérir justifient-elles ce régime aux yeux de Cimon." On the connections between democracy, naval power, and the Empire, see Starr 1989, 38–40; Raaflaub 1999, 142–46.

[64] Raaflaub 1999, 142–43.

[65] Finley 1973, 157; Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, 127; Andrewes 1978, 101–2; de Ste. Croix 1981, 290 with n. 27; Rhodes 1985, 39–42; Strauss 1986, 5, 51–53; Hornblower 1991, 170–71 *ad* Thuc. I.107.4; Hanson 1996, 300–2; Raaflaub 1999, 141.

[66] Oncken 1865, 72–73.

[67] See, however, Steinbrecher 1985, 155–59.

During the later 460s, two factors would have combined to diminish Kimon's once cooperative approach to relations with Sparta. To begin with, during the second half of 462 he had been humiliated by the Spartans in the Ithome affair.[68] Kimon had persuaded the Athenians to assist in the Spartan effort to dislodge the rebellious Helots holding out on Ithome. Subsequently, he had personally led an Athenian force down to Messenia, but the Athenians were summarily dismissed. It seems likely that Kimon, having risked considerable political capital on Sparta's behalf, would now have reconsidered his pro-Spartan stance. Next, with his popularity on the wane by the later 460s,[69] due not least but not only to Ithome, Kimon was on the ropes politically. Since Thucydides refers to the beginning of the Long Walls (Ia) with a chronological formulation which, imprecise though it is, evokes the recent past, and because Kimon was exiled in 461, his contribution to the project should date to precisely this period. Seeking to stave off political extinction, Kimon can certainly have involved himself with a fortification project designed to safeguard the Athenians in the event of conflict with Sparta.

While many scholars simply reject Plutarch's testimony that Kimon contributed to building the Long Walls (Ia), others accept part of the tradition. The more popular among these compromises accepts Kimon's association with the Long Walls (Ia) but, in order to reconcile the passage in Plutarch with Thucydides' statement, holds that Plutarch erred in stating that Kimon contributed to an early stage of work on the phase Ia structures. According to Gomme, upon returning from exile Kimon might have supported repairs to the Long Walls (Ia), which had partially collapsed during his absence.[70] For Yvon Garlan and others, Kimon's views rule out his participation in the initial stages of work on the Long Walls (Ia), but, in the different political context following his return, he could have contributed to their completion—possibly in order to regain favor at Athens.[71]

These suggestions, however, are unconvincing. First, they depend on the controversial issue of Kimon's recall, which may never have happened at all.[72] Next, it is of course possible that Plutarch was "misled,"

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[68] Thuc. I.102.1–3; Ar. *Lys.* 1143–1144; Plut. *Cim.* 16.9–10, 17.3.

[69] Rhodes 1992b, 68–69; Buckley 1996, 221, 241.

[70] Gomme 1945, 311 *ad* Thuc. I.107.1.

[71] Boersma 1970, 58; Delvoye 1975, 805; Garlan 1974, 48; Garland 2001b, 23–24; cf. Lamprinoudakes 1986, 53.

[72] Among those who do not believe in the recall are Bengtson 1983, 104; Rhodes 1985, 14; Scheidel and Siewert 1988, 170 with n. 41; Rhodes 1992b, 75; Rhodes 1993,

as Gomme thinks, but that assertion is arbitrary.[73] In fact the report, internally consistent and clear, shows no signs of confusion in its explicit contrast between the occasion of Kimon's contribution to an *early* stage of the project and the context of the walls' completion well afterwards. Finally, the notion that Kimon's politics would have prevented his contribution to the Long Walls (Ia) has already been rejected.

Another compromise view also holds that Plutarch erred in associating Kimon with the original structures. In order to maintain the statesman's association with the Long Walls despite the apparent chronological conflict with Thucydides' testimony, Peter Krentz supposes that he may have been involved with the early stages of work on the third Long Wall (Ib).[74] As will become clear in chapter 3, however, this structure dates to the later 440s, years after Kimon's death ca. 450.

Having established that objections to the integrity of Plutarch's statement are not conclusive, let us now consider why it may be legitimate. In general, Plutarch possessed both the opportunity and the inclination to inform himself accurately about the Long Walls. As a citizen of Athens due to his adoption by the tribe Leontis,[75] not only had he lived and studied there,[76] but also he took an active interest in the city's land-scape, topography, and monuments.[77] Thus Plutarch must have both observed the remains of the Long Walls (IV), still visible in his time,[78] and inquired into their history. Additionally, Plutarch had read widely in original sources, as pointed out in chapter 1. Thus, having become informed about the structures through autopsy, Plutarch will also have learned about them from earlier authorities. Since he used Thucydides' work directly,[79] naturally Plutarch was familiar with the historian's statements about the Long Walls. However, his knowledge was

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339 *ad* [Arist.] *Ath.* 27.3; cf. also Hornblower 1991, 168 *ad* Thuc. I.107.2–108.4, 179 *ad* Thuc. I.112.1.

[73] Cf. Oncken 1865, 73, who thinks that Plutarch's testimony recalls an (unattested) project sponsored by Kimon which was intended to drain the swampy areas between Athens and its harbors. According to Oncken, the earthworks supposedly built at that time were subsequently found to be useful as solid ground on which to build the Long Walls, leading to the distorted tradition recorded by Plutarch.

[74] Krenz 1997, 62 n. 9.

[75] Plut. *Mor.* 628a.

[76] Podlecki 1988, 232; Lamberton 2001, 10.

[77] Theander 1950/51, 16–19; Podlecki 1975, 135; Podlecki 1988, 234, 236–37.

[78] Paus. I.2.2. See chapter 7.

[79] Ziegler 1951, 923; Wardman 1974, 155–57; de Romilly 1988, 22; Stadter 1989, lx–lxi; Pelling 2000, 45; Pelling 2002, 117–41; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 345d.

not limited to that particular source. Plutarch's reference to the walls as *skele*, "legs," must have come from elsewhere, because Thucydides does not employ the term,[80] and he provides detailed information about the third Long Wall (phase Ib),[81] a structure which Thucydides does not identify clearly. The Long Walls appeared frequently in ancient literature,[82] and Plutarch could have learned about Kimon's participation in building the phase Ia structures from a source close to the date of the actual event. He cites Hellanikos and a variety of Atthidographers multiple times, and Plutarch's broad familiarity with original sources means that he might well have consulted their work directly.[83]

The testimony's context also suggests that Plutarch found the report plausible. In a lengthy passage dedicated to Kimon's humbling of the Persian king,[84] he describes the Athenians' stunning victory at the mouth of the Eurymedon River, the direct results of that accomplishment, and the subsequent expulsion of the Persians from the Chersonesos. As already discussed, in the midst of developing this theme, Plutarch digresses, noting *inter alia* Kimon's possible role in the construction of the Long Walls (Ia). That Plutarch might interrupt the progress of his *topos* to present interesting or otherwise useful material is no surprise,[85] but there are no grounds for believing that he would do so in order to include dubious information.

Assuming that the Athenians started building the Long Walls (Ia) earlier than a superficial reading of Thucydides might suggest, then the project did not constitute a reaction to the outbreak of the First Peloponnesian War, as is often suggested.[86] When before the ostracism of Kimon in spring 461 might they have decided the structures were necessary?

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[80] Cf. Pelling 2002, 117–18 for Plutarch's interest in supplementing Thucydides' accounts with material which the historian had not included.

[81] Plut. *Per.* 13.7–8, *Mor.* 351a.

[82] Conwell 1992, 487–91 lists the relevant ancient testimonia.

[83] For Plutarch's citations of Hellanikos and the Atthidographers, including Androtion, Demon, Kleidemos, Phanodemos, and Philochoros, all of whom he refers to more than once by name, see the entries in Helmbold and O'Neil 1959.

[84] Plut. *Cim.* 12–14.1. See Kolbe 1937, 249.

[85] Stadter 1989, p. li notes that simply presenting information was one of Plutarch's aims. For other instances of gratuitous information, see *Publ.* 16.7, *Per.* 6.3–4, 24.7, 24.12, 39.2–3, *Cor.* 11.2–6, *Lys.* 19.8–12.

[86] Grote 1849, 436; Wachsmuth 1874, 556; Milchhöfer 1881, 29; Kagan 1969, 87; Deane 1972, 40–41; Will 1972, 157–58; Lewis 1992a, 113; Hornblower 2002, 33; Pomeroy et al. 2004, 144.

Perhaps the dismissal of Athenian troops from Mt. Ithome (462), typically acknowledged as a decisive historical development,[87] spurred the Athenians to reevaluate their existing defensive arrangements.[88] As a direct result of the Ithome affair, the foreign policy of Athens became distinctly anti-Spartan.[89] The breach will have deepened due to the probable discovery at this time of Sparta's secret promise to invade Attika during the recent Thasian revolt (465–463).[90] The Athenians cannot have become aware of the pledge until after the dismissal from Ithome, for they would not have supported Kimon's expedition had it been known already.[91] In addition to reacting with hostility towards the Spartans, the Athenians also looked after their strategic interests following Ithome. Foreign policy initiatives included the renunciation of the formal alliance with Sparta, the formation of new alliances with Argos, Thessaly, and Megara, and the construction of the Megarian Long Walls.[92] Whether one interprets these actions as offensive or defensive in nature, they certainly show that Athens had taken stock of its strategic interests and then moved to strengthen its position. In this new period of mutual hostility between Athens and Sparta, the Athenians

[87] Lewis 1992a, 110, referring to "a turning point in Greek history, precipitating a major change in Athenian policy"; Kagan 2003, 14.

[88] Certainly the Athenians did not build the phase Ia Long Walls so early that Themistokles could have been involved with the project, as is sometimes suggested; see Marchant 1891, 151 *ad* Thuc. II.13.7; Sage 1935, 78 n. 1; Edmonds 1957, 875 n. b, 938 n. b; Beattie 1960, 29; Travlos 1960, 48; Travlos 1971, 158; Travlos 1988, 341; Hanson 2005, 45; for older references, see Conwell 1992, 81 n. 8. Scattered ancient sources do associate Themistokles with the structures (Paus. I.2.2; schol. *ad* Ar. *Eq.* 815; cf. Plut. *Them.* 19.4, with Marr 1998, 121 *ad loc.*), but he went into exile in the late 470's, and no sensible interpretation of Thucydides' chronological formulation *kata tous chronous toutous* would allow such an early date for the beginning of the work. On the vexed date of Themistokles' ostracism, see Marr 1998, 130–31 *ad* Plut. *Them.* 22.4 (471/0); Frost 1998, 168–71 *ad* Plut. *Them.* 22.4 (472 plus or minus one year). In addition, Themistokles had advocated withdrawing from the *asty* to Piraeus in an emergency (Thuc. I.93.7), but the Athenians' investment in massive walls joining Athens with its harbors implies that they did not intend to abandon the upper city. Thus, Themistokles likely did not even conceive of the Long Walls (Ia), despite Amandry 1960/61, 208; Culley 1973, 170; Adam 1982, 20, 202; Garland 1982, 158; Spathari 1987, 21; cf. Müller 1999, 21, who suggests that the construction of the Long Walls was decided upon in winter 479/8; for older references, see Conwell 1992, 81 n. 9.

[89] Thuc. I.102.4; Bengtson 1977, 199; Rhodes 1992a, 49; Rhodes 1992b, 73; Buckley 1996, 222, 237, 275; Kallet 2000, 183; Powell 2001, 35–36; Hornblower 2002, 23.

[90] Thuc. I.101.1–2. On dating the revolt precisely, see Rhodes 1992a, 45.

[91] De Ste. Croix 1972, 182; Blamire 1989, 166 *ad* Plut. *Cim.* 16.3.

[92] Thuc. I.I.102.4, 103.4.

sought to do away with the dangerous separation between the *asty* and its warships.[93]

Dating the initiation of work on the Long Walls (Ia) before the ostracism of Kimon runs counter to the prominent modern belief that the Athenians built those structures only after providing Megara with Long Walls in the late 460s.[94] That relative dating, however, is suggested only by the order in which Thucydides mentions the two projects,[95] and we have seen that his report about the beginning of work on Athens' Long Walls is chronologically imprecise. Thus, the fundamental importance of Athens' connection with its ships led the Athenians to begin securing their own connection with the sea at the same time or before they carried out a similar project beyond the borders of Attika.

Having begun building the Long Walls (Ia) in 462/1, the Athenians completed the structures several years later. Thucydides' two references to the work's final stages are so straightforward chronologically that disagreement stems simply from modern differences over the date of the battles at Tanagra and Oinophyta. Shortly before the fighting at Tanagra (458), the project was in full swing. As Thucydides reports, at that time political extremists at Athens invited the Spartans to put an end to it:

> To this course [the Spartans] were partly influenced by some Athenians, who were secretly inviting them into their country, in the hope of putting an end to the democracy and to the building of the long walls.[96] (Loeb: C. F. Smith)

Despite this opposition, the Athenians soon completed the Long Walls (Ia). Thucydides ties the end of the work to the battle of Oinophyta (summer 458):

[93] Others who date the beginning of the Long Walls in this historical context include Keil 1902, 100; Judeich 1931, 75; Bengtson 1977, 202. Keil and Judeich, however, explicitly reject Kimon's participation in the work. For the suggestion that the Athenians had at least planned to build the Long Walls (Ia) in advance of the First Peloponnesian War, see Curtius 1891, 111; Meyer 1939, 509, 558; Lenschau 1937, 73; Meier 1999, 316.

[94] See, for example, Meritt et al. 1950, 176–77; Lewis 1992a, 111–13. Note, however, Parsons in Carpenter et al. 1936, 121; Legon 1981, 185.

[95] Thuc. I.103.4 (Megara), 107.1 (Athens).

[96] Thuc. I.107.4.

> But on the sixty-second day after the battle [of Tanagra], the Athenians, having made an expedition into Boeotia under Myronides, defeated the Boeotians at Oenophyta, got control of Boeotia and Phocis, pulled down the walls of Tanagra, and took one hundred of the wealthiest men of the Opuntian Locrians as hostages. Meanwhile they completed their own long walls.[97] (Loeb: C. F. Smith)

The close chronological association between the phase Ia walls and the battle of Oinophyta is secure for two reasons. In the first place, Thucydides records the completion of the work in the same sentence as both the battle and subsequent developments. Second, in that sentence the statement about the Long Walls (Ia) is appended to the list of events with the particle τε. This connective, like καί and δέ, indicates a tight chronological association.[98] Allowing time for the completion of the Long Walls (Ia) after the battle, the Athenians will probably have finished the Long Walls (Ia) during later 458, although it is possible that the work crept into early 457.[99]

According to the chronology outlined above, the Athenians built the Long Walls (Ia) over a period of not less than three-and-one-half years. We have no information as to the progress of the project after the early work in 462/1 and the completion of the structures in 458/7. It is possible, as has been supposed, that the earlier activity, known from Plutarch, was quite separate from final stages, which are described by Thucydides.[100] Nothing in the historian's testimony, however, specifically suggests that the work to which he refers followed an earlier stage of building activity. Alternatively, then, the project may have proceeded slowly,[101] at least early on, until the outbreak of the First Peloponnesian War spurred the Athenians to redouble their efforts.[102]

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[97] Thuc. I.108.2–3.

[98] See Meritt et al. 1950, 173, following Gomme 1945, 361 on the chronological implications of καί and δέ in Thucydides.

[99] Cf. Meritt et al. 1950, 177–78, who date the end of the building program to winter 458/7, some months after Oinophyta; see also McGregor 1987, 55.

[100] Lenschau 1937, 73, cf. 88; Meyer 1939, 558, cf. 509; Deane 1972, 39–40; Papachatzes 1974, 140 n. 3 *ad* Paus. I.2.2; Blamire 1989, 152–53 *ad* Plut. *Cim.* 13.6. Cf. also the view of Ernst Curtius, who (1) dates Kimon's contributions ca. 460 (1891, 112–13), and (2) discusses the resumption of the work in the context of events which directly precede the battle of Tanagra (1888, 169), dated to late autumn 457 (1888, 170).

[101] Cf. Deane 1972, 39–40; Steinbrecher 1985, 158 with n. 155.

[102] An old proposition holds that the two phase Ia structures were built one after the other rather than simultaneously, but nothing in Thucydides and Plutarch supports this position. For the belief that the Athens-Piraeus wall preceded the one joining Athens to Phaleron, see Leake 1821, 350 with n. 2, 352–53; Kinnard in Stuart and

*Purpose*

No ancient source explains the strategic purpose of the first two Long Walls (Ia). Although we know how the structures of phases Ia/Ib functioned during the Peloponnesian War, at that time the walls belonged to a radical strategic concept which was not necessarily in place some three decades earlier when the Athenians began building the phase Ia Long Walls (see chapter 4). Resorting to hypothesis, then, in the later 460s the Athenians will have sought to achieve one or more of the following goals:

1. To provide safe living space for refugees fleeing an invasion of Attika
2. To safeguard land on which to grow crops and graze animals during a siege
3. To ensure the security of the population residing permanently between Athens and the Bay of Phaleron
4. To secure the connection between the inland center at Athens and its harbors

The huge size of the space enclosed by the Long Walls (Ia) suggests that the first of these alternatives does not correspond to the structures' main purpose. Had the Athenians intended above all for the Long Walls to accommodate refugees, one wonders why they enclosed an area so large. The fortified region included more territory than emergency habitation required, and much of it was far removed from Athens. Had the Athenians wished to provide secure living space for refugees from the countryside, they might have simply altered the line of the *asty*'s circuit wall so that it enclosed more space fairly close to the amenities of the urban center.

Alternatively, the Athenians may have built the phase Ia Long Walls primarily to protect land which would serve agricultural purposes in the event of a prolonged siege by land or sea.[103] Indeed, among the

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Revett 1827, 7 n. c; Lolling 1889, 299; Curtius 1891, 112; Georgiades 1901, 7; Weller 1913, 72; Caspari 1914, 246–48. For the opinion that the Phaleric Wall predated the structure running from Athens down to Piraeus, see Chandler 1817, 23; Warmington in Behr 1973, 248 n. a.

[103] Cf. Foxhall 1993, 137 for the suggestion that during the Peloponnesian War the Athenians might have used cultivable land inside the area protected by the city's walls.

Greeks, it became more typical after the Persian Wars to besiege an enemy city than had previously been the case,[104] and in exceptional circumstances during the mid-fifth century extended sieges occurred. Examples include the Athenian action against Thasos (465–463)[105] and the ten-year Spartan siege at Ithome (465/4–456).[106] It is therefore conceivable that the Athenians sought to ensure an adequate food supply in the event they were crowded within their walls for a period of months, effectively creating a *Geländemauer*.[107] Still, even the whole of Attika could not support the region's population.[108] Thus, the space between the walls cannot have been regarded primarily as a source of food to sustain the substantial part of the local population which, surely, would have retreated behind the city's defenses should an enemy invade Attika in force.

Next, it is conceivable that the Athenians built the Long Walls (Ia) in order to protect the residents of the area between Athens and the coastline. Piraeus possessed a fortification wall of its own, but in the coastal plain the demes Phaleron and Xypete (fig. 2), so far as we know, were unprotected.[109] Although one cannot now estimate the actual population-size of either of these demes, their fourth-century bouleutic quotas do survive.[110] These figures are in all probability valid for the fifth century and should indicate the size of Phaleron and Xypete relative to the other demes of Attika.[111] One may therefore gauge the prominence of the two population centers when the Long Walls (Ia) were built. With quotas of nine (Phaleron) and seven (Xypete), the demes sent fewer representatives to the *Boule* than did ten other demes possessing quotas ranging from

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[104] Osborne 1987, 153; Kern 1999, 89–97.

[105] Thuc. I.101.1–3. On dating the siege of Thasos, see Rhodes 1992a, 45.

[106] Thuc. I.101.3–103.1. For the date of the revolt by the Helots, see Lewis 1992d, 500 §4.

[107] On this aspect of *Geländemauern*, see Garlan 1973, 157–58; Garlan 1974, 82. McNicoll 1997, 228 defines a *Geländemauer* as a "rambling, far-flung circuit characteristic of a *Landschaftstadt*," a city which enclosed large tracts of suburbs or countryside. For the identification of the Long Walls as this sort of structure, see also Milner 1997, 209.

[108] Garnsey 1988, 123, 127.

[109] Some illustrations of the region depict a short cross wall running between the Bay of Phaleron and the Phaleric Long Wall. See, for example, Doxiades 1971, figs. 11–12; Travlos 1971, fig. 213; Connolly and Dodge 1998, figs. pp. 13, 20; Camp 2001, fig. 277. No published evidence, however, suggests that Phaleron was fortified in any way before the construction of the phase Ia Phaleric Wall.

[110] Traill 1975, table pp. 67–70.

[111] Traill 1975, 56, 64–65; Whitehead 1986, 21, 369.

ten to twenty-two. Both locations did, however, have larger quotas than the majority of Attika's demes, and Phaleron had the same number of representatives as Piraeus. Arguably, then, both Phaleron and Xypete were prominent enough to warrant inclusion within Athens' defensive system. However, if the Athenians wished to defend these locations, one wonders why they did not simply employ traditional circuit walls. Such fortifications would have been shorter than the Long Walls (Ia), which incorporated great swathes of sparsely populated rural territory. Thus, the walls joining Athens with the city's harbors likely were not supposed to defend concentrated areas of population in the coastal plain, for they represented a substantial waste of resources when they were built and during a siege would have drained Athenian manpower unnecessarily.

Ultimately, the fourth alternative listed above best explains the purpose of the original two Athenian Long Walls.[112] Thucydides hints at the maritime orientation of the structures,[113] while ancient authors state that Long Walls built elsewhere in Classical times were intended to connect inland cities with the sea.[114] For Athens, this factor suits the historical context in which the structures were built. In the early fifth century the Athenians adopted a radical military strategy centered on naval operations.[115] Specific measures, in all of which Themistokles was deeply involved, included the beginning of work on a circuit wall

[112] Modern authors typically cite this alternative as the basic purpose of the Long Walls, although at times with reference to the Peloponnesian War rather than the period when the Long Walls were originally built; see, for example, Busolt 1897, 309; Beloch 1914, 171; Lehmann-Hartleben 1923, 78–79; Walker 1927, 80; Lenschau 1937, 88; Philippson 1952, 917; Kagan 1969, 87; Will 1972, 157; Osborne 1987, 153; Strauss and Ober 1990, 52; Garlan 1992, 28; Hanson 1996, 293; Kern 1999, 96; Raaflaub 1999, 142; Munn 2000, 202; Hornblower 2002, 33; Pomeroy et al. 2004, 144.

[113] Thuc. I.107.1: "About this period the Athenians began to build their long walls to the sea, one to Phalerum, the other to the Peiraeus." (Loeb: C. F. Smith)

[114] Argos: Thuc. V.82.5; cf. Diod. XII.81.1. Megara: Plut. *Phoc.* 15.2. Patrai: Plut. *Alc.* 15.3; cf. Thuc. V.52.2. For modern discussion, see Tomlinson 1972, 124 (Argos); Legon 1981, 188 (Megara). Note also Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 390, concerning a two-*plethron*-wide *skelos* joining Sestos with its harbor; in this case, the "leg" necessarily denotes a walled corridor.

[115] For the revolutionary nature of the large-scale, concerted focus on naval warfare in the early fifth century, see Kallet-Marx 1993, 12; Raaflaub 1999, 141; also, more generally, Raaflaub 2001, 308–9.

at Piraeus (493/2),[116] passage of the great naval bill (483/2),[117] confrontation of the Persians by sea (480),[118] and then, after the Second Persian War (480/79), speedy resumption of work on Piraeus' fortifications.[119] These measures, of course, tended to enhance the importance of Athens' harbors; although the fortunes of Phaleron declined after the Persian Wars,[120] the Athenians' enthusiastic investment in Piraeus eventually produced an urban center of such size, complexity, and economic importance that the Athenian *Ekklesia* saw fit to maintain unusually close control over the administration of the deme.[121] As that process developed, Athens continued its naval focus as leader of the Delian League in its sea war against Persia.[122] By the mid-fifth century, then, Athens' harbors, particularly at Piraeus, had become central to the Athenians' economic, administrative, and military affairs.

Despite the Athenians' manifest commitment to Piraeus, archaeological and literary evidence demonstrates that the *asty* was, and would remain, the local religious and political center after the Persian Wars. Themistokles himself led the refortification of Athens,[123] a project which in size and urgency signified the continuing importance of the upper city,[124] while subsequent major investments in projects like the Akropolis'

[116] The ancient sources are cited earlier in this chapter.

[117] Hdt. VII.144.1–2; Thuc. I.14.3; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.7; Plut. *Them.* 4.1–3. Gabrielsen 1994, 235 n. 26 lists additional ancient references. Jordan 1975, 16–20 discusses Themistokles' broader impact on the Athenian navy.

[118] Hdt. VII.143.1–3, VIII.57.1–63.1, 75.1–3, 79.2–85.1; Diod. XI.12.4–6, 16.1, 17.1–19.5; Plut. *Them.* 7.1, 10.1–4, 14.2–15.4; note also Meiggs and Lewis 1988, 48–52 no. 23 lines 12–44 = "decree of Themistocles."

[119] Thuc. I.93.3–6; Diod. XI.41.2, 43.1–2; cf. Plut. *Them.* 19.2. According to Thuc. I.93.5, ultimately the wall only reached half the height Themistokles had intended.

[120] Papadopoulos 2003, 285 states that "clearly Phaleron was *the* harbor of Athens before and during the Persian Wars" (emphasis follows the original text). On what little is known about the fate of Phaleron after its decline as Athens' primary harbor, see Wrede 1938, 1663–64; Freund 1989, 534; Spawforth 1996, 1153; Lohmann 2000, 727–28. Note, however, Traill 1975, table pp. 62–63, showing that the reapportionment of bouleutic representation carried out in 224/3 increased Phaleron's quota by four.

[121] For the economic centrality of Piraeus, see von Reden 1995, 33–35; Garland 2001b, 87–95. For administrative control by the *Ekklesia*, see von Reden 1995, 26–27; Garland 2001b, 72–83.

[122] See, generally, Rhodes 1992a, 40–49.

[123] Thuc. I.89.3–93.3; Plut. *Them.* 19.1–3. The Athenians began the project in autumn 479, "immediately" after the retreat of the Persians following the loss at Plataia in late summer (Thuc. I.89.3; Diod. XI.39.1). Judeich 1931, 71 suggests that work may have continued into spring 478.

[124] The Themistokleian city wall of Athens was about 6.35 km in length, relatively long by classical Greek standards. Corinth possessed one of the longest Classical-period

fortification wall and structures in the Agora emphasize the Athenians' commitment to the *asty*.[125] Since they were determined to focus on naval strength while maintaining the primacy of Athens, the best way for the Athenians to ensure the safety of the upper city was to connect it physically to the harbors.

Given their dependence on sea power in the mid-fifth century, one wonders why the Athenians did not fortify the three-kilometer-long stretch of coast between the phase Ia Long Walls (fig. 3). After all, an enemy could have cut communication between Athens and its harbors by forcing an amphibious landing from the Bay of Phaleron, regardless of the structures crossing the plain. The coastal swamp, however, formed a natural hindrance to a force put ashore by ship. In addition, the Athenians had been masters of the Aegean when they began walling off the region between Athens, Phaleron, and Piraeus. Early in the 460s, their navy had dealt a decisive blow to the Persian fleet at the Eurymedon River. Afterwards the Athenians continued to consolidate their naval empire, a process which culminated in 454 with the transfer of the Delian League treasury to Athens.[126] These were times of dominance, when their naval prowess would have convinced the Athenians that no other power could challenge their defenses by sea.[127] Such threats as they could anticipate *ca.* 460, whether from the Peloponnesos or Boiotia, would not have become manifest by sea.

Although no ancient author provides a comprehensive description of the manner in which the Long Walls were to function, one may envision the following sequence of events in the face of an enemy invasion:

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city walls in mainland Greece. That structure, ca. 10.29 km long (pers. comm., Dr. D. G. Romano, July 2003), is considered to be "enormous" by Carpenter in Carpenter et al. 1936, 80. McNicoll 1997, 103 uses the same adjective of the early Hellenistic circuit at Ephesos, which he estimates, p. 96 with n. 109, was at least 9 km long. For the lengths of fourth-century to early Hellenistic *Geländemauern*, which are by definition very long, see Garlan 1974, 82.

[125] For building activity at Athens following the Persian Wars, see Camp 2001, 59–60, 63–71.

[126] See Starr 1989, 34–38. For the date of the transfer in 454/3, see Samons 2000, 100–4.

[127] An analogous situation existed some three decades later. In 429, after the Peloponnesian War had been underway for more than two years, the harbor of Piraeus remained *aphylaktos kai akleistos*, "unguarded and unclosed," a state of affairs which Thucydides (II.93.1) finds unsurprising due to the Athenians' naval superiority at the time.

1. In the event that Athenian land forces seemed likely to lose control of Attika outside the Athens-Phaleron-Piraeus defensive complex, residents of the countryside would withdraw behind the urban defenses
2. Should an enemy assault the walled complex, everyone behind the walls would remain safe so long as the invader could not break through the defenses
3. The Athenians would be largely, if not completely, cut off from local food supplies
4. They would compensate by employing their sea power to provision the population gathered within the defenses
5. So long as Athenian and allied forces could maintain substantial control of the sea lanes, the inhabitants of the walled complex could survive a siege indefinitely

The first two Long Walls, in sum, were not intended primarily to shelter refugees, safeguard crops during an extended siege, or defend the population of the coastal plain. Instead, the Athenians built the Long Walls (Ia) to protect the coming and going of troops, goods, and communication through the fortified space between Athens and its harbors. They may have hoped that during a siege the structures might also serve one or more of the alternative purposes described above, but such functions would have ranked beneath the need to connect the *asty* securely to its ships. Given their purpose, the Long Walls (Ia) were at once both conventional and radical. On the one hand, however impressive their dimensions, the structures simply secured the maritime orientation typical of cities in classical Greece.[128] On the other hand, while many fortifications were simply passive barriers defending an urban zone against invasion, the Long Walls had a more ambitious role. Built to defend the connection between Athens and its ships, they were land-oriented structures with a decidedly maritime purpose.

## *458/7–446*

Following the completion of the phase Ia Long Walls in 458/7, the structures disappear from the historical record until the beginning of

[128] Martin 1974, 37, cf. 31; Hansen 2006, 34.

the Peloponnesian War in 431. One may nevertheless address their prominence in Athenian strategy during the mid-fifth century. Having built the Long Walls (Ia) to secure Athens' connection with the sea during wartime, the Athenians would likely have depended on the structures only when they expected that ships serving Athenian purposes would regularly pass through the Aegean safely. In the absence of such an expectation, a fortified link to the harbors could do little to sustain the Athenians. Developments after the battle of Aigospotamoi (405) demonstrate how little strategic value the Long Walls had without security at sea. Having lost their naval ascendancy, the Athenians were unable to break the Peloponnesian blockade of Piraeus; faced with starvation, they capitulated.[129] Thus, at times when the Athenians did not believe that their own and allied shipping would likely sail through the Aegean in safety, they probably did not consider the Long Walls central to their military planning. This hypothesis does not mean that the structures became relevant whenever Athens possessed a powerful navy; rather, probable control of the sea lanes was a precondition for Athenian reliance on the structures linking the *asty* and its ports.[130] The direct association between the Long Walls and Athenian sea power plays an important role throughout this study,[131] beginning with the phase Ia structures.

As the Athenians finished the first two Long Walls early in the First Peloponnesian War, they exercised considerable power with which to prosecute the conflict and, consequently were likely prepared to employ

[129] See, generally, Hanson 2005, xiii. Note also the Athenians' hopeless situation after the battle of Amorgos (322); as Bosworth 2003, 14 has recently stressed, with their navy shattered, the Athenians had no access to supplies, so attempting to hold out behind the walls against a Macedonian siege would have served no rational purpose.

[130] In characterizing degrees of naval strength, the present study seeks to employ consistent terminology: (1) "dominance" or "mastery," which ensured absolute control of the sea lanes; (2) "the leading power" or "ascendancy," enabling probable control; (3) "a leading power," meaning that a given sea power could not count on safe passage; and (4) "subordination," involving little maritime security. Kennedy 2006, 9 defines "naval mastery" as "a situation in which a country has so developed its maritime strength that it is superior to any rival power, and that its predominance is or could be exerted far outside its home waters." Note, however, that Kennedy prefers to apply the term to a sea power possessing global rather than regional dominance. For usage of the term in the context of ancient Greece, see Starr 1989, 25, 27, 38; Kallet-Marx 1993, esp. 11 with n. 38, 16 n. 55, cf. 114. Based on the comments of Buckler 2003, 39, one may regard an ascendant power as one which is demonstrably strongest but unable, nevertheless, to impose its will at all times.

[131] Ober 1987, 603 employs the same principle in dating the Long Walls at Aigosthena; cf. also Ober 1983, 391.

the Long Wall (Ia) in an emergency.[132] At sea, Athens remained dominant for several years after Oinophyta. Aigina, the city's longtime rival, surrendered in the wake of that battle and became a tribute-paying member of the Delian League. Tolmides carried out various successful actions during his circumnavigation of the Peloponnesos in 456, and Perikles mounted a naval expedition in the Corinthian Gulf during 455 or 454. The Athenians felt confident enough in their control of the Delian League to move the treasury of the alliance to Athens in 454; however, in that same year Athenian sea power suffered a serious blow with the disastrous end of the intervention in Egypt.[133]

The Delian League tribute lists suggest that from 454 down to 446 and after, the Athenians did not exert mastery at sea on a continuous basis. Still the leading power in the Aegean, during the later 450s the Athenians faced serious defections from the alliance.[134] In about 450 their naval power produced a victory at Cypriote Salamis, but in the early 440s they endured a general crisis in the league.[135] Nevertheless, challenges by individual members of the alliance did not generally threaten Athens' Aegean-wide ascendancy. Assuming that the Athenians were able to expect general security of shipping, theoretically the Long Walls (Ia) were still viable. Down to 446, however, the structures were unnecessary due to Athenian control of central Greece, including Boiotia, Phokis, Lokris, and Megara. Since possession of this land empire from 458 virtually ensured that Attika would not be attacked by land, in these years the Athenians probably regarded the urban system simply as insurance against some future vulnerability.

Events in the year 446 had a decisive impact on Athens' military position, for the city suffered crises by land and by sea.[136] Revolts by Boiotia and Megara broke up the land empire, the Athenians were forced to cope with a rebellion among their Euboian allies, and a Spartan force invaded Attika. Although the Athenians put down the Euboian revolt successfully and the Spartan army turned back

[132] For Athenian military activity in Greece in this period, see Kagan 1969, 96–97; Lewis 1992a, 115–20; Hornblower 2002, 35.

[133] For the Egyptian expedition, see Rhodes 1992a, 50–53.

[134] Meritt et al. 1950, 252–56; Hammond 1986, 302, 304; Kagan 1969, 98–100; Meiggs 1972, 111–24; Rhodes 1992a, 54–61; Hornblower 2002, 35.

[135] Meiggs 1972, 157–58; Meiggs and Lewis 1988, 133–35; Lewis 1992b, 123–25, 129–30; Hornblower 2002, 36.

[136] For the events, see Kagan 1969, 122–27; Meiggs 1972, 176–81; Lewis 1992b, 133–36; Hornblower 2002, 36–37.

after reaching the region of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, Athens lost control of central Greece. In autumn or winter 446/5, the Athenians concluded a nonaggression pact with Sparta, the Thirty Years' Peace,[137] but Athens' position had fundamentally changed. By summer 446, it had lost its buffer zone in central Greece and, consequently, become vulnerable to attack by land. Moreover, that danger had manifested itself almost immediately in the Spartan invasion of Attika. The construction of the third Long Wall (Ib) probably occurred in the new historical circumstances following the crisis-year of 446.

### *Summary*

From Thucydides one knows that the Athenians were working on the Long Walls (Ia) by the early 450s, while Plutarch dates an early stage of the work to late 462 or early 461. The second of these reports, which attests to the involvement of Kimon in building the Long Walls (Ia), has been challenged on philological, chronological, and ideological grounds, but ancient evidence shows that the objections are not decisive. Since the scholarly Plutarch possessed detailed knowledge of the Long Walls and would hardly have interrupted his celebration of Kimon's success against Persia to include material he knew to be false, we may accept his testimony. Perhaps seeking both to help safeguard his city after the breakdown of the Athens-Sparta relationship and to regain favor by participating in a project which would enhance the power of many Athenians eligible to vote, Kimon became involved at an early stage of the work. Having begun to build the phase Ia Long Walls between the dismissal of their forces from Mt. Ithome in 462 and the ostracism of Kimon in spring 461, the Athenians completed the structures in late 458, if not early 457. During a time of tense relations with Sparta, they built the Long Walls (Ia) in order to do away with a crucial defensive weakness. By walling off the massive space between Athens, Phaleron, and Piraeus, the Athenians vastly decreased the likelihood that an enemy, simply by occupying the coastal plain, could cut the *asty* off from the harbors on which it depended.

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[137] For the terms and significance of the agreement, see Thuc. I.115.1; Kagan 1969, 128–30; Meiggs 1972, 182–85; de Ste. Croix 1972, 293–94; Lewis 1992b, 136–37; Podlecki 1998, 75–76; Powell 2001, 74. On the date of the peace treaty, see Meritt et al. 1950, 301 with n. 1.

From 458/7 to mid-446, the Athenians retained sufficient naval power to justify reliance on the Long Walls (Ia). Nevertheless, Athenian control of central Greek states meant that an invasion of Attika was unlikely. Ultimately the Athenians faced the real possibility of a siege, for in 446 they lost their land empire. When a Spartan army actually entered Attika in the summer of that year, presumably the Athenians were prepared to employ the Long Walls (Ia). The Spartans turned back before reaching Athens, however, so down to mid-446 the structures never performed their intended function.

CHAPTER THREE

# PHASE IB

The construction of the first two Long Walls (Ia) had resolved a critical weakness in Athens' defenses by creating a fortified link between the *asty* and its harbors. Less than two decades after establishing that connection, however, the Long Walls (Ia) had themselves become vulnerable. Thus, adapting to new circumstances, the Athenians added a third Long Wall (Ib), the Middle or Southern Wall, during the later 440s. The new structure ran down to Piraeus alongside the phase Ia structure joining the *asty* with that port city (fig. 3).

## *Circa 443/2*

Dating the phase Ib Long Wall depends on several literary passages as well as one of the records documenting the construction of the Parthenon. In a passage discussed in chapter 1, Plato writes:

> *Gorgias*: Well, I will try, Socrates, to reveal to you clearly the whole power of rhetoric: and in fact you have correctly shown the way to it yourself. You know, I suppose, that these great dockyards and walls of Athens, and the construction of your harbours, are due to the advice of Themistocles, and in part to that of Pericles, not to your craftsmen.
> *Socrates*: So we are told, Gorgias, of Themistocles; and as to Pericles, I heard him myself when he was advising us about the middle wall.[1] (Loeb: W. R. M. Lamb)

Since Sokrates had heard Perikles discuss the Middle Wall in the Assembly, the structure was not built before Sokrates reached eighteen years of age in 452 or 451.[2]

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[1] Pl. *Grg.* 455d–e.

[2] For a lower *terminus post quem*, one might consider the inclusion of the Middle Wall among the works of the Perikleian building program (Plut. *Per.* 13.7), which Corso 1986, 57 n. 1 finds relevant to dating the structure (cf. also Meiggs 1972, 188 n. 1). When exactly the Athenians initiated that program, however, is not certain. One knows only that it was underway by 447/6, the first year of the Parthenon building accounts. Construction is typically thought to have begun after the Peace of Kallias (Shear 1966, 66–78; Camp 2001, 72–73; cf. Lewis 1992b, 125–26), conventionally dated in 449.

A passage in Thucydides, already presented in chapter 1, suggests a *terminus ante quem* for the construction of the Middle Wall. As the Peloponnesian War loomed in 431, Perikles had described Athens' readiness for the conflict. According to Thucydides, Perikles' remarks included the following statement:

> For the length of the Phalerian wall was thirty-five stadia to the circuit-wall of the city, and the portion of the circuit-wall itself which was guarded was forty-three stadia (a portion being left unguarded, that between the Long Wall and the Phalerian); and the Long Walls to the Peiraeus were forty stadia in extent, of which only the outside one was guarded; and the whole circuit of the Peiraeus including Munichia was sixty stadia, half of it being under guard.[3] (Loeb: C. F. Smith)

This report does not state clearly how many Long Walls existed in 431. Thucydides does indicate elsewhere, however, that two such structures—one joining Athens with Phaleron, the other connecting the *asty* with Piraeus—were in place by early 457, at the latest (see chapter 2).[4] That Harpokration knew three fifth-century structures were in fact Long Walls has been pointed out in the first chapter. Like Thucydides, he labeled one of them the "Phaleric Wall." Therefore, Thucydides' "Long Walls to the Peiraeus" are two in number. Further, since the first of those two Athens-Piraeus structures were in place by early 457, the second one must date to a later time. The quoted report by Thucydides shows that this third Long Wall had been built by 431.

A statement in the *De falsa legatione*, delivered in 343 by Aischines, also pertains to the third Long Wall. Here, the orator lists a Long Wall among the benefits which accrued to the Athenians due to the Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta:

> For we deposited on the Acropolis a thousand talents of coined money; we built one hundred additional triremes, and constructed dockyards; we formed a corps of twelve hundred cavalry and a new force of as many

The Peace of Kallias, however, is so fundamentally problematic that it is possible for some scholars to believe that the pact is fictional (Meister 1982, passim), while others hold that two peace agreements were made with the Persians, the first of them in the mid-460s (Badian 1993, 1–72 read in conjunction with Samons 1998, passim provides a full sense of the issues). Given the controversial nature of treaty, it cannot reliably contribute to dating the phase Ib Long Wall; cf. Miller 1997, 234, reaching a similar conclusion concerning the Odeion of Perikles.

[3] Thuc. II.13.7.

[4] Thuc. I.107.1, 4, 108.3.

> bowmen, and the southern long wall was built; and no man undertook to overthrow the democratic constitution.[5] (Loeb: C. D. Adams)

The Southern Wall, as already established, is the same structure as Sokrates' Middle Wall. Since the Thirty Years' Peace was concluded during autumn-winter 446/5, the passage quoted here places the construction of the third Long Wall in or soon after that time.

Another possible source for dating the Middle Wall is one of the Parthenon's construction accounts.[6] In this inscription, dating to 443/2, the simple entry [π]αρὰ τειχ[οποιο͂ν] records a transfer of funds from the board responsible for Athens' fortifications to the *epistatai* overseeing work on the Parthenon.[7] Presumably these funds had been granted for use by the *teichopoioi* in that same year. In 1899, Eduard Meyer concluded that this entry documented work on the Middle Wall.[8] Following Aischines,[9] Meyer believed that the project began after the Spartan invasion of Attika in 446, so he found that the epigraphic evidence represented the transfer of funds left over following work on the structure in 443/2.[10] Other scholars have taken the connection a step further, maintaining that the transfer marks the end of work on the Middle Wall.[11]

Based on the evidence described above, modern scholarship has reached no consensus as to when the Athenians built the phase Ib Long Wall. Most often it is assigned to the period following the Thirty Years' Peace (446/5).[12] According to other suggestions, however, the

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[5] Aeschin. 2.174; cf. [Andoc.] 3.7.

[6] *IG* I[3] 440 line 127.

[7] The restoration of these words is almost invariably accepted; see, however, Maier 1959, 20.

[8] Meyer 1899, 100–1; Meyer 1939, 687 n. 1.

[9] Or, rather, Andokides (3.7), in a work here regarded as spurious.

[10] Meyer 1899, 100 n. 3 and 1939, 687 n. 1 suggests a similar interpretation of *IG* I[3] 439 line 77, dated 444/3, but few scholars follow his reading of the stone; see, however, Noack 1907, 488 and Schwarze 1971, 88. According to *IG*[3], the text reads παρὰ τρ[ιεροποιο͂ν].

[11] Dinsmoor 1913, 78; Dinsmoor 1921, 243; Meritt et al. 1950, 341 n. 64; Shear 1966, 254. Cf. also Boersma 1970, 74; Garlan 1974, 48 with n. 6; Lamprinoudakes 1986, 134.

[12] So, recently, Lewis 1992b, 138 (after the Thirty Years' Peace to 443); Dillon and Garland 1994, 232 (begun 446/5); Edwards 1995, 171 *ad* Andoc. 1.45 (mid-440s); Cartwright 1997, 100 *ad* Thuc. II.13 (late 440s); Corso 1997, 379 (445–443); Krentz 1997, 63 n. 11 (after the Thirty Years' Peace to 443/2); Podlecki 1998, 99, cf. 170 (late 440s); Harris 2000, 485 (443/2); Raaflaub 2001, 315 (later 440s); Gill 2006, 10–12 (from the mid-440s). See also the modern sources cited in the following notes, which suggest that the work was completed in 446 or the years immediately following.

work was decided upon, begun, or even carried out in its entirety during the mid-450s to earlier 440s.[13] Lastly, some observers date the Middle Wall less specifically, whether to the period 457–431 or some part thereof.[14]

Following Plato and Thucydides, one may reliably date the Middle Wall to a window between 452 and 431. When exactly during that period did the Athenians build the structure? That they carried out the project in the wake of the Thirty Years' Peace, following Aischines, is frequently supposed. Such a dating allows one to envision the Middle Wall as a peacetime response to the serious military challenges experienced by Athens during 446, including the loss of the land empire in central Greece, a revolt by the cities of Euboia, and the Spartan invasion of Attika.[15] The value of Aischines' testimony, however, is overrated. Since the passage, as described in chapter 1, belongs to a literary context which is replete with errors, the orator's unconfirmed statement that the Athenians built the Middle Wall in or soon after 446/5 ought to command no more confidence than his erroneous dating of Piraeus' circuit wall after 451.[16]

As for the epigraphic evidence, one cannot prove exactly what sort of project the *teichopoioi* had overseen in 443/2. Nevertheless, the work occurred during the period 452–431 when, based on Plato and Thucydides, we know the Athenians built the Middle Wall. Since no other fortification project is certainly attested for those years,[17] the

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[13] Project decided upon in these years: Thiolier 1985, 92 n. 104 *ad* Plut. *Mor.* 351a (ca. 452, although the wall was actually built ca. 445); Corso 1986, 57 with n. 1 (decision to build during early 440s but actual construction not until 445–443); cf. Schachermeyr 1969, 196 (dating Cratin. fr. inc. 326 K-A, which seemingly criticizes Perikles for his inability to complete the Middle Wall, soon after 455); Bengtson 1977, 202–3 (begun at an unspecified time before 445). Work begun in this period: Pieters 1946, 70 (project dated 448–442); Stier et al. 1956, map 12/v (450–445); Wesenberg 1982, 111 (work before the beginning of the Parthenon not impossible); Müller 1989, 171 (449–446). Middle Wall both begun and completed in these years: Will 1972, 158 (after 455); Krentz 1997, 62 n. 9 (perhaps before Kimon's death); Phoca and Valavanis 1999, 66 (447); Camp 2001, 72 (ca. 454).

[14] During the years 457 to 431: Day 1928, 176. In the 440s generally: French 1971, 52 n. 81; Coulton 1977, 25; Rhodes 1988, 197 *ad* Thuc. II.13.7. *Circa* 440: Curtius 1868, Text, 33; Lamb 1953, 288 n. 1.

[15] Meyer 1939, 686, cf. 687 n. 1; Boersma 1970, 74; Meiggs 1972, 188; Sealey 1976, 302; Lamprinoudakes 1986, 134; Lewis 1992b, 138–39; Garland 2001b, 25.

[16] Aeschin. 2.173; cf. [Andoc.] 3.5.

[17] The evidence for other fortification work which *may* have occurred in this period is either ambiguous or not firmly dated. First, based upon recent discoveries, a building phase at the Sacred Gate may have occurred as the Peloponnesian War broke out; see

connection between the known activity of the *teichopoioi* in 443/2 and the Middle Wall is attractive.[18] As Arnold Gomme points out, however, one need not conclude that the transfer of funds from the *teichopoioi* to a different board means that they had completed their mandate.[19] In 443/2, the *trieropoioi* passed a sum of money to the Parthenon commissioners.[20] Since a trireme lasted, on average, for about twenty years or a bit more,[21] no doubt the Athenians were continually building warships. Accordingly, if in a given year the *trieropoioi* transferred money to another board, then shipbuilding for that particular year must have been completed either with funds to spare or because the money was needed elsewhere—but not because the Athenians would require no more ships. Similarly, the work in 443/2 will have ceased before the expenditure of all budgeted monies had taken place, whereupon the *teichopoioi* moved the remaining funds to another board. One need not suppose, however, that the project—whatever it was—had been completed.

Since the above evidence does not conclusively date the Middle Wall specifically within the period 452–431, let us consider when during that period historical circumstances will have favored the project.

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German Archaeological Institute 2004, 265. Second, an ambiguous reference by the comic poet Telekleides, fr. inc. 45 K-A, conceivably pertains to work on fortifications after midcentury; see Meiggs 1972, 150–51. Third, one of the Kallias decrees, *IG* I[3] 52A lines 31–32 = Meiggs and Lewis 1988, 154–61 no. 58, perhaps dating to the later 430s, directs that surplus funds be spent on fortification walls and dockyards. We do not know, however, that a surplus actually occurred or that the planned work had anything to do with the Long Walls; cf. also Maier 1959, 20–21. In any event, the conventional dating of the decrees in 434/3 is likely too early. Kallet-Marx 1989, 108–11 and 1993, 105–7, who rejects the long-held belief that *IG* I[3] 52A and 52B were passed simultaneously (1989, 95–100; see also Samons 2000, 126–29), dates decree A to summer 431. More recently, Samons 2000, 113–35 suggests that the Athenians passed decree A in late 433/2. Other dates assigned the two decrees include 422/1 and 418/7; for modern references, see Samons 2000, 126 n. 75; Gill 2006, 12 nn. 71–72. A review of the issues by Cawkwell 1997, 29–30, 107–10 reaches no firm conclusion on the date of the Kallias decrees.

[18] For acceptance of the hypothesis, see Noack 1907, 488; Dinsmoor 1913, 78; Dinsmoor, 1921, 243; Meritt et al. 1950, 341 n. 64; Shear 1966, 254; Boersma 1970, 74; Carpenter 1970, 83; Meiggs 1972, 188 n. 1; Garlan 1974, 48 n. 6; Thompson 1977, 121; Wesenberg 1985, 53; Lamprinoudakes 1986, 134; Lewis 1992b, 138. Those who prefer not to associate *IG* I[3] 440 line 127 with the Middle Wall include Lippold 1919, 1639–40; Judeich 1931, 76 n. 1; Maier 1959, 20.

[19] Gomme 1945, 312 n. 3.

[20] *IG* I[3] 439 line 77.

[21] Kolbe 1901, 397; Amit 1965, 27; Casson 1971, 90 with n. 68; Casson 1991, 88; Casson 1994, 72; Borza 1995, 86. Note, however, the caution of Gabrielsen 1994, 135.

Turning points in the political fortunes and military capability of Athens in these years include the Five Years' Truce in 451, the crisis-year of 446, and the Samian revolt in 440/39. Down to 446 the Athenians would probably not have built a Long Wall, primarily because the city controlled central Greece. Were an enemy to march towards Athens, it would be met in the buffer region forming the land empire, beyond the borders of Attika. Despite fluctuations in Athenian naval power down to 446, Athens remained ascendant at sea and therefore theoretically prepared to invest in a structure closely tied to control of the sea lanes. In practice, though, such a move was unnecessary.

Several crises experienced during the year 446, already noted in passing, produced circumstances conducive to work on the system of Long Walls. In that year, the Athenians lost central Greece, endured the Euboian revolt, and experienced a Spartan invasion of Attika.[22] Soon they concluded a nonaggression pact with the Spartans, the Thirty Years' Peace (autumn or winter 446/5),[23] an agreement which required Athens to abandon control of territories in the Peloponnesos, explicitly listed the city's existing allies, and confirmed that it would retain those allies.[24] Thus the treaty effectively defined the Athenian sphere of influence as the Aegean and other Greek waters. Having recently experienced threats and setbacks by land, the Athenians may have taken advantage of the new stability to improve their defenses. Although the Delian League tribute lists suggest that after 446 the Athenians only gradually recovered full control of the alliance (see below), and despite the fact that individual allies like Chios, Lesbos, and Samos possessed fleets of significant size, the city probably did not face any equal in the Aegean during the second half of the 440s. Because Athens was still ascendant in that sphere, a strategy incorporating the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) made sense at that time.

Conditions during the subsequent period, which is framed by the suppression of Samos' revolt (440/39) and the outbreak of the

[22] See, generally, Meiggs 1972, 176–82; Lewis 1992b, 133–36; Hornblower 2002, 36–37.

[23] For the terms and significance of the agreement, see Thuc. I.115.1; Kagan 1969, 128–30; Meiggs 1972, 182–85; de Ste. Croix 1972, 293–94; Bengtson 1975, 74–76 no. 156; Lewis 1992b, 136–37; Podlecki 1998, 75–76; Powell 2001, 74; Hornblower 2002, 37.

[24] See Thuc. I.140.2 for the statement that, according to the treaty, Athens and Sparta would each "keep what it had."

Peloponnesian War (431), also could have led to the construction of the Middle Wall. Open hostility to the Athenians had become manifest, for the Peloponnesian League had debated whether or not to become involved in the Samian rebellion.[25] Although the Peloponnesians ultimately decided not to interfere, it was clear that some of Athens' enemies were prepared at this time to take up arms against the city. Building the Middle Wall during the early 430s would have been consistent with Athenian actions abroad after Samos, including Perikles' Black Sea expedition (ca. 437) and the foundation of Amphipolis (437/6). Moving to tighten its control of the Aegean and increase its influence further to the northeast,[26] the Athenians might simultaneously have wished to improve their connection to the sea. Had they not built the Middle Wall by 433, then certainly the Athenians will have done so by the time of the defensive alliance with Corcyra against Corinth in that year, when they recognized the inevitability of war with the Peloponnesians.[27] Despite the seriousness of the Samian challenge to Athens' naval dominance at the beginning of the decade,[28] throughout the 430s the Athenians were masters of the Aegean, so relying on the Long Walls was at all times justifiable.

Let us now combine the written and historical evidence in order to date the third Long Wall (Ib). Based on written sources one knows that the Athenians built the structure after 452 but before 431. Hypothesis narrows the window to the period 446/5–431, during which the Athenians can generally have expected their ships to pass through the Aegean safely. For a more specific date, one should not rely on Aischines' untrustworthy testimony. An inscription which refers to work on unidentified fortifications in 443/2, however, conceivably has to do with the phase Ib structure, and the connection—tenuous as it may be—is accepted here. Since one cannot know how much work on the phase Ib Long Wall would have preceded or followed the

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[25] Thuc. I.40.5, 41.2.

[26] Kagan 1969, 180–89; Meiggs 1972, 194–99; Hammond 1986, 316–17.

[27] Thuc. I.44.1–2. If one follows the conventional 434/3 date of the first Kallias decree, *IG* I[3] 52A, then it is possible to date Athenian preparations for war somewhat earlier than the Corcyra alliance; see, for example, Meiggs 1972, 200–1. This document calls for the repayment of what was owed to the gods other than Athena and then directs that any surplus be used for the walls and dockyards. As already noted, however, the document probably belongs to a later date.

[28] Thuc. VIII.76.4. For the revolt generally, see Thuc. I.115.2–117.3; Diod. XII.27.1–4; Plut. *Per.* 24.1, 25.1–28.3; Kagan 1969, 170–78; Meiggs 1972, 188–94; Lewis 1992b, 143–45.

activity attested for that year, let us simply date the new structure ca. 443/2—with full stress on the word *circa*. Finding themselves vulnerable by land but still powerful at sea after 446, the Athenians followed Perikles' advice to build another wall between the *asty* and its harbors.[29] Whether or not the undertaking constituted preparation for an expected conflict with the Peloponnesians,[30] the prospect of war had become real enough for the Athenians to look after their defenses.

Whatever the exact dates of the project, Plutarch suggests that the work proceeded slowly. In transmitting a fragment of the mid-fifth-century poet Kratinos,[31] the biographer explains its meaning:

> Yet Cratinus pokes fun even at Pericles for his slowness in accomplishing his undertakings, and remarks somewhat as follows about his Middle Wall:
> "Pericles in his talk makes the wall to advance,
> By his acts he does nothing to budge it."[32]
> (Loeb: F. C. Babbitt)

The fragment itself does not tell us much: Kratinos seems to have criticized Perikles for supporting an undertaking which, at least for a time, accomplished little. In order to understand what specifically Kratinos has in mind, one is dependent on Plutarch. First, as preserved the quotation does not identify the project. The connection with the Middle Wall is

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[29] Ancient evidence clearly demonstrates the statesman's close association with the phase Ib Long Wall, which therefore stands as one of Perikles' first initiatives following his victory in the political battle with Thucydides son of Melesias. Modern scholars often identify Perikles as the sponsor of the Long Walls generally; see Culley 1973, 170; Garlan 1974, 49; Podlecki 1975, 59; Bengtson 1977, 202; Hammond 1986, 299; Lamprinoudakes 1986, 53; Freund 1989, 534; Meier 1999, 316; Nardo 2001, 491; Ober 2001, 281; Kagan 2003, 51. No ancient testimony, however, specifically connects him with the two phase Ia structures. In addition, since we are not well-informed about Perikles' early career, it is not certain that already by the late 460s he possessed the political capital to spearhead a major project, particularly in the face of strong opposition (cf. Thuc. I.107.4); see Kagan 1969, 68, 79, 155; Will 2000, 568; cf. Sealey 1967, 61–62.

[30] See Meiggs 1972, 187–88.

[31] Cratin. fr. inc. 326 K-A. For the dates of Kratinos' career, see Rosen 1988, 37–38.

[32] Plut. *Mor.* 351a. See also Plut. *Per.* 13.7–8, as translated by B. Perrin (Loeb): "For the long wall, concerning which Socrates says he himself heard Pericles introduce a measure, Callicrates was the contractor. Cratinus pokes fun at this work for its slow progress, and in these words:—'Since ever so long now / In word has Pericles pushed the thing; in fact he does not budge it.'"

made by Plutarch.[33] Second, as far as we know the poet said simply that Perikles had not quickly converted his words into action. That the project proceeded slowly is information supplied by Plutarch, while the fragment itself allows the alternative interpretation that Perikles had been delayed in lining up the votes needed to pass his proposal.[34]

Based on Plutarch's statement, it is frequently supposed that work on the Middle Wall made slow progress.[35] Widely read as he was, Plutarch may have had access to the entire play to which the fragment belongs and, consequently, known exactly what Kratinos had in mind. Even so, one may question the legitimacy of Kratinos' original criticism. Old Comedy was a highly partisan tradition which typically employed stock motifs and exaggeration, and this particular fragment is simply one among many examples of the genre's tendency to ridicule loud-talking heroes who accomplish little.[36] Moreover, the prominent orator Perikles was a common target whom Kratinos and the rest of the comic poets roughed up repeatedly.[37] Kratinos composed several comedies which were entirely anti-Perikleian in tone and often attacked Perikles, particularly for his building schemes.[38] Thus one wonders if Kratinos' allegation about the Middle Wall does not exaggerate the situation. Using the standard tools of his trade, the poet might certainly have trumped up a charge against a favorite nemesis, whereas the project need have moved ahead no more slowly than did work on many ancient fortifications.[39] Since there exist grounds for doubting the legitimacy of

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[33] Note also Plut. *Per.* 13.7, translated in the previous note, where Plutarch associates the poet's reference with testimony by Sokrates about a Long Wall. The allusion to Sokrates, in turn, closely resembles a report by Plato about the Middle Wall (Pl. *Grg.* 455e), as quoted earlier in this study. Since these two authors were certainly referring to the same occasion, then Plutarch is suggesting that Kratinos had referred to the Middle Wall.

[34] Pieters 1946, 70–71.

[35] Wachsmuth 1874, 559; Boersma 1970, 74; Schwarze 1971, 88; Pritchett 1980, 314–16; Wesenberg 1982, 111; Corso 1986, 57 with n. 1; Lamprinoudakes 1986, 134; Lewis 1992b, 139; Garland 2001b, 25.

[36] Schwarze 1971, 89.

[37] For Kratinos' treatment of Perikles, see Ehrenberg 1954, 84; Schachermeyr 1969, 195–98; Rosen 1988, 49–57. On Perikles as a target generally, see Plut. *Per.* 8.4; Schwarze 1971, 169–72; Rosen 1988, 51–52, 60; Podlecki 1998, 169–76.

[38] For anti-Perikleian plays, see Schwarze 1971, 7–8 (*Dionysalexandros*), 33, 36–40 (*Nemesis*), 51 (*Ploutoi*). Specific attacks on Perikles' construction projects, in addition to the one under discussion here, include Cratin. *Dionysal.* fr. 42 K-A, *Thra.* fr. 73 K-A; for other instances of ridicule, see Cratin. *Cheir.* frr. 258, 259 K-A.

[39] For example, as noted above, at Piraeus work on the circuit began under Themistokles in 493/2, continued in the 470s, and in fact was not completed as planned.

Kratinos' attack, let us not suppose solely on the strength of that report that work on the Middle Wall was significantly delayed.

*Purpose*

Both the date and the placement of the third Long Wall are surprising. The Athenians had completed the phase Ia structures in 458/7, less than two decades before the new one. What developments in the interim caused them to modify the existing system of fortifications? Additionally, building a new Long Wall was not the only possible adjustment the Athenians could have made to their defenses in the coastal plain. They might, for example, have fortified the coastline along the Bay of Phaleron, which would have required a structure only about half as long as the Middle Wall. Why, then, did the Athenians build a fortification wall which essentially mirrored the course of one of the original Long Walls—and at such close proximity to that older line of defense?

A report by Thucydides, translated earlier in this chapter, helps to explain the purpose of the structure.[40] In listing the Athenian fortifications which were under guard at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War in 431, Thucydides does not mention the Middle Wall. Of the Long Walls (Ia/Ib), only the Phaleric and Northern Walls were manned. Assuming that the Athenians had not abandoned the Middle Wall already, only about a decade after its construction, then they must not have expected it to face the first wave of an enemy assault. In 431, then, the Middle Wall served as a secondary line of defense.

The Athenians will have built this fallback position for one of two reasons. They may have sought sought to back up both of the other Long Walls.[41] In this scenario, should attackers have overrun either of

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[40] Thuc. II.13.7.

[41] An ancient commentator conceivably articulates this purpose. Seeking to elucidate the passage in which Sokrates claims to have heard Perikles speak in favor of τὸ διὰ μέσου τεῖχος (Pl. *Grg.* 455e; see also the virtually identical statement by Olymp. *in Grg.* 7.3), the scholiast states: ἐν τῇ Μουνυχίᾳ γὰρ ἐποίησεν καὶ τὸ μέσον τεῖχος, τὸ μὲν βάλλον ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ Φάληρα, ἵν' εἰ τὸ ἓν καταβληθῇ, τὸ ἄλλο ὑπηρετοίη ἄχρι πολλοῦ. The Greek, however, is ambiguous, at best. As pointed out by Jackson et al. 1998, 105 n. 200, the label τὸ μέσον τεῖχος does not necessarily correspond to τὸ διὰ μέσου τεῖχος. Additionally, even if the author is actually referring to the Middle Long Wall, he may unaccountably locate the structure between Piraeus and Phaleron

the phase Ia structures, the defenders would have retreated to the Middle Wall. Such a scenario, however, is implausible.[42] Like any functional fortification wall, the Middle Wall required interior and exterior faces, the former outfitted with stairways or ramps leading to the wall-walk, the latter with towers.[43] Were the structure built, instead, to withstand an assault on either side, it would necessarily have omitted the stairways. Improbably, then, defenders would have had no immediate means of passage between the ground and points along the wall-walk.[44]

If the Middle Wall did not back up both phase Ia Long Walls, then it must have served as a fallback position behind only one of them. The Athenians might have sought a secondary line of defense for either of those structures. On the one hand, the original Athens-Piraeus Long Wall faced Megara and, beyond, the Isthmus of Corinth, whence a land attack would almost certainly originate. Since that structure would therefore bear the brunt of an attack from the west, the Athenians may have sought to provide a fallback position in case of a successful assault on it. On the other hand, they may have become concerned that an enemy could neutralize the Phaleric Wall by successfully bringing off an amphibious landing along the unfortified Bay of Phaleron. Thus, Athenian concern that an enemy could bypass the Athens-Phaleron structure could have justified building a new Long Wall so as to ensure communication between the *asty* and Piraeus.

Two points suggest that the Athenians envisioned falling back to the phase Ib structure from the Long Wall running to Phaleron rather than the one crossing the plain to Piraeus. First, by the time the Athenians built the Middle Wall in the mid-fifth century, the relative importance

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rather than between Athens and Piraeus; see Fornara 1983, 80 no. 79A; Jackson et al. 1998, 104–5 with n. 200.

[42] Cf., however, Gardner 1902, 70–71; Caspari 1914, 247 with n. 22.

[43] For example, the phase III Southern Wall, the eventual successor of the Middle Wall, had stairways along its northern face and towers lining the south side; see Berdeles and Dabaras 1966, 92–95 no. 1 (Elaïs Factory: Neo Phalero), fig. 1; Conwell 1992, 331–34 section S14, 350–53, 405. The features of this structure, however, do not necessarily reflect the characteristics of the Middle Wall. Since the third-phase Long Walls did not include the Phaleric Wall, in that phase the Southern Wall formed the outer line of defense and, therefore, required towers along its south face.

[44] Unless, that is, there existed open space between the two defensible faces, as did the siege wall erected by the Peloponnesians around Plataia early in the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. III.21.1–23.5). Defenders might in that case have accessed the wall-walks from the interior space via ladders or stairways. That structure, however, was both temporary and exceptional.

of their two ports had changed. As noted above, Piraeus had become the principal economic and military harbor, while Phaleron had begun to lapse into obscurity. This development will have caused a reevaluation of the fortification system which secured Athens' connection with its ships. During an emergency, the Athenians would have ranked the security of Piraeus above that of Phaleron.[45] By building a second wall between Athens and Piraeus, Athenian forces could concentrate on maintaining the connection to that city were they unable to hold the Phaleric Long Wall.[46] Defending two structures only 183 m apart constituted a more efficient use of manpower, for the same soldiers could guard them both.[47]

Second, challenges to Athens' naval power in the 440s suggest that the third Long Wall would serve as a secondary line of defense behind the Phaleric Wall. As noted in chapter 2, *ca.* 460 the Athenians had such confidence in their naval prowess that they left the coastline between the structures unfortified. By the time they erected the Middle Wall during the second half of the 440s, however, a similar sense of invincibility likely did not exist. After midcentury, to be sure, Athens was still the leading sea power in the Aegean. The city maintained a powerful navy and could probably expect to control the sea lanes, yet its naval mastery had begun to wane. First, in 446 not only did the Athenians lose their land empire in central Greece and endure a Spartan invasion, but also their Euboian allies revolted. The troubles on this nearby island, with its tribute-paying cities and location astride a key route through the Aegean, demonstrated to the Athenians that their sea power was not beyond challenge. Next, after overcoming the Euboian revolt in 446, Athens did not regain full control of the Delian League for several years. Miletos appears to have rebelled between 447/6 and 443/2, most likely in or after 446,[48] while the tribute lists

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[45] For the link between the new structure and the declining importance of Phaleron relative to Piraeus, see Lenschau 1937, 74; Gomme 1945, 312 *ad* Thuc. I.107.1; Dodds 1959, 210 *ad* Pl. *Grg.* 455e6; Ehrenberg 1973, 216; Garland 2001b, 25. Cf. also the corollary that the construction of shipsheds at Piraeus ended the practice of beaching triremes along the coast of Phaleron Bay, which thereafter did not need to be inside the fortified zone; see Bury and Meiggs 1975, 555; Frost 1998, 156 *ad* Plut. *Them.* 19.3.

[46] For the suggestion that the phase Ia walls were too widely spaced to be defended adequately by the available manpower, see Judeich 1931, 76; Berdeles and Dabaras 1966, 95; Lewis 1992b, 138–39; cf. Adcock 1927a, 167.

[47] Lawrence 1979, 155.

[48] Gorman 2001, 216–36; see also Meiggs 1972, 188, cf. 563–64.

for the years 446/5 through 443/2 show only a gradual recovery in the number of cities in the alliance.[49] Accordingly, still ascendant at sea but chastened by the demonstration of real limits to their power in the Aegean, ca. 443/2 the Athenians will have recognized that their navy was not all-powerful. Understanding that an invasion by sea was no longer out of the question, the Athenians adapted to the new conditions by building a third Long Wall. Should an enemy successfully land on the coastline between the phase Ia structures, Athenian forces could fall back from the Phaleric Wall to the Middle Wall so as to focus on defending communication between Athens and Piraeus.[50] So long as they held that structure together with its northern twin, the *asty* would remain connected to its principal port at Piraeus.

## *Summary*

During the later 440s, the Athenians supplemented the existing two Long Walls (Ia) with a third structure. They are known to have been working on their defenses in 443/2, and the phase Ib Long Wall is the only major fortification project specifically known to have been undertaken during the period 452–431. Identifying the third Long Wall (Ib) with that undertaking suits the historical circumstances. During the second half of the 440s, the Athenians were the leading Aegean sea power, but developments in and after 446 had demonstrated a

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[49] Kagan 1969, 148–49; see also Ehrenberg 1954, 130–31 with table p. 130. Lewis 1992b, 137–38 finds that the tribute lists furnish few signs of trouble in the Delian League immediately after 446; he does, however, document reductions in the assessment for 445, which he characterizes as "conciliatory." Note that the Athenians also reorganized the league in conjunction with the reassessment of tribute in 443/2, a year ahead of schedule, for which see Meritt et al. 1950, 68, 306; Kagan 1969, 148–51; Meiggs 1972, 187. These administrative changes, however, are not necessarily suggestive of discontent among its members. According to Meiggs 1972, 187 and Meiggs and Lewis 1988, 85–86, purely financial considerations might explain not only the reorganization, but also the fact that the changes occurred as part of an extraordinary reassessment. Meritt et al. 1950, 306 and Samons 2000, 80 n. 246 provide alternative explanations of the reassessment.

[50] For the suggestion that the Athenians built the Middle Wall due to the long stretch of unprotected coast between the original two walls, see also Curtius 1891, 112; Meyer 1939, 686–87; Bury and Meiggs 1975, 235–36; Lawrence 1979, 156; Gill 2006, 10. Cf. also Caspari 1914, 243; Adcock 1927a, 167; Adam 1982, 202; Cartwright 1997, 100 *ad* Thuc. II.13; Garland 2001b, 25.

new weakness in their position. Thus, no longer dominant at sea, they built the Middle Wall to back up the phase Ia structure joining Athens with Phaleron. In the event of an amphibious invasion along the open coastline between Piraeus and Phaleron, the Athenians could fall back to the new Long Wall (Ib).

CHAPTER FOUR

# PHASES IA/IB

Functional by the end of the 440s, the new system of Long Walls (Ia/Ib) was not tested until the Peloponnesian War broke out in 431. During enemy occupations, both temporary (431–425) and permanent (413–404), the fortified connection between Athens and its harbors was central to the Athenian war strategy. As Perikles had advised, the Athenians yielded Attika to the enemy, withdrawing from the countryside to the fortified urban complex. Safe behind the walls and the leading, at times the dominant, sea power down to the final stages of the conflict, they could both receive supplies and employ their navy abroad. Early on in the Dekeleian War, the Athenians abandoned the phase Ia Athens-Phaleron wall. Both before and after that development, the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) performed their function successfully, for throughout the Peloponnesian War the connection between Athens and its harbors remained intact.

## *Later 440s–431*

The breakdown of the Thirty Years' Peace began not long after the Athenians completed the system of Long Walls (Ia/Ib). In 439, the Peloponnesian League formally considered intervening in the Samian revolt, a development which suggests that some enemies of Athens no longer felt restrained by the non-aggression pact concluded in 446/5. Ultimately the Peloponnesians decided against becoming involved in the matter, but the Athenians cannot have missed this explicit display of readiness to take up arms against them. In these years Athens was not besieged, so the fortified link to the harbors was never pressed into service. With tension rising from the early 430s, however, the Athenians will have carried out routine maintenance in order to keep the structures ready for use. In the event, the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) became the lynchpin of their strategy as the Peloponnesian War began at the end of the 430s.

## *Perikleian Strategy*

While the Peloponnesians prepared to invade Attika in spring 431, the Athenians implemented the war strategy championed by Perikles during the runup to the conflict. As we will see, that concept depended upon maintaining Athens' connection with its harbors, so the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) now began to serve the purpose for which they had been designed. A summary of Perikleian strategy demonstrates its dependence on the structures.[1]

In 432/1, shortly before the Peloponnesian War broke out, Perikles outlined the strategy which he believed Athens should employ during the conflict. As the Athenian Assembly debated how to respond to the final Spartan embassy, Perikles spoke out:

> If [the Peloponnesians] march against our territory, we shall sail against theirs; and the devastation of a part of the Peloponnesus will be quite a different thing from that of the whole of Attica. For they will be unable to get other territory in its place without fighting, while we have an abundance of territory both in the islands and on the mainland. A great thing, in truth, is the control of the sea. Just consider: if we were islanders, who would be more unassailable? So, even now, we must, as near as may be, imagine ourselves such and relinquish our land and houses, but keep watch over the sea and the city; and we must not give way to resentment against the Peloponnesians on account of our losses and risk a decisive battle with them, far superior in numbers as they are. If we win we shall have to fight them again in undiminished number, and if we fail, our allies, the source of our strength, are lost to us as well; for they will not keep quiet when we are no longer able to proceed in arms against them. And we must not make lament for the loss of houses and land, but for men; for these things do not procure us men, but men these....
>
> Many other considerations also lead me to hope that we shall prove superior, if you will consent not to attempt to extend your empire while you are at war and not to burden yourselves needlessly with dangers of your own choosing; for I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of the enemy's plans.[2] (Loeb: C. F. Smith)

Based on this passage, the strategy advocated by Perikles included the following elements:

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[1] For modern discussions of Perikleian strategy, see Knight 1970, passim; Garlan 1974, 44–65; Cawkwell 1975, passim; Holladay 1978, passim; Spence 1990, passim; Lewis 1992c, 381–88; Ober 1996, passim; Krentz 1997, 61–65; Hanson 1998, 231–33; Podlecki 1998, 143–44; Munn 2000, 76–77; Hanson 2005, 29–30, 61–62.

[2] Thuc. I.143.4–144.1; see also Thuc. II.13.2, 65.7.

1. To avoid engaging the more powerful army of the enemy
2. To employ the Athenian navy rather than the army
3. To carry out military action abroad
4. To refrain from extending the Empire
5. To maintain the allegiance of Athens' allies
6. To rely on land, i.e. provisions,[3] made accessible by Athenian sea power
7. To abandon property outside the *asty* in order to defend the sea lanes as well as Athens

The concept was, then, based on avoidance, abandonment, and naval prowess. When, as expected, the Peloponnesian land army invaded Attika, the Athenians intended to retreat from the countryside where most of them lived.[4] As we know from the actual implementation of the policy, they planned to take refuge behind the urban fortification complex at Athens until the enemy withdrew. The Athenian infantry, due to its inferior numbers, would not march out to engage in set battles with the Peloponnesians. By avoiding losses on land, the Athenians expected to maintain control of their own allies. Enemy hoplites, denied the chance to defeat the Athenians in the field, would ravage the land and property left behind by the residents of the hinterland, who had retreated behind the walls at Athens. Despite losing the harvest, the Athenians could survive thanks to provisions brought by sea,[5] where their dominance ensured a continuous food supply.[6] While refusing hoplite warfare, the Athenians proposed to employ their navy overseas, all the while taking care to avoid overextending themselves. By following this strategy—and as long as they both dominated the sea and held their fortifications against the generally unsophisticated siege techniques of the time[7]—the Athenians might endure enemy occupation of the *chora* indefinitely.

[3] Gomme 1945, 461 *ad* Thuc. I.143.4.

[4] Thuc. II.16.1. See Ober 1996, 76; Hansen 2006, 71.

[5] Thuc. I.81.2.

[6] On Athens' naval superiority at the outset of the war, including sheer numbers of ships, maritime skill and tactics, and command of the sea lanes, see Thuc. I.33.2, 80.4, 121.4, 141.3–4, 142.2–9, II.13.2, 62.2, 87.4–5, 89.3, 93.1, III.32.3; Lewis 1992c, 382; Cawkwell 1997, 43–44 with 43 n. 8.

[7] For the relatively simple machines and methods of siege warfare in the fifth century, see Lawrence 1979, 41–42; Garlan 1989, 122–23 (remarking on p. 123 that the uncomplicated state of poliorcetics at that time meant that "le principal mérite d'un rempart était d'exister"); Garlan 1992, 30–31; Rusch 1997, 905–7, 932–34; Kern 1999, 112–13; Le Bohec-Bouhet 1999, 269; Hanson 2005, 164–65, 174–75, 192–94.

The above passage from Thucydides conveys a remarkably full sense of Perikles' war strategy, but two key issues warrant further consideration. First, although Perikles outlines a largely defensive strategy in Attika, limited Athenian operations against the enemy will have occurred there. We know that certain border forts were garrisoned early on in the Peloponnesian War,[8] and from these locations Athenian troops likely harassed the invaders. In addition, the Athenians sent out the cavalry to harry the Peloponnesians from the beginning of the Archidamian War.[9]

Second, the specific role of Athenian sea power in Perikles' plan is not immediately clear. The quoted passage demonstrates, to be sure, that he recognized the critical importance of keeping Athens' Delian League allies in line.[10] Given the maritime nature of the alliance, this task will have fallen to the city's powerful fleet.[11] Next, let us clarify Perikles' prediction that the Athenians would "sail against" the Peloponnesos. In view of his earlier, hypothetical reference to placing forts (ἐπιτειχίζειν) in enemy territory,[12] this statement has occasioned much discussion. Suggestions that Perikles intended to pursue ambitious offensive activities overseas, such as mounting large-scale blockades or establishing garrisons, are implausible.[13] In fact, his specific intention follows from the comparison in the above passage of the "devastation" to be wrought by the Peloponnesians in Attika, on the one hand, and by Athenian and allied troops in the Peloponnesos, on the other. Perikles' use of the verb τέμνειν, combined with his explicit statement, later in the quoted passage, that the Athenians stood to lose "houses and land," suggests that offensive maneuvers against the Peloponnesians would involve sailing

[8] Ober 1985, 192–93; Spence 1990, 96, 106; Lewis 1992c, 382; Ober 1996, 80–81.

[9] Bugh 1988, 79–80; Spence 1990, 92–93, 102–4; Lewis 1992c, 382; Spence 1993, 129–33; Ober 1996, 80–83; Gaebel 2002, 95.

[10] See also Thuc. II.13.2.

[11] For the navy's activities in connection with rebellions during the Archidamian War, whether directly against Athenian rule or between opposing forces within allied states, see Thuc. III.2.1–6.2, 69.2–81.5, cf. IV.2.3. For other naval involvement by the Athenians with their allies, including tribute collection, see Thuc. II.69.1, III.19.1.

[12] Thuc. I.142.4.

[13] Kagan 1974, 29–31. In recent times, Hanson 2005, 29 has revived the idea that Athens' plan for prosecuting the war by sea including blockading the Peloponnesians. On the issue of establishing overseas forts, or *epiteichismoi*, during the early years of the war, see Holladay 1978, 400–3.

abroad to lay waste to fields and property.[14] As it happened, troops transported by sea engaged in just that sort of activity on a variety of occasions during the first decade of the war.[15]

In addition, the Athenians' fleet took part in a whole host of other activities during the first few years of the war, some or all of which Perikles might have anticipated:

1. pressuring military and mercantile shipping in the Corinthian Gulf;
2. securing the waters surrounding Attika against enemy raids by sea;
3. policing the Aegean to keep essential supply routes open and hinder the Peloponnesian fleet; and
4. supporting both armed intervention in the political affairs of other states and conquest abroad.[16]

As we have seen, Perikleian strategy combined an essentially defensive policy in Attika with limited offensive actions by sea beyond Athenian borders. How did the Long Walls fit into this approach? Although the statesman himself does not explicitly answer this question, one may infer the structures' role from two of the fundamental tenets of Perikleian strategy, retreat from the countryside and reliance on the city's naval strength. Perikles cannot possibly have envisioned these elements of his plan without expecting to have a secure connection between Athens and its harbors. Otherwise, invading Peloponnesian forces would easily undermine his strategy by interposing themselves between Athens and the harbors to the southwest. Trapped in the *asty*, the Athenians would be cut off from their navy, denied access to seaborne provisions, and compelled to surrender by the prospect of starvation. Functioning as

[14] What exactly Perikles hoped to achieve via these raids continues to provoke debate. It is often supposed that he intended to exert pressure, whether economic or psychological, which would have a political impact; so Westlake 1945, 80–84; de Ste. Croix 1972, 209; Garlan 1974, 43; Kagan 1974, 35–36; Spence 1990, 92; Kagan 2003, 52, 77; cf. also Holladay 1978, 401 with n. 10. Ober 1985, 71 and 1996, 78 suggests that Perikles, well aware that such raiding would be futile, intended to boost Athenian morale, while Hanson 2005, 94 finds that the missions were meant to accomplish a variety of aims.

[15] Thuc. II.25.1–26.2, 56.1–6, III.7.2, 91.6, IV.56.1–2. On the character and effect of such amphibious ravaging operations, see Thorne 2001, 236–38.

[16] Pressuring shipping: Thuc. II.69.1, 80.4, 81.1, 83.1–84.4, 85.4, 86.2–92.7. Securing Attika's territorial waters: Thuc. II.26.1, III.51.1–4. Policing the Aegean: Thuc. II.69.1. Intervening in political affairs: Thuc. II.102.1–2. Supporting offensive actions: Thuc. II.30.1–2, 56.4, 58.1–3, 70.1–5. For this list, cf. Adcock 1927b, 195.

expected, the Long Walls provided the all-important connection to the sea without which Perikleian strategy had no hope of success.

### *Perikleian Strategy and the Phase Ia Long Walls*

In view of Perikles' prominence at Athens when the original two Long Walls (Ia) were built (462/1–458/7), one wonders whether or not the structures had always belonged to a policy like the one advocated by the statesman in 432/1. On this matter, modern opinion is divided. Y. Garlan and P. Krentz hold that the essential features of the strategy outlined by Perikles directly before the Peloponnesian War existed when the Long Walls (Ia) were built.[17] Others, including J. Ober and D. Kagan, believe instead that during the march to war at the end of the 430s, Perikles reacted to unique circumstances by developing a plan based on his experience over thirty years as a leader of Athens.[18] One might also consider the possibility that the Athenians had developed a policy akin to Perikleian strategy well before the runup to the Peloponnesian War in the later 430s, if not already when they had built the Long Walls (Ia).

The importance of the phase Ia Long Walls as a fortified link between Athens and its harbors certainly anticipates Perikles' plan in some respects. As outlined in chapter 2, during wartime the structures would have facilitated a navy-based military policy and the transportation of goods from the harbors to the *asty*. Nevertheless, before 431 the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) did not function as part of a strategy fundamentally analogous to the one devised by Perikles.

Let us begin with avoidance, a radical element of Perikleian strategy because it reversed the Greek practice of confronting an invader.[19] At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War both sides recognized that the Spartans and their allies possessed an advantage in land warfare.[20] Because losing a land battle would endanger Athens' naval alliance, in 432/1 Perikles advised the citizenry to avoid such encounters. This premeditated refusal to engage an invading army did not characterize

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[17] Garlan 1974, 49; Krentz 1997, 61–65.

[18] Adcock 1927b, 195; Bury and Meiggs 1975, 252–53; Hammond 1986, 348; Ober 1996, 74–75; Kagan 2003, 51, 60, cf. 59.

[19] Legon 1981, 188–89; Ober 1985, 35; Ober 1996, 66–67, 75; Burke 2005, 19.

[20] Thuc. I.81.1, 121.2, 143.5, IV.12.3; cf. [Xen.] *Ath.* 2.1.

the Athenians' military approach when they began building the Long Walls (Ia) some thirty years earlier.

In the later 460s, and indeed during the Pentekontaetia generally, Athenian military might was formidable.[21] The Athenians were considered preeminent in siege warfare,[22] and—although the entire levy of the Peloponnesian League outnumbered Athens' forces—at this time the Athenians controlled a greater number of citizen hoplite soldiers than did any single state in the Peloponnesos.[23] The actions of the Athenians early on in the First Peloponnesian War, when they took the battle to the enemy, demonstrate how confidently they regarded their own power. Far from refusing land battles or avoiding strong offensive action, in 459 and 458 they attacked the enemy on land at Halieis, in the Megarid, at Tanagra, and at Oinophyta.[24] With their victory at Oinophyta, the Athenians established a land empire stretching from the Megarid to Boiotia. Soon the Athenians pursued seaborne aggression in the form of Tolmides' *periplous* of the Peloponnesos (456),[25] even as they mounted a major expedition to Egypt (459, perhaps, to 454) as part of the ongoing war with Persia.[26] Thus in the 450s Athens' powerful army, along with its prodigious naval resources,[27] enabled the city and its allies to carry on simultaneous wars on two fronts and—at least until the disastrous end of the Egyptian expedition—with much success. If one may assume that the strategic policy according to which the Athenians were fighting in these years at least generally resembled the one which had produced the Long Walls (Ia) immediately before the war, then the concept shared little with Perikles' willingness to acknowledge Athenian weakness on land and, accordingly, refrain from both infantry warfare and aggressive initiatives overseas.

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[21] Stadter 1993, 48 remarks that "in Thucydides' narrative the Pentecontaetia is dominated by a strong, aggressive, and ceaselessly active Athens."

[22] Thuc. I.102.2.

[23] Hammond 1986, 296–97. According to Thucydides (I.107.5), the army which fought the Peloponnesians at Tanagra amounted to 14,000 men, including the Athenians in full force plus allied contingents, among them 1,000 soldiers from Argos. Following Jones 1957, 161, the Athenians could probably field more than 10,000 hoplites in this period.

[24] For the historical narrative, see Bury and Meiggs 1975, 218–19, 220–21; Sealey 1976, 268–71; Lewis 1992a, 112–15. On dating the events, see Lewis 1992d, 500–1 §5.

[25] Lewis 1992a, 117–19.

[26] Bury and Meiggs 1975, 219–20, 221; Sealey 1976, 271–72; Rhodes 1992a, 50–53; Pomeroy et al. 2004, 144–45. On the dates of the expedition, see Lewis 1992d, 500–1 §5.

[27] Hammond 1986, 297–98.

Although a strategy of avoiding battle did not exist at Athens at the end of the 460s, such an approach may have been developed before the end of the 430s.[28] The most likely moment would have been in 446, when Boiotia, Euboia, and Megara revolted from the Athenians,[29] thus precipitating the end of Athens' land empire in central Greece. Athens had suddenly become vulnerable to an attack from the Peloponnesos,[30] and in the midst of the crisis Perikles was forced to return with his army from Euboia to Athens because a Peloponnesian army was actually preparing to invade Attika.[31] As it happened, the invasion occurred but did not progress beyond Eleusis and Thria.[32] G. E. M. de Ste. Croix has suggested that, because Athens' highest priority at this time will have been the reduction of Euboia, Athenian troops might have remained behind their fortifications rather than risk their fighting strength in battle against the invaders.[33] As de Ste. Croix himself admits, however, the actual evidence is inconclusive, so this suggestion remains speculative.

As for abandonment, another pillar of Perikleian strategy, P. Krentz has suggested that, by the time Perikles outlined his Peloponnesian War strategy in 432/1, the idea of giving up the countryside to an invading army was already an established concept at Athens.[34] Naturally the Athenians were prepared to use their fortifications, if necessary, and in ancient Greece evacuating the countryside temporarily was the obvious, oft-practiced option in an emergency.[35] In addition, one might suppose that the Athenian abandonment of the *asty* and the *chora* already in 480,[36] which belonged to a successful strategy, established flight without

[28] According to Herodotos (I.17.1–22.4), Miletos had employed a withdrawal strategy already in the Archaic period. For twelve years during the later seventh century, first under King Sadyattes and then under King Alyattes, the Lydians invaded Milesian territory and ravaged the countryside. Herodotos' account implies that the Milesian populace took shelter behind the city fortifications during the invasions, and there is no suggestion that Miletos's army offered battle before the annual abandonment of the countryside. See, generally, Moles 1996, 260–61; Gorman 2001, 122 with n. 61; Greaves 2002, 101.

[29] Thuc. I.113.1–114.3; Plut. *Per.* 22.1.

[30] Cf. Kagan 1969, 86.

[31] Thuc. I.114.1; Plut. *Per.* 22.1.

[32] Thuc. I.114.2, II.21.1.

[33] De Ste. Croix 1972, 198–99. Cf. Plut. *Per.* 22.2; Will 1999, 265.

[34] Krentz 1997, 64. Cf. Lewis 1992c, 382; Meier 1999, 316; Hanson 2005, 26, cf. 54.

[35] Hanson 1998, 103–21.

[36] Hdt. VIII.40.1, 41.1–3; Thuc. I.18.2, 89.3; Plut. *Them.* 10.8–10, *Cim.* 5.2–3; cf. Meiggs and Lewis 1988, 48–52 no. 23 lines 6–10 = "decree of Themistocles."

offering battle as an acceptable policy precedent. Themistokles, for his part, had advocated a standing policy of withdrawal from Athens to the fortified naval base at Piraeus should defending the *asty* prove impossible.[37] There the Athenians would need to defend only the circuit wall of that city, leaving the rest of the population free for naval duty.

The context in which the Athenians built the Long Walls (Ia), however, had little in common with the circumstances of the invasions by the Persians (480) and the Peloponnesians (431). In those situations, the Athenians evacuated the countryside because they believed that they could not prevail in land battle against the enemy. In contrast, when the Long Walls (Ia) were built, Athens' powerful army—which would have strongly opposed a standing policy of abandonment because of the traditional focus on confronting an invader (see above)[38]—would hardly have retreated before offering battle. Moreover, the Athenian alliance with Megara (462) and subsequent conquest of Boiotia (458) meant that the city could not be directly attacked from the Peloponnesos, at least not until it lost control of those territories in 446. Consequently, during most of the First Peloponnesian War the Athenians doubtless retained the prospect of evacuation as an emergency measure but had little expectation that it would become necessary. One might suppose that the Spartan invasion of Attika at the very end of the conflict prompted the population living outside the *asty* to retreat behind the walls of the urban defensive system, but that hypothesis amounts to a guess.

While abandoning the *chora* probably existed as an option of last resort when the Athenians began building the Long Walls (Ia) in the late 460s, certainly it was not a premeditated feature of policy. In the first place, although Themistokles had advocated retreating to Piraeus in an emergency, nothing suggests that his plan was ever approved and implemented. Indeed, the construction of the Long Walls (Ia) beginning in the late 460s—permanent structures built at great cost—demonstrates decisive rejection of any such plan to retreat from the *asty*. Second, when Perikles outlined his Peloponnesian War strategy at the end of the 430s, he had to exhort the citizens as to the wisdom of abandoning the countryside.[39] Loathe to evacuate the *chora* in 432/1, partly due to

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[37] Thuc. I.93.7.

[38] Cf. Burke 2005, 19–21 concerning the tension in Athens during the first Peloponnesian invasion of Attika in 431.

[39] Thuc. I.143.5, II.14, 16.2.

the effects of the abandonment carried out in 480, the Athenians seem not even to have regarded the measure as consistent with existing policy. Third, in 431 the circumstances of the evacuation itself demonstrate that abandoning the countryside ran contrary to current policy. The situation, according to Thucydides, was chaotic.[40] Lacking direction from a central authority, refugees found shelter wherever they could. In their desperation they occupied sacred ground in defiance of religious scruples and settled in the towers of the Athenian circuit despite the obvious impediment this would pose for efficient defense of the walls. Had the Athenians over many years or even several decades envisioned retreating to Athens upon the arrival of the enemy in Attika, one would legitimately expect them to have developed systematic plans which to facilitate the initiative more efficiently.

In sum, certainly one may recognize a kinship between the strategy underpinning the phase Ia Long Walls and the concept applied beginning in 431. In both approaches, the structures served primarily to maintain a safe connection between the inland *asty* and its harbors. However, there existed a profound difference between the circumstances operating during the period when the Long Walls (Ia) were built and the critical moment when Perikles convinced the Athenians to accept his strategy some thirty years later. Earlier on, aggression had been the order of the day for both the army and the navy: the Athenians possessed substantial hoplite forces and pressed offensives by land and sea near Attika, elsewhere in Greece, as well as across the Mediterranean. Hardly predisposed to abandon Attika to the enemy, ca. 460 they will have envisioned giving up the countryside as no more than a last resort. Not until the dawn of the Peloponnesian War, then, did the Athenians incorporate first-choice retreat from both battle and the countryside in their strategic policy.

## *431–425*

The Long Walls (Ia/Ib) proved vital to Athenian security during the first part of the great conflict, the Archidamian War (431–421). In spring 431, the Athenians implemented Perikleian strategy. Facing the first Peloponnesian invasion, the residents of Attika gathered up their

[40] Thuc. II.17.1–3.

household possessions and retreated behind the defenses at Athens.[41] The Peloponnesians occupied Attika each summer thereafter down to 425, except in 429 and 426.[42] Although Thucydides refers just once to the abandonment of the countryside during the post-431 invasions,[43] his narrative leaves little doubt that the rural population retreated to Athens during the temporary Peloponnesian forays into Attika. Aristophanes' many references to the refugees support this point,[44] while one of them suggests that in fact the squatters did not all return to their extramural homes between invasions.[45] During the short periods of enemy occupation, the longest of which lasted for about forty days (430), the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) secured the connection between the *asty* and its harbors. Thus, even as the enemy ravaged the hinterland,[46] the structures enabled the bloated population behind the urban defenses to survive on provisions brought by sea, while warships sailed freely to and from Athenian harbors.

Although there is no evidence that the structures were actually assaulted in this period, the danger was real. In 431, for example, King Archidamos of Sparta, the leader of the Peloponnesian forces, had contemplated ravaging Athenian territory right up to the walls of Athens.[47] For this reason the two outer, phase Ia Long Walls were guarded at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War in 431.[48] During the enemy's repeated invasions thereafter, the Athenians doubtless paid careful attention to their fortifications, likely instituting measures similar

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[41] Thuc. II.14.1–2, 18.4.

[42] Thucydides' references to the invasions are provided in chapter 1. The Peloponnesians did not invade Attika in 429 (Thuc. II.71.1), perhaps for fear of the plague ravaging Athens at the time (cf. Thuc. II.57.1), and aborted their invasion in 426 due to earthquakes (Thuc. III.89.1). For description and discussion of each occupation, see Hanson 1998, 132–36; Hanson 2005, 48–59.

[43] Thuc. II.52.1, cf. 55.2 (430).

[44] See, for example, Ar. *Ach.* 32–36, *Eq.* 792–794, *Pax* 550–604, 632–640; Hanson 1998, 136 provides additional citations. A fragment of Andokides (fr. inc. 4 Blass) has been thought to refer to conditions at Athens during the Archidamian War; so Blass 1880, 109 note *ad* Andoc. fr. inc. 4; Jebb 1893, 105; Maidment 1941, 583 *ad* Andoc. fr. inc. 1; cf. Blass 1887, 310–11. Ober 1985, 53–54 finds, instead, that the fragment ought to belong to an oration delivered after 404.

[45] Ar. *Eq.* 792–794; so also Gomme 1956, 158 *ad* Thuc. II.52.1; Jones 1975, 133 n. 41.

[46] On the effects of Peloponnesian ravaging in Attika during the Archidamian War, see Hanson 1996, 297–98, 300; Hanson 1998, 132–53, 233–35; Chandezon 1999, 199–201; Thorne 2001, 248–52; Hanson 2005, 35–37, 52, 53–54, 55–57.

[47] Thuc. II.20.4.

[48] Thuc. II.13.7.

to those which they employed later in the war. In the context of the profanation of the Mysteries in 415, a force of Spartans appeared at the Isthmus of Corinth and Boiotian troops massed on the border of Attika.[49] Fearing treachery, if not an invasion, armed Athenian troops and cavalry mustered for the night at key points inside the fortified urban zone.[50] According to Andokides, one of these sites was a Theseion between the Long Walls (fig. 3: T). More generally, after the installation of the Peloponnesian garrison at Dekeleia in 413, the Athenians constantly guarded their fortifications—the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) included.[51] At a minimum, then, during the Archidamian War the Athenians will have manned the walls at all times while the Peloponnesians were in Attika. If enemy troops were known to be close enough to Athens to mount an assault in short order, reinforcements would have taken up positions inside the city, thus facilitating rapid movement to any part of the fortifications.

In addition to safeguarding the movement of troops, goods, and communication during the enemy invasions down to 425, the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) served also to shelter part of the Athenian population. For the evidence, let us begin with Thucydides, who describes the situation at Athens as residents of Attika began to retreat from the countryside in 431:

> And they began to bring in from the fields their children and wives, and also their household furniture, pulling down even the woodwork of the houses themselves; but sheep and draught-animals they sent over to Euboea and the adjacent islands....
>
> And when they came to the capital, only a few of them were provided with dwellings or places of refuge with friends or relatives, and most of them took up their abode in the vacant places of the city and the sanctuaries and the shrines of heroes, all except the Acropolis and the Eleusinium and any other precinct that could be securely closed. And the Pelargicum, as it was called, at the foot of the Acropolis, although it was under a curse that forbade its use for residence, and this was also prohibited by a verse-end of a Pythian oracle to the following effect:

[49] Thuc. VI.61.2; Andoc. 1.45.

[50] Thuc. VI.61.3; Andoc. 1.45; cf. also Xen. *Hell.* II.4.24 (403).

[51] Thuc. VII.28.2 (413), VIII.69.1 (411), 71.1 (411); Ar. *Th.* 493–496 (likely produced in 411); Polyaen. I.40.3 (407); cf. Front. *Strat.* III.12.1 (407).

"The Pelargicum unoccupied is better,"
nevertheless under stress of the emergency was completely filled with buildings.... Many also established themselves in the towers of the city walls, and wherever each one could find a place; for the city did not have room for them when they were all there together. But afterwards they distributed into lots and occupied the space between the Long Walls and the greater part of the Peiraeus.[52] (Loeb: C. F. Smith)

Long after the fifth century, Lucian attacked the historian Crepereius Calpurnianus for transparently emulating Thucydides. After showing how his target had copied the manner in which Thucydides began the history of the Peloponnesian War, Lucian asks rhetorically:

> After a beginning like that why should I tell you the rest...what sort of plague [Crepereius Calpurnianus] brought down on the people of Nisibis who declined to take the Roman side (he lifted that from Thucydides in its entirety except for the Pelasgicum and the Long Walls, where those who had at that time caught the plague had settled)?[53] (Loeb: K. Kilburn)

Lastly, Andokides describes how the Athenian *Boule* reacted to testimony by a certain Diokleides following the mutilation of the Herms in 415:

> The Council adjourned for a private consultation and in the course of it gave orders for our arrest and close confinement. Then they summoned the Generals and bade them proclaim that citizens resident in Athens proper were to proceed under arms to the Agora; those between the Long Walls to the Theseum; and those in Peiraeus to the Agora of Hippodamus.[54] (Loeb: K. J. Maidment)

Thucydides shows that Athenians fleeing the first Peloponnesian invasion (431) initially crowded into *asty*. There they settled even in the towers of the fortifications, sanctuaries, and—in defiance of a curse—the Pelargikon.[55] Only as a last resort did the refugees occupy Piraeus and the space behind the Long Walls of phases Ia/Ib, which suggests that

[52] Thuc. II.14.1, 17.1, 17.3.
[53] Lucian, *Hist. conscr.* 15.
[54] Andoc. 1.45.
[55] Thuc. II.17.1–3; for the refugees' makeshift accomodations, see also Ar. *Eq.* 792–794. Winter 1971, 162 points out that the authorities would hardly have allowed people to take up residence where they might have hindered efforts to defend the city; he suggests that, instead, the refugees inhabited the hollow ground-level stories of the towers. For archaeological documentation of the crowded conditions in the *asty*, see Thompson and Wycherley 1972, 56–57; Townsend 1995, 18–23; Lawall 2000, 83–84.

one should not imagine the defensible zone between Athens and the sea teeming with refugees. This point finds some support in Thucydides' description of conditions during the second Peloponnesian invasion (430).[56] At that time, with the plague wreaking havoc among the Athenians, the arrival of country residents in the *asty* magnified the distress. Presumably the crowding would not have so sharply aggravated the situation had large numbers of refugees settled in the huge space between the phase Ia Long Walls (fig. 2).[57] Although no specific evidence indicates where the country residents settled during subsequent enemy incursions down to 425, there is no reason to assume that they behaved any differently than they had in 431 and, apparently, 430.

That the refugees from Attika settled between the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) only when they had no other option is at first surprising. One might suppose that the basic amenities of the region, such as water supply, markets, and latrines, could not meet the basic needs of a bloated population over an extended period. As noted in the first chapter, however, the coastal plain seems to have had a moderate supply of water. As well, even though Piraeus was a well-appointed urban zone with sufficient water,[58] that city, too, was settled only as a last resort. Perhaps, then, the coastal plain was deemed unsafe due to the unfortified coast along the Bay of Phaleron. This explanation is at least consistent with the testimony of Andokides that the area between the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) was occupied as late as 415, a decade after the Peloponnesian invasions had ceased.[59] While the war continued beyond the borders of Attika after 425, some former refugees—having found the area congenial enough—had felt sufficiently secure to take up permanent residence.

To return to the plague which struck Athens early in the Archidamian War, Lucian indicates that the region between the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) included camps populated by victims of the disease. The suggestion is superficially attractive, for (1) the Athenians do seem to have recognized the contagious nature of the malady,[60] (2) Thucydides, at least, understood

[56] Thuc. II.52.1–3.

[57] For discussion of this point, I am much indebted to Prof. Dr. K.-H. Leven.

[58] For ancient remains associated with the water supply at Piraeus, particularly wells and cisterns, see von Eickstedt 1991, 121–33, 194–237, 265–71, suppl. 3; Garland 2001b, 145, 215.

[59] Note also Ar. *Eq.* 792–794, a reference to squatters in the year 424.

[60] Thuc. II.51.4–5; cf. Thuc. II.47.4. See Leven 2000, 81.

that the crowding magnified the disaster,[61] and (3) fear of infection prompted a degree of house-by-house isolation.[62] However, one hears nothing from Thucydides about the segregation of plague victims in camps. Instead, the historian describes how they continued to live at home or, if they were refugees from the countryside, wherever they had found shelter.[63] Since contemporary evidence does not suggest that the Athenians were inclined to isolate victims of the plague, one may doubt Lucian's unconfirmed report.

### *425–413*

In the year 425, Athenian forces captured Spartan hoplites on Sphakteria and threatened to put them to death should Peloponnesian forces invade Attika thereafter.[64] As a result, the Peloponnesian incursions into Attika ceased, and for some twelve years the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) did not play a role in military affairs. At the beginning of the Dekeleian War (413–404), the final phase of the Peloponnesian War, the fortified link between the *asty* and its harbors once again became essential to the Athenians' survival.

### *413–404*

In spring 413, Peloponnesian forces marched into Attika, just as they had done repeatedly between 431 and 425. This time, however, the enemy would not depart after occupying the countryside for a period of weeks. Alkibiades had earlier advised the Spartan assembly to fortify the hill of Dekeleia, northeast of Athens,[65] and now the Peloponnesians installed a permanent garrison at the site.[66] The Athenians reacted by reviving the domestic features of Perikleian strategy, for without giving battle they retreated behind the city defenses, there to rely on seaborne

[61] Thuc. II.52.1. Later authors believed that there was a causal connection between the crowding and the disease; see Diod. XII.45.2; Plut. *Per.* 34.5.

[62] Thuc. II.51.5.

[63] Thuc. II.51.5, 52.2–3.

[64] Thuc. IV.41.1.

[65] Thuc. VI.91.6–7, VII.18.1; Lys. 14.30; Diod. XIII.9.2.

[66] For construction of the fort, see Thuc. VII.19.1–3, 20.1, 27.3, 42.2, 47.4. For its purpose, see Thuc. VI.91.7, 92.5, VII.18.1–2, 19.2, 27.3.

provisions.[67] Judging by the Peloponnesians' continuing presence at Dekeleia, even in winter,[68] contemporary references stating that the fort deprived the Athenians of Attika,[69] and the crowded living conditions between the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) after Aigospotamoi (405),[70] most refugees from the countryside were forced to remain behind the walls of Athens' fortification system right down to the end of the Peloponnesian War in spring 404.[71] Thus, even as lasting Peloponnesian control of the countryside now inflicted greater psychological and economic suffering on the Athenians than had the relatively short invasions between 431 and 425,[72] so also the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) acquired greater importance as compared to the period of the Archidamian War. No longer able to return to their livelihoods following the withdrawal of the enemy,[73] during the Dekeleian War the Athenians relied for years on goods brought from the harbors to the *asty* via the Long Walls (Ia/Ib).

The effectiveness of those structures, of course, depended on Athenian sea power. Following the disastrous Sicilian Expedition (415–413), the Athenians could no longer dominate the sea lanes.[74] Their navy was dangerously depleted,[75] and in 413 the Peloponnesians began preparations for an Aegean war.[76] Without ample Persian support, however,

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[67] For the apparent lack of resistance to the Peloponnesian invasion in spring 413, cf. Thuc. VII.19.1; for Athenian reliance on imports, see Thuc. VII.28.1; Xen. *Hell.* I.1.35.

[68] Thuc. VII.28.2, 42.2, VIII.3.1, 5.3, 69.1, 70.2–71.3, 98.1; Xen. *Hell.* I.1.33–35, 2.14, 3.22, II.2.7; *Hell. Oxy.* 20.4 Chambers.

[69] Thuc. VII.27.5–28.1, VIII.95.2; Xen. *Hell.* I.1.35.

[70] Xen. *Hell.* II.2.3. In a comedy dated to 412, Eupolis (*Demoi*, fr. 99 lines 11–14 K-A) refers to the residents of the Long Walls. However, this testimony should not serve as evidence for the abandonment of the countryside due to the fort at Dekeleia, because the presence of the fort contributes to the dating of the play.

[71] Hanson 1998, 161–66, 171–72 shows that some parts of Attika remained cultivated and inhabited during the Dekeleian War; see also the shorter statements by Burford 1993, 161–62; Hanson 1996, 297–98, 300; Telò and Porciani 2002, 29 with n. 28. For the marginal farmland, which by reason of its remoteness was more likely to remain under cultivation, see Krasilnikoff 2000, 180–82.

[72] Thuc. VII.27.3–28.2, VIII.69.1; *Hell. Oxy.* 20.4 Chambers; cf. Isoc. 8.92. In general, see Kagan 1981, 291–92; Strauss 1986, 43–45; Hanson 1998, 138–39; Thorne 2001, 239; Hanson 2005, 60. For a detailed study of the nature of agricultural damage in Attika during the Dekeleian War, see Hanson 1998, 153–73, 237–46, who shows that modern authors tend to exaggerate the harm done to agriculture.

[73] Thuc. VII.27.4; cf. *Hell. Oxy.* 20.5 Chambers.

[74] For detailed discussion of fluctuations in sea power during this period, see Kagan 1987, passim; Munn 2000, 127–206; Hanson 2005, 273–85.

[75] Thuc. II.65.12, VIII.1.2.

[76] Kagan 1987, 2–3, 14–16; Hanson 2005, 271–74.

the Peloponnesians could not take control of the sea.[77] Thus, although Athenian naval strength was shaken at times after 413,[78] in general Athens managed through such important naval victories as Kynossema (411), Kyzikos (410), and Arginusai (406) to remain the leading power in the Aegean. Not until 405 were the Peloponnesians, led by the capable admiral Lysandros and supported by Persian funds, able to mount a decisive challenge to Athenian naval strength.[79] In fact the safe arrival of provisions in the harbors is known to have frustrated King Agis, the commander of the Dekeleia garrison, in 410.[80]

Although the Athenians remained strong enough at sea to maintain a domestic strategy involving the Long Walls (Ia/Ib), developments early in the Dekeleian War caused them to modify the layout of those structures. In or soon after 413 they abandoned the Phaleric Wall, the location of which had previously spurred the construction of the Middle Wall as a secondary line of defense. Written sources hint that this important change in Athens' system of defenses occurred before the construction of the phase II Long Walls in the later 390s, for all of the unambiguous references to the Phaleric Wall pertain to the fifth century.[81] In addition, authors who specifically identify the second-, third-, and fourth-phase Long Walls allude only to the Athens-Piraeus structures.[82]

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[77] Kagan 1987, 16; see also Hanson 2005, 273, 276–78.

[78] Having failed to seize Miletos, for example, in 412/11, the Athenians began to lose control of the eastern Aegean, forfeited Abydos, with its crucial location in the Hellespont, and were unable to sustain their blockade of Chios (Kagan 1987, 69–105; Andrewes 1992, 470–71, 474). A serious crisis developed after most of Euboia successfully rebelled in 411 (Kagan 1987, 198–200; Andrewes 1992, 480). Hanson 2005, 271–72 considers the weakened state of the Athenian navy after 413.

[79] For Persian support, see Thuc. II.65.12; Xen. *Hell.* II.1.12, 14; Diod. XIII.104.3–4; Plut. *Lys.* 9.2; Munn 2000, 196–97; Kagan 2003, 469–71; Hanson 2005, 273.

[80] Xen. *Hell.* I.1.35.

[81] Thuc. I.107.1, II.13.7 with schol.; Harp. Δ 44 Keaney (s.vv. Διὰ μέσου τείχους), followed by Phot. Δ 383 Theodoridis (s.vv. Διὰ μέσου τείχους) and Suda, Δ 652 Adler (s.vv. Διὰ μέσου τείχους); Aristodem. *FGrHist* 104 F 1.5 §4; cf. also schol. *ad* Pl. *Grg.* 455e = Olymp. *in Grg.* 7.3. A third-century BC papyrus which supposedly refers to the Athens-Phaleron wall does not clearly place the structure in a pre-404 context (Anon. Periegete, *FGrHist* 369 F 1, col. II §§4–5 lines 25–27: Ἐκ [δὲ Φαλήρου ὑπὲρ τὴν] Σικελίαν προῄε[ι ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ τριά]κοντα σταδίου[ς τρίτον (?) τεῖχος]. If these heavily restored lines in fact have to do with the Phaleric Wall, one might find some significance in the reference to that structure in the past tense even as the present tense is used of the phase IV Athens-Piraeus walls (lines 20–27). Thus, U. Wilcken 1910, 220–21 supposes that the structures linking Athens with Piraeus were still standing when its author wrote, while the Phaleric Wall was not.

[82] [Scyl.] *Perip.* 57; Anon. Periegete, *FGrHist* 369 F 1, col. II §4 lines 22 (restored), 23; *Anth. Pal.* [Theodorid.] VII no. 406; Str. IX.1.15; Liv. XXXI.26.8, XLV.27.11; Prop.

Dating the abandonment of the Phaleric Wall to the period of the Peloponnesian War follows from several sources. Thucydides shows that the Athens-Phaleron wall was under guard when the Peloponnesian War broke out in 431 (above, chapter 3),[83] while we know from Xenophon that by 405 only the two Long Walls (Ia/Ib) joining Athens with Piraeus were still functioning (chapter 1). One may raise Xenophon's *terminus ante quem* based on Polyainos' report that in 407 Alkibiades concerned himself with the wakefulness of the guards on the fortifications:

> Because he wanted to make sure the guards of the city and the Piraeus and the walls to the sea [τῶν σκελῶν τῶν ἄχρι θαλάσσης] stayed awake on duty when the Lacedaemonians were besieging Athens, Alcibiades announced that he would lift up a torch from the acropolis three times during the night, and that whoever did not lift up his torch in response would be punished as having deserted his watch. So all the guards remained awake, looking at the acropolis, so that when the general raised the fire they could respond, signaling that they were awake on guard.[84]

Polyainos' reference to the Long Walls as *skelon*, "legs," ought to mean that there were only two such structures at the time. The omission of Phaleron from the report suggests that the two "walls to the sea" which were functioning in 407 did not include the one linking Athens with that port.[85]

Scholars have never agreed as to when the Athenians abandoned the Phaleric Wall. Many suggest that the structure became obsolete either upon the construction of the Middle Wall or soon thereafter.[86]

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III.21.24; Paus. I.2.2; Eust. *Il.* 2.356; schol. *ad* Aristid. 1.351 L-B; cf. Str. IX.1.24.

[83] Thuc. II.13.7.

[84] Polyaen. I.40.3, as translated by Krentz and Wheeler 1994, 85; cf. Front. *Strat.* III.12.1.

[85] A fragment of Eupolis (*Demoi*, fr. 99 lines 11–14 K-A) initially seems useful in dating the demise of the Phaleric Wall. Its use of the dual in reference to the people living between the structures in 412, τοὺς ἐν μακροῖν τειχοῖν, might suggest that only two Long Walls were functioning, or actively guarded, early in the Dekeleian War. The poet, however, is concerned with the residents of the space between the Long Walls, so he is referring to the two structures which defined that area at its greatest extent. In 412, the phase Ia walls, including the structure joining Athens with Phaleron, may have served that purpose, regardless of the phase Ib wall.

[86] Garlan 1974; 48; Bury and Meiggs 1975, 555; Sealey 1976, 302; Bengtson 1977, 202; Adam 1982, 202; Corso 1986, 60 n. 7; Edwards 1995, 171 *ad* Andoc. 1.45; Adkins and Adkins 1997, 113; Connolly and Dodge 1998, 13, 21; Garland 2001b, 25.

According to Thucydides, however, it was still functioning in 431. Others recognize that the Athenians abandoned the Athens-Phaleron structure during the Peloponnesian War,[87] and several specific alternatives deserve closer scrutiny.

John Day argues that the Athenians gave up the structure "probably within a few days" of the speech during 431 in which Perikles outlined his war strategy.[88] As Perikles spoke, the Peloponnesians were mustering for the initial invasion of Attika.[89] Afterwards, the residents of the countryside began to withdraw behind the fortifications at Athens,[90] leading to severe crowding.[91] Day believes that the apparent scarcity of space demonstrates that the Phaleric Wall was no longer functioning, for otherwise the large area protected by the structure would have relieved the crowding described by Thucydides. However, as noted above, based on the historian's description of the situation at Athens in 431, the refugees crowded into the *asty* because they did not wish to settle elsewhere—not because space between the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) was limited.

A. Passow proposes that the Athenians abandoned the Phaleric Wall during the early years of the Peloponnesian War.[92] In a comedy dated to 424, Aristophanes employs the verb *diateichizein* in stating that Kleon "partitioned" Athens.[93] Scholia on the passage explain that wartime conditions had produced a shortage of both money and defenders, forcing the Athenians to contract their fortifications. Based on these written sources, Passow holds that Kleon built a cross wall, or *diateichisma*, in order to shorten Athens' defenses.[94] Moreover, he supposes that the Athenians may at the same time have abandoned the Athens-Phaleron Long Wall (Ia). In Passow's opinion, this context is appropriate because the ancient

[87] Given up during the conflict: A. Passow in Ulrichs 1863, 167–68; Wachsmuth 1874, 329; Milchhöfer 1881, 30; Milchhöfer 1887, 1196; Frazer 1898, 39; Wilcken 1910, 220; Scranton 1938, 528; Garland 2001b, 169 (allowing the alternative that the structure was destroyed during the war). Abandoned towards the end of the war: Bursian 1862, 268; Judeich 1931, 81, 155; Maier 1959, 21.

[88] Day 1928, 177–78, with reference to Thuc. II.13.2–9.

[89] Thuc. II.13.1.

[90] Thuc. II.14.1.

[91] Thuc. II.17.1, 3, 52.1–4.

[92] Passow in Ulrichs 1863, 167–68.

[93] Ar. *Eq.* 817–818.

[94] Passow recognizes the extant fortification wall crossing the Pnyx Range (fig. 8 no. 2) as the structure attributed to Kleon, and he believes that Kleon's wall is the *diateichisma* known from the inscription *IG* II² 463. Both the date of the cross wall and the identity of the *diateichisma* known from the inscription are discussed in chapter 7.

sources allude to a shortage of manpower, and the two structures joining Athens and Piraeus were so close to each other that the Athenians would have required fewer men to defend them than was the case when the distant Phaleric Wall was in service. This last point is sensible, to be sure, but none of the evidence explicitly applies to the Phaleric Wall. More problematic is the ambiguity of Aristophanes' comic allusion to Kleon. Although it could conceivably document the construction of a fortification wall,[95] alternative interpretations of the evidence are possible. R. L. Scranton supposes that Kleon had simply announced his desire to build a *diateichisma*,[96] while a recent study suggests that one should take the reference in a metaphorical sense.[97]

Based on a prophecy issued by the oracle at Dodona, H. G. Lolling suggests that the Phaleric Wall had met its demise before the departure of the Sicilian Expedition in 415.[98] According to the late authors who mention it, the prophecy directed the Athenians either to colonize Sikelia[99] or to annex it to the city of Athens.[100] They also assert that, whereas the Athenians had thought that the oracle involved the island of Sicily, it actually referred to Sikelia Hill immediately south of the *asty* (fig. 3). For Lolling, if it was necessary in 415 to make that hill part of the city, then the Phaleric Wall—which would have done so—must no longer have been functioning. The cited evidence, however, can hardly bear the weight of this hypothesis. Neither anecdotal passages purporting to explain the disastrous decision to invade Sicily[101] nor later authors' interpretations of such reports are convincing.

A. W. Gomme believes that the Phaleric Wall may still have been functioning after Peloponnesian forces occupied Dekeleia in 413. He reasons that the great triangular space protected by that wall on one side perhaps sheltered some of the large numbers of country residents driven into the urban complex by the presence of the enemy.[102] This view probably overestimates the size of the refugee population at

[95] See, in addition to Passow, Judeich 1931, 81, 161–62; Boersma 1970, 156 no. 10; Martin 1974, 194.
[96] Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 336.
[97] Sokolicek 2003, 66, 71, 78, 123, 125–40, 203, 268.
[98] Lolling 1896, 346.
[99] Paus. VIII.11.12.
[100] D. Chrys. 17.17.
[101] Cf. Dover in Gomme et al. 1970, 197 *ad* Thuc. VI.1.1 for references to other ancient stories foretelling the expedition's doom.
[102] Gomme 1945, 312 *ad* Thuc. I.107.1.

Athens during the Dekeleian War. In the first place, as noted above, some parts of Attika retained their inhabitants despite the presence of a Peloponnesian garrison at Dekeleia, so space for the entire population of Attika was not required behind Athens' walls. In addition, the Athenian population declined dramatically during the Peloponnesian War.[103] The most devastating of the various contributing factors was the plague (430–427),[104] which reduced the population by one quarter or more.[105] Its impact among women of child-bearing age would have slowed any subsequent recovery; thus, although by the year 415 the Athenian army may have restored the losses in manpower brought on by the plague and the war,[106] the recovery in military enrollment did not apply to the population in general. In short, if the Athenians had settled between the Long Walls (Ia) only as a last resort in 431, before the loss of so many people, then in and after 413 the markedly smaller population need not have required the huge space between the phase Ia structures.

At what point between 431 and 407, then, did the Athenians perceive that the Phaleric Wall was a liability? It is unlikely that they would have modified Athens' system of defenses before the Dekeleian War. During the Archidamian War (431–421), the fortifications functioned successfully in the face of repeated Peloponnesian invasions. Due to the lull in direct encounters with Sparta after the Peace of Nikias (421), the Athenians will likewise have had no compelling reason to alter their defenses down to 415. The same consideration applies to most of the period taken up with the Sicilian Expedition (415–413). While the Athenians were preoccupied in the West, the Spartans remained

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[103] See, for example, Jones 1957, 180; Strauss 1986, 70; Hansen 1988, table p. 27 (adult male citizens only); Stockton 1990, 17; Hornblower 2002, 202–3; Hanson 2005, 296.

[104] See Jones 1957, 180.

[105] Thucydides (II.47.3, 51.4–52.4, III.87.2–3) stresses the plague's staggering impact on the Athenian population. Modern scholars estimate that the epidemic decreased the Athenian population by about one quarter (Beloch 1923, 393; Leven 1991, 145–46), one third (Stockton 1990, 17; Kagan 2003, 78, 327, 487; cf. Hanson 2005, 14), or one quarter to one third (Strauss 1986, 75–76; Hanson 2005, 82, cf. 46, 79–80, 311). For a clear summary of related issues, see Strauss 1986, 75–76. Apart from plague-induced losses, the local population declined during the war due to both emigration (some 2,000 colonists plus their families, according to Hansen 1988, 19) and, probably, the departure of metics and resident aliens in response to declining economic opportunities (Strauss 1986, 74).

[106] Thuc. VI.26.2.

quiescent on the mainland—at least until spring 413 when they installed the garrison at Dekeleia.

Serious setbacks in 413 likely drove the Athenians' decision to modify the system of Long Walls (Ia/Ib). The chief catalyst was the crushing loss in Sicily during summer 413. This catastrophe not only demonstrated that the Athenian navy was vulnerable, but also entailed great losses in both manpower and ships.[107] At the same time, the permanent Peloponnesian garrison had settled in at Dekeleia, so the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) now represented the Athenians' lifeline. Thus, just as their very survival had become dependent on sea power, the Athenians' navy had suffered a profound blow. Weakened and threatened at the same time, the Athenians doubtless reassessed their naval prospects. Perhaps now they resolved no longer to accept the risk that an invasion across the unfortified coast along the Bay of Phaleron would short-circuit the system of Long Walls (Ia/Ib). In addition the Athenians may have sought to take maximum advantage of the available manpower as efficiently as possible, for the same detachments of soldiers could guard both Athens-Piraeus Long Walls. Thus, not long after summer 413, and no later than 407, the Athenians abandoned the Long Wall joining Athens with Phaleron.

Despite the demise of that structure, the primary purpose of the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) remained the same as it always had been. By giving up the Phaleric Wall, the Athenians reduced the defensible space in the coastal plain to less than one tenth of its original size. Accordingly, they did not seek now to provide secure living space for refugees, arable land, or safety for permanent residents of the region between Athens and the sea. Instead, the modified system of Long Walls strengthened the Athenians' ability to secure the connection between the *asty* and its harbors. Having fallen back permanently from the Phaleric Wall, they created a more secure system of Long Walls which could be defended with fewer troops.

Since the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) acted as the Athenians' lifeline throughout the Dekeleian War, they were guarded at all times. Among the ancient sources, already listed, which show that Athens' fortifications

[107] Thuc. VIII.1.2. Manpower: Hansen 1988, 14–16 estimates that a minimum of 10,000 Athenian citizens died in the campaign; for higher figures, see Kagan 1987, 2; Hanson 2005, 271–72. Rusch 2002, 290 notes that, even as the Athenians were pressed for troops after 413, they endured "a difficult security situation" due to the need to defend at least 24 km of fortifications in the face of the garrison at Dekeleia. Ships: 160 Athenian triremes were lost in Sicily; see Hansen 1988, 15.

were manned constantly in these years, some mention the standing presence of guards on the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) specifically. After the Four Hundred seized control of Athens in 411, Agis descended from Dekeleia hoping to capture at least the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) due to the current dissension among the Athenians.[108] If they did not surrender right away, he thought, at least the emergency might cause the Athenians to leave the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) unguarded so that he could seize those structures.[109] Agis was driven off, but more important here is the implication that the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) were were guarded constantly.[110] Some years later, in 407, these walls, as well as the circuits of Athens and Piraeus, were manned through the night. In a passage translated earlier in this chapter, Polyainos reports that Alkibiades sought at that time to ensure the alertness of the men guarding those structures after dark.[111]

Agis had focused on the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) in 411 because they were essential to Athenian survival. Subsequent incidents, in which the Peloponnesians approached Athens from their base at Dekeleia, emphasize the importance of the structures after 413. During summer 410, Agis reached the very walls of the city.[112] A force of Athenians led by Thrasyllos sallied forth and gathered at the Lykeion, causing Agis to retreat without offering battle. Later, in 408 or 407, Agis descended again from Dekeleia, bringing a large force of infantry and cavalry with which he surrounded nearly two-thirds of the fortification

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[108] Thuc. VIII.71.1–2; Kagan 1987, 167; Andrewes 1992, 477; Rusch 1997, 560–61 no. 80; Rusch 2002, 288.

[109] Thuc. VIII.71.1. For the scenario envisioned by Agis upon his approach, see Andrewes in Gomme et al. 1981, 183 *ad loc.*

[110] Telò and Porciani 2002, 34–39 connect Thucydides' account of Agis' attack with a reference by Eupolis (*Demoi*, fr. 99 lines 12–13 K-A) to τοὺς ἐν μακροῖν τειχοῖν. Although this passage, as already noted, is normally taken as a reference to refugees who were living between the Long Walls, Telò and Porciani 2002, 30–34 find that it has to do with soldiers *on* the structures. On this basis, they hypothesize that, when Agis marched on Athens, the Athenians reinforced the standing guard of military-age reserves on the Long Walls (Thuc. II.13.6–7) with regular hoplites.

[111] Polyaen. I.40.3; cf. Front. *Strat.* III.12.1.

[112] Xen. *Hell.* I.1.33–34; see Kagan 1987, 262–63; Andrewes 1992, 485; Lewis 1992d, 504; Munn 2000, 160. On dating the incident, see Bleckmann 1998, 273–74, 276, 433; Rusch 2002, 288. Cawkwell 1979, 31, note p. 59 *ad* Xen. *Hell.* I.1.33 suggests that Xenophon is probably describing the same assault which Thucydides (VIII.71.1–2) assigns to 411, or even the attack in 408 or 407 which is recorded by Diodoros (XIII.72.3–73.2) and described immediately below.

wall at Athens.[113] After losing a hard-fought cavalry battle in front of the wall, Agis decided not to besiege the *asty*. Having camped at the Academy, the next day Peloponnesian forces attacked Athenian infantry arrayed before the wall, were subsequently driven off by fire from the fortifications, and finally retreated from Athens. Our accounts of these incidents do not explicitly mention the Long Walls (Ia/Ib), but one may assume that the structures were central to the safety of Athens on both occasions. Were the Athenians not connected by fortifications to their harbors, then enemy troops need not have focused on assaulting the walls of Athens, but instead might have simply settled down in the coastal plain so as to isolate the city from the sea.

While the primary function of the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) did not change after the demise of the Phaleric Wall, ancient reports show that the structures also served a secondary purpose, just as they had during the Archidamian War. Following the Peloponnesian occupation of Dekeleia, the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) sheltered part of Athens' population, even as the space between the structures shrank drastically to the limited area between the Athens-Piraeus walls. A fragment of a comedy by Eupolis, produced in 412 (see chapter 1), refers to residents of the area between the Long Walls (Ia/Ib):

> First of all, then, Kallias ought to be
> screwed, and those within the Long
> Walls at the same time, for they
> are better fed than we.[114]

Additionally, Xenophon reports how news of the disastrous loss at Aigospotamoi in 405 reached Athens:

> It was at night that the Paralus arrived at Athens with tidings of the disaster, and a sound of wailing ran from Piraeus through the long walls to the city, one man passing on the news to another.[115] (Loeb: C. L. Brownson)

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[113] Diod. XIII.72.3–73.2, assigning the event to the archon-year 408/7; see Kagan 1987, 321 with n. 113; Andrewes 1992, 491; Krentz 1997, 70; Rusch 1997, 595–602 no. 93; Rusch 2002, 289–98. Diodoros' unique report has been rejected on occasion, but its integrity is ably defended by Rusch 2002, passim, and it has been dated in 408 (Krentz 1997, 70), 407 (Rusch 1997, 591 n. 78), or 408/7 (Munn 2000, 374 n. 34).

[114] Eup. *Demoi*, fr. 99 lines 11–14 K-A.

[115] Xen. *Hell.* II.2.3.

The refugees who arrived in 413 will have joined the semipermanent population which, judging by the testimony of Aristophanes and Andokides, had remained between the walls even after the end of the Archidamian War.[116] With the demise of the Phaleric Wall, of course, the settlers would have abandoned the coastal plain, apart from the narrow strip between the Athens-Piraeus structures. At that time, the space bounded by the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) probably became densely populated, just as, according to Xenophon, it was in 405. However well-fed the residents of the region had been, the conclusion of the war in 404 will have led to an exodus of most or all of the settlers whose real homes were in the countryside. Soon, however, a fresh wave of uprooted Athenians—this time from inside the city—took their place. In 404/3, the Thirty drove the purportedly disloyal residents of Athens out of the *asty*, forcing them to settle between the destroyed Long Walls.[117]

After defeating the Athenian navy at Aigospotamoi in late summer 405, the Peloponnesians were in a position to neutralize the Long Walls (Ia/Ib). Their navy defeated, the Athenians blocked off all but one of the harbors, repaired their fortifications, and prepared for a siege.[118] The enemy besieged Athens by land and blockaded Piraeus by sea.[119] Now that shipping could not come and go, the fortified connection between the *asty* and its harbors hardly benefited the Athenians. Lacking warships, allies, and provisions, they became desperate.[120] During the protracted siege in fall-winter 405/4, the Spartans first called for the destruction of ten stades, not quite 2 km, of each remaining Long Wall, but at that time the Athenians refused to consider destroying any fortifications.[121] Here the Spartans' focus on the structures joining the *asty* with its harbors demonstrates with particular clarity the structures' essential role in defending Athens. The Athenian refusal was misguided, for the final terms, which included an order to destroy the Long Walls

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[116] Ar. *Eq.* 792–794; Andoc. 1.45. See the discussion above in this chapter.

[117] Just. *Epit.* V.9.12.

[118] Xen. *Hell.* II.2.3–4; Diod. XIII.107.1.

[119] Siege by land: Andoc. 3.21; Xen. *Hell.* II.2.7–8; Diod. XIII.107.2; Plut. *Lys.* 14.1. Sea blockade: Lys. 13.5; Xen. *Hell.* II.2.9; Diod. XIII.107.3–4; cf. Isoc. 18.60–61. See, generally, Ostwald 1986, 450; Kagan 1987, 398–400; Munn 2000, 201; Wolpert 2002, 9.

[120] Xen. *Hell.* II.2.10–22; Diod. XIII.107.4.

[121] Lys. 13.8; Xen. *Hell.* II.2.15.

(Ia/Ib) along with Piraeus' circuit wall, were much more severe.[122] In April 404, the Athenians surrendered when Lysandros took control of Athens' fortifications and fleet on 16 Mounychion.[123] Nevertheless, the Athenians did not raze the fortifications in compliance with the peace terms. Although Xenophon connects the destruction of the walls closely in time with the surrender,[124] Plutarch records a delay.[125] Mark Munn finds that the chronology of the Thirty will not allow the scenario depicted by Xenophon,[126] who has compressed events. Consistent with Plutarch's version, Munn suggests that the Long Walls (Ia/Ib), together with the enceinte of Piraeus, were finally destroyed—by the Peloponnesians rather than by the Athenians—in about September 404, some six months after the surrender which marked the end of the war.[127]

That the Long Walls and Piraeus' circuit were demolished need not mean that the structures were razed in their entirety.[128] No published physical evidence sheds light on the matter, but written sources suggest that parts of the walls survived intact. When the forces of the Thirty approached Piraeus in 403, Thrasyboulos and his men considered manning the city's circuit wall against them,[129] so the structure seems to have been partially defensible. Certainly the Thirty had not rebuilt Piraeus' wall after their sponsors had destroyed it in 404, so it had apparently not been torn down completely. In addition, Thucydides reports that the full width of Piraeus' circuit wall was still apparent,[130] even though the wall was in ruins.[131]

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[122] Lys. 13.14; Xen. *Hell.* II.2.20; [Andoc.] 3.12; Diod. XIII.107.4, XIV.85.2; Plut. *Lys.* 14.8. For the negotiations and the final terms, see Bengtson 1975, 153–55 no. 211; Ostwald 1986, 450–59; Kagan 1987, 400–12; Andrewes 1992, 495–96; Hamilton 1997, 211–18; Munn 2000, 201–6; Wolpert 2002, 9–15.

[123] Xen. *Hell.* II.2.23; Plut. *Lys.* 15.1. Munn 2000, 206 with n. 32 suggests that in connection with the events of 16 Mounychion the Athenians swore an oath of allegiance to the terms of the treaty.

[124] Xen. *Hell.* II.2.23.

[125] Plut. *Lys.* 15.2–5; cf. also Diod. XIV.3.6.

[126] Munn 2000, 340–44.

[127] Explicit references to the destruction of the Long Walls include Xen. *Hell.* II.2.23, 3.11; Diod. XIV.85.2; Plut. *Lys.* 15.5. In reconsidering the establishment of the Thirty at Athens, Stem 2003, 20–21 suggests that the destruction of the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) and Piraeus' circuit wall was a lengthy process stretching from April to September.

[128] See also Munn 2000, 319 n. 63.

[129] Xen. *Hell.* II.4.11.

[130] Thuc. I.93.5.

[131] Munn 2000, 319 with n. 63 has recently emphasized the fact that the wall, as described by Thucydides, was in a ruinous state.

Written hints suggesting a limited destruction in 404 are supported by common sense. After all, the two Athens-Piraeus Long Walls (Ia/Ib) were stone and mudbrick constructions totaling some 12.16 km in length. Piraeus' circuit, built solidly of masonry, was about 9.5 km long. Destroying these formidable structures completely would have required a colossal number of man-hours, and to what end? Sparta had no intention of crushing Athens. First of all, the Spartans refused at the end of the war to give in to allied demands to destroy the city and sell the inhabitants into slavery.[132] Second, they left the circuit wall of the *asty* intact.[133] Thus, the Spartans will have sought to demilitarize rather than destroy the walls, tearing down parts of the structures so that they could serve no immediate defensive function.[134] As noted above, during their negotiations with the Athenians, the Spartans had first called for the destruction of ten stades of each Long Wall, no doubt because they believed that destroying part of the walls would accomplish their aim of severing the Athenians' fortified connection with their harbors. One might therefore assume that in September 404 they pulled down at least this amount, a total of less than 4 km, and perhaps no more in view of the fact that there was work to do at Piraeus as well.[135]

## *404–395/4*

Even had the Peloponnesians not put the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) out of service in 404, Athens' subordinate naval status after the war would have marginalized the structures. The terms of the peace treaty had required the reduction of the Athenian fleet to a skeletal force of 12 ships,[136] while at Piraeus the dockyards were destroyed and the shipsheds sold for demolition.[137] The ruined state of the Piraeus shipsheds in 399 aptly symbolizes the city's naval impotence during this interim period,[138]

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[132] Xen. *Hell.* II.2.19; Plut. *Lys.* 15.3. As to why Athens was not destroyed, see the full discussion, by Hamilton 1997, 203–18.

[133] Conwell 2002, passim.

[134] Cf. Lawrence 1979, 115 concerning the destruction of the fortifications at Samos and Thasos.

[135] For the ruins of the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) as of 404/3, see Just. *Epit.* V.9.12; cf. also Lys. 30.22 for a vague reference to ruinous walls in 399.

[136] Xen. *Hell.* II.2.20; [Andoc.] 3.12. Cf. also Lys. 13.14; Diod. XIII.107.4 (10 ships); Plut. *Lys.* 14.8.

[137] Lys. 12.99 (dockyards); Isoc. 7.66 (shipsheds).

[138] Lys. 30.22; cf. Philisc. Com. fr. inc. 2 K-A, a comic reference to Piraeus as a "big nut without a kernel."

even as the lack of evidence for Athenian naval activity in the years after 404 no doubt reflects reality. After the war, the Athenians were initially loyal to the Spartans,[139] but they began to cast off their subject status in 397, following the appointment of Konon as commander of the Persian navy.[140] In that year, Athens sent petty officers (ὑπηρεσίαι) and equipment to Konon,[141] and then, during winter 396/5, some Athenians attempted to send Konon a ship commanded by Demainetos.[142] A reference to shipsheds at Piraeus in connection with this affair suggests that Athens' war harbors were undergoing restoration by this time.[143] Soon, the Athenians would begin to rebuild their Long Walls, too.

## *Summary*

From the later 440s down to 405, Athens was at least the leading naval power in the Aegean. Therefore, a strategy which incorporated the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) running from the *asty* down to the harbors made sense throughout the period. Untested during the 430s, all three structures were incorporated in the strategy developed by Perikles during the runup to the Peloponnesian War in 432/1. Down to 425, the Peloponnesians occupied Attika repeatedly, but the Athenians were able both to survive and to prosecute the war abroad because the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) secured communication with the harbors of Phaleron and Piraeus. Part of the population settled between the structures during the enemy invasions and, it seems, even after they had ceased in 425. The Long Walls (Ia/Ib) were guarded constantly while the enemy occupied Attika, but they never actually had to repel an assault. From 425 down to 413, the walls linking Athens with its ships were not a factor in the

[139] Strauss 1986, 104–6.

[140] Isoc. 4.142; Diod. XIV.39.1–2; Plut. *Art.* 21.1–4; cf. Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 FF 144–145. For the date, see Hornblower 1994, 67; also Lewis 1977, 140–41 with 141 n. 41. On the sources of Athenian support for Konon in his new position, see Strauss 1986, 106–7, 109–10.

[141] Isoc. 4.142; *Hell. Oxy.* 10.1 Chambers. The term *hyperesia* refers to a group of shipboard specialists and is commonly translated "petty officer" or "naval officer"; so Morrison and Williams 1968, 232; Cawkwell 1984, 338; Seager 1994a, 98; Gabrielsen 1994, 106; Gabrielsen 1995, 240; cf. Bleicken 1994, 132–33; Burckhardt 1995, 121. For a different view, see Jordan 1975, 240–59; Jordan 2000, 89–95.

[142] *Hell. Oxy.* 9.1 Chambers. This dating follows Seager 1994a, 98.

[143] *Hell. Oxy.* 9.1 Chambers.

war. Then, not long after the installation of a Peloponnesian garrison at Dekeleia in spring 413, the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) again became central to Athens' war effort. Faced with the permanent presence of the enemy, the Athenians withdrew behind the urban defenses, including the Long Walls (Ia/Ib), there to rely on the fortified connection between Athens and the sea. The disastrous conclusion of the Sicilian Expedition in summer 413 led the Athenians to modify their system of Long Walls (Ia/Ib). Already hard-pressed by the foreign presence at Dekeleia, they now abandoned the phase Ia Athens-Phaleron wall. As the conflict wore on, enemy forces approached Athens three times, targeting the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) specifically on one of those occasions. There is no evidence that the Peloponnesians assaulted those walls, which were constantly guarded, but in every instance the structures prevented them from severing communication between Athens and its harbors. Ultimately the enemy developed a powerful navy which crushed the Athenian fleet at Aigospotamoi in late summer 405, therefore rendering the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) ineffectual. The peace treaty which concluded the war in early 404 ensured this state of affairs by providing for the termination of Athens' naval power and the demilitarization of the structures. Within less than a decade, however, the Athenians had involved themselves in Aegean affairs and begun to rebuild the walls which joined Athens with its harbors at Piraeus.

# CHAPTER FIVE

## PHASE II

Immediately after 404 the Athenians were basically loyal to their Spartan conquerors.[1] Nevertheless, left "disarmed but unappeased" by their loss in the Peloponnesian War,[2] soon they began both to re-engage in the Aegean and rebuild the two Athens-Piraeus structures as well as Piraeus' circuit wall. In 395/4, even before becoming ascendant in the Aegean once again, the Athenians started work on the fortifications which had been demilitarized in 404. Since the old Athens-Phaleron Long Wall (Ia) was never rebuilt after passing out of use between 413 and 407, the phase II structures joined Athens exclusively with Piraeus (fig. 4). The new walls connecting the cities may have incorporated those parts of the phases Ia/Ib structures which had remained intact after 404. Once the Long Walls (II) were in place at the end of the 390s, their viability depended on the Athenians' fluctuating fortunes at sea. During short periods immediately after the completion of the walls and just before the demise of the structures in 337, Athens lacked the naval power which justified reliance on the walls connecting the asty with its harbors. In between those times of relative weakness, however, the Athenians were strong enough at sea to include the Long Walls (II) in their defensive planning.

### *395/4–Circa 392/1*

Reports by Xenophon establish a window during which the fortification project will have begun. According to the historian, Piraeus was *ateichistos*, "unwalled" at the time of Athens' alliance with the Boiotians in summer 395.[3] Next, among the many references to the reconstruction

[1] Strauss 1986, 104–6.

[2] Kagan 2003, 489. For the survival of an imperialistic frame of mind among the Athenians after 404, see Cargill 1981, 189; Ober 1985, 209–10; Strauss 1986, 60, 106; Hornblower 2002, 222–23.

[3] Xen. *Hell.* III.5.16; cf. also Isoc. 14.40; Dem. 18.96; Aristid. 1.267 (apparently referring to the ruinous state of the Long Walls during this same period; see Behr 1986, 441 n. 397), 11.44 L-B. For the alliance, see Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 38–40 no. 6; Bengtson 1975, 168–70 no. 223.

of the walls destroyed in 404, Xenophon's full account provides a date by which it must have started.[4] In describing events at sea after the battle of Knidos (August 394), he states the following:

> Conon said that if [Pharnabazus] would allow him to have the fleet, he would maintain it by contributions from the islands and would meanwhile put in at Athens and aid the Athenians in rebuilding their long walls and the wall around Piraeus, adding that he knew nothing could be a heavier blow to the Lacedaemonians than this. "And by this act, therefore," he said, "you will have conferred a favour upon the Athenians and have taken vengeance upon the Lacedaemonians, inasmuch as you will undo for them the deed for whose accomplishment they underwent the most toil and trouble." Pharnabazus, upon hearing this, eagerly dispatched him to Athens and gave him additional money for the rebuilding of the walls.
>
> Upon his arrival Conon erected a large part of the wall, giving his own crews for the work, paying the wages of carpenters and masons, and meeting whatever other expense was necessary. There were some parts of the wall, however, which the Athenians themselves, as well as volunteers from Boeotia and from other states, aided in building.[5] (Loeb: C. L. Brownson)

Xenophon refers to different structures, the circuit at Piraeus and the Long Walls. His collective references to *to teichos*, "the wall," however, show that the historian regards them all as part of a single undertaking. According to Xenophon, then, the project developed as follows: in summer 393 Konon solicited financial support from the Persians for the reconstruction of the Long Walls and Piraeus' circuit; having received the requested funds,[6] Konon returned to Athens, where he

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[4] Other reports concerning the Long Walls specifically include Xen. *Hell.* IV.8.9–10; Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 146; Arr. *Anab.* I.9.3; Paus. I.2.2 (certainly referring to the Long Walls, on which see Conwell 2002, 327); schol. *ad* Aristid. 1.267 L-B. For Piraeus' circuit, see Xen. *Hell.* IV.8.9–10; Nep. *Con.* 4.5; Diod. XIV.85.3; Ath. 1.3d. For references to the restoration of unidentified Athenian fortifications in the 390s, see Lys. 2.63; Andoc. 3.12, 14, 23, 36, 39; Isoc. 5.64; Pl. *Mx.* 245a; Dem. 20.68, 72, 74; Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 40a; Nep. *Timoth.* 4.1; Diod. XIV.85.2–3, XV.63.1; Aristid. 1.280, 25.65–66, cf. 11.44 L-B with schol.; Diog. Laert. 2.39; Plut. *Ages.* 23.1, *Mor.* 349d; Just. *Epit.* VI.5.8–9; Oros. III.1.23–24; Thom. Mag. *Hyper ateleias*, 148 Lenz. Not all scholars accept Jacoby's association of Philochoros fr. 40a with the fortification activities of Konon; see Badian 1971, 8; Frost 1998, 158 n. 12.

[5] Xen. *Hell.* IV.8.9–10.

[6] For which, cf. Nep. *Con.* 4.5; Plut. *Ages.* 23.1. According to late sources, Konon also contributed the booty won from the Spartans at Knidos; see Nep. *Timoth.* 4.1; Just. *Epit.* VI.5.9–10. Jacoby 1954, 514 suggests that Konon himself contributed funds to the project via a *chrematon epidosis*; cf. also Davies 1971, 509.

and his ships' crews involved themselves in the project,[7] to which the Athenians and other Greeks also contributed.

A series of building inscriptions may fill out our picture of the project to which the second-phase Long Walls belonged.[8] These documents list payments to contractors, both Athenian and non-Athenian,[9] for work on the fortification system during 395/4, 394/3, 393/2 and 392/1.[10] In fact, the earliest of the records yields a more precise date, since it lists expenditures for the month Skirophorion during the year 395/4, that is, June–July 394.[11]

Clearly the Athenians carried out important work on their fortifications during the mid- to later 390s, and scholars generally agree that the reconstruction of the Long Walls and Piraeus' circuit occurred at that time. There is no unanimity, however, as to the specific dates of the project.[12] Its beginning has been assigned to the years 395, 395/4, 394, or 393,[13] and its end to 392/1, 391, or soon after 391.[14] Some scholars,

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[7] For the participation of Konon's crews, see also Nep. *Con.* 4.5; Diod. XIV.85.3; Just. *Epit.* VI.5.9–10.

[8] *IG* II[2] 1656–1664 = Maier 1959, 21–35 nos. 1–9; *SEG* 19 no. 145 = Maier 1961, 117–18 no. 9a (Agora I 5091; *editio princeps*: Meritt 1960, 24 no. 31); *SEG* 32 no. 165 (Agora I 7344; *editio princeps*: Walbank 1982, 42–43 no. 2). For *IG* II[2] 1656–1657, see also Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 46–49 no. 9. Walbank 1995, passim proposes to add *SEG* 45 no. 150 (Agora I 4779c + I 4779d + I 729 + I 4779e + I 4779a), *SEG* 45 no. 151 (Agora I 4779b), and *SEG* 45 no. 152 (Agora I 3994) to the series; however, he notes on p. 320 that these fragmentary records might instead have to do with the reconstruction of the Tholos in the Athenian Agora.

[9] For non-Athenian contractors, see *IG* II[2] 1657 lines 6–8; 1664 lines 4, 12.

[10] Expenditures are known to have been made while the following archons were in office: Diophantos, 395/4 (*IG* II[2] 1656), Euboulides, 394/3 (*IG* II[2] 1657–1658), Demostratos, 393/2 (*IG* II[2] 1660–1661; 1664), and Philokles, 392/1 (*IG* II[2] 1662–1664; *SEG* 32 no. 165). In these inscriptions, some of the archon-names are partially restored, but the restorations are virtually certain. Additionally, in *IG* II[2] 1662 and 1663, the records of expenditures during Philokles' archonship follow what are probably listings concerning the previous year, 393/2, while *IG* II[2] 1664 includes expenditures during the terms of both Demostratos and Philokles after another fragmentary record, probably that of 394/3; see Maier 1959, 28–31 nos. 7–9.

[11] *IG* II[2] 1656 lines 1–3.

[12] In supplying dates for the work, some scholars duly refer to the Long Walls and Piraeus' wall, while others mention only one or the other of these quite separate fortifications. The following summary of dates proposed in the earlier scholarship makes no distinction between such references.

[13] (1) 395: Ober 1985, 207, cf. 56 with n. 11; Camp 2000, 41; (2) 395/4: Sinclair 1978, 32; von Eickstedt 1991, 27–28; Sealey 1993, 10 with n. 13; (3) 394: Knigge 1988, 50; Panagos 1997, 339; Schwenk 1997, 13–15 (before July 394); Migeotte 2000, 147; Munn 2000, 319; Garland 2001b, 37–40, 172; Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1371 s.v. Athenai; and (4) 393: Edwards 1995, 106.

[14] (1) 392/1: von Eickstedt 1991, 27–28; (2) 391: Panagos 1997, 339; Camp 2000,

however, place the entire project in one particular year, generally 393,[15] while others suppose that the Athenians never actually completed it.[16]

Before establishing the construction dates of the phase II Long Walls, we ought to examine the relevance of the epigraphic evidence. Since the inscriptions do not specify the location of the work with which they are concerned, it is not obvious that they pertain to the reconstruction of the Long Walls and the fortification wall around Piraeus. Turning to the provenances of the documents, two of them, one dating to June/July 394, the other to 394/3, were cut on blocks which were found mounted in Piraeus' enceinte near the Eetioneia Gate.[17] The findspots of these two inscriptions are often thought to associate them with the structure of which they were a part.[18] There is some dissent,[19] but the objections to associating the documents with the construction of the Eetioneia wall are not convincing. For example, it may seem significant that, as found, the inscriptions would not have appeared on the wall at eye level. P. Foucart, however, reports that they were discovered in a part of the wall which was preserved to a height of 1.20 m,[20] and he notes that beneath them was more than one course of the structure.[21] This may not bring them up to eye level, but, if the inscriptions were to be consulted by those who were

41; Camp 2001, 294; Garland 2001b, 37–40, 172; Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1371 s.v. Athenai; and (3) after 391: Judeich 1931, 83 with n. 7; Cawkwell 1973, 52, 54 (before the King's Peace); Cawkwell 1981, 74–76 (before the King's Peace); Ober 1985, 56 with n. 11, 207 (stating on p. 56 that the project was "probably largely complete by the mid-380s"); Strauss 1986, 63.

[15] For 393, see Amit 1961, 472; Amit 1965, 93; Krause 1972, 49; Briscoe 1973, 125 *ad* Liv. XXXI.26.8; Lawrence 1979, 155, cf. 282; Burke 1990, 6. Other years include (1) 395: Bosworth 1980, 86 *ad* Arr. *An.* I.9.3; Corso 1997, 379; Frost 1998, 158 n. 12; (2) 395/4: Baldassarre in Baldassarre and Borrelli 1965, 181; Berdeles and Dabaras 1966, 95; (3) 394: Panagos 1997, 287; and (4) 394/3: Bleicken 1994, 126.

[16] Sinclair 1978, 31–34; Pritchett 1980, 315; Clark 1990, 65 with n. 100; cf. Scranton 1941, 118.

[17] *IG* II$^2$ 1656; 1657. On the findspots, see Foucart 1887, 129, 131.

[18] Foucart 1887, 135; Frickenhaus 1905, 8, 9; Maier 1959, 23, 34; Funke 1983, 187; Steinhauer 2003, 29–31; cf. Maier 1961, 36. For the installation of an inscription at the location of the work with which it was concerned, cf. Richardson 2000, 605–7, suggesting that *IG* II$^2$ 244 was set up at the quarry used by contractors who needed direct access to the law and specifications detailed in the document.

[19] Von Eickstedt 1991, 41–42 with n. 181; cf. Richardson 2000, 605 with n. 18.

[20] Foucart 1887, 139 n. 2.

[21] Foucart 1887, 135. The state of the evidence means that we cannot know whether or not the blocks belonged to the foundations of the structure, i.e. were located below ancient ground-level, despite some modern opinion (Wrede 1933, 26; Maier 1959, 21 no. 1, 22 no. 2).

affected by their provisions, there is nothing problematic about their occurrence in the lower part of the wall. Since these particular documents are concerned with the transportation of stone—from which the bottom parts of the structure were built—perhaps one should expect to find them there. Finally, Foucart saw and copied both inscriptions while the blocks on which they were cut were still set into the wall.[22] The texts were clearly accessible to him, so the natural, if not the only, assumption is that they were visible in the face of the wall. Had the blocks been in secondary use, it is unlikely that both would have been placed in this fashion. If the documents found in the Eetioneia wall likely pertain to work on Piraeus' city circuit, then so also should a third, dated 392/1, which was apparently found near the Eetioneia Gate but not actually mounted in the wall.[23]

The rest of the inscriptions were found in various locations. Two were discovered in Piraeus,[24] three on the Athenian Akropolis or its slopes,[25] one or perhaps more in the Market Square area of Athens' Agora,[26] one somewhere in Athens,[27] and one in an unknown location.[28] If, as has been suggested, all the documents in the series were originally affixed to or set up beside the walls with which they were concerned,[29] some of these findspots are surprising.[30] Ever since antiquity stones have drifted apart from each other and away from their original locations,

[22] Foucart 1887, 129 states explicitly that he observed the inscriptions before they were removed from the wall and transported to the museum at Piraeus.

[23] *IG* II[2] 1662. See Lechat 1888, 347 no. 3.

[24] *IG* II[2] 1659; 1664. See Lechat 1888, 355 (*IG* II[2] 1659, possibly from Mounychia); Nachmanson 1905, 391 (*IG* II[2] 1664).

[25] *IG* II[2] 1661; 1663; *SEG* 19 no. 145. See U. Koehler in *IG* II, part 2, p. 298 at no. 832 (*IG* II[2] 1661, from the south slope of the Akropolis); Rangabé 1855, 391 no. 772 (*IG* II[2] 1663, on the Akropolis); Meritt 1960, 24 no. 31 (*SEG* 19 no. 145, from Agora grid-square P 21, west of the Eleusinion).

[26] *SEG* 32 no. 165, 45 nos. 150–152. See Walbank 1982, 42 no. 2 (*SEG* 32 no. 165, from Agora grid-square J 5); Walbank 1995, 317 (*SEG* 45 no. 150, from Agora grid-squares H 10–11, east and northeast of the Tholos), 322 (*SEG* 45 no. 151, from Agora grid-squares H 10–11, northeast of the Tholos), 323 (*SEG* 45 no. 152, from Agora grid-square D 11, on the Kolonos Agoraios).

[27] *IG* II[2] 1658. Although Köhler 1878, 50 believes the inscription was found in Piraeus, Koumanoudes 1878, 388–89 no. 7 (*editio princeps*) includes this document among a group of inscriptions found southwest of the Athenian Akropolis and in other places in Athens.

[28] *IG* II[2] 1660. Maier 1959, 27 no. 6, 34 suggests that this inscription, for which *IG* gives no findspot, might be from the Akropolis; however, Walbank 1995, 316 is overly confident in that possibility.

[29] Maier 1959, 34; Maier 1961, 36; Camp 2001, 138–39.

[30] Richardson 2000, 605 also doubts the connection.

as is demonstrated by the discovery of joining fragments of inscriptions in widely disparate locations.[31] Thus, although one might assume that the documents found *ex situ* at Piraeus have to do with the reconstruction of that city's circuit, they could actually pertain to the Long Walls (II). As well, the discovery of most or all of the other inscriptions at Athens, where the circuit wall was not part of the work known to have occurred in the later 390s, requires no special explanation.[32] It is likely that the stones simply migrated from their original positions. The manner in which stones move about means that any of the Athens fragments could have to do with Piraeus' circuit[33] or with the Long Walls (II).[34] In any event, none of the finds at Athens contribute to the identification of the walls involved in the project which they describe.

Generally speaking, then, one may confidently associate only the two inscriptions from the Eetioneia wall, by virtue of their dates and findspots, with the literary evidence for work on Piraeus' enceinte and the Long Walls (II). As for the rest, a combination of factors strongly suggests that they, too, have to do with that project. First, they are contemporaneous with it. Second, as simple records of payments for construction activities, they resemble the two Eetioneia inscriptions. Third, one of the documents actually refers to a Boiotian contractor,[35] which parallels the foreign involvement described by Xenophon.[36] Having associated all of the inscriptions with the building project carried out in the

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[31] Note, for instance, Agora I 5419, which joins *IG* II[2] 1628 and 1630, both of which were found in Piraeus; see Schweigert 1940, 343–45 no. 43; Laing 1968, 245; Shear 1995, 180. Another instructive example is *IG* I[3] 1144, three fragments of which were found near Spata in Attika's Mesogeia region, while the other two fragments turned up at Athens; see Bradeen 1967, 321–23, 325. Note also Gill 2006, 5, concerning the Piraeus *horoi*, at least two of which were discovered in Athens.

[32] As proposed, for instance, by Frickenhaus 1905, 9, who thinks the fragments from the Akropolis belong to inscriptions which had been set up there. This belief is rightly doubted by Maier 1959, 34; Maier 1961, 118. Liddel 2003, 79–80 describes the sorts of documents which were actually made public on the Akropolis. Another suggestion holds that some of the inscriptions found in Athens have to do with otherwise unattested repairs to the city wall there during the later 390s; see Maier 1959, 34, cf. 35 (Walbank 1995, 315, however, believes that the project included the walls of Athens and, p. 316, that *SEG* 19 no. 145 was set up in that city as a public record following the completion of the work).

[33] See Meritt 1960, 24 on *SEG* 19 no. 145 and Walbank 1982, 42 concerning *SEG* 32 no. 165.

[34] So also Maier 1959, 34, 35 and 1961, 118 concerning the fragments found at Athens.

[35] *IG* II[2] 1657 lines 6–8.

[36] Cf. also Diod. XIV.85.3, who refers to assistance by Thebans in the work at Piraeus.

late 390s, one must admit that there is no demonstrable connection between any of those documents and the Long Walls (II). Nevertheless, the above translation from Xenophon describes a single restoration effort, so—even were all of the inscriptions specifically concerned with Piraeus' wall—their chronological implications would apply equally to the Long Walls (II).

Let us now return to the date of the undertaking to which the phase II Long Walls belonged. The epigraphic evidence shows that work began before Konon returned in midsummer 393.[37] As noted above, one of the inscriptions lists expenditures for June-July 394,[38] so the project was underway by that time. The document might date the initiation of the work, for its reference to the transportation of stone blocks no doubt pertains to the foundations and socle, the construction of which would obviously have occurred at an early stage.[39] There is no certainty, however, that this inscription marks the project's beginning. In the series to which it belongs, the walls under construction were divided into sections and assigned to individual contractors.[40] That blocks were ordered for a single segment of the circuit wall in northwestern Piraeus in summer 394 need not mean that the project had by then reached the same stage at all points. For example, the accounts for 394/3 show that in one work zone building activity involved the foundations,[41] while elsewhere mudbricks, i.e. the upper parts of the curtain wall, were laid.[42] If, then, the earliest of the building inscriptions need not date the actual beginning of the project, it does serve as a *terminus ante quem*. The work will not have begun a great deal earlier because Piraeus was "unwalled" at

[37] On the chronology of Konon's return, see Funke 1983, 152–74, who places his arrival at the end of 394/3 rather than early in 393/2. *Cf.* Funke 1980, 129 n. 74 who suggests that the verb *synanastesoi* at Xen. *Hell.* IV.8.9 indicates that the project was underway already before Konon arrived in Athens.

[38] *IG* II[2] 1656.

[39] This inscription also refers to σιδηρίων μισθός (lines 7–8), normally taken as a reference to a payment for the iron tools required by stonemasons; see Liddell and Scott 1940, 1597 s.v. σιδήριον; Maier 1959, 22. On the basis of the rather high sum involved, Loomis 1998, 108 n. 13 suggests instead that the inscriber mistakenly substituted the word σιδηρίων for σιδηρέων, i.e. the genitive plural of σιδηρεύς.

[40] Maier 1961, 51; cf. Walbank 1995, 315–16. The clearest example is *IG* II[2] 1657.

[41] *IG* II[2] 1658 lines 3–4.

[42] *IG* II[2] 1664 line 2. The date of the work documented in this first part of a multi-year accounting is not proven but, as noted by Maier 1959, 30, it is made almost certain because it is followed by accounts for 393/2 and 392/1.

the time of Athens' alliance with the Boiotians in summer 395.[43] Thus the reconstruction of the fortifications destroyed in 404—the circuit wall of Piraeus and the Long Walls—began during the year between summer 395 and summer 394.

Dating the beginning of work more exactly depends on hypothesis. W. K. Pritchett, identifying the battle of Knidos (August 394) as a catalyst, opts for a date towards the end of that short period.[44] Others believe that the Athenians began rebuilding their fortifications at the earliest opportunity after forming their alliance with the Boiotians, perhaps soon after the battle of Haliartos (summer 395).[45] The circumstances support the higher date, because the breaking hostilities between Sparta and Thebes meant that a vote for the alliance amounted to a vote for war.[46] As well, in stressing that Athens had entered the alliance even despite Piraeus' unfortified state, Thrasyboulos acknowledged the depth of local concern for the city's vulnerability to attack.[47] Certainly the Athenians will not have chosen confrontation with Sparta and then waited another year to look after their defenses. Therefore, they decided upon and begun the project in late summer or autumn 395, almost two years before Konon returned to Athens in midsummer 393.[48]

Xenophon's report, as translated above, appears to date the completion of the phase II Long Walls generally. After Konon's arrival in Athens during summer 393, πολὺ τοῦ τείχους, "much of the wall," was built.[49] Those words do not indicate that this new stage of the endeavor

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[43] Xen. *Hell.* III.5.16.

[44] Pritchett 1974, 120 n. 21.

[45] Funke 1980, 104 n. 5; Seager 1994a, 101.

[46] Seager 1967, 98 n. 21; Cawkwell 1976, 275; Funke 1980, 102; Seager 1994a, 99–100.

[47] Xen. *Hell.* III.5.16.

[48] On chronological grounds, then, Konon cannot have participated directly in several of the undertaking's essential stages, including the Assembly debate which will have preceded the decision to rebuild the city's defenses, the subsequent organization of the work, and the initial stages of construction. Accordingly, he did not inspire or lead the project, as is frequently suggested; so, recently, Burke 1990, 6; Bleicken 1994, 126; Edwards 1995, 106; Corso 1997, 379; Habicht 1997, 23–24; Panagos 1997, 287, 339; Camp 2000, 41; Knell 2000, 71; Camp 2001, 294. According to Xenophon (*Hell.* IV.8.10), the project made substantial progress due to Konon's infusion of money and manpower, which explains why many ancient sources closely associate him with it; see Isoc. 5.64; Xen. *Hell.* IV.8.9–10; Dem. 20.68, 72, 74; Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 146; Nep. *Con.* 4.5, *Timoth.* 4.1; Diod. XIV.85.2–3; Plut. *Ages.* 23.1, *Mor.* 349d; Aristid. 1.280 L-B, 25.65–66, with schol. *ad* 1.267 and 11.44; Paus. I.2.2; Diog. Laert. 2.39; Just. *Epit.* VI.5.8–9; cf. Oros. III.1.23–24.

[49] Xen. *Hell.* IV.8.10; see also Diod. XIV.85.3, although strictly speaking his statement applies only to the wall of Piraeus.

brought the work to a conclusion, but they do allow the supposition that by the time Konon left Athens in early summer 392, the project was well on its way to completion.

The building inscriptions, for their part, attest to work during 392/1,[50] so the project continued after Konon's departure. It seems to have been reaching its end at this time, for certain building activities carried out in 392/1 are consistent with the final stages of construction. On certain sections of the fortifications, work included plastering, which would apply to the mudbrick superstructure, construction of a parapet, and preparation of a *stele* to record the accounts.[51] Nevertheless, plastering had also occurred in the previous year,[52] so, again, the status of the walls in particular work areas does not necessarily establish the project's progress generally. In addition, in 392/1 mudbricks were laid along one section of the walls,[53] an activity which need not have occurred towards the end of work on the superstructure. In any event, the inscriptions indicate that at least some parts of the undertaking were essentially completed by summer 391.

One report may suggest that the Athenians never finished the great fortification project begun in 395/4. According to Xenophon, when the Spartan Sphodrias set out to raid Piraeus in spring 378, the circuit wall of that city had no gates.[54] One need not doubt, however, that the work on the Long Walls (II) and the wall at Piraeus was completed.[55] |Not only did little remain to be done at the end of the 390s, but also the Athenians would hardly have left Piraeus so vulnerable as late as the 370s. With the failure of the peace negotiations in 392/1, the Corinthian War continued down to 386. During these years, the Athenians faced continuing hostilities on land which could have threatened Piraeus, and they actively pursued their foreign policy by sea.[56] Certainly they will have looked after the security of the port at this time, so we may conclude that they completed the reconstruction of Piraeus' fortifications—

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[50] *IG* II$^2$ 1662 lines 3–6; 1663 lines 7–8; 1664 lines 13–18; *SEG* 32 no. 165 lines 1–5.

[51] *IG* II$^2$ 1664 lines 13 (plastering), 15 (*stele*); *SEG* 32 no. 165 lines 2–3 (parapet).

[52] *IG* II$^2$ 1663 line 3; 1664 line 9.

[53] *IG* II$^2$ 1662 line 4.

[54] Xen. *Hell.* V.4.20. Stylianou 1998, 261 *ad* Diod. XV.29.5–6 dates the raid to April. By summer 378, following the raid, the Athenians had installed gates at Piraeus (Xen. *Hell.* V.4.34).

[55] See also Judeich 1931, 83 n. 7; Cawkwell 1973, 52–54; Cawkwell 1981, 74–76; Hornblower 1994, 80; Garland 2001b, 41, 185–86.

[56] Hammond 1986, 463–64; Seager 1994a, 109–17; Buckler 2003, 116–28.

and the Long Walls (II)—in or soon after 392/1. The state of affairs at Piraeus in 378, then, belongs to circumstances unrelated to the earlier project.[57]

## *Purpose*

With Piraeus well established as Athens' primary port by the early fourth century,[58] there was no compelling reason to include the Phaleric Wall in the Long Walls' second phase. In rebuilding only the two Athens-Piraeus structures during the later 390s, the Athenians once again established the narrow fortified zone first created early in the Dekeleian War by the abandonment of the Athens-Phaleron wall. In that earlier period, the modified layout had not been symptomatic of a new purpose, for the remaining two Long Walls (Ia/Ib) were still intended primarily to facilitate the secure movement of troops, goods, and communication between the *asty* and its harbors. Since there had been no change in function at that time, even with an alteration in the system's design, the similar layout of the final two fifth-century Long Walls and the phase II structures almost certainly signals a continuity of purpose.

If the basic purpose of the Long Walls (II) continued unchanged, what of their role as the lynchpin of the broader strategy developed by Perikles? Writing in the 360s concerning the duties of a cavalry commander, Xenophon outlines two ways in which the Athenians might react to an enemy invasion of Attika:

> If the enemy invades Athenian territory, in the first place, he will certainly not fail to bring with him other cavalry besides his own and infantry in addition, whose numbers he reckons to be more than a match for all the Athenians put together. Now provided that the whole of the city's levies turn out against such a host in defense of their country, the prospects are good. For our cavalrymen, God helping, will be the better, if proper care is taken of them, and our heavy infantry will not be inferior in

[57] Based on the assumption that the fortifications of Piraeus were indeed finished as part of the program discussed here, the situation in 378 has been explained in various ways: (1) repairs had become necessary or else the circuit had been expanded (Lenschau 1937, 74); (2) some "act of violence" had occurred (Scranton 1941, 118); or (3) the King's Peace had included a clause which required the Athenians to remove the gates of Piraeus (Cawkwell 1973, 52–54; Cawkwell 1981, 74–76; Garland 2001b, 41, 185–86).

[58] Papachatzes 1974, 96 n. 2 *ad* Paus. I.1.2; cf. Wachsmuth 1874, 579 n. 2.

> numbers, and I may add, they will be in as good condition and will show the keener spirit, if only, with God's help, they are trained on the right lines.... But if the city falls back on her navy, and is content to keep her walls intact, as in the days when the Lacedaemonians invaded us with all the Greeks to help them, and if she expects her cavalry to protect all that lies outside the walls, and to take its chance unaided against her foes,—why then, I suppose, we need first the strong arm of the gods to aid us, and in the second place it is essential that our cavalry commander should be masterly.[59] (Loeb: E. C. Marchant)

Of particular interest here is Xenophon's second alternative.[60] Acknowledged by the historian as closely similar to the concept developed by Perikles, it assumes that the Athenians would abandon the countryside. Having retreated behind their walls, they would seek to hold the city's fortifications while depending on their naval power. One may suppose that Athens' ships would have sustained the otherwise helpless population in this situation, but they could have done so only were the Long Walls functioning. Xenophon's report therefore suggests that an Athenian defensive option during the 360s had much in common with Perikleian strategy.[61]

One key element of that concept, at least, did survive into the fourth century. As already noted, the quotation immediately above implies that withdrawal from the *chora* to the fortified urban zone was conceivable in the 360s. Elsewhere, Xenophon shows that the expedient was a matter of debate at Athens during the second quarter of the century.[62] At midcentury the military theorist Aeneas Tacticus recognizes withdrawal as a realistic option, although without specific reference to Athenian affairs.[63] Additionally, the population of Attika was prepared to evacuate

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[59] Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 7.2–4. On this passage, see also Garlan 1974, 70; Munn 1993, 20–21.

[60] *Contra* Ober 1985, 82, Xenophon's preference for the first alternative need not mean that the second one was merely a back-up plan; cf. also Ober 1996, 80. See Munn 1993, 21 n. 46.

[61] Cf., however, Ober 1985, 56.

[62] Xen. *Oec.* 6.6–7.

[63] Many of Aeneas' recommendations for surviving invasion and siege are based upon the tactic of falling back to an urban center. See, for example, Aen. Tact. 8.3–4, 15.2–7, 16.2; note also the summary by Kern 1999, 121, including references to specific passages in Aeneas. Munn 1993, 30 points out that Athenian practices "generally conformed to those recorded in handbooks such as that of Aeneas Tacticus and in philosophical treatises such as the work of Plato and Aristotle." On the date of Aeneas' manual, see Whitehead 1990, 8–10.

the *chora* at various times during the fourth century,[64] as ancient reports demonstrate. Evacuations were undertaken in 346,[65] decreed in 338,[66] and at least partly carried out in 335.[67]

Although the reconstruction of the Long Walls (II) in the early fourth century combined with the Athenians' continuing readiness to abandon the countryside call to mind the domestic component of the Peloponnesian War strategy developed by Perikles, our sources suggest that after 404 the Athenians dropped a key element of that policy. As described earlier, Perikles had elevated abandonment of the *chora* from choice of last resort to first option. The known fourth-century evacuations, whether actual or merely decreed, were hardly premeditated decisions. In 346 the rural population withdrew from Attika under emergency conditions and in a context of sudden developments and disagreement among the Athenians concerning the intentions of Philip II after the Peace of Philokrates.[68] Some years later, the disastrous loss in the battle of Chaironeia (338) sparked a similar hysteria at Athens.[69] Expecting Philip to march on the city after the battle,[70] the Assembly resolved to bring all women and children inside the walls. Finally, after lending official support in 335 to the Theban revolt against Alexander the

[64] *Contra* Ober 1985, 56; Burke 1990, 3; Ober 1991, 29; Lohmann 1995, 533.

[65] Aeschin. 2.139, 3.80; Dem. 18.36, 19.86, 125.

[66] Lycurg. 1.16; [Plut.] *Mor.* 849a. The testimony of Pseudo-Plutarch derives from a decree attributed to Hypereides calling for sacred objects, children, and women, in that order, to be moved to Piraeus at this time. The measure contains a variety of provisions, such as granting freedom to slaves, amnesty to exiles, and citizenship to metics, some of which were later judged to be illegal and led to the prosecution of its proposer. A modern view holds that the proposal did not pass the Assembly (Habicht 1997, 11). However, Dio Chrysostomos (*Or.* 15.21) states that it was indeed approved, for which Engels 1989, 101 n. 193 finds support in Lykourgos' references to the decree (esp. Lycurg. 1.36–37, 41). The more radical provisions of the measure, at least, were not enacted, probably due to the speedy conclusion of the emergency; see D. Chrys. *Or.* 15.21; Thalheim 1914, 283; Burtt 1954, 364–65; Engels 1989, 100–1; cf. Cooper in Worthington et al. 2001, 138. For full discussions of Hypereides' proposal, plus the relevant ancient references, see Schäfer 1887, 8–11; Thalheim 1914, 282–83; Engels 1989, 99–102.

[67] [Demad.] *Hyper dodek.* 14 (a clear reference to 335, despite Ober 1985, 200, cf. 55 n. 10); Diod. XVII.4.6; Arr. *Anab.* I.10.2. The reports state only that the Athenians brought their property into the city.

[68] On the circumstances, see Ellis 1976, 117–22; Hammond 1986, 552–53; Sealey 1993, 148–50; Hornblower 2002, 275.

[69] For the panic after Chaironeia, see Sealey 1993, 198–99; Habicht 1997, 10–11; Yunis 2001, 247 *ad* Dem. 18.248; Buckler 2003, 504–5. Engels 1989, 96–99 provides a close analysis of developments at Athens after the battle.

[70] Engels 1989, 96–97.

Great,[71] the Athenians reversed that policy once the Macedonian army actually arrived in Boiotia. Reacting to events rather than proceeding according to established policy, they deposited their property, at least, behind the city fortifications and sent an embassy to the king.[72] While retreating behind the urban defenses was not an unusual measure among the Athenians,[73] in none of these situations do they seem to have implemented a systematic plan.[74] Rather, in each instance they resorted to hastily conceived measures in a manner which typified the desperate evacuations commonly employed by the Greeks as a last resort. Thus, still prepared both to depend on the Long Walls (II) and to abandon the *chora*, the Athenians maintained central elements of Perikleian strategy. There is no evidence, however, that their plans included a standing policy of retreat from the countryside before offering battle—as did Perikles' concept.

In addition to dropping an important element of Perikleian domestic strategy, after 404 the Athenians began to place greater emphasis on securing the *chora*. By the middle of the century, this initiative became a central component of their approach to defense.[75] Its various aspects had existed in earlier times, but, in the words of M. Munn, "What was new was the integration of many elements—watchtowers, barrier walls, light infantry and cavalry patrols, and garrison forts—into a system of territorial defense."[76] The elevated importance of safeguarding Attika, however, did not mean that city defense become secondary.[77] Reports by

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[71] Bosworth 1988b, 194–95; Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 56–61; Habicht 1997, 14–15.

[72] For the negotiations with Alexander, see Bosworth 1988b, 196–97; Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 66; Habicht 1997, 15.

[73] Munn 1993, 30–31.

[74] By way of contrast, the withdrawal carried out in spring 431—although chaotic—had taken place well after the original decision to retreat from the *chora*. In 432/1, with the third and final Spartan embassy at Athens, the Athenians had accepted Perikles' advice to "relinquish our land and houses, but keep watch over the sea and the city" (Thuc. I. 143.5; Loeb translation by C. F. Smith). Although one cannot determine exactly how much time elapsed between Perikles' speech and the actual evacuation of Attika, Kagan 1969, 341 suggests that "some months" intervened between the departure of the final embassy from Sparta and the Theban assault on Plataia in March, 431 which ultimately led to the Athenians' withdrawal from the *chora* in late May.

[75] Ober 1985, 87–100; Osborne 1987, 157, 159; Garlan 1989, 107; Munn 1993, 4–5, 109–10, 187–95; Oliver 1995, 4–5; Hanson 1998, 98–100.

[76] Munn 1993, 187.

[77] More than twenty years ago, J. Ober proposed that in the fourth century the Athenians replaced the city-focused defensive strategy advocated by Perikles with a system based upon preclusive border defense. According to Ober 1985, 3: "The central

Xenophon, as described above, show that the option of withdrawing to the urban fortifications existed during the second quarter of the fourth century, as does the Athenians' readiness to abandon the countryside at midcentury. The clearest statement of the continuing prominence of defending the Athens-Piraeus complex, however, is the simple fact of Athenian investment in the Long Walls at the beginning, middle, and end of the fourth century. Now committed to defending both the territory of Attika and the urban fortifications at Athens,[78] the Athenians had settled upon the dual strategy recognized by modern scholars in the works of authors writing in the fourth century, particularly Aeneas Tacticus, as well as the archaeological remains.[79] This approach, Y. Garlan's "stratégie nouvelle," amounts to a compromise between the traditional emphasis on defending the countryside and Perikles' urban strategy.[80]

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thesis of this study is that the psychological and economic impact of the Peloponnesian War, together with the danger posed by the new-style warfare, led to the growth of a defensive mentality at Athens, characterized by a deep fear of enemy invasion and by the determination to guard the homeland against incursions by hostile forces.... As one result of this new mentality the Athenians rejected the Periclean policy of city defense and instead adopted a system of border defense intended to protect Attica from the ravages of invading land armies." See also Ober 1989, 294; Ober 1991, 26–33, esp. 28–29. Note, however, that Ober does not suggest that the Athenians actually abandoned all thought of defending the Athens-Piraeus complex; see Ober 1985, 56; Ober 1996, 69. For acceptance of this theory, see Burke 1990, 3, but cf. n. 17; Bleicken 1994, 127, although with qualifications pp. 492–93; Müller 1999, 23–26; Cartledge 2001, 111. For negative reaction, see especially Harding 1988, passim; Munn 1993, 18–25; also Pritchett 1991, 352 n. 505; Rusch and Rice 1991, 6; Sealey 1993, 274 n. 34; Buckler 2003, 234 n. 3.

[78] See also Steinhauer 2001b, 173: "Η νέα στρατηγική σημασία που αποκτά η οχύρωση της χώρας στον 4ο αι. π.Χ., δεν σημαίνει καθόλου την ταυτόχρονη υποβάθμιση της πόλεως."

[79] Garlan 1973, 154–60; Garlan 1974, 66–86; Garlan 1989, 106–7; see also Whitehead 1990, 23–24; Munn 1993, 4 n. 4; Kern 1999, 120; Will 1999, 268. For the ancient sources, see the discussion and notes in Garlan 1974, 67–77; also Whitehead 1990, 23 n. 68.

[80] See, for example, Garlan 1989, 106, referring specifically to Athenian strategy after 404: "Athènes se comporta désormais comme beaucoup de cités grecques, se ralliant à une sorte de compromis stratégique qui ne subordonnait totalement ni la ville au territoire ni le territoire à la ville, à une stratégie 'nouvelle' qui faisait certes de la ville le réduit ultime de la défense et l'enjeu suprême de combats, mais sans lui sacrifier *a priori* la protection du territoire." Munn 1993, 25–32 describes the manner in which such a system would have functioned.

*Circa 392/1–337*

The ancient evidence tells us nothing specific about the Long Walls (II) following their completion. In fact not until the construction of the phase III structures in the 330s, do the Long Walls reappear in the historical record.[81] The sources do show, however, that after the Social War (357–355) the Athenians concerned themselves repeatedly with their fortification system, and some of this testimony may apply to the phase II Long Walls.

One knows from Xenophon that the Athenians were discussing the restoration of their fortifications ca. 355. In concluding the *De vectigalibus*, which contains his proposals for recovery from the Social War, Xenophon suggests that among the results of his program would be the repair of the walls.[82] By implication, in the mid-350s the Athenian fortification system was suffering from neglect, although it is not clear where exactly repairs were needed at that time.

Whatever became of Xenophon's proposal, in 354 at least 10 talents were spent to repair part of the urban fortifications.[83] At a time when Athens' total revenue was just 130 talents,[84] such a sum suggests a high-priority program of renovations.

Speaking in 349, Demosthenes disparaged the supposed domestic accomplishments of Athens' leaders.[85] Among these activities was the plastering of parapets, which a scholiast connects with Euboulos. Disdainful as Demosthenes may have been of the work,[86] at the same

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[81] *IG* II$^2$ 244 lines 5 (restored), 29 (restored), 34. In fact the only specific reference to any fortifications in the Athenian system between ca. 390 and the mid-fourth century is Xenophon's testimony that gates were installed at Piraeus in 378.

[82] Xen. *Vect.* 6.1. Bloch 2004, passim has recently upheld the date of this treatise in 355/4.

[83] Nep. *Timoth.* 4.1. According to Nepos, this project involved the walls rebuilt earlier on by the admiral Konon, grandfather of the Konon who paid for the repairs. One need not, however, suppose that the work pertained to the Long Walls (II) and/or the circuit at Piraeus, for the symmetrical juxtaposition of the first Konon's activity with the projected repairs by his grandson is perhaps too neat, cf. Conwell 2002, 325–27. Surely the *murus* to which Nepos refers belongs to Athens' fortification system generally rather than any particular part of it, thus facilitating the statement that both men contributed to work on the same wall. For Nepos' historiographical method, see Titchener 2003, 88–90.

[84] Dem. 10.37. For the economic situation directly after the Social War as well as measures taken to improve it, see Hintzen-Bohlen 1997, 95–99.

[85] Dem. 3.29; cf. [Dem.] 13.30, 23.208. Ober 1985, 56 n. 11, 215–16 suggests that Dem. 3.29 involves Attika's rural fortifications.

[86] The reference comes in the course of an attack by Demosthenes on the policies

time his statement suggests that in the early 340s the Athenians were undertaking the routine maintenance required by their mudbrick fortification walls.

Athens' fortifications remained a topic of discussion during the first half of the 340s. There was talk of repairing the walls and a tower in 347/6,[87] although we have no idea whether or not action followed. Ambitious fortification work may have occurred soon thereafter. Alarmed after the Phokians capitulated to Philip at the end of the Third Sacred War in 346, the Athenians not only evacuated the countryside,[88] but also resolved to fortify (*teichizein*) Piraeus.[89] That they passed such a decree indicates that Piraeus' walls were thought to require attention at that time. Indeed, based in part on this resolution, F. G. Maier supposes that the Athenian fortification walls had fallen into disrepair by midcentury.[90] The written sources summarized above, however, suggest ongoing concern for Athens' defenses since the mid-350s. Assuming that the walls were in relatively sound condition by 346, then the Athenians perhaps intended to modernize the defenses so as to withstand Philip's advanced siege techniques. As it happened, Philip refrained from conflict with the Athenians at this time,[91] but their state of panic may neverthless have led them to strengthen Piraeus' walls before his attitude of restraint had become clear.

In the mid-fourth century, then, the Athenians on various occasions considered the status of their city's defenses, and they acted on those concerns at least twice. Would the Long Walls (II) have ranked as a priority in those years or at any other time after they were built in the later 390s? Specific ancient evidence for the position of the Long Walls (II) in Athenian strategic planning is limited to the testimony of Xenophon,[92] as discussed above, a passage which suggests that relying on the Athens-Piraeus structures was a legitimate option during the 360s. In order to understand more fully the potential strategic role of the

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of the leaders who produced this and other measures. If one assumes, following the scholiast, that Demosthenes has in mind plastering by Euboulos specifically, then his persistent opposition to the policies of Euboulos during the later 350s and early 340s (as discussed by Burke 2002, 180–87) explains the tone of the reference.

[87] Aeschin. 1.80.

[88] Aeschin. 2.139, 3.80; Dem. 18.36, 19.86, 125.

[89] Dem. 19.125. For Athenian fear of Philip as the Sacred War drew to a close, see Sealey 1993, 149–50; Buckler 2003, 448–49, 451–52.

[90] Maier 1959, 35.

[91] See Griffith in Hammond and Griffith 1979, 346–47; Buckler 2003, 451–52.

[92] Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 7.2–4.

phase II Long Walls, let us consider the degree to which the Athenian navy controlled the sea lanes while those structures were standing. As emphasized above, the Athenians would have depended on the walls joining the *asty* with its harbors only when they believed that the navy could generally ensure the safety of shipping.

The terms of the 404 peace treaty had reduced the navy to a minimal force, but before long the Athenians began to involve themselves in Aegean affairs. The earliest stages of this development, Konon's appointment as commander of the Persian navy in 397 along with the Demainetos affair and work on the shipsheds at Piraeus, both in 396/5, were described in chapter 4. Konon's success at the head of the Persian fleet operating in the Aegean, particularly his admission into Rhodes in 396, perhaps combined with the expectation that the Persians might support Athens,[93] may explain why the Athenians were confident enough of their rising fortunes at sea to begin work on the Long Walls (II) even before the battle of Knidos (August 394) crushed Spartan power in the Aegean.[94] That engagement, together with the subsequent activities of Konon and Pharnabazos in the Aegean,[95] both marginalized the Spartan navy[96] and increased Athenian strength at sea (even though Konon was in fact employed by the Persians).[97] During the later 390's, Athens took back control of the Delian amphiktyony,[98] regained its cleruchies on Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros,[99] and may have acquired the large fleet of 80 triremes with which Konon had arrived in Piraeus in summer 393.[100]

Ironically, however, the Athenians began to lose their recently acquired ascendancy in the Aegean just as they were completing the Long Walls (II), structures which depended on the exercise of substantial

[93] Sinclair 1978, 32 n. 13. Buckler 2003, 70–73 describes Persian naval activity before Knidos. For the Rhodian revolt, see Diod. XIV.79.6; on its importance and Rhodes' subsequent acceptance of Konon, see Hornblower 1994, 67–68.

[94] For the battle, see Xen. *Hell.* IV.3.11–12; Diod. XIV.83.4–7; for modern summaries of developments in the Aegean after Knidos, see Seager 1994a, 103–4; Buckler 2003, 130–36.

[95] Xen. *Hell.* IV.8.1–8; Diod. XIV.84.3–5.

[96] Diod. XIV.84.4. See Morrison and Williams 1968, 232; Hornblower 1994, 73–74; Seager 1994a, 103–4.

[97] Cargill 1981, 7; Burke 1990, 5; cf. Strauss 1984, 40.

[98] By 393/2, on epigraphic grounds; see Sinclair 1978, 43–44 with 44 n. 54; Seager 1994a, 105; Seager 1994b, 173; Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 142.

[99] Sealey 1993, 10; Cargill 1995, 13 with n. 6; Schwenk 1997, 15; Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 122.

[100] Hamilton 1979, 290; Clark 1990, 58; Hornblower 1994, 76.

sea power. The naval fortunes of Sparta, having declined after the battle of Knidos, had begun to rise again after the failure of peace negotiations in 392/1.[101] Soon the Spartans were challenging the Athenians for power in the Aegean, even to the point of asserting themselves near Aigina and along the coast of Attika itself in a number of successful maritime actions against their rival.[102] To be sure, a naval offensive under Thrasyboulos in 390/89, probably carried out largely with a view to securing the Hellespontine grain route,[103] re-established Athenian influence in the north Aegean.[104] Yet from the early 380s down to the King's Peace in 386, something of a stalemate developed between the navies of Athens and Sparta.[105] Ultimately, pressured by the raids from Aigina and, particularly, by Antalkidas' success at the Hellespont, the Athenians considered the peace terms dictated by King Artaxerxes of Persia in 387.[106] Although Athens was a leading sea power in the early 380s, the ability of the Spartan navy to operate successfully in the Athenians' home waters probably rendered the Long Walls (II) obsolete during the short period between their completion and the conclusion of the King's Peace in spring 386.[107]

In the wake of the pact, the signatories demobilized their armies and navies.[108] Athenian ships are known to have been at sea in 386/5,[109] so Athens retained a fleet, albeit one of modest size.[110] Economic factors will have ensured that they did not adopt a passive approach towards Aegean affairs,[111] for they needed a naval force in order to ensure the

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[101] Xen. *Hell.* IV.8.16, 24–25; Diod. XIV.97.4. See Sinclair 1978, 45; Hamilton 1979, 281, 293–94; Funke 1980, 150–53; Burke 1990, 5.

[102] Xen. *Hell.* IV.8.24 (390), V.1.2 (389), 19–23, 25–27 (387).

[103] Burke 1990, 5–7.

[104] Lys. XXVIII.2–6; Xen. *Hell.* IV.8.25–30; Diod XIV.94.2–4, 99.4. See Hammond 1986, 463; Strauss 1986, 151–54; Seager 1994a, 113–15.

[105] Hammond 1986, 464; see also Clark 1990, 58–59 for "near parity" ca. 387.

[106] Lys. 33.4–6; Xen. *Hell.* V.1.28–29. See Hornblower 2002, 225; Buckler 2003, 167–68.

[107] For the treaty, see Xen. *Hell.* V.1.31 together with the reference collected by Bengtson 1975, 188–92 no. 242. Recent summary and discussion includes Hornblower 2002, 225–26; Buckler 2003, 170–74.

[108] Xen. *Hell.* V.1.35. On the demobilization, see Sinclair 1978, 34–35 with 35 n. 23.

[109] *IG* II$^2$ 31 line 20 = Tod 1948, 47–50 no. 117; on the readings and restorations in lines 20–21 of this document, see Clark 1990, 60 n. 71.

[110] For the size of the Athenian fleet at about the time of the King's Peace, see Amit 1965, 25 (50 to 60 ships ca. 388); Sinclair 1978, 49 (ca. 70 triremes by midsummer 387); Clark 1990, 58 (65 to 70 triremes as of 386); Gabrielsen 1994, 127 (50 to 70 triremes).

[111] Wilson 1970, 310; Sinclair 1978, 47; Clark 1990, 60.

security of the city's grain supply and combat piracy.[112] Nevertheless, in the wake of the King's Peace Athens maintained a cautious foreign policy,[113] as is clear from the careful wording of the decree documenting a defensive alliance with Chios (384) which conformed to the provisions of the King's Peace.[114] In this period the city could not—or at least would not—dominate the sea lanes, so the Long Walls (II) will have continued to play no active role in Athenian military affairs.

Although Athens never again ruled the Aegean as it had during much of the fifth century, the city became the dominant naval power in the region upon the foundation of the Second Athenian League.[115] As the leader of a major naval alliance, Athens exerted renewed mastery of the sea lanes lasting from the origins of its league in 378 down to the outbreak of the Social War in 357.[116] An important victory against the Spartans off Naxos (376) confirmed Athenian superiority in the Aegean,[117] ensuring that the city could safeguard its grain supply and acquire additional allies in the region.[118] During the 360s, Athens remained strong in the Aegean.[119] Timotheos, for example, campaigned with much success throughout the northern Aegean during 366/5.[120] Expelling a Persian garrison from Samos, he captured the island (365),

[112] For current threats to the grain supply, see Lys. 22.14. Sinclair 1978, 47 discusses Athenian attention to the food supply after 386 and the use of Athens' fleet to secure it, while Harding 1988, 67–68 considers Athens' ongoing concern for the security of the grain route during the fourth century. De Souza 1999, 33–36 discusses piracy during the first half of the fourth century.

[113] Sinclair 1978, 40, 43; Cargill 1981, 9; Seager 1994b, 163–64.

[114] *IG* II$^2$ 34 = Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 82–87 no. 20.

[115] Burke 1990, 10; Burckhardt 1995, 122, 124.

[116] On the initial web of alliances between Athens and individual states as well as events leading up to the decree of Aristoteles, which formally established the league in early 377, see Cargill 1981, 190; Seager 1994b, 166–69; Hornblower 2002, 233–34; Buckler 2003, 218–27. For the decree itself, see *IG* II$^2$ 43 = Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 92–105 no. 22; also Bengtson 1975, 207–11 no. 257, 343 no. 257; Baron 2006, passim.

[117] Xen. *Hell.* V.4.61; Diod. XV.34.4–35.2. For a complete list of ancient references, see Burckhardt 1995, 123 n. 101.

[118] Bosworth 1980, 86 *ad* Arr. An. I.9.3; Cargill 1981, 190; Hammond 1986, 488–89; Burke 1990, 10; Cargill 1995, 18; Dreher 1995, 276; Hornblower 2002, 239.

[119] See Cawkwell 1984, 334–42; Roy 1994, 208; Burckhardt 1995, 124; Buckler 2003, 266. Burckhardt 1995, 124 n. 107 lists Athenian naval activity in the north Aegean during the 360s; see also Burke 2002, 170 n. 29. For a summary of general factors conducive to Athenian naval superiority in this period, see Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.2–7 for the statements made by Prokles of Phleious in 369.

[120] For summary discussion , see Roy 1994, 200–1; Buckler 2003, 353–59; concerning Athens' interests in the region, see Buckler 2003, 339.

which became an Athenian cleruchy and naval base.[121] Subsequently he lifted a siege at Sestos mounted by the Thracian king Kotys (364), thus strengthening Athens' hold on the northwestern grain route.[122] A challenge to Athenian sea power developed in the mid-360s, when Thebes—intending to challenge Athens for mastery of the sea—built a 100-ship war fleet.[123] In the end, the Thebans' naval effort achieved little lasting success against Athens,[124] but their activities, the bold strikes by Alexander of Pherai late in the decade,[125] and active threats to shipping passing through the Propontis[126] show that the Athenians were not unchallenged as the 360s came to a close.[127] Given Athens' ability to secure the sea lanes in this period, the city could certainly have maintained a military strategy which included the Long Walls (II). Therefore it is likely not coincidental that during the 360s, as attested by Xenophon, the Athenians at least debated the possibility of employing a strategy similar to the one championed by Perikles.

During the 350s, challenges to Athens on several fronts impacted the city's absolute control of the sea lanes. First, in 357 key members of the Second Athenian League revolted, sparking the disastrous Social War (357–355).[128] The loss of these states markedly diminished the power of the alliance.[129] A second, longer-term threat manifested itself as well, for the Athenians were unable to check an assertion of power in the north by the recently crowned king of Macedonia, Philip II.[130] By the end of 354, Philip controlled much of the northern Aegean

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[121] Isoc 15.108, 111; Arist. *Rh.* II.6.24; Dem. 15.9; Din. 1.14; Nep. *Timoth.* 1.2; Diod. XVIII.8.7, 18.9; Polyaen. III.10.9. See Cargill 1995, 18–21.

[122] Isoc. 15.112; Nep. *Timoth.* 1.2.

[123] Isoc. 5.53; Diod. XV.78.4–79.1. See Buckler 2003, 338–39, 359–61.

[124] Roy 1994, 201–2 with 202 n. 17; Buckler 2003, 372–73.

[125] Dem. 51.8; [Dem.] 50.4; Diod. XV.95.1–2; Polyaen. VI.2.2; cf. Xen. *Hell.* VI.4.35. See Cargill 1981, 169–70; Cawkwell 1984, 335, 339 with n. 19; Roy 1994, 203; Dreher 1995, 277; Buckler 2003, 371.

[126] [Dem.] 50.6; Cawkwell 1984, 335–36; Hammond 1986, 514; Hornblower 2002, 255.

[127] For a summary of Athens' activities and priorities in the Aegean in 362 and the years immediately following, see Hammond 1986, 514–15.

[128] For a narrative of the conflict as well as its historical significance, see Hammond 1986, 515–16; Buckler 2003, 377–84; note also the comments of Cargill 1981, 194; Ellis 1994a, 738–39. On the poverty of Athens at the end of the war, see Burke 2002, 170.

[129] Cargill 1981, 194; Burke 1984, 112–13; Bosworth 1988b, 14; Burke 1990, 12–13. Dreher 1995, 287–90, however, warns against supposing that the league had become meaningless.

[130] For a useful summary of developments in the relationship between Athens and Philip down to the battle Chaironeia in 338, see Yunis 2001, 1–6.

littoral stretching from Macedonia to western Thrace.[131] Losing access to potential naval bases and unable to protect its allies and cleruchies in the region, the Athenians could not necessarily claim mastery of the northern sea lanes. They were unlikely to meet Philip in a major battle there, however. He could put to sea only a relatively small fleet[132]—perhaps about twenty ships under typical circumstances—and normally did not pursue decisive engagements by sea.[133] The third challenge to the Athenians in the 350s was piracy, including harassment by Philip. This problem posed a continuing threat to Athenian shipping in these years,[134] and, following the Social War, controlling it acquired new urgency in connection with Euboulos' ambitious economic program.[135] By the second half of the 350s, these challenges had ended the dominance of the Aegean which the Athenians had maintained since 378. Nevertheless, at midcentury the city's fleet had grown in size,[136] and in that period Athens remained the leading sea power in the region.[137] Its many hulls were never in service simultaneously,[138] of course, but the navy could still generally control the sea lanes and, therefore, protect the shipborne grain supply from the Black Sea region.[139] Accordingly,

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[131] See, generally, Ellis 1994a, 736–38; Buckler 2003, 388–97, 413.

[132] Griffith in Hammond and Griffith 1979, 310–12 with 312 n. 1, 567 with n. 3, 658; Bosworth 1988b, 16; Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 24.

[133] Cawkwell 1984, 345; Burke 1992, 224.

[134] Hauben 1975, 55; Burke 1984, 116–17, 118; Burke 1992, 224; Hintzen-Bohlen 1997, 101. For piracy in general after the Social War, see Isoc. 5.120–23; Dem. 12.2, 13, 23.148, 166, 58.56; [Dem.] 7.2–4, 14–15. For raiding under Philip, see esp. Dem. 4.34.

[135] Burke 1984, passim; cf. Dreher 1995, 277.

[136] Demosthenes (14.13) refers to 300 triremes in the context of ca. 354. Euboulos built triremes and shipsheds in the mid-fourth century; see Din. 1.96, and cf. *IG* II$^2$ 1627 lines 353–54, dated 330/29, for shipbuilding timber left over from what Euboulos had bought. One naval inventory (*IG* II$^2$ 1611 lines 3–9) lists 283 ships at the end of the year 357/6, while another (*IG* II$^2$ 1613 lines 284–302) identifies 349 ships at the end of 353/2.

[137] See also Bosworth 1988b, 14; Burckhardt 1995, 126; Schwenk 1997, 28–29; Paulsen 1999, 29.

[138] Enormous resources would have been required to pay large numbers of crews; see Griffith 1978, 144; Griffith in Hammond and Griffith 1979, 312 n. 1; Burke 1984, 116 with n. 26; Gabrielsen 1994, 110–25. In any event, the trierarchy system was not functioning effectively in this period (Jordan 1975, 74; Gabrielsen 1994, 180–82, 224–25; Garland 2001b, 99; Hornblower 2002, 265–66), a situation which, in the words of Gabrielsen 1994, 147, caused a "serious and chronic shortage" of equipment; see Gabrielsen 1994, 146–48 and 1995, 238.

[139] Burckhardt 1995, 126. For the use of Athenian ships at midcentury to control piracy and safeguard the grain supply, see Burke 1984, 116–17, 118–19; Harding 1995, 111 n. 36; Hintzen-Bohlen 1997, 101–2.

at this time the Long Walls (II) could have been a useful component of Athens' defenses, so the fortification projects discussed ca. 355 and carried out in 354 may have involved those structures.

With Philip's power continuing to grow in the mid-fourth century, the security of Athenian shipping became increasingly precarious. Philip seized Olynthos in 348 so as to gain control of nearly the entire Thracian coast, and by the end of the decade he was threatening the grain route at either end. In 343 most of the Euboian Gulf entered Philip's sphere of influence,[140] and in 340 he attacked the Greek cities of the eastern Thracian coast along with Perinthos and Byzantion,[141] eventually capturing a fleet of Athenian grain ships near the second of these cities.[142] Although Philip subsequently withdrew from both Perinthos and Byzantion, his ability to threaten Athens' lifeline through the Bosporos was now manifest, as was the Athenian navy's inability to reverse this state of affairs. By the later 340s, then, a strategy incorporating the Long Walls (II) would no longer have made sense—a situation soon to be confirmed by developments after the battle of Chaironeia (below, chapter 6). Since Athens had remained the leading sea power down to that time, however, conceivably some of the fortification work which was done ca. 349 and at least discussed in 347/6, if not the project undertaken at Piraeus in 346, had included the phase II Long Walls.

## *Summary*

Contemporary with Konon's successes as a Persian admiral in the mid-390s, the Athenians began to renew the sea power they had lost at the end of the Peloponnesian War. In that context, perhaps during late summer 395, they began to rebuild the fortifications destroyed in 404, including the Long Walls (II). When Konon returned to Athens in midsummer 393, work had already been underway for nearly two years. Konon's contribution of Persian funds and the labor of his crews, combined with the efforts of the Athenians and other Greeks, brought the undertaking to an advanced stage. Following the departure of Konon less than a year after his arrival, the Athenians carried on

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[140] Buckler 2003, 456–58.

[141] Buckler 2003, 477–87.

[142] Dem. 18.73, 139; Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 292; Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 162; Just. *Epit.* IX.1.5–6; Oros. III.13.3. See Hauben 1975, 56; Griffith in Hammond and Griffith 1979, 575–78; Buckler 2003, 484–85.

with the project. By 392/1 work had reached the final stages in at least some construction areas, and the Athenians will have completed the entire endeavor by the end of the 390s.

Athens was not besieged while the phase II Long Walls stood, so the structures were never called upon to maintain the connection between the *asty* and its harbors. In fact, during two periods, from ca. 390 to 378 and the later 340s to 337 (when work on the third-phase Long Walls began), relying on the structures would have made little sense due to Athenian naval weakness. Between 378 and the later 340s, however, the Athenians were in a position to employ the Long Walls (II). During the first part of the period (378–357), their navy dominated the Aegean, and a contemporary report by Xenophon suggests that the option of employing the phase II structures existed in the 360s. Thereafter, although Athenian sea power had declined somewhat due to the outcome of the Social War and Philip's success along the Aegean littoral, down to the later 340s the city remained the leading sea power in the region. Athenian shipping therefore enjoyed probable security at sea, and that circumstance would have justified reliance on the walls connecting the *asty* with its harbors. Accordingly, although one cannot prove that the Athenians actually incorporated the Long Walls (II) in their defensive planning between 378 and the end of the 340s, some of the fortification work at midcentury may have involved those structures.

CHAPTER SIX

# PHASE III

During the panic at Athens following the battle of Chaironeia (summer 338), the Athenians hurriedly shored up their defenses. These emergency repairs, in which Demosthenes played a leading role,[1] included the use of trees, metal, and gravestones in the construction of walls, moats, and palisades.[2] Whatever was accomplished during this hasty effort, work may have stopped with the conclusion of the so-called Peace of Demades between Athens and Philip II, the victor at Chaironeia.[3] By summer 337, the Athenians had initiated a systematic fortification project involving the circuits of Athens and Piraeus as well as the two great structures crossing the plain between those two cities (fig. 4). The extensive program of construction, probably focused on modernizing Athens' defenses in the face of improving methods of assault, was completed several years later. Since the supremacy of Macedon after 338 eclipsed the ability of the Athenians to act independently at sea, the rebuilt Long Walls (III) had no immediate role to play in Athenian military affairs. Built with a view to a future in which the Athenian navy once again controlled the sea lanes, the structures never actually served to maintain the connection between Athens and its harbors during a siege.[4] In fact, the phase III Long Walls enter the historical record only as part of purely local activity by a Macedonian force not long after the Lamian War.

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[1] Dem. 18.248, cf. 18.300; cf. Din. 1.78. Buckler 2003, 505 rejects the orator's claim to have played an important part in the effort.

[2] Aeschin. 3.236; Lycurg. 1.44. Since Aischines alludes to the dismantling of tombs, then he is referring to the emergency works carried out immediately after Chaironeia rather than the more systematic program begun in 337; see also Adams 1919, 492 n. 1; Harris 1995, 143; cf. Camp 2001, 142–43. Lykourgos' report that temples contributed *hopla* to the work presumably refers to metal equipment like weaponry which was melted down to make tools, dowels, and clamps. For physical remains assigned to the repairs in 338, see Ohly 1965, 341–43; cf. Knigge 1988, 42.

[3] Schäfer 1887, 80. On the peace, see Diod. XVI.87.3; Schmitt 1969, 1–3 no. 402; Griffith in Hammond and Griffith 1979, 605–8; Will 1983, 11–16; Sealey 1993, 198–99; Ellis 1994b, 782; Buckler 2003, 505–6.

[4] Because the two phase III Long Walls, like their phase II predecessors, ran from Athens down to Piraeus, one may assume continuity in function from the one building period to the next.

## *337–Circa 334*

During the first half of 337, in two meetings convened by Philip at Corinth, delegates from all the Greek states except Sparta established a common peace and formed the Corinthian League.[5] Literary sources show that, even as this process unfolded, the Athenians were embarking on a comprehensive and systematic fortification program.[6] Demosthenes, speaking in the Assembly during late spring 337, proposed that in June of that year the tribes select officials to supervise work on the walls of the city's fortification system.[7] In the event, the orator himself was elected to represent his tribe on the supervisory board,[8] received about ten talents from the state for his work on the defenses,[9] and contributed 100 *minai* of his own funds to the effort.[10] Presumably the construction program began not long after the organization of the building commission in mid- to late summer 337. Assuming that each of the ten building commissioners received the same sum as did Demosthenes,[11] then the Athenians set aside a considerable sum, on the order of 100 talents, for the project.

The nature of Demosthenes' role in the work carries useful implications concerning the broader organization and scope of the project.[12] Assuming that each tribe elected one *teichopoios*, then there were ten

[5] See, generally, Schmitt 1969, 3–10 no. 403/I–II; Ellis 1976, 204–9; Griffith in Hammond and Griffith 1979, 623–46; Buckler 2003, 511–15; Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 372–79 no. 76.

[6] Other summaries of the literary evidence include Schäfer 1887, 80–81; Will 1983, 24–25.

[7] Aeschin. 3.27; Lib. *Arg.* D. 17.1.

[8] The sources identify his office as either *teichopoios* (Aeschin. 3.14, 17, 24, 27, 28, 31, with schol. ad 3.13, 17; Dem. 18.113) or *epimeletes ton teichon* (Dem. 18.118; [Plut.] *Mor.* 845f). The present study follows the common assumption that Demosthenes served as one of the *teichopoioi*. For less precise descriptions of Demosthenes' position, see Aeschin. 3.23; Cic. Opt. Gen. 7.19; [Plut.] *Mor.* 851a. Cf. Dem. 18.299–300, exaggerating Demosthenes' own responsibility, just as Din. 1.96 played down the orator's role in safeguarding the city.

[9] Aeschin. 3.23 (10 talents), 31 (nearly 10 talents).

[10] See Aeschin. 3.17 and [Plut.] *Mor.* 845f for the 100-*mina* figure. Pseudo-Plutarch (*Mor.* 851a) records the sum of 3 talents plus the cost of two moats at Piraeus, while the spurious decree at Dem. 18.118 lists 3 talents; Cicero (*Opt. Gen.* 7.19) provides no specific figure. Modern sources tend to follow the 100-*mina* figure; see, for example, Mitchel 1970, 34; Sealey 1993, 207; Harris 1995, 139. For further discussion of this matter, see Schäfer 1887, 81 with n. 2; Mesk 1939, 1266–68.

[11] A matter of common agreement; see, for example, Mitchel 1970, 34; Habicht 1997, 11.

[12] See also Mitchel 1970, 34.

building commissioners. Demosthenes was assigned to Piraeus,[13] so each of his nine colleagues must also have supervised work on a particular sector of the fortifications. Given the great size of the zone assigned to Demosthenes, one of just ten *teichopoioi*, then the project was extensive in scope, perhaps including the Long Walls, the city circuit of Athens, and even forts and towers in the countryside.[14]

The literary sources provide limited insight into the sort of building activities undertaken at this time. One knows, at least, that moats were excavated.[15] This part of the project must have completed or extended the hasty work on the moats carried out during the emergency after Chaironeia.[16] Otherwise, Demosthenes refers to his own wall-building activity (*teichismos*) as well as the use of stone blocks and mudbrick.[17] Conceivably the statement relates to Demosthenes' prominent contributions directly after Chaironeia, but it is unlikely that those emergency works involved time-consuming work in cut stone.[18] Since the bricks must have been incorporated above the substructures, presumably the stone blocks belonged to the foundations or socles. Thus, the work started in 337 included attention to the walls from top to bottom and, perhaps, at least some reconstruction from the ground up.

While ancient authors date the beginning of work, suggest that the project was ambitious, and begin to clarify what exactly was done, the building inscription *IG* II$^2$ 244 may enhance our understanding of

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[13] [Plut.] *Mor.* 851a; cf. Dem. 18.300.

[14] See also Jones et al. 1957, 187.

[15] Aeschin. 3.30; [Plut.] *Mor.* 851a; cf. Dem. 18.299. Note also *IG* II$^2$ 2495, which marked the *telma* of Athena near the Diochares Gate at Athens and has been connected with the moat of the Athenian circuit (Gruben 1964, 414 n. 20; Travlos 1971, 158). In *IG*, vol. II, part 2, no. 1056 (p. 488), U. Koehler, followed by J. Kirchner in *IG* II$^2$, dates the document to the Lykourgan period by comparison with other inscriptions more definitely belonging in those years.

[16] It is sometimes supposed that work on the moats took place only during the emergency in 338; see Frickenhaus 1905, 26–27; Maier 1959, 36. The ancient sources, however, place moat-related activity in the context of Demosthenes' service as *teichopoios*.

[17] Dem. 18.299.

[18] For the connection between Dem. 18.299 and the work begun in 337, see also Ellis 1976, 296 n. 90; Will 1983, 25; Yunis 2001, 276 *ad loc.* Note that Demosthenes' reference in this passage to his wall-building (*teichismos*) need not connect the report with the work begun in 337. One could engage in such activity without actually serving as a *teichopoios*, as the orator did in 338, and it seems that in fifth- and fourth-century Eleusis activity described by the verb *epistenai* was not necessarily carried out by men known officially as *epistatai* (Cavanaugh 1996, 4).

the endeavor.[19] The stone actually includes two distinct but closely related documents,[20] one of them a law ordering work on fortifications, the other a list of specifications related to that project. These texts are concerned with various components of Athens' urban defenses, including the Long Walls, the circuit of Piraeus, and the harbors of Piraeus, together with at least one location in the hinterland, the fort at Phyle.[21] Connecting the inscription with the fortification program begun in 337, however, depends on the date of the document.

Although no internal information dates *IG* II² 244 specifically, several factors suggest that it belongs to a period stretching from just after 350 into the last quarter of the century. The reference in line 46 to Philodemos Autokleous Eroiades, who is known from various other inscriptions dating from the mid-fourth century to the 320s,[22] dates the document generally. Line 19 refers to a ten-talent *eisphora*, thus narrowing the window because this is apparently the tax known to have been levied annually from 347/6 to 323/2.[23] Stephen Tracy's analysis of other inscriptions cut by the same hand provides an additional chronological hint, for the person who inscribed *IG* II² 244 was active from at least 340/39 to ca. 320.[24] We may, then, assign this document to the years 347/6 to ca. 320.

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[19] Maier 1959, 36–48 no. 10, whose text is followed here. Schwenk 1985, 18–26 no. 3 prefers Kirchner's text in *IG* II². I am deeply indebted to Dr. Molly Richardson for an informative discussion of this inscription (July 2004) and for granting me access to the relevant sections of her unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.

[20] Richardson 2000, 602.

[21] Long Walls: lines 5 (restored), 29 (restored), 34; circuit wall of Piraeus (Eetioneia): lines 3, 29 (restored), 34 (restored); circuit wall of Piraeus (Mounychia): line 4 (restored); circuit wall of Piraeus generally: lines 3 (restored), 29 (restored), 34 (restored); harbors of Piraeus: lines 14, 40; Phyle: line 11. Contra Garland 2001b, 169, one need not doubt the inclusion of the Long Walls in the program; cf. Thür 1985, 66: "Die Ergänzung der Bauvorhaben in den Z. 29 und 34 ist durch die in den Z. 2 und 34 erhaltenen Angaben gesichert." Although there is no certain reference to Mounychia in the law (lines 1–46), Richardson 2000, 602 rightly supports the restoration of the toponym in line 4.

[22] Osborne and Byrne 1994, 453 s.v. Philodemos (19).

[23] *IG* II² 505 lines 12–17. For the connection, see Thomsen 1964, 239–40; Brun 1983, 49–51; cf., however, Maier 1959, 42; Migeotte 2000, 156, 168 n. 3. Following Foucart 1902, 182–83, Maier, 1959, 40 accepts a somewhat higher limit, supposing that the decree cannot be earlier than 354 because in line 2 it includes the demotic and, perhaps, patronymic of the proposer: *[Kephisophon Kephalionos] Aphidnaios eipen*. Richardson 2000, 603, 609 notes, however, that *Aphidnaios* could signify the proposer's personal name rather than his demotic origin.

[24] See Tracy 1995, 96–103. Note that the dates of this cutter will have been established independently of the inscription's supposed date because Tracy identifies the chronological limits of a cutter's career based on the earliest and latest securely dated inscriptions; see Tracy 1990a, 2; cf. also Tracy 1975, 85. Additionally, in describing

A more precise date follows from a comparison between the work enacted by the inscription and the fortification projects which were discussed or carried out at Athens during the period to which it dates. The program known from *IG* $II^2$ 244 was obviously important, for, as already noted, it was extensive in scope. In addition, the work was apparently expected to last for more than one year,[25] was subject to the close and periodic scrutiny of the *Boule*,[26] required complicated financial arrangements,[27] and involved a complex administration with at least four different sorts of supervisors.[28] As for the exact nature of work, the law forming the first document on the stone contains one enigmatic reference to stone walls.[29] The specifications for stonework in Mounychia,[30] the subject of the second document on the stone, refer to the production and transport of stone blocks as well as to the restoration of a tower, the core of which was to become cut blocks.[31] As preserved, the inscription does not provide a full record of what specifically was planned,[32] but it certainly demonstrates that the project was an ambitious and highly organized undertaking which involved at least some reconstruction from the ground up.

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his method of identifying hands, Tracy stresses the importance of relying on securely dated inscriptions (1990b, 60) and ignoring the historical debate as far as that is possible (1994, 152).

[25] *IG* $II^2$ 244 line 30.

[26] *IG* $II^2$ 244 lines 9–10, 36–37, cf. 41–42.

[27] *IG* $II^2$ 244 lines 11–31.

[28] Cf. Maier 1961, 41–42. The provisions of *IG* $II^2$ 244 show that responsible officials included *teichopoioi* (lines 34, 38, 44; cf. 31, 39), *tamiai* (lines 26, 34, 38), *hoi eiremenoi*, "chosen men" (lines 31–32, 37–38, cf. 22–23, 33–34, 42–43), and certain other supervisors (line 29). The *tamiai*, who are listed twice, are not necessarily the same in both instances; if they are the same, one wonders why they are not identified as Athena's treasurers at the first rather than the second reference. Despite Maier's restorations, it is not entirely clear to which type of supervisors the inscription refers in lines 22–23, 33–34, and 42–43; it is even conceivable that they involve another group entirely. On the composition and duties of the building commission, see Maier 1959, 43–44; Maier 1961, 44; Thür 1985, 66.

[29] *IG* $II^2$ 244 line 4.

[30] *IG* $II^2$ 244 lines 47–113.

[31] For the tower, see *IG* $II^2$ 244 lines 81–98, with Maier 1959, 45–46.

[32] In *IG* $II^2$, part 1, p. 114, J. Kirchner holds that originally the stone included space for a total of four columns following lines 1–46, although only two columns of text actually survive. This suggestion is typically accepted (Schwenk 1985, 23; Thür 1985, 66) but cannot be proven, for damage to the right side precludes establishing the original width of the stone with certainty (M. Richardson, pers. comm., July 2004). This fact also means that many of the proposed restorations to lines 1–46 are not certain.

From the period in the mid-fourth century to which *IG* II$^2$ 244 belongs, there are three known Athenian fortification projects with which to associate this building program. These include the proposals dating to 347/6 and 346, as described above, in addition to the project begun in 337. Assuming that the discussion of repairing walls and a tower during 347/6 actually came to pass, that project hardly corresponds to the major undertaking suggested by the inscription. If any construction occurred in 346, it would have been substantial and would have occurred at Piraeus. However, as already discussed, the program was proposed in a time of panic following Philip's reduction of the Phokians in the Third Sacred War; under such circumstances, the Athenians would not have carried out the systematic and deliberate undertaking known from *IG* II$^2$ 244. The third project possibly connected with the work known from the inscription was initiated by the Athenians in 337. Involving considerable expense on ten substantial sectors of the urban defense system and, probably, fortifications in the countryside, this program was carefully organized and extensive, like the project known from the inscription. In addition, the work in and after 337 involved Piraeus, as did the project articulated by *IG* II$^2$ 244. These fundamental parallels suggest that one equate the epigraphically attested building program with the work which began in 337.[33] The contents of the inscription, a law calling for fortification work and specifications associated with the undertaking, associate it with an early stage of the project, meaning that *IG* II$^2$ 244 belongs to the year 337.[34]

[33] Ever since 1902, this connection has been the basis for the orthodox dating of *IG* II$^2$ 244 in the year 337. Foucart 1902, 182–83, citing epigraphic, prosopographic, and historical factors, first assigned the document to that year. Soon after, Frickenhaus 1905, 28 refined the date to 337/6. Essential to this dating was the statement by Aischines (3.27) that Demosthenes moved a decree calling for the selection of *teichopoioi* and *tamiai* during Skirophorion 338/7, the final month of the archon-year, for the purpose of initiating a fortification project. Frickenhaus supposed that the organizational activity at the very end of 338/7 had produced the law forming lines 1–46 of *IG* II$^2$ 244, which he therefore assigned to the first prytany of 337/6. Dating *IG* II$^2$ 244 to 337/6, whether to the first prytany or not, is likely correct because it allows time for the building commission, which was chosen in very late 338/7, to form and develop a plan before the production of the detailed law and specifications.

[34] Recent acceptance of this dating, sometimes expressed as 337/6, includes von Eickstedt 1991, 29; Engels 1992, 17 n. 24; Loomis 1998, 24, 100, 102, 264, 278 (ca. 337); Migeotte 2000, 148, 149; Richardson 2000, 601; Hellmann 2002, 38. Cf. Schwenk 1985, 24–26, who assigns the document generally to 337 but allows a more specific dating in either 338/7 or 337/6.

One may now combine the literary and epigraphic evidence for the systematic fortification program carried out after Chaironeia. These sources show that, in mid- to late summer 337, the Athenians initiated an expensive, wide-ranging project involving the city walls of Athens and Piraeus, the Long Walls (III), and perhaps at least one fort in the countryside. Whatever was done outside Athens, work on the urban fortification system included the reconstruction of some portions of the walls from the level of the substructures. The project would incorporate cut stone blocks, both in the curtain walls and in the core of at least one tower.[35] Above the socles, the fabric of the fortifications probably consisted of mudbrick.[36] Continuing part of the work begun during the emergency in 338, the Athenians excavated moats in front of the walls.

The terrible loss at Chaironeia no doubt inspired this major fortification program, but what exactly did the Athenians seek to accomplish? Given their attention to the walls at midcentury, the defenses had probably not yet fallen into disrepair.[37] The historical context suggests that, rather than simply shoring up their defenses, the Athenians sought to counter improved siege techniques. The dramatic improvements in siegecraft among the Greeks had begun long before the 330s. The invention of the non-torsion catapult at Syracuse in 399 had initiated the process,[38] while the development of wheeled siege towers in the same place and at about the same time also anticipated the advances to come

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[35] It is possible, however, that the core of the tower was not actually built with cut blocks as called for by *IG* II$^2$ 244. According to Maier 1959, 18, 46–47 and von Eickstedt 1991, 49, a tower excavated long ago on Mounychia may correspond to the structure known from the inscription. If so, then its in-filled construction suggests that the builders did not follow the specifications; see von Eickstedt 1991, 49 n. 213; cf. Maier 1959, 47. The physical remains of the tower, are documented by Threpsiades 1935, 160–64; Travlos 1988, fig. 431; von Eickstedt 1991, 48, fig. 24.

[36] *IG* II$^2$ 463, dating to 307/6 (below, chapter 7), also suggests that the walls built in 337 and after had brick superstructures. Lines 74–75 describe the restoration of curtains in mudbrick, and lines 54–58 detail the repair and extension of the parapet using the same material. The superstructure of the original walls had doubtless been built with mudbricks, probably during the 330s when the Athenians had last carried out a major fortification project.

[37] Cf., however, Wachsmuth 1874, 596 with n. 1; Knigge 1988, 50.

[38] Diod. XIV.42.1. The view of Marsden 1969, 49 that Dionysios' technicians invented the non-torsion catapult is generally accepted. Y. Garlan, however, allows the possibility that the machine invented at Syracuse in 399 was torsion-driven; see Garlan 1989, 124; Garlan 1992, 31; Garlan 1994, 683.

in the fourth century.[39] Subsequently Philip II became a master of poliorcetic assault, besieging many cities successfully already in the 350s.[40] Then, beginning ca. 350, he initiated what E. W. Marsden identifies as "an astonishing period of technical development" in siege machinery which was especially intense down to 331.[41] The most threatening weapon of all, torsion artillery, was invented by 341, probably in Macedonia.[42]

By 337, the Athenians were well aware of the advanced methods with which an attacker could assault their fortifications.[43] Ammunition for catapults had reached Athens not later than 370, so they had already acquired those weapons not long after their invention in 399.[44] The Athenians can hardly have failed to comprehend the power of catapults soon after acquiring them,[45] and they will also have recognized that such weaponry posed a profound threat to their defenses. By 341, Demosthenes was acknowledging the revolution which had occurred in the art of war by that time, and he specifically remarked upon the use of artillery by Philip II during sieges.[46] The Macedonians' elaborate, if unsuccessful, assault on Perinthos (340) soon proved the orator's point.[47] Lastly, epigraphic and literary evidence suggests that the Athenians possessed torsion artillery by 340.[48]

Mindful of the new dangers, after Chaironeia the Athenians cannot have failed to recognize the weakness of their physical defenses. The

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[39] Diod. XIV.51.1; see Lawrence 1979, 49, 420; Garlan 1992, 32. Milner 1997, 210–11 provides a useful summary and discussion of Dionysios' effort to develop siege machinery.

[40] Le Bohec-Bouhet 1999, 271 provides a list of sieges mounted by Philip.

[41] Marsden 1977, passim, with quotation taken from p. 212. See also Winter 1971, 319–20; Garlan 1994, 686; Milner 1997, 211–12; Le Bohec-Bouhet 1999, 271–72.

[42] Marsden 1969, 56–61, followed by Ober 1985, 44; Ober 1987, 570; McNicoll 1997, 4.

[43] See also Ober 1985, 218–19.

[44] *IG* II² 1422 lines 8–9 (371/0); see Marsden 1969, 65–66; Garlan 1974, 172 with n. 2; Ober 1987, 571 with n. 9. Garlan 1974, 172 discusses catapults at Athens in succeeding decades.

[45] See also Ober 1987, 571. Cf. *IG* II² 9979, the gravestone of an artilleryman; for a short discussion, see Marsden 1969, 67, dating the inscription in the mid-fourth century. If the Athenians actually acquired their knowledge, along with their catapults, from the man responsible for inventing the weapon, Dionysios I of Syracuse, as suggested by Marsden 1969, 65–66, then the power of the catapult will have been demonstrated to them without delay.

[46] Dem. 9.47, 50.

[47] Diod. XVI.74.2–76.3.

[48] Marsden 1969, 56–58, 67, followed by Milner 1997, 211; cf. Ober 1987, 599. The view perhaps receives some support from the addition to the ephebic program, soon afterwards, of training in the use of the catapult ([Arist.] *Ath.* 42.3).

fortifications of the asty remained essentially in their fifth-century state, while the Long Walls (II) had last been the subject of a major construction program in the later 390s.[49] Since the mid-350s, the Athenians had discussed renovating their defenses on multiple occasions, undertaken at least some actual construction, and perhaps modernized the fortifications at Piraeus. The known details of the work done in the year 338 and from 337 to ca. 334 suggest that the Athenians now sought to counter advanced poliorcetic techniques.[50] Having dug moats and built palisades immediately following Chaironeia, in the major project begun soon thereafter they continued to work on moats, perhaps built a *proteichisma* in front of the Long Walls,[51] and intended to rebuild the core of a tower in cut blocks. Moats and outworks were measures intended to prevent attackers from reaching the fortification wall itself.[52] Rebuilding a tower with orthogonal masonry would have prepared it to serve as an artillery platform[53] and, with the attack focused increasingly on towers,[54] strengthened it against rams and artillery bombardment. Further, not only did the Athenians see fit to replace rather than repair the old phase II walls, but also the preserved substructures of the new Long Walls consist entirely of squared masonry (fig. 7). Since other Greek fortifications in exposed locations were built in this exceptionally strong fashion during the fourth and early third centuries,[55] the use of solid-block construction

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[49] It is generally believed that the Athenians had failed to modernize, as opposed to maintain or repair, the structures before the 330s; see Frickenhaus 1905, 46; Griffith in Hammond and Griffith 1979, 605 n. 1; Ober 1985, 56 with n. 11; Hammond 1994, 155 with n. 4.

[50] See also Frickenhaus 1905, 46; Beloch 1922, 611; Winter 1963, 378; Griffith in Hammond and Griffith 1979, 605 n. 1; Lawrence 1979, 423; Milner 1997, 211; cf. Maier 1959, 35. For similar reasoning, as applied to the third phase of Piraeus' Eetioneia Gate, see Steinhauer 2003, 33–37, dating the reinforcement of the curtain, excavation of a moat, and construction of a *proteichisma* to the end of the fourth century.

[51] Liangouras and Papachristodoulou 1972, 341, fig. 1 no. 2; Conwell 1992, 319–20 section S6, 406; fig. 44 no. 2. Note, however, that neither the identification of the structure nor its date is certain.

[52] Garlan 1994, 692. Such constructions, to be sure, were known at Athens already before the end of the late fifth century; see Travlos 1971, 158; Knigge 1988, 49–50, 60, 76, 78.

[53] Tomlinson 1961, 139–40 with n. 19; Lawrence 1979, 222; Maier 1959, 47; Winter 1986, 27.

[54] Winter 1971, 176.

[55] Examples include (1) the northeastern section of the circuit at Corinth (Carpenter in Carpenter et al. 1936, 57–58, 126; Parsons in Carpenter et al. 1936, 282, 294–96); (2) Messene, near the Arkadian Gate (Martin 1965, 377); (3) Demetrias, theater area (Lawrence 1979, 216); (4) Athens, Dipylon Gate (Knigge 1988, 69–71, with Gruben 1970, 125–26 for the date in the late fourth century). In the case of Corinth, the authors date the solid-block construction partly on the basis of its efficacy against siege

in the Long Walls (III) suggests that the Athenians employed it with a view to countering advanced methods of attack.[56]

The project probably had an additional component, for roofs were built atop the Long Walls (III) and parts of the enceinte around the *asty* before the late fourth century (fig. 1). In 307/6, the building inscription *IG* II$^2$ 463 ordered the construction of a roof over most of the wall-walks of the city circuit as well as the Long Walls.[57] According to the specifications, however, work on the Long Walls' roofs would be limited to installing *simas* (*hegemones*) wherever they were not in place.[58] The

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machinery, but citing the example here need not constitute circular reasoning because the dating was not limited to this point.

[56] The solid-block construction of the substructures also contributes to dating the phase III Long Walls, for this building technique was especially popular at Athens during the second half of the fourth century; see Conwell 1992, 370–75; Conwell 1996, 99–101. Note that the use of this factor for dating purposes is independent of its interpretation as an adaptation to advanced siege techniques.

[57] *IG* II$^2$ 463 lines 52–54 = Maier 1959, 48–67 no. 11: Καταστεγάσει δὲ κα[ὶ] τὴν πάροδον [τοῦ κύκλ]ου τοῦ περὶ [τὸ ἄστυ ἄνευ το]ῦ διατειχί[σμ]α[τ]ος καὶ τοῦ διπύλου τοῦ ὑπὲρ τῶν πυλῶν, [καὶ τὰ μ]ακρ[ὰ τ]είχη. This inscription is more fully discussed in chapter 7. According to the document, in the Athenian circuit the roofing operation would exclude a *diateichisma*, "cross wall," and a *dipylon*, "double gated," passage through the wall. Contrary to common opinion (e.g., recently, Hellmann 1999, 36; Lazaridou and Dakoura-Vogiatzoglou 2004, 11–12, 37, map pp. 20–21 no. 2), the dipylon gate did not belong to the wall crossing the Pnyx Range. The connection between the epigraphic reference and the primary gate through the cross wall on the Pnyx (fig. 8 no. XIV) has always been problematic (Gruben 1970, 126 n. 14), and that passageway did not even become double gated until more than a century after the inscription was cut (Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 352–56; Conwell 1996, 95 with n. 21). Instead, the epigraphic reference is to the anciently named Dipylon Gate in northwest Athens (fig. 8 no. IV), as Kirchner recognizes in his commentary on this inscription (*IG* II$^2$, part 1, p. 195). Excavated evidence shows that the wall-walk of that gateway possessed crenellated battlements and was, therefore, unroofed; see Gruben 1964, 389, fig. 4; Gruben 1970, 126–27; Knigge 1988, 70, fig. 61; German Archaeological Institute 2003, 178. Not long ago, Ruppenstein 1997, 109–10, followed by Sève 2000, 450–51 no. 99, suggested that the word *dipylon* in *IG* II$^2$ 463 line 53 means "upper story." According to this interpretation, that part of the inscription refers not to any particular gateway in Athens' circuit wall but, rather, to whichever gates in the city wall possessed a two-story wall-walk; thus, the document would stipulate that all such gates not be roofed. Ruppenstein's argument, however, is weak for several reasons: (1) it turns on a rarely attested meaning of the word dipylon (Liddell and Scott 1940, 436 s.v. δίπυλος; Orlandos and Travlos 1986, 81 s.v. δίπυλος; Ginouvès 1992, 39 n. 180; Ginouvès 1998, 69), (2) it fails to explain convincingly why—if there existed more than one dipylon gate at Athens—the term was applied properly to one of them in particular, and (3) it overlooks the physical evidence which most naturally explains the ancient name of the Dipylon Gate—that the structure possessed two passages through the rear wall of its gatecourt from Themistokleian times onwards (for the original two-gated arrangement, see Gruben 1964, 390, cf. 419; Knigge 1988, 69–70, 73, figs. 61–63).

[58] *IG* II$^2$ 463 line 70.

roofs over those structures, therefore, had been largely, if not entirely, completed at an earlier date.[59] At two points, the document refers also to completing elements of a superstructure which were at the time still not finished.[60] Since the Long Walls' roofs were all but completed earlier on, the unfinished work ought to have belonged to the other structure named in connection with the roofing, the Athenian city circuit.[61]

When before 307/6 would the Athenians have begun to roof the wall-walks of their fortifications? Analogous constructions from the fourth century or, indeed, any period, are rare. A. W. Lawrence suggests that the fortifications at Aitolian Chalkis were roofed already in the first half of the fourth century.[62] The date of that wall is hardly certain, however, while the evidence for the roof is speculative.[63] Wooden roofing elements and Corinthian roof tiles are recorded in conjunction with work on the Eleusis circuit in 329/8.[64] These materials may have been acquired in order to cover the wall-walk of that structure, although they could have served other purposes.[65] Lacking comparative material, one may date the original roofing project at Athens based on its purpose. Roofs served to protect troops on the wall against landing bridges and artillery assault, particularly from siege towers.[66] As already shown, the Athenians were well aware of such threats by the 330s, so

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[59] Maier 1959, 63, 67; Winter 1959, 180–81, 197; cf., however, Wycherley 1978, 20–21.

[60] *IG* II[2] 463 lines 59, 61; see Maier 1959, 67; cf. Garlan 1974, 264.

[61] The initial reference to the circuit, *IG* II[2] 463 line 53, is heavily restored: [τοῦ κύκλ]ου τοῦ περὶ [τὸ ἄστυ]; however, line 69 preserves the word κύκλου in its entirety. Both references belong to the same section of the document concerning the installation of a roof over the wall-walk in 307/6, so it is likely that line 53 refers specifically to the city wall.

[62] Lawrence 1979, 368.

[63] On the date, cf. Winter 1971, 141; Kienast 1978, 95 n. 294. For the traverses, or buttresses, at Chalkis, see Noack 1916, 238, fig. 17; also Winter 1971, fig. 114; Lawrence 1979, fig. 80. It is not inconceivable that the traverses supported a roof; still, one finds traverses in fortifications which were certainly not roofed, such as Phyle (Wrede 1924, 173–77, figs. 6, 11; Winter 1971, 139, fig. 111; Adam 1982, 39, fig. 10), and no direct evidence suggests that they supported a roof at Chalkis.

[64] *IG* II[2] 1672 lines 62–65, 71–73 = Maier 1959, 92–103 no. 20.

[65] Maier 1959, 102.

[66] Maier 1959, 67; Garlan 1974, 267–68; Lawrence 1979, 369; Adam 1982, 38; Maier 1986, 303; Milner 1997, 219. Winter 1963, 378 and 1971, 141, 151 believes the roofs were intended primarily to protect artillery from the weather (cf., however, Winter 1959, 187–90, 196–97; Winter 1971, 328); see also Wycherley 1978, 21 n. 25; Milner 1997, 219. Since defensive artillery was normally housed in towers (Marsden 1969, 129; Lawrence 1979, 48; cf. Winter 1971, 142), protecting such weaponry would not have been the main purpose of the roofs.

they had reason to build roofs over their walls during the major project undertaken after Chaironeia.[67]

Although scholars have long recognized the year 337 as the starting point of the major fortification project which included the phase III Long Walls, few have sought to date the conclusion of the work precisely.[68] Two scraps of written evidence establish a basis for dating the end of the program. First, the law enacting it refers to contractors "for each year," so building activity was apparently expected to continue for more than a single year.[69] Second, Diodoros hints at the length of the undertaking, for he states that, after Alexander entered Boiotia in late summer 335, the Athenians voted to bring their property into the city and carry out whatever work on the walls was feasible.[70] The passage yields no specific idea as to how and where the Athenians wished to look after their fortifications at this time, but Diodoros does suggest that by the middle of 335 Athens' defenses were not fully prepared to withstand an attack.

In seeking a specific date for the completion of the phase III Long Walls and the rest of the endeavor to which they belonged, let us turn to the historical context. We know, first, that the Athenians had begun a major fortification project in 337 and, second, that during the mid-330s, Lykourgos embarked on his famous building program.[71] It is perhaps unlikely that the Athenians will have forged ahead with both of these major undertakings simultaneously, so one may suppose that the wall-building project which started in 337 was essentially completed by the time work began on the monuments associated with Lykourgos. Based on the political situation in Greece down to the end of 335 and the dates

[67] For this dating, see also Ober 1987, 587 n. 41. A date closer to 307/6, as Maier 1959, 67 and Winter 1959, 181, 197 have suggested, necessitates a purely hypothetical phase of fortification work between the mid-330s and 307/6.

[68] Humphreys 1985, 204, citing Treves 1934, 17 (*n.v.*), suggests the date 336. In that year, while Demosthenes was serving both as a building commissioner and as a member of the board in charge of the festival budget, the *Boule* approved a proposal by Ktesiphon to award the orator a gold crown for his public services. Supposing that such a motion would have been made only after Demosthenes' contributions were complete, then the project had been finished by the end of 336. Yunis 2001, 7 usefully summarizes what we know about Ktesiphon's proposal.

[69] *IG* II$^2$ 244 line 30; Jones et al. 1957, 187; Mitchel 1970, 34.

[70] Diod. XVII.4.6.

[71] [Plut.] *Mor.* 852c; for Lykourgan-period constructions at and near Athens, see Camp 2001, 144–54. Many scholars regularly suppose that Lykourgos took control of Athens' finances in 338, but some prefer the date 336. See, for example, Davies 1971, 351; Humphreys 1985, 200; Develin 1989, 7–8, 396; Bosworth 1994, 850.

of inscriptions associated with building activity during these years, W. Will plausibly suggests that Lykourgos began his program of construction ca. 334.[72] By dating the completion of the fortification effort to about that time, one may reconstruct events as follows. Regarding the city's defenses as their top priority after Chaironeia, the Athenians enacted a major fortification project within a year of the battle. Having seen that work through to the end, they redeployed their funds and manpower towards other important military installations, such as shipsheds and the arsenal of Philo, as well as ambitious yet less essential constructions, including the theater of Dionysos, the Panathenaic stadium, and the porch of the Telesterion at Eleusis. On historical grounds, then, the Athenians completed the third-phase Long Walls ca. 334.

### *Justifying the Phase III Long Walls*

Perhaps surprising is the fact that the Athenians had even included the Athens-Piraeus structures among the measures taken to improve the security of their city after Chaironeia. Since the Long Walls (III) traversed a flat plain, they were especially vulnerable to the powerful siege techniques of the time.[73] Well informed about current methods of assault, in the 330s the Athenians certainly understood the potential danger in depending on exposed structures like the Long Walls. Far from naive or misguided, the Athenians rebuilt those walls because they had more to consider than simply the dangers of advanced poliorcetics.

The Athenians' cultural and strategic priorities rendered the Long Walls (III) a virtual necessity. As was stressed in chapter 2, culturally they were committed to living at Athens. Long before, to be sure, Themistokles had emphasized the virtues of moving to Piraeus, at least in an emergency.[74] Additionally, during the panic after Chaironeia (338), the Assembly had passed Hypereides' measure to ensure the safety of sacred objects, children, and women by moving them to Piraeus.[75] Still, a whole host of economic, social, and religious considerations

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[72] Will 1983, 95–96.

[73] See also Lawrence 1979, 144, 155; Garland 2001b, 43; for the inherent vulnerability of Long Walls, see Lehmann-Hartleben 1923, 79; Winter 1971, 111; Kern 1999, 96.

[74] Thuc. I.93.7.

[75] [Plut.] *Mor.* 849a. That Hypereides' bill was in fact approved is discussed in chapter 5.

ruled out the prospect that the Athenians would ever move their affairs permanently to that city.

Of course, the Athenians might have simply strengthened the city wall of Athens rather than build fortifications across the coastal plain, but an essential strategic choice produced the third-phase Long Walls. In the years after Chaironeia, the navy continued to play a central role in Athens' military plans, as is discussed in more detail below. With the Athenians permanently reliant on their inland *asty* but committed to a navy based at harbors some 7 km away, there was little choice but to rebuild the structures which joined Athens with Piraeus. In the mid-330s, the Athenians sought to adapt their fortifications to powerful methods of assault, so—even as they were forced to rely on the vulnerable Long Walls (III)—they compensated as best they could.

In fact, the construction of Long Walls at Athens during the 330s—as well as Megara not long before—accurately reflects the incomplete Greek response to more powerful methods of attack.[76] As already noted, advanced siege engines had begun to develop in Magna Graecia at the very outset of the fourth century. Their full effects, however, were not felt immediately in all parts of the Greek world. During the first half of the century, the mainland Greeks adopted the new equipment rather slowly and inconsistently.[77] Therefore, since the design of Greek fortifications reacted to—rather than prompted—poliorcetic advances,[78] fundamental changes were not yet actually forced upon the defense. To be sure, as early as 371 at Mantineia, some Greek fortification walls included adjustments in material, general layout, and specific features of design which were likely intended to counter new methods of offense.[79] In addition, J. Ober has shown that a series of towers in

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[76] During an incident generally dated in 343, the Megarian Long Walls were rebuilt with Athenian assistance (Plut. *Phoc.* 15.2); see Griffith in Hammond and Griffith 1979, 497–98; Ober 1983, 391 with n. 17; Gehrke 1985, 110; Ober 1985, 218; Tritle 1988, 90–91; Sealey 1993, 175.

[77] Winter 1971, 309; Ober 1987, 571; Garlan 1989, 123–24; Garlan 1994, 684–85; Le Bohec-Bouhet 1999, 270–71, cf. also p. 269 (noting that, during the first half of the fourth century, siege methods in the Greek world were characterized by "quelques progrès notables, mais d'ampleur limitée"); cf. Ober 1985, 44 with n. 34.

[78] For this hypothesis, which amounts to a truism among modern scholars, see Winter 1971, 309; McNicoll 1978, 410; Lawrence 1979, 49, 420; Garlan 1989, 124, 125; Garlan 1994, 692; McNicoll 1997, 46; Milner 1997, 209; Steinhauer 2001b, 202. For a possible exception to the "rule," note Winter 1971, 57.

[79] See Lawrence 1979, 420–23; Garlan 1994, 684–85; Le Bohec-Bouhet 1999, 270.

Attika and Boiotia dating from ca. 375 were designed to house small, probably non-torsion catapults,[80] while a variety of progressive measures, including large moats, *proteichismata*, as well as towers of increased size and strength, were employed for the same purpose at and after midcentury.[81]

Through most, if not all, of the fourth century, however, defensive strategy tended to focus on "the old objective of securing invulnerability by the size or location of the walls themselves."[82] The fortifications at some important eastern Greek cities demonstrate this hypothesis. Built during the last third of the century, the defensive systems of Priene, Erythrai, Kolophon, and Knidos, were still "basically very passive" in their reliance, essentially, on such traditional factors as size and location—as opposed to aggressive techniques like the use of powerful (torsion) artillery.[83] Not until the third century did Greek cities become determined—or financially able—to counter contemporary methods of offense with a qualitatively different approach.[84] The actual fortification walls remained fundamental, of course, although cities now sought to adapt *all* aspects of the structures to the potential strength of the assault. In addition, strategy came to focus on an active form of defense intended to keep attackers away from the actual wall.[85] Thus, the mainland Greeks had begun to adapt their walls by the time the Athenians built the phase III Long Walls in the 330s, but there was little uniformity in the nature of the changes or the degree to which they were incorporated from one city to the next. The nature of the work executed by the Athenians after Chaironeia conforms precisely to

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[80] Ober 1987, passim; see also Steinhauer 2001b, 206. All-important to Ober's thesis, of course, is the integrity of his chronology. One may be reasonably confident in his dates for the towers at Messene (Ober 1987, 572–73 with 573 n. 14) and Siphai (Ober 1987, 577), which are among his earlier examples.

[81] Winter 1971, 322–23; Lawrence 1979, 423–24; Garlan 1984, 361; Garlan 1994, 692.

[82] Winter 1971, 323; see also McNicoll 1978, 410.

[83] For the dates, characteristics, and interpretation of these fortifications, see McNicoll 1997, 46–74; the quotation is from p. 74.

[84] Winter 1971, 324–32; see also Garlan 1984, 359–60; Garlan 1989, 125; Garlan 1994, 692. For the impact of financial resources on the ability of Greek cities to modernize their fortifications, see Winter 1971, 58–59, 324; McNicoll 1978, 413–16; McNicoll 1997, 47–48, 71–74, 103; Milner 1997, 213. Cf. also Ober 1996, 70 on the inability of the typical Greek city to develop or acquire advanced war machinery.

[85] McNicoll 1997, 75–105 provides examples of such fortification systems; see also Milner 1997, 213–15.

this stage of development. One the one hand, they sought to modernize the fortifications by building outworks and employing solid-block construction. On the other hand, they did not (and could not) fundamentally alter the layout of the Long Walls (III) in order to compensate for the structures' vulnerable position in the coastal plain.[86]

### *Circa 334–307*

Even as the Athenians were building the Long Walls (III), they lacked the sea power which justified the structures. Following the battle of Chaironeia in summer 338, Philip and Athens had concluded the Peace of Demades, which seemingly left the city with substantial naval potential. The Athenians were allowed to retain their fleet, the islands of Samos, Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, as well as their special position on Delos. As described in chapter 5, however, Athens' naval power had begun to wane even before Chaironeia, and now, required by the treaty to disband the Second Athenian League and likely forced out of the Chersonesos,[87] it suffered a sharp blow.[88] By mid-337, the pact which established the Corinthian League undercut the fleet's independence of action. The agreement included terms forbidding Greek states from interfering with shipping and, perhaps, restricting warships from entering the harbors of other cities without permission.[89] As well, Philip was named by the Corinthian League as its *hegemon kata gen kai kata thalattan* and commander in the war against Persia.[90] Now possessing the right to call up the ships of member states—including Athens—as part of that undertaking, the Macedonian king acquired substantial, if indirect, control over those fleets.[91] Following Chaironeia, therefore, the Athenians possessed naval prowess only on paper, because

[86] For systematic developments in the trace of fortification walls during the late fourth to early third centuries, see Milner 1997, 212–13; for Hellenistic times generally, see Winter 1971, 116–24.

[87] Concerning the Chersonesos, see especially Griffith in Hammond and Griffith 1979, 607; also Hauben 1975, 57.

[88] Paus. I.25.3. See Hornblower 2002, 279–80.

[89] [Dem.] 17.19, 26–28. See Griffith in Hammond and Griffith 1979, 634.

[90] For his position as *hegemon*, see Polyb. IX.33.7; Plut. *Mor.* 240a. Griffith in Hammond and Griffith 1979, 626, 629–30 discusses Philip's formal title(s).

[91] Hauben 1975, 57; see also Griffith in Hammond and Griffith 1979, 628, 629; Buckler 2003, 515.

in practice they had a limited ability to assert sea power or control the trade routes of the Aegean.[92]

Subsequent developments further marginalized the Athenian navy. While Philip had never overtaken the Athenians in the Aegean, his son, Alexander, developed an effective naval force after succeeding his father in 336. The Macedonians' own fleet may have numbered 60 warships by 334,[93] and that same year Alexander actively employed a fleet of 160 Greek ships.[94] During the mid-330s, however, the Persians began to develop a major fleet,[95] and by 334 that force, which may have numbered some 400 vessels, was recognized as far superior to Alexander's navy and was operating in the Aegean.[96] Not to be outdone, Alexander, having decommissioned the bulk of his Greek naval force after taking Miletos in 334,[97] reconstituted it the next year[98] and carried out a naval war against the Persians.[99] By 331 he had defeated them and, further, demonstrated a willingness to apply his naval strength in the Aegean. In the summer of that year, Alexander dispatched a fleet led by his admiral Amphoteros, together with 100 Phoenician

[92] See also Burke 1992, 225, noting that the Athenian fleet ceased to be a weapon of Athenian foreign policy after Chaironeia; Oliver 1995, 4; Habicht 1997, 11. For exaggeration of Athens' real maritime strength in this period, see Tarn 1930, 131; Griffith in Hammond and Griffith 1979, 605, 619; Will 1983, 15 n. 100; Cawkwell 1984, 345.

[93] Diod. XVII.17.2. See Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 24–25, followed by Morrison 1996, 3–4, cf. 6–7. Brunt 1976, 453, however, supposes that the Diodoros passage is corrupt and should be emended so as to correspond with the known size of Alexander's Greek fleet in 334.

[94] Arr. *Anab.* I.11.6, 18.4, cf. 18.6, 19.7. According to Diodoros (XVII.22.5), twenty of these ships were Athenian. For discussion, see Brunt 1976, 453; Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 24–25, 69–70; Ashley 1998, 91–92. Cf. also Diod. XVII.17.2 (60 ships) and Just. *Epit.* XI.6.2 (182 ships), whose figures are dismissed as problematic by Brunt 1976, 453. If the Macedonian fleet did total 60 warships at this time, then Alexander controlled the impressive number of 220 ships; cf. Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 26 with n. 1.

[95] Diod. XVII.7.2.

[96] Arr. *Anab.* I.18.4–7, 20.1. Brunt 1976, 453, citing other ancient evidence, suggests that the fleet may have totaled 300 ships rather than 400.

[97] Diod. XVII.22.5; Arr. *Anab.* I.20.1. Cf. Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 25, 70–71 for the suggestion that Macedonian ships continued to control the Hellespont.

[98] Curt. III.1.19–20, IV.5.14; Arr. *Anab.* II.2.3; cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 21.1.

[99] For the course of Alexander's naval war from 333 down to its successful conclusion in 331, see Brunt 1976, 454–56; Bosworth 1988b, 52–53, 58, 63, 192, 199–200; Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 69–72; Morrison 1996, 5–9.

and Cypriote ships, in order to end the Spartans' revolt.[100] With the Persians defeated at sea and neither Athens nor any other Greek city prepared to challenge Alexander, the Macedonians were the decisive power in the Aegean down to and beyond Alexander's death in 323.[101] This point is underscored by the Athenians' elevated concern for the grain supply in the years after Chaironeia.[102]

Why, then, did the Athenians invest in the Long Walls (III) at a time when their navy's power could not reliably support a strategy incorporating those structures? The answer to this question lies in the Athenians' emphasis on military preparedness after 338, when Lykourgos dominated financial affairs.[103] During this period, they restructured the *ephebeia* (probably 336/5),[104] concentrated armor and missiles on the Akropolis,[105] and looked after the defenses of Athens and Piraeus as well as Attika (above).[106] More directly relevant to the Long Walls (III) was the Athenians' ample investment in their fleet after Chaironeia. Lykourgos is said to have overseen the production of a fleet of 400 triremes.[107] Fantastic as this figure initially seems,[108] it accords well with the ship numbers known from the naval inventory dating to 330/29.[109] During the Lykourgan period the Athenians also

[100] Arr. *Anab.* III.6.3; cf. Curt. IV.8.15. For a modern account of the rebellion, see Bosworth 1988b, 198–204.

[101] See Diod. XVIII.15.8 for the period of the Lamian War (323–322).

[102] Lycurg. 1.18; Oliver 1995, 281–85, cf. 4, 307–10; Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 485, 525; Lambert 2006, 117, 132 n. 68; Lambert 2007, 119. For documented shortages of grain in this period, see Tracy 1995, 30–34.

[103] In addition to the following summary, see Bosworth 1988b, 208–10; Engels 1992, 15–19; Habicht 1997, 23–25; cf. Mitchel 1970, 36–37. Bosworth 1988b, 211, echoed by Habicht 1997, 23, remarks that the priorities of Lykourgos' administration were "firmly centred on military preparedness and the civic adornment of Athens."

[104] [Arist.] *Ath.* 42.3. On the date and nature of the institutional changes, see Mitchel 1970, 37–38; Bosworth 1988b, 209–10 with n. 27; Rhodes 1993, 494–95; Tracy 1995, 10 n. 21; Habicht 1997, 16 with n. 19, 24; Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 453.

[105] [Plut.] *Mor.* 852c. With Sealey 1993, 210–11 and Tracy 1995, 11 n. 22, one should read Pseudo-Plutarch's Stratokles decree with caution due to the possibility of exaggeration; however, epigraphic evidence suggests that in Lykourgan times the Athenians kept torsion artillery on the Akropolis. See *IG* II$^2$ 1467 lines 48–56, dated by letter forms and discussed by Marsden 1969, 56–57.

[106] For activity at Eleusis, possibly ca. 330 and certainly in 329/8, see Maier 1959, 88–92 no. 19 (Lykourgan-period dating based on letter forms), *IG* II$^2$ 1672 = Maier 1959, 92–103 no. 20 (dated by the eponymous rchon's name in 329/8). For possible work at Phyle during the mid-330s, see *IG* II$^2$ 244 line 11.

[107] [Plut.] *Mor.* 852c.

[108] By way of comparison, when the Peloponnesian War broke out in 431, Athens—then at the height of its naval power—possessed 300 seaworthy ships (Thuc. II.13.8).

[109] Lines 266–278 of *IG* II$^2$ 1627 list 392 triremes and 18 quadriremes. The maxi-

completed important naval support structures at Piraeus. Work on the *skeuotheke* of Philo and the shipsheds had been suspended in 340/39 in order to release funds for the fight against Philip,[110] and those projects were now completed.[111] According to the naval inventory for 330/29, the shipsheds at Piraeus numbered 372 at that time.[112] One may also gauge the depth of Athens' naval commitment from the expenditure of significant sums annually to pay the crews of active-duty ships.[113] Certainly the ambitious naval buildup during the Lykourgan era will have improved the Athenians' ability to protect commercial investments against piracy, which in those years remained a threat.[114] Nevertheless, the unprecedented scale of construction will have had more than economic purposes, because a fraction of the actual commitment in ships would have sufficed to police the Aegean. Despite the difficulty of equipping and manning a powerful fleet, the Athenians must have sought to rebuild their naval power in order to be ready for decisive

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mum fleet size recorded in this period was 412 ships for the year 325/4 (*IG* II[2] 1629 lines 783–812: 360 triremes, 50 quadriremes, and, probably, 2 quinqueremes; that the document lists 2 quinqueremes, rather than the more typically accepted number of 7, is the conclusion of Ashton 1979, 238–42, based on close analysis of the stone). For a summary of the epigraphic references to ship numbers during the 320s, see Gabrielsen 1994, 127 with n. 4.

[110] Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 56a.

[111] [Plut.] *Mor.* 852c. The *skeuotheke* seems to have been completed by 330/29, since *IG* II[2] 1627 lines 279–305 include nails, surely from the roof, among the various building elements left over from the project at that time; see Dittenberger 1920, 76 n. 2 *ad* no. 969 line 1; Thompson 1982, 145 n. 40. Work on the structure had started in 347/6 (*IG* II[2] 1668; Aeschin. 3.25; cf. *IG* II[2] 505 lines 13–14). Although the inscription *IG* II[2] 1668 and the Aischines passage are commonly connected, note that only the first of these two sources explicitly associates the *skeuotheke* with the architect Philo. Aischines simply refers to a *skeuotheke*, and more than one such building existed, as noted by Hintzen-Bohlen 1997, 15 n. 27; the date of his speech in 330, however, is close to the completion-date of Philo's building, which tends to confirm the identification of the epigraphically attested *skeuotheke* with the structure mentioned by Aischines (von Eickstedt 1991, 78 n. 363). On the *skeuotheke* generally, see Steinhauer 1994, passim; Steinhauer 1996, passim; Hintzen-Bohlen 1997, 15–18; Goette and Hammerstaedt 2004, 267–71.

[112] *IG* II[2] 1627 lines 398–405. The same number of shipsheds is attested in subsequent years: *IG* II[2] 1628 lines 552–559 (326/5); 1629 lines 1030–1036 (325/4); 1631 lines 252–256 (323/2). For work on the shipsheds before 323/2, cf. also *IG* II[2] 505 line 13 (with Morrison 1996, 19). That there were more ships than sheds at this time was typical, for some vessels will have been out of port or simply standing in the open; cf. *IG* II[2] 1611 line 6, dated 357/6; see Blackman 1968, 181 with note; Morrison 1987, 91 n. 18, 93; Morrison 1996, 16.

[113] See Burke 1985, 256–64; Burke 1992, 225.

[114] Bosworth 1988b, 207; Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 69; Burke 1992, 203–4.

action if and when the opportunity presented itself.[115] One may therefore recognize the work on the Long Walls (III) in the mid-330s as part of a naval strategy which the Athenians intended to employ in the future, whenever the opportunity presented itself.

The conflict for which the Athenians had sought to enhance their military preparedness ultimately manifested itself in the Lamian War (323–322).[116] They managed to find sufficient manpower to put some 170 ships to sea against the Macedonians during the second year of the conflict.[117] However, the sea war, particularly the decisive loss off Amorgos in midsummer 322, devastated the Athenian fleet and is generally thought to have marked the end of Athens' prominence as a naval power.[118] A major defeat on land at Krannon soon followed, effectively ending the uprising. Following that setback, the Athenians had no more military options and might have considered falling back behind the Long Walls (III). Yet this was not a rational alternative; lacking the prospect of safe passage at sea, surrender was the only sensible choice.[119]

In the wake of the Lamian War, the Long Walls (III) served no purpose for the Athenians. Their city had now lost whatever independent role it might still have exercised in international politics before 322.[120] In fact at this point they could not have looked after the Athens-Piraeus

[115] For the interpretation of Athens' policies after Chaironeia as preparation for conflict, although without the intention of causing it, see Jones et al. 1957, 187; Mitchel 1970, 29–31, 36–39, 49; Bosworth 1988b, 208–9; Habicht 1997, 17; cf. also Sealey 1993, 219; Tracy 1995, 10–11.

[116] For the conflict, see *FGrHist* 239 B §§9–10 (Marmor Parium); Diod. XVIII.15.8–9; Plut. *Demetr.* 11.4. Modern discussions include Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 108–14; Schmitt 1992, passim; Tracy 1995, 23–29; Habicht 1997, 36–40; Bosworth 2003, passim.

[117] On the challenge faced by the Athenians in manning their ships at this time, see Bosworth 2003, 14–16, 22, who also cogently points out crews' lack of previous experience in naval combat; also Green 2003, 1–2. According to Diodoros (XVIII.10.2), in 323 the Athenians decided to launch 240 warships; concerning the supposed transposition of either ship numbers or ship types in the manuscript of Diodoros, which lists 40 triremes (*triereis*) and 200 quadriremes (*tetrereis*), see Ashton 1977, 4–5; Morrison 1987, 89–92; Morrison 1996, 15–16; Bosworth 2003, 15 with n. 16.

[118] Ferguson 1911, 17–18; Tarn 1913, 72; Beloch 1925, 73; Tarn and Griffith 1952, 28–29; Amit 1965, 26; Morrison 1987, 97; Gabrielsen 1995, 240; Tracy 1995, 28–29; Habicht 1997, 42; Tracy 2000b, 338 n. 32, 339; Garland 2001b, 45, 100; cf. however, Green 2003, 2, and see Hauben 1974, passim for Athenian naval activity soon after 322.

[119] Bosworth 2003, 14, 22.

[120] Green 1990, 11; Tracy 1995, 18, 21–22; see also, more generally, Kralli 1999–2000, 160.

structures even had they wished to do so. In September 322, immediately after the conflict, the regent Antipatros had installed a Macedonian garrison on the hill of Mounychia (fig. 8 no. 5)[121] and turned Athens into a subject state.[122] Now the Athenians could aspire to no more than simply ridding themselves of the Macedonian presence on Mounychia.[123] The Macedonians, likewise, will have had little use for the structures linking a city of diminished significance to harbors with no prominent role to play in the events now unfolding. No doubt Antipatros, the city's overlord,[124] wished simply to pacify the irksome Athenians. He was preoccupied elsewhere, fighting the last opponent left standing from the Lamian War,[125] the Aitolian League, and involving himself in the struggle for control of Macedon. In this context, achieving his aims depended on land warfare—not the sea power served by the Long Walls (III).[126]

Following the death of Antipatros (319), however, the phase III structures do appear in the historical narrative. Just before his death, Antipatros had appointed Polyperchon rather than his own son, Kassandros, as successor to the regency. Not surprisingly, Antipatros' decision made rivals of Polyperchon and Kassandros, and their subsequent maneuvering produced complex developments at Athens.[127] In autumn 319, Polyperchon moved to enhance his position by proclaiming the liberty and autonomy of the Greek states as well as the return of Greeks who had been exiled from their homelands.[128] At Athens the declaration prompted events which by spring 318 produced the restoration of

[121] Diod. XVIII.18.5; Plut. *Phoc.* 28.1, *Dem.* 28.1, *Mor.* 188 e–f; Paus. I. 25.5; cf. *FGrHist* 239 B §10 (Marmor Parium).

[122] See Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 114; Tracy 1995, 17–21; Habicht 1997, 40–41, 44–47; Baynham 2003, 23–24; Green 2003, 3, 5–6. On the degree to which democratic organs of government survived under the oligarchic administration formed under the Macedonians, note the comments of Tracy 2003b, 10–12.

[123] Plut. *Phoc.* 30.8–9.

[124] For Antipatros' political and military position after Alexander's death, see Will 1984a, 26.

[125] Will 1984a, 33; Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 115.

[126] The narrative of events demonstrates the land-based focus of the struggle over Macedon in its early years; see Will 1984a, 33–40; Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 117–22, 126–30.

[127] See also the summaries by Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 133–37; Green 1990, 43–44; Tracy 1995, 21; Habicht 1997, 47–53; Green 2003, 6. For specific dates in Athenian history during the period 319–317, see Williams 1984, passim, whose chronology for those years is followed here.

[128] Diod. XVIII.56.1–8; Plut. *Phoc.* 32.1.

democracy.[129] However, even as the Athenians successfully overthrew the oligarchy installed in 322 under Antipatros, Kassandros continued to control the Macedonian garrison at Mounychia via his appointed commander, Nikanor.[130] Moreover, during winter 319/8, as the Athenians agitated for the expulsion of the garrison, Nikanor had seized Piraeus' walls and harbor fortifications.[131] A challenge to the garrison commander's position soon developed, for in early spring 318 Polyperchon's son, Alexander, arrived with an army in order to gain control of both Mounychia and Piraeus.[132] During the summer of the busy year 318, Kassandros himself sailed into Piraeus with reinforcements, with which he relieved Nikanor's troops, withstood Polyperchon's attempted siege of the harbor city, and carried out other military operations in and near Attika.[133] Ultimately, in summer 317 Athens negotiated peace terms with Kassandros.[134]

An unconfirmed report by Pausanias suggests that the Long Walls (III) were caught up in events during this period of instability. After a short discussion of the Lamian War, Pausanias describes how the outcome of that conflict impacted Athens:

> A Macedonian garrison was set over the Athenians, and occupied first Munychia and afterwards Peiraeus also and the Long Walls. On the death of Antipater Olympias came over from Epeirus, killed Aridaeus, and for a time occupied the throne; but shortly afterwards she was besieged by Cassander, taken and delivered up to the people. Of the acts of Cassander when he came to the throne my narrative will deal only with such as concern the Athenians. He seized the fort of Panactum in Attica and also Salamis, and established as tyrant in Athens Demetrius the son of Phanostratus, a man who had won a reputation for wisdom.[135] (Loeb: W. H. S. Jones).

In general, the developments mentioned by Pausanias fit the historical narrative known from other sources. At the beginning of the passage, the reference to the occupation of Mounychia doubtless has to do with the installation of the Macedonian garrison in autumn 322.

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[129] Nep. *Phoc.* 3.3; Diod. XVIII.65.6; cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 33.2.

[130] For the installation of Nikanor as garrison commander, see Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1; cf. Nep. *Phoc.* 2.4.

[131] Nep. *Phoc.* 2.5; Diod. XVIII.64.4; cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 32.10.

[132] Diod. XVIII.65.3, 66.2; Plut. *Phoc.* 33.1.

[133] Diod. XVIII.68.1, 69.1–2; Paus. 1.25.6, 35.2; Polyaen. IV.11.1.

[134] Diod. XVIII.74.1–3; cf. *IG* II$^2$ 1201.

[135] Paus. I.25.5–6.

Most of the other datable events reported here belong to the years 319 through 317.[136] The allusion to the occupation of Piraeus probably recalls Nikanor's seizure of the city's defenses, i.e. the whole port city, during winter 319/8. Pausanias' statement parallels the known extension of Macedonian control from Mounychia to Piraeus, while the next Macedonian seizure of that city (as opposed to the fort in Mounychia) dates to 295[137]—a completely different chronological context from the one described by Pausanias.

Unlike the rest of the report, Pausanias' unique reference to the occupation of the Long Walls has produced competing explanations of its exact historical context. The incident has been recognized as

1. An action carried out by Kassandros upon his arrival in Piraeus during summer 318[138]
2. An action carried out by Kassandros as part of his campaign in Attika during 317[139]
3. An occupation of the Long Walls (IV), and perhaps Piraeus, which probably dates to the last years of the fourth century[140]

All of these possibilities are essentially arbitrary. The last of them wrenches the statement entirely out of its chronological context. Admittedly, Pausanias violates exact chronological order by placing the activities of Olympias before rather than after Kassandros' actions in Attika. This need not mean, however, that the author conflates events which derive from entirely different periods of Athenian history. Since all the datable events in the passage demonstrably belong to the immediate post-Lamian War years, let us assume that Pausanias' report about the seizure of the Long Walls also belongs in that general context. This would allow the first and second alternatives, that Kassandros garrisoned the Long Walls (III) in either 318 or 317, but these suggestions are merely possible. The evidence does not specifically support either one.

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[136] Kassandros' actions against Olympias, however, belong to the years 316 to 315; see Habicht 1997, 61.

[137] Polyaen. IV.7.5; cf. Paus. I.25.8. See Habicht 1979, 8–13.

[138] Launey 1950, 635.

[139] Garland 2001b, 48. Kassandros' activities in 317 appear at the end of the quoted passage.

[140] Dreyer 1999, 150 with n. 152, 177.

More attractive is to suppose that Nikanor took the structures joining Athens and Piraeus during winter 319/8, at the same time as he garrisoned Piraeus.[141] As noted above, Pausanias' reference to the extension of Macedonian control from Mounychia to Piraeus suits that context. To suppose that Nikanor's maneuver included not only Piraeus, but also the Long Walls (III), is more plausible than to invent from nothing an action by Kassandros, as do the first two suggestions listed above. In addition, although this interpretation requires the assumption that Pausanias broke strict chronological order, it does not, like the third hypothesis, assign his testimony to an entirely separate historical context. In 319/8, then, Nikanor reacted to Athenian pressure on his position by occupying both Piraeus and the Long Walls (III).

What advantage did Nikanor seek by taking control of these structures?[142] The action can hardly have belonged to a grand design involving the Long Walls (III), because at this point Kassandros neither possessed Athens nor could clearly anticipate controlling the sea lanes.[143] Manning the Long Walls (III) would have been of purely local value, then, but would seem to have brought Nikanor nothing beyond what he might have derived from simply controlling Piraeus. He may have sought to intimidate the Athenians who had been calling for an end to the Macedonian occupation of Mounychia; however, from a practical viewpoint, one wonders how controlling the corridor joining Athens and the sea would have increased pressure on the *asty*. Perhaps Nikanor sought simply to keep the Athenians from seizing the Long Walls (III), a position which might have allowed them either to cut off Nikanor's land communications or to employ the walls for artillery assaults on Piraeus' landward circuit wall.

It is impossible to know precisely how long the Macedonians held the Long Walls (III), but their occupation probably ended soon after it was established. The conclusion of peace terms between the Athenians and Kassandros in 317 establishes a *terminus ante quem* for this development, for the agreement explicitly recognizes only Kassandros' control

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[141] See also Wachsmuth 1874, 608 n. 4; cf. Ferguson 1911, 34.

[142] Cf. Hitzig and Blümner 1896, 279 *ad loc.*, who seem to doubt the integrity of the passage due to the pointlessness of occupying the Long Walls.

[143] In summer 317 the allied fleets of Kassandros and Antigonos crushed Polyperchon's fleet at the Bosporos and therefore took control of the Aegean; see Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 135–38. In winter 319/8, however, this development was well in the future.

of Mounychia.[144] It is possible that the garrison was removed by the time Olympias sent a letter to Nikanor not long after he expanded his control beyond Mounychia in late winter 319/8.[145] Olympias' message ordered Nikanor to return Mounychia and Piraeus to the Athenians; that it does not refer to the Long Walls (III) may suggest that the structures were no longer in Macedonian hands. This is an argument from silence, to be sure, but Diodoros' description of the letter is sufficiently explicit that any reference to the structures ought to have been transmitted. Alternatively, the walls joining Athens with Piraeus may have been given up in later 318, when Kassandros relieved Nikanor's soldiers of responsibility for all but Mounychia.[146] Manning forward positions with his own troops, Kassandros may have seen no reason to retain the Long Walls (III).

Thereafter, down to 307 the structures crossing the coastal plain likely played no role in strategic affairs. By summer 317, Kassandros had locked Athens down tightly. His own appointee, Demetrios of Phaleron, now ran the Athenian government,[147] while the garrison at Mounychia would control Athenian military and foreign affairs down to the end of Demetrios' ascendancy in 307.[148] The Athenians, of course, had no opportunity to make use of the Long Walls (III), and Kassandros himself almost certainly would not have incorporated the structures in his plans. Although he did engage in naval warfare at times, Kassandros had little use for the Long Walls (III) because he never possessed a comprehensive naval strategy and did not seek to develop a fleet with which to achieve control of the Aegean.[149]

Subsequent events also suggest that Kassandros would not have included the Long Walls (III) in his strategic vision. With Athens safely in his pocket, he turned his attention elsewhere. First, Kassandros continued the war with Polyperchon, focusing in particular on eliminating his rival's ally, Olympias.[150] That aim accomplished by spring 315, later the same year he made an alliance with Lysimachos and Ptolemy, and together they opposed Antigonos Monophthalmos down to 311.[151]

[144] Diod. XVIII.74.2–3.
[145] Diod. XVIII.65.1.
[146] Diod. XVIII.68.1.
[147] See Tracy 1995, 43–47.
[148] Tracy 1995, 38, 46–47 with 46 n. 61; Habicht 1997, 54; Tracy 2000b, 337.
[149] Buraselis 1982, 33–37, 39.
[150] Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 139–43; Habicht 1997, 60–61.
[151] Buraselis 1982, 5–11; Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 148–62.

Although Antigonos would develop a large fleet by 313, at the outset of this conflict Ptolemy controlled the most powerful naval forces.[152] It is thus not inconceivable that Kassandros sought to protect Athens from Antigonos by coordinating with Ptolemy to develop a maritime strategy involving the Long Walls (III). However, the structures probably remained a low priority for Kassandros because during this period of hostilities Athens was, for the most part, tangential to operations in Greece.[153] As well, even if the Long Walls (III) had been considered useful early on in the conflict, they would have become obsolete soon enough with the appearance of Antigonos' new fleet, whereupon Kassandros could no longer have relied on control of the sea lanes. The peace agreement concluded in 311 recognized Kassandros as *strategos* in Europe,[154] and his control of Athens continued uninterrupted down to 307, when he lost the city to the Antigonids.[155] There is no evidence, however, that he engaged in naval operations of any kind during these years,[156] doubtless because, following the conclusion of peace in 311, Ptolemy and Antigonos divided control of the eastern Mediterranean seas among themselves.[157]

### *Summary*

The reconstruction of the walls linking Athens and Piraeus belonged to an ambitious fortification project carried out between 337 and ca. 334. Committed both to an inland *asty* and to a strong navy, the Athenians had little choice but to invest in the Long Walls (III) at this time. The length and location of the structures rendered them dangerously vulnerable to the advanced siege techniques of the day. Well aware of those threats, the Athenians sought to strengthen the urban system of

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[152] Buraselis 1982, 39–45; Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 151.

[153] See the narrative by Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 152–60. Athens became a factor briefly in 312, when an army led by Polemaios, Antigonos' nephew, marched into Attika, prompting the Athenians to open talks with Antigonos about a possible alliance (Diod. XIX.77.3–4); see Habicht 1997, 64.

[154] For the treaty, see Will 1984a, 49–52.

[155] On the liberation of Athens by Demetrios Poliorketes, see *FGrHist* 239 B §§20–21 (Marmor Parium); Diod. XX.45.1–46.1; Plut. *Demetr.* 8.3–9.4. Modern sources include Buraselis 1982, 52; Will 1984a, 55–56; Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 170; Habicht 1997, 65–66.

[156] Buraselis 1982, 35–36.

[157] As described by Buraselis 1982, 45–46; Will 1984a, 53–54; cf. Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 168–69.

defenses against contemporary methods of assault. Thus, they replaced the old phase II Long Walls, built the new substructures of cut blocks exclusively, and may have installed roofs above the wall-walks. One might suppose that the Athenians rebuilt the Athens-Piraeus walls with the intention of using them in an emergency. After Chaironeia, however, their fleet had lost the initiative in the Aegean. Since the Athenians could not expect to control the sea lanes in the post-Chaironeia period, they did not build the Long Walls (III) in response to current needs. Rather, the structures belonged to a Lykourgan-era military buildup carried out with a view to the future.

Not until 323 were the Athenians in a position to press the Long Walls (III) into service. The death of Alexander provided them with the chance finally to benefit from the military investments made since the mid-330s. Late in the ensuing Lamian War, a land siege of Athens did become a distinct possibility, but by that time the Long Walls (III) were no longer viable because the Athenian navy had already been crushed. Having lost the conflict, the Athenians became subordinate to the Macedonians, who garrisoned Mounychia in 322. The presence of the Macedonian garrison, combined with the blow suffered by the navy of Athens in the Lamian War, ruled out any chance that the Athenians might incorporate the Long Walls (III) in a naval strategy down to 307.

Macedonian leaders, for their part, controlled the cities located at either end of the Long Walls (III) during most of the period 322–307, but they had little use for a fortified connection with the sea. Until his death in 319, Antipatros' priorities lay elsewhere. The garrison commander Nikanor did occupy the Long Walls (III) briefly beginning in winter 319/8. Since he did not control Athens, however, his position had nothing to do with employing the structures in connection with a comprehensive naval strategy. Thereafter, from 317 to 307, Kassandros did not maintain the sort of naval ambitions which were the necessary precondition for employing the Long Walls (III). Thus, like the structures of the preceding phase, the Long Walls (III) were never actually employed in conjunction with the naval strategy which justified their construction.

CHAPTER SEVEN

# PHASE IV

In summer 307, Demetrios, son of Antigonos Monophthalmos, ended the regime of Demetrios of Phaleron and expelled Kassandros' Mounychia garrison.[1] Although Athens had earlier ceased to be a major player in international affairs and was now subordinate to the Antigonids,[2] the Athenians were elated by the restoration of their democratic constitution. Determined to protect their newfound sovereignty and aware that Kassandros would attempt to reclaim the city, the Athenians renovated their defenses. The fortification program, completed in 304, included the fourth phase of the Long Walls (fig. 4).[3] These newly restored structures were soon garrisoned for a short time by Demetrios Poliorketes, but thereafter they disappear from the historical record for over a century. In describing a military encounter between Philip V and the Athenians in the year 200, Livy refers to the Long Walls (IV), but by this time they had been abandoned. Archaeological evidence suggests that the structures were obsolete already by the mid-280s, while the historical circumstances show that neither the Athenians nor a foreign power would have employed them after ca. 290.

## *307–304*

The *Vitae decem oratorum* attests to a major fortification program led by Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes and one of the leading Athenian politicians of the later fourth century. The text praises Demochares for having fortified Athens at the time of the Four Years' War (307–304),[4] during which Kassandros sought to regain control of Athens. Presumably the restoration of the walls began during the

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[1] For the events, see the sources, both ancient and modern, listed at the end of the previous chapter.

[2] Habicht 1997, 72.

[3] Since the phase III Long Walls remained in place, the function of the structures will not have changed during phase IV.

[4] [Plut.] *Mor.* 851d; cf. *IG* II$^2$ 1492 lines 124–127.

second half of 307 (307/6), for the Athenians will have expected war from Kassandros after Demetrios drove out his Mounychia garrison in the summer of that calendar year.[5]

Epigraphic evidence provides further information about the project led by Demochares. A document inscribed in summer 301 calls for the Athenians to honor the metics Nikandros and Polyzelos.[6] Among the various benefactions by these men was the repair of towers in the Southern Long Wall during the archonship of Κ[οροίβος] (306/5).[7] Although the archon's name is almost completely restored, the apparent reference to the *strategos* Ἡγη[σίας] in line 32 facilitates the restoration. As we know from another inscription, Hegesias was *strategos* during the year of Koroibos' archonship.[8] These repairs to one of the Long Walls (IV) in 306/5 must have belonged to the project led by Demochares, which had begun in 307/6.

Another inscription potentially associated with Demochares' fortification program is the well-known decree published as *IG* II² 463.[9] This document enacts a program of wall-building, lists specifications, and assigns the work to individual contractors. The project, scheduled to last for four years,[10] involves the walls of Athens and Piraeus as well as the Long Walls, i.e. the entire urban fortification system.[11] The relevance of this inscription to the works carried out at the end of the fourth century depends, of course, on its date. Since the document does not preserve the name of the eponymous archon, we must rely on other factors in order to date it.

The style of the lettering places *IG* II² 463 squarely in the later fourth to very early third centuries.[12] Franz Maier identifies a number

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5 Habicht 1997, 70.

6 *IG* II² 505 = Maier 1959, 69–73 no. 13, which, according to lines 2–5, was moved on 21 Skirophorion during the archonship of Nikokles in 302/1. Pečírka 1966, 80–81 provides a useful introduction to this important inscription.

7 *IG* II² 505 lines 31–37.

8 *IG* II² 1487 lines 91–93. The connection of their work on the Long Walls with the year 306/5 is typically accepted; see, for example, Pečírka 1966, 80; Migeotte 1992, 22.

9 Maier 1959, 48–67 no. 11. For lines 100–130 plus a non-joining fragment potentially associated with this document, see Agora I 3843 = Woodhead 1997, 171–74 no. 109.

10 *IG* II² 463 line 119, cf. lines 104–107, 116–117.

11 *IG* II² 463 lines 2–3 (restored), 7 (restored), 37, 53–54, 69–70, 76, 95 (restored), 117–118 (restored), col. I line 120, col. II line 120, col. III line 120.

12 For other discussions of this document's date, see Maier 1959, 56–57; Merker 1986, 47–48.

of documents with similar letter forms, of which one is securely dated in 303/2.[13] Further, two of those inscriptions are assigned by Stephen Tracy to the Cutter of *IG* II$^2$ 1262, whose career spans at least the years ca. 320 to ca. 296,[14] and the date of one of the two in 307/6 seems assured.[15]

Within this later fourth/early third century window, historical and technical considerations provide a more precise date. The presence of the Macedonian garrison on Mounychia Hill in Piraeus establishes a *terminus post quem*, because the inscription almost certainly was not cut between the installation of the garrison in September 322 and its expulsion in early summer 307. The document orders work on Piraeus' fortifications, an endeavor which the garrison will not have permitted, thus suggesting a date after mid-307. That the inscription identifies Habron, son of Lykourgos, as the current comptroller provides an additional hint.[16] Since Habron held office as treasurer of the military fund in 306/5[17] and cannot have been comptroller at the same time, then the Athenians did not pass *IG* II$^2$ 463 in that year. The inscription honoring Nikandros and Polyzelos, however, demonstrates that work on the Long Walls, to which *IG* II$^2$ 463 also refers, did occur in 306/5. Finally, the walls must have been defensible when Kassandros unsuccessfully besieged Athens in spring 304,[18] so the project was well advanced by that time. All of these factors suggest that *IG* II$^2$ 463 has to do with the program carried out under Demochares at the end of the fourth century. Since the document enables the work, which probably began soon after summer 307 (see above), it belongs to the early

[13] *IG* II$^2$ 494. The other inscriptions are cited by Maier 1959, 56.

[14] *IG* II$^2$ 468 = Maier 1959, 199–200 no. 54; Agora I 1541. See Tracy 1995, 136–47.

[15] *IG* II$^2$ 468, on which see Maier 1959, 200.

[16] *IG* II$^2$ 463 line 36: *ho epi tei dioikesei*. On the translation of this title, see Merker 1986, 43 n. 9; cf. more generally, Schuler 2005, passim.

[17] *IG* II$^2$ 1492 lines 123–124.

[18] For Kassandros' siege, see Plut. *Demetr.* 23.1. For the broader context, including Kassandros' invasion of Attika and activities by Demetrios in response, see Ferguson 1911, 116–18; Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 176; Habicht 1997, 74–75 with ancient references p. 75 n. 24. Habicht 1997, 74–75 and 1998, 77–82 has connected a battle between the Athenian cavalry and Pleistarchos, the brother of Kassandros, with the siege in 304. Others, however, date the event in 303; see Burstein 1977, passim; Shear 1984, 22. Whenever the battle actually occurred, no specific evidence supports the statement by Habicht 1997, 75 that Pleistarchos "led an enemy charge that breached the walls" of Athens.

stages of the necessary arrangements and may be assigned specifically to 307/6.[19]

As already noted, *IG* II$^2$ 463 provided for a building program involving the entire Athenian fortification system. The project included renovations, such as reconstructing the socles, shoring up the curtains, and rebuilding the mudbrick superstructure.[20] The existing walls would also be augmented with new constructions, including a palisade[21] and, at Athens, a closed parapet with shuttered windows and a roof over most of the wall-walk (fig. 1).[22] Judging by the renovations which were needed, parts of the fortifications were fundamentally unsound—perhaps due to natural events[23]—and the circuit wall at Piraeus may have suffered serious damage when Demetrios' soldiers stormed it in 307.[24] Since the roofs over the Long Walls needed only tiling at this time,[25] the phase III curtains and towers beneath them were probably sound structurally. Nevertheless the walls must have deteriorated after 322, when local circumstances provided little incentive or, at least for the Athenians, opportunity to maintain them. We may assume that the plastered mudbrick superstructures had begun to decay, and, indeed, the inscription documenting work on the towers in the Southern Wall during 306/5 shows that the Long Walls required attention to more than just their roofs.

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[19] That *IG* II$^2$ 463 belongs to 307/6 is regularly accepted, including, recently, by von Eickstedt 1991, 31 with n. 132, 33; Ruppenstein 1997, 109; Dreyer 1999, 91, 124; Woodhead 1997, 173; Loomis 1998, 143, 163 n. 253, 304; Hellmann 1999, 33, 36; Hedrick 2000, 332; Tracy 2000a, 228. It is often supposed that Demochares proposed the decree preserved by this inscription (Habicht 1997, 70; Kralli 1999–2000, 153 with n. 48; Tracy 2000a, 228), which explains the restoration of Demochares' name in the second line of the document.

[20] *IG* II$^2$ 463 lines 37–48, 74–75, 105.

[21] *IG* II$^2$ 463 line 97, cf. 94. The palisade (χάραξ) was not necessarily for the Long Walls, *contra* Orlandos and Travlos 1986, 264–65 s.v. χάραξ.

[22] *IG* II$^2$ 463 lines 52–74, 75–79. Based on the specifications in this document, scholars have reconstructed the roof structure differently; among these solutions, the reconstruction proposed by Maier 1959, 60–63, fig. p. 61 (cf. Adam 1982, 38, fig. 9) is likely more accurate than the solution of Winter 1959, 171–82, fig. 3. See Conwell 1992, 406–8; cf. Lawrence 1979, 369 with n. 21; Hellmann 2002, 282–83.

[23] Knigge 1988, 40, 50 and 2005, 74, 77–78 suggests that the fortifications required repairs in 307 due to natural causes, whether an earthquake or—at least in the area of the modern Kerameikos—flooding. Cf. also Knigge 1988, 93; German Archaeological Institute 1991, 573; Knigge in Knigge et al. 1991, 373; Schöne-Denkinger 1999, 224.

[24] Cf. Diod. XX.45.3.

[25] *IG* II$^2$ 463 lines 69–70. For the date of the roofs, see chapter 6.

In sum, anticipating an attack by Kassandros, the Athenians renovated their defenses late in the fourth century. Led by Demochares, work began in or soon after summer 307. The program included the Long Walls, now in their fourth building phase. Unlike some parts of the urban fortification complex, the two structures required repairs rather than reconstruction. By the time Kassandros besieged Athens in 304, Athens' fortification system was at least defensible since he failed to take the city. The renown won by Demochares for supervising the program implies that it was in fact finished and, assuming the Athenians completed the four-year project on schedule, the work ended during the second half of 304.

### *Justifying the Phase IV Long Walls*

The Athenians' intention to rely on the Long Walls (IV) at this time seems profoundly misguided. By the last third of the fourth century, Greek poliorcetic techniques had reached what is often considered an apogee, as embodied particularly in the elaborate sieges mounted by Alexander and Demetrios Poliorketes.[26] Consequently, according to A. W. McNicoll, as the fourth century drew to a close the attack was much more likely to succeed than the defense—and a tally of sieges known from Diodoros for the years from 322 to 303 seems to support the view.[27] N. P. Milner even finds that "by the end of the fourth century almost no city could hope to survive an onslaught by a Macedonian army."[28] Such considerations form the basis of the assertion that Long Walls connecting inland cities to harbors stood little chance against the powerful siege methods of the late fourth century.[29] If this perspective is correct, then the Athenians committed a serious blunder by once again placing the Long Walls (IV) at the heart of their defensive strategy.

Despite the allegation that the Athenians simply did not understand the nature of the threat,[30] several strands of evidence show that they

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[26] Winter 1971, 322; Garlan 1989, 125. Among the more striking examples of sieges in this period are Alexander's siege at Tyre in 332 (Diod XVII.40.4–46.5; Curt. IV.2.7–4.19; Plut. *Alex.* 24.5–25.3; Arr. *Anab.* II.18.1–24.6; Just. *Epit.* XI.10.11–14) and Demetrios' assaults on Cypriote Salamis during 306 (Diod. XX.48.1–8) and Rhodes in 305/4 (Diod. XX.82.1–88.9, 91.1–99.3; Plut. *Demetr.* 21.1–22.8).

[27] McNicoll 1997, 47 with table 7.

[28] Milner 1997, 212.

[29] Winter 1971, 111; Ober 1983, 391 with n. 16.

[30] Winter 1959, 197: "The Athenians must have learned remarkably little from the

cannot have failed to recognize the power of contemporary siegecraft. By the end of the fourth century, the Athenians had long been familiar with the power of artillery (see chapter 6). They possessed non-torsion machinery within fewer than three decades of its invention in 399 and acquired torsion artillery, in addition to other modern weaponry, over a period lasting from at least 330/29 to 306/5.[31] Characterizing Athenian awareness of modern artillery during the last third of the fourth century, E. W. Marsden states that the Athenians had "made efforts to keep abreast with the gradually improving methods of construction."[32] In fact, by the end of that century Athens became associated with the progress of poliorcetics, for the city produced the engineer Epimachos, builder of the famous *helepolis* used by Demetrios during the second stage of his assault on Rhodes (304).[33]

Further, in the later fourth century—as already during the 330s—the Athenians sought to adapt their fortifications to advanced poliorcetic techniques. Some aspects of the project led by Demochares suggest that the Athenians wished to modernize their defenses.[34] By roofing the circuit wall at Athens, they wished to protect defenders from siege towers (see chapter 6), while the palisade was likely meant to keep machinery away from the fortifications. In addition, archaeological evidence from the Dipylon Gate area shows that ca. 300 the Athenians built a *proteichisma* and narrowed the great Dromos directly in front of the gate to ca. 18 m.[35] The *proteichisma* was doubtless meant to hinder the approach of towers and other machines, while the modification of the Dromos may have had a similar purpose.[36] Although these activities did not necessarily belong to the project begun in 307, they

events of the preceding half-century, if they still regarded the Long Walls as defensible in the heyday of Demetrios Poliorketes."

[31] Marsden 1969, 56–57, 68–71.

[32] Marsden 1969, 71.

[33] Ath. Mech. p. 27.2–6 Wescher; Vitr. X.16.4; cf. Diod. XX.91.2–8; Plut. *Demetr.* 21.1–3. For modern discussion of Epimachos' elaborate siege tower, see Marsden 1971, 84–85; Garlan 1974, 209 with n. 4, 229–33; Pimouguet-Pédarros 2003, 378–79; Whitehead and Blyth 2004, 134–38 *ad* p. 57 §27.

[34] See also Ferguson 1911, 112–13; Maier 1959, 47, 67. The inscription *IG* II$^2$ 463, however, does not necessarily indicate that the modernization of the walls at this time included the construction of stone superstructures, *contra* Frickenhaus 1905, 40, 48 and Ferguson 1911, 113; see Maier 1959, 59–60, 65, 67.

[35] *Proteichisma*: Knigge 1988, 50, 76–77; German Archaeological Institute 2002, 142; German Archaeological Institute 2003, 177–78; Stroszeck 2003, 66 n. 28; German Archaeological Institute 2004, 265. Narrowing of the Dromos: German Archaeological Institute 2002, 142.

[36] An earlier view held that the Athenians drastically narrowed the Dromos farther west of the Dipylon Gate at the end of the fourth century; see Ohly 1965, 301–5;

do demonstrate the Athenians' awareness of current threats at the end of the fourth century.

Finally, one may deduce from the Athenians' own experience that they understood the power of current siege techniques. In 307, before the decision to renovate the Long Walls (IV), Demetrios Poliorketes had successfully assaulted the Mounychia garrison. Employing his state-of-the-art methods and equipment, including catapults and stone throwers, no doubt he impressed the Athenians by mastering that strong position in just two days.[37]

Well-schooled in poliorcetic techniques, prepared to adapt their defenses to the threat, and with Demetrios' assault on Mounychia fresh in their minds, why did the Athenians include the vulnerable Long Walls in the late-fourth-century fortification program? One possibility is that their judgment became clouded due to the heady atmosphere produced by the ejection of Kassandros' Mounychia garrison coupled with the restoration of democracy.[38] Elated by those events and buoyed by the support of their new patrons, Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes, the Athenians might have begun to aspire to their old position of influence in Greek affairs. Such a state of mind, conceivably, could have produced a questionable decision to depend on the Long Walls (IV).

At this time, however, Athenian decisions about matters of security were not unrealistic. For example, after rejecting Kassandros in 307, the Athenians prepared carefully for his expected attempt to regain control of Athens. In addition to mounting a systematic and extensive fortification project,[39] they collected funds from a wide range of sources,

Knigge 1988, 159, 163–64. In that case, one might detect adaptations to siege machinery beyond the gateway itself. Recent excavations have shown, however, that street surfaces continued to build up in that area (Stroszeck 2003, 69), so the adjustment in the width of the Dromos seems to have been limited to the area directly in front of the Dipylon Gate. I am indebted to Dr. Judith Binder for pointing out the potential significance of the reduction in the width of the Dromos (July 2004).

[37] Diod. XX.45.6–7; cf. Plut. *Demetr.* 9.4, 10.1.

[38] See Green 2003, 6–7 (after Diod. XX.46.1–3 and Plut. *Demetr.* 8–10), finding that "the delirious explosion of delight at [Kassandros'] overthrow by Demetrios Poliorketes shows that the Athenian passion for ἐλευθερία was, against all rational expectations, very far from being extinguished." Note also Habicht 1997, 71, remarking upon "the almost excessive zeal with which the Assembly recorded and publicized its activities."

[39] The phase 1 cross wall, or "Compartment Wall," on the Pnyx Range has been associated with Athenian defensive measures dating to the late fourth century; see Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 337; Thompson 1982, 146. However, the

both local and foreign, and stockpiled armor, modern weaponry, and ammunition.[40] As well, aware that a strategy involving Long Walls could not succeed without naval power, in 307 they had reason to expect that Antigonos and Demetrios would back them actively against a common enemy. Shortly before, Demetrios had begun his effort to liberate the Athenians from Kassandros by sailing a major flotilla right into Piraeus and issuing a strong statement of support for Athens.[41] Subsequently, Antigonos provided a gift of timber for the construction of 100 warships.[42] Having received the lumber as early as 307, the Athenians could have produced a fleet of only modest size—even when combined with the few vessels they possessed hitherto.[43] Nevertheless, the Antigonids had provided the core of a new naval force, a strong message of sponsorship which the Athenians will not have missed.

If the Athenian decision to renovate the Long Walls was not naive, then it must have derived from reasoned deliberation. How this can be, given the Athenians' understanding of the structures' vulnerability, follows from recognition of their lack of better alternatives. Precisely the same traditional and strategic limitations applied at the end of the fourth century as had three decades earlier, when the Athenians built the phase III Long Walls. Clearly the Athenians had no intention of moving their *asty* to another location. Thus, any plan to ensure their own safety would have to allow for the inland urban center at Athens. In addition, the Athenians continued to regard the navy as an important element of their strategic affairs. For evidence of this commitment, one

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structure likely belongs to the early third century, as is discussed below, so it played no role in Athens' physical preparations for the return of Kassandros.

[40] See Ferguson 1911, 113–14; Maier 1959, 47; Shear 1978, 47 n. 127; Migeotte 1992, 21–22 no. 9; Dreyer 1999, 63 n. 214. Marsden 1969, 70–71 describes the nature of some of the artillery acquired in this rearmament effort.

[41] For Demetrios' statement of support for the Athenians, see Plut. *Demetr.* 8.7: "When [silence] was secured, he proclaimed by voice of herald at his side that he had been sent by his father on what he prayed might be a happy errand, to set Athens free, and to expel her garrison, and to restore to the people their laws and their ancient form of government." (Loeb: B. Perrin)

[42] Diod. XX.46.4; Plut. *Demetr.* 10.1. See Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 170–71; Morrison 1996, 22; Habicht 1997, 70 with n. 10; Dreyer 1999, 62–63.

[43] It has been assumed that *IG* II$^2$ 1492 lines 120–121, dated 306/5, documents the arrival of the timber (Marasco 1984, 290 n. 38; Dreyer 1999, 63 n. 212), but Loomis 1998, 200 n. 38 points out that the inscription need not refer to the same timber as do the literary sources. At any rate, Loomis assigns some weight to Diodoros' date for the gift (307), while Ferguson 1911, 112 supposes that some of the timber had arrived by fall 307, because by the following spring Athens was able to contribute 30 quadriremes to Demetrios' siege of Cypriote Salamis (Diod. XX.50.3).

need look no further than their interest in adding 100 ships to their fleet as early as 307. Thus, facing a conflict with Kassandros, the Athenians were forced to renovate the Long Walls because they intended both to defend the *asty* and to revive the navy. In readying their defenses, the Athenians might have chosen to ignore the exposed structures which crossed the coastal plain. The option existed, for example, of focusing on the fortifications of the *asty*, but condoning the prospect of a siege and blockade by land would not have constituted a more sensible choice than opting to depend on the Long Walls (IV).

Although one may justify the Athenian decision to depend on the Long Walls (IV), the possibility remains that the plan could not have succeeded were the structures actually assaulted. The Athenians, however, did not unreasonably believe in the viability of the fourth-phase Long Walls. Methods of attack had become very powerful by the late fourth century, to be sure, but modern scholarship tends to overstate the case. A recent study rightly questions the view that Greek poliorcetic techniques culminated at that time, for important advances were still to come.[44] That the Long Walls (IV) were not doomed to failure is evident from the fact that contemporary assaults were not invariably successful. In 305/4 Rhodes successfully endured a vigorous attack by Demetrios Poliorketes.[45] Then, in 304 the Athenians themselves were able to hold out against Kassandros' siege until Demetrios drove him off.[46] Lastly, besieged by Demetrios himself in 295, the Athenians opened their gates to the enemy due not to the strength of his assault, but rather because Demetrios had starved them into submission.[47] One might characterize these examples as exceptions to the "rule" that the attack possessed a significant advantage over the defense at the close of the fourth century.[48] Still, defenders were not necessarily helpless,[49] and sieges mounted by powerful early Hellenistic warlords could fail.

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[44] Pimouguet-Pédarros 2003, 376–84. Cf. also McNicoll 1978, 405–6, 416–17 and 1986, 311–12, who assigns a new tactic, the "multiple simultaneous infantry attack," to the later third century.

[45] The ancient sources are listed earlier in this chapter; for a full modern discussion of the siege, see Morrison 1996, 32–34.

[46] Plut. *Demetr.* 23.1.

[47] Plut. *Demetr.* 33.5–6, 34.1.

[48] Cf. McNicoll 1997, 47.

[49] Pimouguet-Pédarros 2003, 387–92 describes new defensive practices developed by the Rhodians even as Demetrios besieged their city during 305/4; in addition, she suggests that the siege of Rhodes prompted Greek cities with sufficient means to develop defensive measures, thus producing already in the late fourth century an equilibrium between offensive and defensive forces.

Therefore, even in the face of the machinery and tactics wielded during the greatest age of Greek poliorcetics, seeking to defend the Long Walls (IV) was not a policy condemned, a *priori*, to failure.

### *304 to Mid-280s*

After completing the Long Walls (IV) in 304, the Athenians—with the support of the Antigonid navy—might have incorporated the structures in their strategic planning only down to 302, when Demetrios Poliorketes became involved in local military affairs. In a mid-third-century decree honoring the tyrant Aristomachos I of Argos, the Athenians recorded their gratitude for the assistance of an earlier Aristomachos in regaining the Long Walls (IV).[50] The implication is that some time before granting honors to Aristomachos I, they had lost or ceded control of the structures to another power. The incident ought to belong to the late fourth or early third centuries, the date depending on whether one restores the name of Demetrios Poliorketes, Kassandros, or Lachares to the inscription.[51] In 1925, A. Wilhelm, who associated the occupation of the Long Walls (IV) with Demetrios, developed the most attractive reconstruction of events.[52] According to that scenario, Demetrios garrisoned the Long Walls (IV) before leaving Greece to assist his father in Asia Minor (302), only to have his troops driven out the very next year—perhaps even before the battle of Ipsos—by forces from Athens and Argos. Far from functioning together with the navy to safeguard the *asty*, then, the Long Walls (IV) served in this instance as a fortified position from which an opponent might control Athens.[53]

The Long Walls (IV) may have been damaged during the troubled times just before and after 300. Both the *asty* and its port were besieged

[50] *IG* II$^2$ 774b–c lines 5–9, as revised by Wilhelm 1925, 19–30 (*SEG* 3 no. 98); Moretti 1967, 47–50 no. 23 incorporates Wilhelm's revisions; following Moretti's text, Dreyer 1999, 60 prints the relevant lines of the document. Piraeus may well have been involved, but there is very little of the city's name actually on the stone. The decree is typically dated in the 240s; see Habicht 1979, 124–25; Walbank 1984a, 248; Walbank in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 201 n. 4, 302 with n. 6; Charneux 1991, 314 n. 117; Dreyer 1999, 59 n. 202; cf. Tracy 2003b, 112–17. Recently Osborne 2003, 70–72 has assigned the document specifically to 241/0.

[51] See Moretti 1967, 49.

[52] Wilhelm 1925, 27–28; see also Walbank in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 201 with n. 4; Dreyer 1999, 59–61, 150, 177, cf. 263.

[53] Dreyer 1999, 61 speculates that the Athenians had invited Demetrios to occupy both the Long Walls (IV) and Piraeus.

on several occasions in these years, including Kassandros' investment of Athens in 304,[54] Lachares' attack on his opponents in Piraeus ca. 298/7,[55] and Demetrios' two successful sieges during spring 295, one at Piraeus,[56] the other at Athens.[57] During one or more of these operations, either the attackers or, more likely, the defenders may have torn down the structures at their junction with the circuit wall of the city under assault (cf. fig. 8 nos. 8, 9)—perhaps to the distance of a catapult shot—in order to prevent the use of the structures as assault platforms.[58] The Athenians had done just this at Megara in 424. In walling off Nisaia at that time, they sought to safeguard themselves by removing Megara's Long Walls where they met that city's enceinte.[59]

Whatever the fate of the Long Walls (IV) during these sieges, the structures were given up once and for all during the third century. Written and archaeological evidence establishes a basis for dating the demise of the Long Walls (IV). Let us begin with a report by Livy. In the year 200, Athens declared war on Philip V of Macedonia, whereupon Macedonian forces invaded Attika. According to Livy, following Polybios,[60] the Long Walls (IV) became the scene of a battle during this campaign:

> [Philip V] then divided his army and sent Philocles to Athens with half of them and himself proceeding to Piraeus, in the hope that while Philocles was keeping the Athenians within the city by approaching the

[54] Habicht 1979, 102–7 and 1997, 75 takes a passage in Pausanias (I.26.3) as evidence of an assault by Kassandros' troops on Mounychia and Piraeus in 305 or during the period 303–301. The historical context of the report, however, remains a much-disputed matter. For example, Gabbert 1996, 61 assigns it to 296/5, while another view holds that it describes Athens' recovery of Mounychia and Piraeus from Macedonian control in the years after 287 (see especially the extensive discussion by Dreyer 1999, 257–72, including a summary on pp. 257–58 of previous scholarship concerning the passage). Ambiguous as Pausanias' testimony is, it cannot by itself demonstrate an attack by Kassandros on Piraeus and Mounychia during the later fourth century.

[55] Anon. (poss. Phleg.), *FGrHist* 257a F 3 col. II line 14; see Gabbert 1997, 11–12; Habicht 1979, 8–13.

[56] Polyaen. IV.7.5; cf. Paus. I.25.8. See Habicht 1979, 8–13.

[57] Plut. *Demetr.* 33.3–34.1; Paus. I.25.7; Ferguson 1911, 132–35; Habicht 1997, 86–87. The relative chronology of Demetrios' sieges at Piraeus and Athens is not certain. Nevertheless, it is fair to assume that Demetrios would first have sought to control the port of Piraeus in order both to secure the rear and to enhance his ability to isolate Athens; see also Walbank in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 212; Dreyer 1999, 21, 42, 76, 422; cf. Gabbert 1997, 12; Habicht 1997, 88.

[58] As suggested by Dr. Scott Rusch (pers. comm., September 2002).

[59] Thuc. IV.69.4.

[60] Briscoe 1973, 1–2; Habicht 1997, 186 with n. 44.

> walls and threatening an attack, the opportunity might be offered himself of taking Piraeus, left with a small guard. But, with practically the same defenders, the capture of Piraeus was in no wise easier for him than that of Eleusis. Suddenly he marched from Piraeus to Athens. But having been driven away from there by a sudden sally of infantry and cavalry amid the narrow space of the half-demolished [*semiruti*] wall which, with its two arms [*bracchiis*], joins Piraeus to Athens, he gave up his attack on the city.[61] (Loeb: E. T. Sage)

Livy's report is ambiguous in several respects. To begin with, it does not explicitly mention the "Longi Muri." Instead, Livy refers to a single wall between Athens and Piraeus and then, in a relative clause, identifies this structure more specifically: the "wall" is actually an area enclosed by two "arms," i.e. structures. Although the use of the word *bracchium* for the Long Walls is rare,[62] it is doubtless the Latin equivalent of the figurative Greek *skelos*, "leg," which ancient authors employ with some frequency in reference to the Long Walls (above, chapter 1). Joining Athens and Piraeus as they did, these structures forming a single "wall" can only correspond to the Long Walls (IV), which Livy describes more explicitly at another point.[63] In earlier times, Andokides had similarly employed the singular in conceiving of the structures as a self-contained fortress.[64]

Next, the adjective *semiruti* may suggest that the Long Walls (IV) had simply reached an advanced state of deterioration by the year 200.[65] It is more likely, however, that the word applies to structures which were in ruins because they had been demolished.[66] Nothing suggests that

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[61] Liv. XXXI.26.6–9: Diviso deinde exercitu rex cum parte Philoclem Athenas mittit, cum parte Piraeum pergit ut, dum Philocles subeundo muros et comminanda oppugnatione contineret urbe Athenienses, ipsi Piraeum levi cum praesidio relictum expugnandi facultas esset. Ceterum nihilo ei Piraei quam Eleusinis facilior iisdem fere defendentibus oppugnatio fuit. A Piraeo Athenas repente duxit. Inde eruptione subita peditum equitumque inter angustias semiruti muri, qui bracchiis duobus Piraeum Athenis iungit, repulsus, omissa oppugnatione urbis...For reasons which will become clear below, Sage's rendering of the final sentence of the passage has been replaced by the author's own translation. I am much indebted to Prof. Bill Hutton, Prof. James Ker, and Prof. Ralph Rosen for fielding my many questions about this passage.

[62] Known otherwise only from Justin (V.8.5, 9.12) and a somewhat confused passage in Propertios (III.21.23–24).

[63] Liv. XLV.27.11.

[64] Andoc. 1.45.

[65] Judeich 1931, 93 n. 1; Hus 1977, 35 trans *ad loc.*

[66] See Souter et al., 1968–1982, 1732 s.v. *semirutus*, and the translation of the passage by Bettenson 1976, 45. As Prof. R. E. A. Palmer (†) suggested to me in the early 1990s, had Livy—or his source—thought the walls were deteriorating due to natural

Philip V himself had damaged the Long Walls (IV),[67] but the structures may have been partially dismantled long before, during one or more of the sieges *ca.* 300.

Lastly, understanding the nature of the engagement between Philip V and the Athenians depends on the word *inter*, which potentially yields four different interpretations. Many scholars believe that the Athenian infantry and cavalry sallied forth suddenly from the *asty* into the space between the structures, where they fought the Macedonians.[68] Alain Hus supposes that Athenian forces broke out of the area defined by the Long Walls (IV) and then drove Philip away from Athens.[69] One may also take *inter* in the sense of "amid circumstances particularly favorable or unfavorable to the action."[70] Accordingly, the Athenians encountered Philip in close proximity to the Long Walls (IV), whether he was actually crossing one or the other of them or close enough to be considered in their midst. Lastly, one might associate *inter* directly with the movements of Philip and his force. Taken with *repulsus*, it would suggest that the Athenians drove Philip back into, or amid, the space bounded by the Long Walls (IV).

Of these alternatives, the first two are less likely than the others. On the one hand, had Livy intended for *inter* to show that the Athenians entered the area between the Long Walls (IV), then he might have employed a verb of motion in order to show clearly that he was depicting the route of their approach. On the other hand, Hus understands *inter* in a way which corresponds to no regular meaning of the word. Had Livy intended to show that the Athenians had erupted from the area between the Long Walls (IV) to confront Philip, a preposition like *ex* would have served his purpose. The two remaining interpretations of the Livy passage are both reasonable. In either case, Philip got the worst of a battle with the Athenians, whether the engagement simply occurred in close proximity to the Long Walls (IV), if not necessarily

causes alone, he might have written something on the order of *vetustate lapsi muri*: "the walls falling down by age."

[67] *Contra* Leake 1821, 351 n. 1, who dropped the idea from his 1841 second edition; W. Kinnard in Stuart and Revett 1827, 7 n. c; Panagos 1997, 287.

[68] Weissenborn and Müller 1883, 49 *ad loc.*; Ferguson 1911, 275; Sage 1935, 79 trans. *ad loc.*; Bettenson 1976, 45 trans. *ad loc.*; Garland 2001b, 54.

[69] Hus 1977, 35, translating as follows: "[Philip V] en fut repoussé par une brusque sortie d'infanterie et de cavalerie, qui s'effectua par l'étroit couloir que forme le mur à demi ruiné, qui, de ses deux bras, relie le Pirée à Athènes."

[70] See Souter et al., 1968–1982, 939 s.v. *inter* 8b.

between them, or Philip was forced back into the space between the two structures. Although the above translation reflects the first of these two possibilities, there are no clear grounds for deciding between them. In any event, no matter how the skirmish actually transpired, Livy's testimony seems to establish the year 200 BC as a *terminus ante quem* for the abandonment of the Long Walls (IV).

An argument from the silence of an inscription cut during the later third century perhaps suggests an earlier *terminus ante quem*. Honoring the Athenian Eurykleides, a decree published as *IG* II$^2$ 834 lists the repair of the city walls of Athens and Piraeus among the statesman's contributions.[71] In the past, this document has been assigned to 229/8 or shortly afterwards,[72] but in recent times a somewhat lower date ca. 215 has been suggested.[73] Whenever exactly the inscription was cut, no doubt these fortifications were renovated soon after Athens achieved autonomy in 229/8.[74] That the work did not include the Long Walls (IV) may indicate that the structures were not part of the building project.

Archaeological evidence recovered in southwestern Athens is also relevant to the abandonment of the Long Walls (IV). The Pnyx excavations carried out by Robert Scranton and Homer Thompson during the 1930s focused in part on a fortification wall running from the Hill of the Nymphs to the Mouseion (fig. 8 no. 2).[75] Scranton suggests that the Athenians began building this cross wall (*diateichisma*) during the later fourth century, and he believes that the project may have lasted as long as fifteen years.[76] Given its location and function, the new structure, known in modern times as the "Compartment Wall," implies some change in the status of the defenses in southwestern Athens. Since the Athenian circuit skirted the lower slopes of the Pnyx Range to the southwest of the Compartment Wall (fig. 8), the new structure either served as a secondary line of defense behind the still-functioning city wall beyond or else marked the new course of the Athenian circuit in the region.[77]

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[71] *IG* II$^2$ 834 lines 15–16.

[72] 229/8: Knigge 1988, 50. Shortly after 229/8: Maier 1959, 76; Wycherley 1978, 21.

[73] Habicht 1982, 118–24; Burstein 1985, 91 n. 5; cf. Habicht 1997, 192. Tracy 1990a, 46 assigns it to the Cutter of *IG* II$^2$ 1706, who was active between at least 229/8 and ca. 203. Cf. also Dreyer 1999, 192 n. 335.

[74] Conwell 1996, 98 with n. 46; Habicht 1997, 185–86; cf. Shipley 2000, 87, 150.

[75] For the final report, see Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 301–78.

[76] Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 333–37.

[77] Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 337 incorporates both alternatives in

The second of these alternatives would have involved the abandonment of the Long Walls (IV), which reached Athens on the southwest side of the city.

Based on some or all of the evidence described immediately above, scholars have proposed a variety of dates for the demise of the Long Walls (IV), including immediately after the battle of Ipsos (301),[78] during the early to mid-third century,[79] before ca. 229/8,[80] soon after 229/8,[81] and in the later third century.[82] These dates are found to be consistent with one or more developments in the third-century history of Athens, including: (1) the city's weakened financial condition,[83] (2) a political and economic reorientation away from Piraeus,[84] (3) changing strategic priorities,[85] (4) the intermittent political separation between the *asty* and Piraeus,[86] (5) a deficiency in manpower,[87] and (6) the Athenians' loss of substantial sea power.[88] The present discussion dates the abandonment of the Long Walls (IV) by combining the literary and archaeological evidence with historical factors which are demonstrably relevant to the Long Walls (IV), particularly the status of Athenian naval power.

The written evidence outlined above establishes a probable *terminus ante quem* for the abandonment of the structures which joined Athens with Piraeus. According to Livy, the Long Walls (IV) were half-demolished

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his conclusion that the Compartment Wall belonged to a long-range plan executed with a view to the *eventual* abandonment of both the Long Walls and the southwestern portion of Athens' enceinte. See also Winter 1959, 197–98; cf. Thompson 1982, 145–46.

[78] Lenschau 1937, 89.

[79] Ferguson 1911, 230 (dilapidated during the first forty years of the third century), cf. 211 with n. 2, 245; Tarn 1913, 125 with n. 28 (by 288, if not before); Judeich 1931 92–93 (gradually decaying since the mid-third century), cf. 93 n. 1; Maier 1959, 79 (by 263, at the latest).

[80] Wilcken 1910, 222; Briscoe 1973, 125 *ad* Liv. XXXI.26.8; Mossé 1973, 133; Wycherley 1976, 683; Wycherley 1978, 21; Gauthier 1982, 277–78. Some scholars do not give the date 229/8; instead, they simply note that the inscription *IG* II$^2$ 834 shows that the structures were left out of the fortification work called for in that document, which dates to 229/8 or soon afterwards.

[81] Habicht 1982, 128; Habicht 1997, 186; cf. Garland 2001b, 53.

[82] Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 357–60.

[83] Ferguson 1911, 211; Maier 1959, 79; Wycherley 1978, 21; Habicht 1997, 186.

[84] Maier 1959, 79.

[85] Habicht 1982, 128; Habicht 1997, 186; Garland 2001b, 53.

[86] Tarn 1913, 125 n. 28; Judeich 1931, 92–93; Gauthier 1982, 277; Habicht 1997, 186.

[87] Judeich 1931, 92–93; Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 360; Garland 2001b, 53.

[88] Ferguson 1911, 211; Lenschau 1937, 89; Maier 1959, 79.

in 200, so they were out of use by that time.[89] Conceivably the Athenians employed the massive remains, even in a deteriorated state, as a preliminary line of defense. However, Livy's description shows that while Philip was approaching Athens, the opposition did not come from atop the walls. The structures, therefore, were not guarded. That the Athenians had abandoned the Long Walls (IV) even earlier than Livy suggests is evident from the decree *IG* II$^2$ 834, which suggests that the Long Walls (IV) were not part of the fortification work undertaken in or soon after 229/8.[90] The structures, therefore, were probably out of use by that time. One hesitates to rely on an argument from silence, but otherwise—were the Long Walls (IV) in fact restored during the early 220s—it is necessary to suppose that the Athenians soon undid that work by demolishing the structures before the arrival of Philip in the year 200.

We may now turn to the physical evidence from the Pnyx Range. As pointed out above, should the Compartment Wall have replaced the old city circuit in southwest Athens, then the date of the new structure would also mark the demise of the Long Walls (IV). The validity of this hypothesis turns on the date and purpose of the Compartment Wall. Let us first consider when the Athenians built the structure. As noted above, Scranton believes that the project began during the late fourth century and lasted for up to fifteen years. Although his chronology is typically accepted,[91] there is now reason to doubt it.[92] Fortunately Scranton's careful presentation of the evidence in the final report facilitates a new interpretation.

One may begin with the relative architectural sequence, as recorded by the excavators. On the Mouseion, they identified remains which

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[89] See also Leake 1841a, 429–30; Wachsmuth 1874, 629 n. 1; Frazer 1898, 40; Wilcken 1910, 222; Ferguson 1911, 211 with n. 2; Judeich 1931, 93 n. 1; Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 360; Hus 1977, 35 n. 4; Habicht 1997, 186; cf. Lenschau 1937, 89. Some scholars cite the passage simply as evidence of the Long Walls' half-ruined state, though it also implies that the structures were out of use: Wachsmuth 1874, 629 n. 1, 656 n. 2; Weissenborn and Müller 1883, 49 *ad loc.*; Carroll 1907, 231; Ferguson 1911, 275; Papachatzes 1974, 140 n. 3 *ad* Paus. I.2.2; Garland 2001b, 169.

[90] See also Wachsmuth 1874, 629 n. 1; Wilcken 1910, 222; Ferguson 1911, 211 with n. 2; Judeich 1931, 93 n. 1; Lenschau 1937, 89; Maier 1959, 66; Briscoe 1973, 125 *ad* Liv. XXXI.26.8; Mossé 1973, 133; Wycherley 1976, 683; Wycherley 1978, 21; Gauthier 1982, 277–78; Habicht 1982, 128; von Eickstedt 1991, 32; Habicht 1997, 185–86.

[91] Kahrstedt 1950, 54; Maier 1959, 67; Grace 1963, 324; Gruben 1970, 126–27; Travlos 1971, 159, 392; Winter 1971, 114 with n. 30; Lawrence 1979, 149–50; Lauter 1982, 49. For a date in the period following the battle of Chaironeia, see Mastrapas 1992, 146; Lazaridou and Dakoura-Vogiatzoglou 2004, 4, 36.

[92] Thompson 1982, 146 n. 44; Romano 1985, 452–53; Conwell 1996, 97 n. 43.

almost certainly belong to the fort built by Demetrios Poliorketes in 295 (fig. 8 no. 5).[93] Were physical evidence to show that the Compartment Wall must predate the fort, it would rule out any substantial down-dating of the cross wall. Scranton's description of the physical relationship between the two structures does not show, however, that the Compartment Wall deserves chronological priority over the fort; in fact, he found that the two structures were at least in part contemporary.[94] As it happens, Scranton's belief that the Athenians started building the Compartment Wall before the fort stems not from the observed architectural sequence, but rather from the absolute date assigned to the beginning of work on the cross wall based on epigraphic and ceramic evidence.

The inscription *IG* II[2] 463 (307/6) refers to a *diateichisma*, "cross wall," and a *dipylon*, "double gated," passageway.[95] Since the Compartment Wall is a diateichisma and incorporates a *dipylon* gate (fig. 8 no. XIV),[96] Scranton believes that he has found both of the features mentioned in the decree and that, therefore, the inscription dates the cross wall.[97] The gateway on the Pnyx, however, did not actually become double gated until the cross wall's second phase,[98] known as the "White Poros Wall," which was carried out more than a hundred years after the inscription was cut.[99] Thus there is no association between the Pnyx gate and the *dipylon* passageway mentioned in the decree. Accordingly, even though the Pnyx wall is a *diateichisma*, one need not equate it with the one known from *IG* II[2] 463.[100]

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[93] Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 331, 337.

[94] See Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 337: "Although no definite indication of the nature of the contact between the fortress wall and the *diateichisma* was found to show whether the former was of a piece with the latter or added afterwards, there can be little doubt but that the fortress was begun before the *diateichisma* was completed. The rock cuttings would suggest that the two bonded, although they do not prove it."

[95] *IG* II[2] 463 line 53.

[96] Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 334. For the excavation report concerning the gateway, see Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 352–56.

[97] That the Pnyx cross wall corresponds to the structure mentioned in the inscription is typically accepted; see, for example, Maier 1959, 59; Winter 1959, 171–72, 196–99; Gruben 1970, 126–27; Lawrence 1979, 149–50; Thompson 1982, 146; cf. also Travlos 1971, 159. Romano 1985, 453–54, however, rejects the connection.

[98] Thompson and Scranton in Blegen 1938, 157; Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 352; Conwell 1996, 95 with n. 21.

[99] See also chapter 6. The date of the new gateway is discussed below.

[100] Where, then, was the epigraphically attested *diateichisma*? According to *IG* II[2] 463 lines 52–53, it belonged to the Athenian circuit: Καταστεγάσει δὲ κα[ὶ] τὴν πάροδον

As for the ceramic evidence, the sherds retrieved from inside the Compartment Wall are the most direct indicators of the structure's date.[101] Identifying "numerous parallels" between sherds from the filling of the wall and Agora Group A, Agora Group B, and the earliest material from the cemeteries of Alexandria, Scranton dates the pottery "to the second half of the fourth century BC, and as late as the last quarter of the century."[102] Since the 1943 publication of the Pnyx material, the chronology of Hellenistic ceramics has changed. The pottery groups to which Scranton compares his diagnostic ceramics include material now dated well after the year 300.[103] Moreover, according to Virginia Grace, a Rhodian amphora stamp from the packing of the wall dates as late as the 270s.[104] This finding suggests to Homer Thompson, Scranton's partner in the Pnyx excavations, that at least part of the wall might require a "considerable down-dating."[105] The context pottery, therefore, now suggests that the Athenians built the Pnyx cross wall as many as thirty years later than Scranton originally proposed.

Other archaeological evidence from the Pnyx also suggests down-dating the Compartment Wall. In 1956, working immediately outside that structure's main gate (fig. 8 no. XIV), S. I. Charitonides identified a floor covered with destruction debris.[106] The relative lack of small finds suggested that the associated building, which he regarded as a house (*oikia*), had been abandoned before it was destroyed. Based on the

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[τοῦ κύκλ]ου τοῦ περὶ [τὸ ἄστυ ἄνευ το]ῦ διατειχί[σμ]α[τ]ος καὶ τοῦ διπύλου τοῦ ὑπὲρ τῶν πυλῶν. Admittedly the reference to the city circuit (*kyklos*) is heavily restored here, but a certain reference to that structure in line 69 supports the restoration. Accordingly, the *diateichisma* most likely corresponds to the section of the Themistokleian circuit crossing the space between the Athens-Piraeus Long Walls where they meet the city wall (fig. 8 no. 7). The Athenians would have excepted that part of the circuit from receiving a roof in 307/6 because they were restoring the Long Walls (IV) at the same time, so the *diateichisma* was behind the line of the fortifications.

[101] See Scranton in Thompson and Scranton, 333–34.

[102] Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 333.

[103] For Group A (Agora deposit G 13:4, lower fill closed ca. 260, upper fill closed ca. 150), see Rotroff 1982, 107–8; Grace 1985, 36; Rotroff 1987a, 6; Rotroff 1997, 453–54. For Group B (Agora deposit H 16:3, closed ca. 240), see Grace 1974, 194, 198 n. 19; Kroll 1974, 202–3; Rotroff 1982, 108–9; Grace 1985, 36; Rotroff 1987a, 2–3, 6; Rotroff 1987b, 185; Rotroff 1997, 456. On the Chatby cemetery at Alexandria, the earliest known site of burials by the colonists who arrived from Greece after 331, see Rotroff 1997, 29–31 for a summary of evidence which suggests that burials were made there into at least the second half of the third century.

[104] Grace 1974, 198 with n. 19; for the stamp, see also Grace in Talcott et al. 1956, 141 n. 70; Grace 1963, 324 with n. 11.

[105] Thompson 1982, 146 n. 44.

[106] Charitonides 1979, 162, 167–68.

similarity of three *kantharoi* discovered on the floor of the building to vessels published in connection with the Agora excavations, Charitonides concluded that the house had been put out of use in the later fourth century.[107] The Agora *kantharoi*, however, are now dated ca. 275, so the abandonment of Charitonides' building would have occurred during the early decades of the third century. Given the close proximity of that structure to the Pnyx cross wall, one suspects that the former was removed to make way for the latter, particularly because the abandonment of the building occurred in a deliberate fashion.

In sum, whereas nothing compels us to follow the conventional date of the Compartment Wall, pottery evidence suggests dating the structure in the early third century. The earliest years of that century were too troubled for major fortification projects, but the Athenians' successful rebellion against Demetrios Poliorketes in 287 soon presented both a motive and an opportunity.[108] Newly independent but accustomed to foreign interventions since losing the Lamian War, the Athenians must have expected more of the same. Let us therefore suppose that during the mid-280s, they adapted their defenses with the construction of a cross wall on the Pnyx Range.

We may now address the function of the Compartment Wall: would the new structure merely back up or in fact replace the existing line of defense in southwest Athens? A decisive change in the pattern of land use in the region at about the time the Compartment Wall was built would indicate that the structure belonged to a fundamentally new pattern of life. Thus, whether the new wall spurred the change or conformed to an existing trend, it would mark the new limit of southwestern Athens. Alternatively, were the Compartment Wall not a primary feature of Athenian security measures because it would merely back up the existing city wall beyond, then one might not expect to find evidence of profound change in the area when it was built.

Turning first to settlement in southwestern Athens, the limited evidence suggests a certain continuity there preceding the construction of the Compartment Wall. During the reapportionment of bouleutic representation in 307/6, the deme Koile (fig. 8 no. 6), west of the Pnyx

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[107] Charitonides 1979, 168, cf. 162. For the Agora material, see Rotroff 1997, 243 nos. 17–18.

[108] Cf. Romano 1985, 452–53, who dates the cross wall ca. 280.

Range, retained the quota of three to it assigned in the reforms of Kleisthenes.[109] That Koile's representation remained the same is a sign of demographic stability in the region.[110] Soon, however, the situation would change.[111] As already suggested, the house found by Charitonides on the Pnyx Range was abandoned in the early third century, probably due to the construction of the Compartment Wall. In addition, among the finds of the Scranton-Thompson excavations on the Pnyx were the remains of houses which were destroyed to make way for the Compartment Wall.[112] The cross wall was set in and on the structures—as clear an indicator as can be of an interruption in the life of the area.[113] Certainly one might suppose that only houses directly affected by the new structure were abandoned, while others continued to be inhabited as before. Even so, were the Compartment Wall simply a secondary line of defense, then perhaps the Athenians might have avoided such

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[109] Traill 1975, table p. 68.

[110] As for the archaeology in the Koile area, a wealth of rock-cuttings exists on the slopes southwest of the Pnyx cross wall, in the area of the deme; see Leake 1841a, 432; Judeich 1931, 389, map I C–D/5–7; Lazaridou 1997, 39–40; Lazaridou and Dakoura-Vogiatzoglou 2004, 17–18, map pp. 20–21; Goette 2001, 58. Although these remains attest to extensive ancient settlement in that region, no published evidence accurately dates the cuttings, so they have no place in the present discussion.

[111] An ancient report from the mid-fourth century has been thought to suggest that the demography in the vicinity of the Pnyx meeting-place was in flux by that period. In 346/5, Aeschines (1.81–84) alluded to a decree proposed by Timarchos concerning houses in a deserted area of the Pnyx. A scholiast *ad* Aeschin. 1.81 (Dilts no. 179) explains that Timarchos had proposed to rebuild some houses which were vacant and dilapidated. On this basis, some scholars suppose that by midcentury Athenians had begun to abandon the Pnyx region, at least for habitation; see Judeich 1931, 86; Kahrstedt 1950, 54; Lauter and Lauter-Bufe 1971, 116–17. Other explanations of Aischines' testimony are possible. Carey 2000, 52 n. 88 *ad* Aeschin. 1.81 supposes that Timarchos had proposed to clear the area around the Pnyx, while Thompson 1982, 145 n. 40 and Fisher 2001, 217–18 *ad* Aeschin. 1.81 connect the measure with preparations for the reconstruction of the Assembly's meeting-place (Pnyx III). See also Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 361.

[112] Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 312, 322–23, 333.

[113] Excavation has turned up household pottery from later house sites adjacent to the northern section of the second-phase cross wall, the White Poros Wall (Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 338, 358–60, 361). Scranton considers the material similar to Agora Group C, although "probably a little earlier." Since Susan Rotroff now believes that Group C was deposited during the second quarter of the second century, people were living along at least part of the heights of the Pnyx Range soon after the year 200; cf. Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 361. On re-dating Group C (Agora deposit G 6:2), see Rotroff 1982, 101, 109; Rotroff 1983, 276–78; Grace 1985, 36; Rotroff 1987a, 2–3, 6; Rotroff 1987b, 186; Rotroff 1997, 452–53. Thus, if the Koile region had in fact "ceased to be inhabited" upon the construction of the original Pnyx cross wall (Travlos 1971, 392), then settlers eventually returned to the region.

drastic steps as the destruction of property and the displacement of the local population.

Funerary remains from the area of Koile confirm the altered status of the region during early Hellenistic times. Because intramural burials were forbidden at Athens by the late Archaic period,[114] third-century graves found between the Compartment Wall and the Themistokleian city wall to the southwest suggest that the area was no longer recognized as part of Athens proper. During the 1930s, the Pnyx excavations located a grave just over 30 m west of the Compartment Wall.[115] Scranton dated the material from the burial, including two Broneer type VII lamps, to the fourth century. According to R. H. Howland's chronology, however, the lamps could date well into the first half of the third century.[116] Finds made nearby but not in their original context suggested to Scranton that other graves "of the same period" had been located in the same area.[117] Next, outside the main gate in the Compartment Wall, Charitonides discovered a burial which he assigned to the first quarter of the third century.[118] The dating derived particularly from a pair of *kantharoi* which resemble finds from the Athenian Agora.[119] The Agora vessels, however, are now dated in the period 275–250,[120] so the burial will have occurred about a quarter of a century later than Charitonides supposed. Lastly, graves assigned to the early third century have been excavated on the lower southwestern slopes of the Hill of the Nymphs, inside the line of the old Themistokleian city wall.[121] Assuming that they were dated at least in part on the basis of ceramic finds, then these burials may have been made two or three decades later than was originally supposed; in any event, they serve as further evidence that by the mid-third century the Athenians had begun to bury their dead west of the Pnyx cross wall.

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[114] Cic. *Fam.* IV.12.3–4. See Young 1951a, 131–34; note, however, the caution of Kurtz and Boardman 1971, 70, 92.

[115] Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 379, pl. XV. At a later date, tower W2 in the White Poros Wall, was built just a few meters away from this grave.

[116] Howland 1958, chart following text: types 25A, 25A', 25B, 25B', 25D'.

[117] Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 379.

[118] Charitonides 1979, 162–63, 178–79. This grave will have belonged to the cemetery lining the road which stretched from this gateway through Koile; see Lazaridou and Dakoura-Vogiatzoglou 2004, 18, map pp. 20–21 no. 9, who date the beginning of burials here to the third century.

[119] Charitonides 1979, 178 nos. 2–3.

[120] See Rotroff 1997, 265 no. 219, 265 no. 222.

[121] Karagiorga-Stathakopoulou 1979, 18 no. 12 (Pallenaion 40: Athens-Ano Petralona).

The evidence therefore suggests a fundamental alteration in the pattern of life in southwestern Athens during the period when the Compartment Wall was built. Houses were abandoned before the construction of the wall, and, not long after completing the structure, the Athenians began burying their dead between it and the old line of the circuit wall further west.[122] Therefore, the cross wall on the Pnyx Range, far from simply backing up the circuit wall beyond, now defined the perimeter of southwestern Athens.[123] Accordingly, the Athenians had abandoned the Long Walls (IV) by the time they built the Compartment Wall in the mid-280s. Finds from the space enclosed by the phase IV Long Walls are consistent with this conclusion. A pyre excavated during the early 1970s included pottery considered to be late classical/early Hellenistic in date,[124] but the current pottery chronology may require a lower dating. In addition, various graves and pyres from the region have been placed in the third century.[125] Whatever the actual date of the earliest among these discoveries, that find need not, by itself, mark the time when the Long Walls (IV) ceased to define part of the urban zone. The fact that it was followed by more burials during the third century, however, does point towards a change in the status of those structures during the 200s.

The history of the period supports dating the demise of the Long Walls (IV) early in the third century. As pointed out above, hitherto scholars have explained the abandonment of the structures in various ways. The specific relevance of most of those factors to the Long Walls (IV), however, is difficult to establish. Accordingly, the following discussion is founded upon two hypotheses which are directly relevant to the Long Walls (IV): (1) the structures would not have been renovated

[122] Note, however, the discovery of a pyre apparently dating to Classical times near the church of Agios Demetrios Lompardiares (Meliades 1956, 265). The find yielded sherds attributed to the Reed Painter or his circle, i.e. the later fifth century; for the date, see Kurtz 1975, 58; Oakley 2004, chart p. 40. Whatever the exact location of the pyre, it was well within the limits of the city as defined by the circuit wall, and the actual burial of the cremated remains was probably made nearby. I am grateful to Prof. Liz Langridge for her assistance in tracking down the Reed Painter.

[123] Cf. also Choreme-Spetsiere 2003, 7.

[124] Liangouras 1973/74, 54 (in Troon between plots 68–70 and the intersection with Kyklopon: Athens-Ano Petralona).

[125] Alexandre 1969, 37 no. 14 (Deinocharous 15: Athens-Ano Petralona); Steinhauer 1989, 55 (Kyprou and Hydras: Athens-Moschato); cf. Liangouras 1973/74, 54 (in Troon between plots 68–70 and the intersection with Kyklopon: Athens-Ano Petralona) for finds which are not clearly dated. See also Schilardi 1975, 120–21.

when Athens and Piraeus were controlled by opposing powers, and (2) the walls will not have functioned during periods in the third century when no foreign naval power found the structures useful.

Whereas the first of these hypotheses requires little justification, one should clarify certain assumptions underlying the second. It has been emphasized above that the Long Walls would not have played a key strategic role at Athens when the city could not expect at least probable control of the sea lanes, whether real or presumed. Since Athens' navy had been devastated in the battle of Amorgos (322), never again to achieve substantial power, at no time after the construction of the phase IV Long Walls could Athens claim such control.[126] Therefore, a strategy relying on the Long Walls (IV) would have been employed only had an external power exercising considerable control of the sea lanes facilitated the policy. This assumption operated when the phase IV Long Walls were built, since it is hardly coincidental that the Athenians restored the structures at a time when Demetrios Poliorketes and his father controlled affairs at Athens. Despite the unsuccessful siege of Rhodes (305/4), during this period the Antigonids were ascendant in the Aegean.[127] The Athenians would not have renovated the Long Walls (IV) had they not anticipated the safe arrival of seaborne supplies—and only the protection of the Antigonids could have ensured this.[128]

This point yields another important assumption. The Athenians cannot have simply gambled on the prospect of assistance from the Antigonid navy, so they must have had grounds for believing that Demetrios and Antigonos would support the development of a strategy dependent upon sea power. In other words, the Antigonids, who after all were the ultimate arbiters of Athenian affairs in the period 307–301, would have condoned the restoration of the Long Walls (IV). Some modern scholars have even suggested that Demetrios played a prominent role in the fortification program to which the phase IV Long Walls belonged.[129] However that may be, at the end of the fourth century

[126] Cf. Oliver 1995, 117–18, 286.
[127] Buraselis 1982, 53; Will 1984a, 56–57; Green 1990, 32; Shipley 2000, 44; Walbank 2002, 108.
[128] For Athenian dependence on Antigonid support, see Green 1990, 49; Tracy 1995, 21–22.
[129] Frickenhaus 1905, 29–30, 48–49; Parsons in Carpenter et al. 1936, 123; Garlan 1974, 217; Adam 1982, caption for fig. 115; Knigge 1988, 40, 50; cf. Garland 2001b, 49. Given the Antigonids' strength at sea and their demonstrated interest in controlling

two Macedonian dynasts associated themselves with a strategy based on these structures; thus, given Athens' prominence in the struggles to succeed Alexander,[130] determining the fate of the Long Walls (IV) during the third century ought to take into account any role they may have played in the strategies of the foreign powers which constantly involved themselves in Athenian affairs before ca. 200, by which time the Long Walls (IV) were definitely abandoned.

During the short period of independence (301–295) after the battle of Ipsos, Athens cannot have anticipated controlling the sea lanes in the event of a prolonged emergency. The city had apparently begun to redevelop its navy beginning in 307, for Antigonos Monophthalmos had donated enough timber to build 100 ships following the liberation of Athens (see above). Even with the addition of vessels built from that lumber, the Athenians' fleet was no doubt modest relative to some of the navies then operating in the Mediterranean.[131] Moreover, even assuming that the Athenians retained that fleet,[132] as the third century began Demetrios Poliorketes commanded the leading Aegean naval power.[133] This remained the case despite the Antigonids' defeat at Ipsos and the control of eastern Mediterranean ports consequently exerted by

Athens, it is certainly possible that Demetrios encouraged the repair of the city's fortifications, including the Long Walls. However, the Athenians are known to have proposed and carried out the project, and there is no actual evidence that Demetrios involved himself in the work.

[130] Palagia and Tracy 2003, vii: "One of the side effects of Macedonian domination was Athens' new role as a stepping stone in the struggles of the Successors for the throne of Macedon. Cassander, Demetrius Poliorcetes and Antigonus Gonatas were able to secure Macedonia by using Athens as a power base." In fact, the actions of Polyperchon and Kassandros after the death of Antipatros in 319, described above, had demonstrated the importance of Athens to the Macedonians during the later fourth century. See also Ferguson 1911, ix–x; Shipley 2000, 108; Brogan 2003, 194; Wescoat 2003, 114.

[131] For late-fourth-century fleets generally, see Morrison 1996, 19–34. In 307, for example, Demetrios arrived at Piraeus with 250 ships (Plut. *Demetr.* 8.4). At Salamis (306), he apparently fought with a fleet numbering not quite 200 vessels (according to Plut. *Demetr.* 16.2, he had a total of 190 ships; Polyaen. IV.7.7 lists 170; Diod. XX.50.3, however, gives a total of 118). Ptolemy had command of at least 200 warships at Salamis (Diod. XX.49.2–3; cf. Polyaen. IV.7.7; Plut. *Demetr.* 16.1 puts the number at 210). In 304 Demetrios brought 330 vessels when called upon to end Kassandros' siege of Athens (Plut. *Demetr.* 23.1).

[132] Cf. Dreyer 1999, 63–64, who argues that after Ipsos the Athenians gave Demetrios the ships they had built with Antigonos' timber.

[133] Tarn 1913, 81, 84–85; Will 1979, 85, 165–66; Buraselis 1982, 59; Will 1984b, 101–2; Errington 1990, 148; Green 1990, 121; Tracy 1995, 22; Morrison 1996, 35; Habicht 1997, 81–82, 85, 87; Bosworth 2002, 259–60; Walbank 2002, 108–9.

Ptolemy Soter.[134] Accordingly, were a strategy incorporating the Long Walls (IV) to be realistic, Demetrios would have to have supported or sponsored it. However, after the battle of Ipsos (301) the Athenians had summarily dismissed him,[135] involved themselves with his opponents Kassandros and Lysimachos,[136] and come under the control of the tyrant Lachares, whom Demetrios probably opposed.[137] Athens' open opposition to the leading naval power of the time will have ruled out employing the Long Walls (IV) in these years.

Having regained both Athens and Piraeus in 295, Demetrios maintained a firm hold on these cities down to 287, particularly through garrisons on Mounychia Hill and the Mouseion (fig. 8 no. 5). He controlled a substantial fleet early in this period,[138] but his mastery of the sea lanes soon began to wane. Before the end of the 290s, perhaps in 294, Demetrios had lost both Cyprus[139] and the key eastern Mediterranean ports of Tyre and Sidon.[140] Early in the next decade, his power suffered even in the Aegean where, despite the ambitions demonstrated by his massive shipbuilding program in the early 280s,[141] Demetrios lost

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[134] Morrison 1996, 34.

[135] Plut. *Demetr.* 30.4.

[136] Ferguson 1911, 131; Will 1984b, 101; Green 1990, 123–24; Habicht 1997, 82–84; Shipley 2000, 48, 122.

[137] Green 1990, 124; cf. also Dreyer 2000, passim, who argues that Demetrios was putting pressure on Lachares' regime even before the death of Kassandros in 297.

[138] Bosworth 2002, 263; Walbank 2002, 109.

[139] Plut. *Demetr.* 35.5–6. Ellis 1994, 34, 58, 73 assigns the Ptolemaic seizure of Cyprus to 295, Hölbl 2001, 23, 323, dates it 295/4, and Walbank in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 214 dates it to 294.

[140] Antigonos I possessed Sidon already by 314 (Diod. XIX.58.4) and captured Tyre in 313 (Diod. XIX.61.5); Ptolemy Soter retook Tyre, along with Sidon, upon winning the battle of Gaza in 312 (Diod. XIX.86.1–2; on the date, see Bosworth 2002, 225–28, 283), but the Antigonids soon forced him to withdraw from the region (Diod. XIX.93.1–7; see Hölbl 2001, 18, 321, dating the Antigonid reoccupation of Syria to spring 311). The peace treaty of autumn 311, as dated by Hölbl 2001, 18, 321, will have confirmed Antigonid possession of the two cities (Diod. XIX.105.1), and Demetrios continued to hold them after Ipsos (Plut. *Demetr.* 32.7; cf. Will 1984b, 104). The foregoing dates, except where noted, follow Green 1990, 23, 26, 27, 686–87; see also Habicht 1997, 64. Dating Ptolemy's eventual reacquisition of Tyre and Sidon depends on numismatic evidence. The date 288/7 is often accepted (Shear 1978, 72; Will 1979, 94, 96–97; Will 1984b, 108); however, Merker 1974, passim, esp. 125–26, followed by Walbank in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 214 with n. 2, re-dates the Alexander coinage of Tyre, yielding a date in the mid-290s for Demetrios' loss of these ports (294, according to Walbank).

[141] Plut. *Demetr.* 43.4. See Buraselis 1982, 89–90; Walbank in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 226; Green 1990, 127.

control of both the Island League and his island territories.[142] During the early 280s, therefore, Demetrios would have had little reason to invest in the Long Walls (IV); however, it is possible that he would have renovated them earlier on. Since Demetrios remained stronger at sea than his rivals during the mid- to later 290s, the essential precondition for a strategy based on Long Walls existed during those years. Facing considerable land-based opposition from Lysimachos and Pyrrhos after 295,[143] Demetrios might have perceived a need to strengthen Athens' defenses in order to safeguard the city. Perhaps damaged by siege in or before 295, the Long Walls (IV) may have required repair in the vicinity of the city circuits at either end. Soon, however, Athens rebelled against Demetrios, and he besieged the city again (287).[144] If now he found it advisable to demilitarize the Long Walls (IV), this time Demetrios might have undone his own handiwork.

After its successful revolt against Demetrios in 287,[145] Athens remained independent until the end of the Chremonideian War in 263/2. Demetrios still held Piraeus, however, as he and his successors did right down to 229.[146] Lack of access to the port city will have rendered the Long

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[142] Will 1979, 94; Will 1984b, 108. The exact date of the shift in control over the Island League is unclear. The honorary decree *IG* II$^2$ 650, dated 286/5 by the name of the archon Diokles, establishes a *terminus ante quem*; for discussion of this decree and related matters, see Merker 1970, 143; Bagnall 1976, 137–38, 147–48; Shear 1978, 78 n. 217. Suggested dates for the transfer of control include (1) 291–287: Will 1979, 94; Will 1984b, 108; Green 1990, 765 n. 48; (2) 288: Ellis 1994, 73, 78, cf. 60; Reger 1994, 32; and (3) 287: Walbank in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 228 with n. 2, 232; Habicht 1997, 95; cf. Hölbl 2001, 24, 323, proposing a date in 287 at the latest. Shear 1978, 78 finds that Ptolemaic control of the Phoenician ports and mastery of the Aegean were formally acknowledged in the treaty which concluded Demetrios' siege at Athens; for a full discussion of the treaty, see Shear 1978, 74–78.

[143] Will 1984b, 105–8; Green 1990, 125–27.

[144] Agora I 7295 lines 27–40 (honoring Kallias of Sphettos); Plut. *Demetr.* 46.1–4, cf. *Pyrrh.* 12.6–7. For a narrative of the siege, see Shear 1978, 74–75.

[145] Shear 1978, passim, esp. 63–65, dates the revolt in spring 286. Habicht 1997, 95 n. 99 recognizes a "general consensus" in favor of spring during the previous year; see, for example, Will 1984b, 108; Green 1990, 128; Morrison 1996, 35; Gabbert 1997, 16. Dreyer 1999, 211–19, 422–23 and Hölbl 2001, 24, however, assign it to summer, rather than spring, 287.

[146] For the ancient sources which demonstrate the existence of a Macedonian garrison in Piraeus during these years, see Habicht 1979, 98–100. Scholarly opinion now generally holds that the Athenians never regained Piraeus in the period between the expulsion of Demetrios and the Chremonideian War, meaning that Piraeus was occupied continuously by the Macedonians from the mid-290s until 229. See Habicht 1979, 96–107; Osborne 1979, 193–94; Walbank 1984a, 232 with n. 17; Gabbert 1997, 37–38; Habicht 1997, 124; Habicht 1998, 100–1; Kralli 1999–2000, 155; Shipley 2000, 124; Garland 2001b, 51–52, 188–89; cf. Taylor 1998, passim. Dreyer 1999, 257–81, however, has suggested that Piraeus was taken by the Athenians ca. 280, only to be regained by Antigonos II after 276.

Walls (IV) useless from the Athenians' perspective. As for the Macedonians at Piraeus, of course they still had a fleet, but now Ptolemaic Egypt controlled the Aegean.[147] In any event, it would have been pointless indeed—and hardly feasible—to connect Piraeus to the hostile city of Athens by restoring the Long Walls (IV). Although specific evidence is lacking, the structures may have been demilitarized during the siege by Antigonos Gonatas at the end of the Chremonideian War.[148]

After prevailing in that conflict, Antigonos Gonatas reimposed Macedonian control at Athens.[149] From 263/2 to 229, then, the Athenians themselves cannot have renovated the Long Walls (IV). Antigonos, however, controlled the cities at either end of the structures, and his naval power may have been strong enough even before the Chremonideian War to contribute to the outbreak of the conflict in 268.[150] Moreover, the weak performance of the Egyptian navy during the war conceivably prepared the way for concerted growth in Antigonos' sea power.[151] Nevertheless, even as Ptolemaic Egypt gradually lost its once dominant Aegean position after the Chremonideian War, Antigonos did not exert broad, long-term control at sea. Either at the end of the Chremonideian War, or soon after the end of that conflict (perhaps 255), his fleet defeated the navy of Ptolemy Philadelphos off the island of Kos.[152] Although this victory no doubt strengthened Antigonos' naval power, scholars often suppose that it did not permanently affect

[147] Ferguson 1911, 151, 153, 177–80; Tarn 1913, 106–9; Tarn and Griffith 1952, 12; Walbank 1984a, 237; Walbank in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 245, 262 with n. 4; Green 1990, 129, cf. 131, 146; Morrison 1996, 35, cf. 37–38; Dreyer 1999, 321 n. 122, cf. 315; Hölbl 2001, 24, 40, 42; Walbank 2002, 109. For a summary discussion of Macedonian and Ptolemaic sea power during the Chremonideian War, see Dreyer 1999, 321 n. 122; also Reger 1985, 166–67.

[148] For the siege, see Apollod. *FGrHist* 244 F 44; Polyaen. IV.6.20; Paus. III.6.4–6.

[149] Heinen 1972, 180–81; Will 1979, 228–30; Habicht 1982, 13–20, 55–59; Walbank in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 286–87; Errington 1990, 169–70; Green 1990, 147; Habicht 1997, 150; Shipley 2000, 127; Tracy 2003a, 56–58.

[150] Will 1979, 220–21; Walbank 1984a, 237; Walbank in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 279, 290; Green 1990, 146–47; Habicht 1997, 142–43; Hölbl 2001, 40–41; Walbank 2002, 112, 114–15; cf. Errington 1990, 168.

[151] For the activities of Egypt's fleet during the Chremonideian War, see the summary by Hölbl 2001, 41–42, cf. 66.

[152] For the battle, see Walbank in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 291–93. This engagement is normally placed either at the end of the Chremonideian War or in the mid-250s; suggested dates include (1) 262: Will 1979, 224–26; (2) 261: Reger 1994, 40–41; Morrison 1996, 36; Walbank 2002, 113; (3) 255: Walbank in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 291–93, 595–99; Gabbert 1997, 52–54 (ca. 255); Dreyer 1999, 416–19; Hölbl 2001, 44; (4) 255/4: Buraselis 1982, 146–51; and (5) 254: Errington 1990, 171.

Ptolemy's hitherto strong position in the Aegean.[153] He continued to control a series of naval bases in the region after the Chremonideian War,[154] and the Egyptian fleet seems to have recovered from Kos by ca. 250,[155] so—despite having defeated his rival at sea—Antigonos apparently gained no lasting advantage. In 246 or 245, his fleet again overcame the Ptolemaic navy, this time off Andros.[156] Judging by the evidence from the Cyclades,[157] however, even this victory did not lead to Aegean-wide predominance. Given Antigonos' inability to control the sea lanes consistently after the Chremonideian War, or perhaps his lack of interest in doing so, he would not have developed a strategy involving the Athenian Long Walls (IV).

Some scholars have speculated that, far from restoring the Long Walls (IV), Antigonos Gonatas in fact destroyed them.[158] This action, which might have served to ensure his control of the Athenians,[159] presumably would have occurred when he removed the Macedonian garrison from the Mouseion in 255.[160] As noted already, however, the structures had

[153] Will 1979, 231–33; Walbank in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 293–95; Morrison 1996, 36–37; Walbank 2002, 114–15, 125. For the view that Kos substantially weakened Ptolemy's naval position in the Aegean, see Hölbl 2001, 44, 66.

[154] Hölbl 2001, 42–43. Note, however, the view of Reger 1985, 164, 168–69 and 1994, 33, 34, 40 that Egypt lost interest in the Cyclades after ca. 260, even though it maintained naval bases in various parts of the Aegean.

[155] Buraselis 1982, 170–72; Walbank in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 295, 315; Hölbl 2001, 45, 66.

[156] On the battle, see Buraselis 1982, 119–41; Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 306–7. For the date, see Buraselis 1982, 141–45; Hammond in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 587–95; Reger 1994, 46 n. 56.

[157] See Reger 1994, passim, esp. 46, 60, 64.

[158] Wachsmuth 1874, 629 with n. 1; Wachsmuth 1890, 187, 196; Lolling 1889, 299 n. 5; Curtius 1891, 239; Frazer 1898, 39–40; Carroll 1907, 231; Theophaneides n.d., 543; cf. Maier 1959, 79.

[159] For Antigonos' methods, see Ferguson 1911, 191–92; Pouilloux 1946, 488–96; Mossé 1973, 131; Walbank 1984a, 240–41; Habicht 1997, 150–52, 158–60; Dreyer 1999, 373; Tracy 2003b, 15–25.

[160] Paus. III.6.6. Dating the withdrawal of the garrison derives from the assumption that it corresponds with a development known from Eusebios, who states that the Athenians were given back their freedom by Antigonos; according to the Greek manuscript of the *Chronica* (vol. II, p. 121 Schoene), that event dates to 256/5, while the Armenian version (vol. II, p. 120 Schoene) places it in 255/4. See Habicht 1982, 16; Walbank in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 596 n. 8. On the statement that Antigonos restored the Athenians' freedom, see now Habicht 2003, 53; Tracy 2003a, 58–60. For the circumstances of the removal of the garrison, see Will 1979, 228–30; Walbank in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 288, 293; Errington 1990, 171; Gabbert 1997, 40–41, 52; Habicht 1997, 152, cf. 158.

probably been partly dismantled during one or more of the assaults on Athens and Piraeus ca. 300, if not by Antigonos himself when he besieged the *asty* at the end of the Chremonideian War. Thus, not only was Antigonos' control at Athens secure by 255, but also there will have been little need to destroy them.[161] Under Antigonos, then, the Long Walls (IV) will have been neither restored nor entirely dismantled. Rather, they will have been left to the natural elements. With the continuing decline of Macedonian naval strength after Antigonos' death (239),[162] down to 229 the structures will have simply deteriorated.

Having regained its independence in 229, Athens sought to maintain a policy of neutrality based on Egyptian support.[163] At this time, the city possessed minimal strength at sea,[164] so it still could not by itself maintain a strategy dependent on the Long Walls (IV). Foreign, sea-based support of such a policy was no alternative, however, for there was no dominant power in the Aegean during the second half of the third century.[165] Macedonian naval strength had been on the wane since midcentury. Following the short-lived revival signaled by Antigonos Doson's Karian expedition (227), and regardless of Philip V's intermittent naval ambitions during the last two decades of the century,[166] this decline continued after 227.[167] It is true that in order to cultivate a positive relationship with Antigonos Doson, in ca. 226 the Athenians sent Prytanis, a philosopher who was much respected

[161] Others who have discounted the entirely hypothetical destruction by Antigonos include Leake 1841a, 429; Wilcken 1910, 221–22; Judeich 1931, 93 n. 1; Lenschau 1937, 89.

[162] See Davies 1984, 286; Walbank 1984b, 460; Morrison 1996, 56; cf. Walbank 2002, 115–17.

[163] Ferguson 1911, 207–8, 239–43, 248, 254 with n. 4, 269–70, 272; Habicht 1992, 74–75; Habicht 1997, 173–93, cf. 194–96; Garland 2001b, 53; Hölbl 2001, 52.

[164] Ferguson 1911, 211; Garland 2001b, 53; cf. Habicht 1997, 186.

[165] For the central Aegean, see the detailed discussion by Reger 1994, 47–65, who argues that neither Ptolemies, Antigonids, nor Rhodians exercised hegemony in the Cyclades during this period.

[166] For which see Tarn and Griffith 1952, 24; Walbank 1984b, 478–80; Errington 1990, 189–91, 193, 196–97; Green 1990, 297, 305–6; Walbank 2002, 119–24, cf. 125–26.

[167] Walbank 1940, 13, 20–21; Berthold 1984, 98, although suggesting, p. 97 n. 47, that Macedonian sea power nevertheless predominated in the Aegean until Antigonos' death (221), for which see also Tarn 1913, 391 and Tarn and Griffith 1952, 23–24; Walbank in Hammond and Walbank 1988, 363–64; Walbank 2002, 117; cf. Walbank 1984b, 460–61.

by the king,[168] on an embassy to the Macedonian court.[169] In the years after 229, however, when they were interested above all in safeguarding the city's newfound freedom,[170] few Athenians would have sought the intervention of their recent masters in local affairs. The Ptolemaic navy, for its part, remained strong in the eastern Mediterranean,[171] but since the middle of the century its power—or at least commitment—in the Aegean had declined.[172] Finally, by this time both Pergamon and, particularly, Rhodes had assumed political significance and considerable power at sea,[173] and the Romans, having proven their naval strength against the Carthaginians, had become embroiled in Aegean affairs.[174] With several powerful navies sailing the region, plus the threat of piracy, which had been a prominent danger since the mid-third century despite Rhodian efforts to control it,[175] it is unlikely that Athens could have counted on any one power for reasonably certain control of the sea lanes. Therefore, between 229 and the year 200, by which time the Long Walls (IV) were certainly out of use, the Athenians did not renovate the structures joining Athens to Piraeus.

### *Summary*

Literary and epigraphic sources show that from 307 to 304 the Athenians carried out a major fortification program involving the Long Walls (IV). Athens' Macedonian patrons in this period, Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes, must have condoned the

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[168] Polyb. V.93.8.

[169] Woodhead 1997, 321–24 no. 224 = Moretti 1967, 60–63 no. 28, dated 226/5 by the name of the archon Ergochares. Connecting this inscription with Antigonos depends ultimately on the restoration of erasures, probably made in 201/0, in lines 16 and 19; see Meritt 1935, 529; Dow and Edson 1937, 169; Woodhead 1997, 322. On the historical circumstances and significance of Prytanis' mission, see Dow and Edson 1937, 169–71; Habicht 1992, 74; Habicht 1997, 177–78.

[170] Habicht 1997, 176.

[171] Hölbl 2001, 66–67, 129.

[172] Berthold 1984, 97 with n. 47, 99; Heinen 1984, 418; Shipley 1987, 186–88; Reger 1994, 34, 46, 47; Gabrielsen 1997, 44; Hölbl 2001, 66. For the survival of a degree of Ptolemaic power in the Aegean during the final decades of the century, see Shipley 1987, 190–91.

[173] Ferguson 1911, 254–56; Berthold 1984, 98–99, 105–8; Heinen 1984, 432–33; Shipley 1987, 191–92; Green 1990, 305, 378–81; Morrison 1996, 56–57; Gabrielsen 1997, 44–45, 56; de Souza 1999, 49–50; Daly 2007, 543. For a short period of Rhodian control in the central Aegean already during the 250s, see Reger 1994, 41–43.

[174] See, generally, Errington 1989, passim.

[175] Davies 1984, 286; cf., generally, de Souza 1999, 48–54. On Athens' concern with the problem after regaining independence, see Ferguson 1911, 209.

undertaking, for without the support of the Antigonid navy, the Athenians cannot have expected to gain an advantage from relying on the structures. The Athenians may appear naive for having supposed that the Long Walls (IV) might hold up against the powerful siege techniques of the day. However, the threat was well understood at Athens, the Athenians had no better option as long as they maintained an inland *asty* even while placing a high priority on the navy, and contemporary sieges were not invariably successful. The walls crossing the coastal plain were perhaps garrisoned by Demetrios Poliorketes from 302 to 301 and likely damaged during one or more of the sieges at Athens and Piraeus between 304 and 295. In none of these situations did the Long Walls (IV) serve their primary strategic purpose.

After ending their alliance with Demetrios Poliorketes in 301, the Athenians were never again in a position to employ the Long Walls (IV) in conjunction with a naval strategy. Thus in those years the structures would not have secured the Athens-Piraeus connection except under the patronage of a foreign ruler who controlled both the *asty* and its port city as well as the naval prowess which justified the walls joining those two cities. Only during the second half of the 290s did the necessary combination of conditions provide an opportunity for such a power to restore and employ the Long Walls (IV). After taking control of both Athens and Piraeus in 295, Demetrios Poliorketes retained ample strength in the Aegean down to the end of the 290s, and conceivably he regarded the Long Walls (IV) as a useful component of Athens' defenses.

Whether or not Demetrios had anything to do with the Long Walls (IV), after rejecting him for a second time in 287, the Athenians built the Compartment Wall on the Pnyx. The project belonged to a change in the pattern of land use in southwestern Athens, for it was preceded by the abandonment of houses and followed, not later than the second quarter of the third century, by burials directly to the west. Since the Compartment Wall now delimited the urban zone on the southwestern side of Athens, the Long Walls (IV) were no longer part of the city's defenses. The construction of the cross wall, then, dates the Athenians' decision to abandon the structures joining Athens with Piraeus. The Long Walls (IV) had in fact become obsolete a few years earlier. By ca. 290, no sea power exercised the sort of control in the Aegean which would have justified restoring the walls stretching from Athens to Piraeus. Therefore, at that time, if not before, the structures had become useless. No single historical factor—of the six listed earlier in this chapter—can explain a development of such fundamental importance

for the city of Athens. Economic realities must have played a role in the Athenians' recognition of their inability to sustain the Long Walls (IV), and demographic trends might also have done so. One may be certain, at least, that when the Athenians turned away from the walls connecting the *asty* with the sea, they believed that their navy would never again compete for control of the sea lanes.

### *The Long Walls as Relics*

Even as the Long Walls fell into disrepair during the third century, they were too massive, both in memory and in the landscape, to be forgotten entirely. Thus they appeared in a mock epitaph during the second half of the century,[176] were named in an inscription probably dating from the 240s,[177] and—as already described—were the scene of a battle in the year 200.

Archaeological evidence from the 1930s Pnyx excavations strongly suggests that the Long Walls continued to decay after the year 200. In these years, the Athenians built the White Poros Wall on the Pnyx Range (fig. 8 no. 2),[178] which modified the line of the cross wall built during the early third century. On the Mouseion, the excavators found that one of the new structure's towers (C7) was built across the line of the city circuit.[179] This discovery means that the southwestern portion of the circuit wall—and therefore the Long Walls—were not in use after the construction of the White Poros Wall.[180] Scranton assigned the second phase of the Pnyx cross wall to the later third century based primarily on ceramics from houses destroyed in the course of building the structure.[181] That pottery, which Scranton compared to Agora Group C, should be down-dated to the early second century, as described in

[176] *Anth. Pal.* [Theodorid.] VII no. 406; see Gow and Page 1965a, 194 no. XIV; Gow and Page 1965b, 545–46 no. XIV.

[177] *IG* II$^2$ 774b–c lines 5–9, discussed earlier in this chapter.

[178] For this structure, see Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 340–62.

[179] Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 357 with fig. 59.

[180] Based on the evidence summarized here, Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 357, 360 concludes that the White Poros Wall rendered both the southwest part of the city wall and the Long Walls (IV) obsolete—in other words, that those structures functioned until the construction of the phase 2 structure crossing the Pnyx Range. The White Poros Wall, however, serves only as a *terminus ante quem* for the abandonment of those walls, which occurred in the early third century. See also Conwell 1996, 97.

[181] Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 358–60.

a note earlier in this chapter. Thus, the Athenians probably built the White Poros Wall some decades later than Scranton thought.[182] Perhaps they carried out the project in connection with work known to have occurred on the city wall in the later 170s.[183] In any event, whenever exactly the Athenians rebuilt the Pnyx cross wall in the early second century, the Long Walls were out of use at that time.

Nevertheless, the structures still ranked among Athens' noteworthy monuments in the early second century. During his travels in Greece following the battle of Pydna (168), the consul Aemilius Paullus passed through Athens after stopping at Oropos. Livy describes his visit as follows:

> Thence he went to Athens, which is also replete with ancient glory, but nevertheless has many notable sites, the Acropolis, the harbours, the walls joining Piraeus to the city, the shipyards, the monuments of great generals, and the statues of gods and men—statues notable for every sort of material and artistry.[184] (Loeb: A. C. Schlesinger)

This statement includes a certain degree of ambiguity. It is not clear that Paullus actually observed the Long Walls, although Christian Habicht is inclined to think that he did.[185] Additionally, one wonders whether the structures were impressive in 168 or when Livy (or, rather, his source Polybios)[186] was actually writing. If one opts for the former alternative, then, according to Habicht, Livy "gives the impression that the walls connecting the city and harbor were either still or once again intact" after having been in a ruined state by 200.[187]

That the Long Walls had been restored after 200, however, is doubtful. The construction of the White Poros Wall provides physical evidence that the Athenians, far from repairing the Long Walls early in the second century, had reconfigured their defenses in a way which manifestly excluded those structures. The White Poros Wall, of course, may post-date 168, since it is not certainly connected with the inscription cited above. Nevertheless, had Athens somehow financed the restoration of the Long Walls and secured foreign assistance to

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[182] See also Conwell 1996, 96–97.

[183] *IG* II$^2$ 2331 = Maier 1959, 82–84 no. 17, dated 172/1 by the name of the archon Sosigenes.

[184] Liv. XLV.27.11.

[185] Habicht 1997, 215.

[186] Walsh 1961, 133–35; cf. also Luce 1977, 180–81.

[187] Habicht 1997, 186 n. 44.

man the structures between 200 and 168,[188] the city had no source of continuing control at sea. Since their own naval weakness continued,[189] the Athenians would have required foreign assistance for a strategy incorporating the Long Walls. In this period, only Athens' ally Rome could have provided such support.[190] However, given its abiding interest in the harbors of Piraeus,[191] Rome would hardly have condoned, let alone facilitated, the challenge implied by the restoration of the Long Walls. If, then, the structures were worth visiting in 168, it was simply because so much of them survived.

After 168, the Long Walls do not reappear in the historical record until the early first century BC.[192] By the time of Sulla's operations in Attika in 87/6, they must have been in an advanced state of deterioration.[193] Nevertheless, substantial portions of the structures still stood,[194] because before the onset of winter 87/6, Sulla tore them apart in order to use the stones, wood, and earth in his siege mound at Piraeus.[195] Since the stone retrieved by the Romans will have been pulled from the substructures, the Long Walls must have suffered extensive damage, the worst of course occurring at the Piraeus end of the walls, nearest to the site of the siege mound. Walther Judeich, however, exaggerates the

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[188] On Athens' inability to defend itself successfully against Philip V without assistance from abroad, see Ferguson 1911, 273–74; Habicht 1997, 199–200, 204; Shipley 2000, 150; cf. also Liv. XXXI.44.9.

[189] Ferguson 1911, 273 with n. 3, 278, 314 n. 1; Habicht 1997, 199, 201, 209 with n. 49.

[190] With their victorious campaigns against Philip V and Antiochos III, which ended, respectively, at Kynoskephalai in 197 and Magnesia in 189, the Romans had become the arbiters of eastern Mediterranean affairs. See Polyb. XXIV.11.3; Tarn and Griffith 1952, 28–29; Will 1982, 161–62, 172–74, 221–23; Gruen 1984, 325; Green 1990, 311, 414–15, 421–22.

[191] For the period 200–167 generally, see Habicht 1997, 194–219, esp. 202, 205, 208–9; note also Ferguson 1911, 278–79.

[192] The lack of specific evidence, however, has not prevented speculation as to the fate of the structures in these years. Based on App. *Mith.* 29.115 and 30.116, Panagos 1997, 287 asserts that Mithridates VI planned to destroy the Long Walls during the slave revolt at the end of the second century. The cited evidence in fact describes the activities of the Romans Bruttius and Sulla in the year 87, during the First Mithridatic War, so no ancient testimony supports this view. Georgiades 1901, 14–15, after Posidon. fr. 247 Theiler = Ath. 5.214a–b, thinks that the walls were largely preserved when the late-second-century slave revolt occurred; however, the passage from Athenaios, far from referring to the Long Walls, describes some of the measures taken by the tyrant Athenion after returning from his embassy to Mithridates VI in 88.

[193] Hind 1994, 153 with n. 80; Habicht 1997, 305; Hoff 1997, 35. For modern narratives of the events, see Habicht 1997, 305–7; Hoff 1997, 34–37.

[194] *Contra* Wachsmuth 1874, 656 n. 2.

[195] App. *Mith.* 30.121; see also Str. IX.1.15.

amount of damage done at this time.[196] He suggests that Sulla's troops completely removed whatever portions of the Long Walls still survived in order that the walls could not be rebuilt. However, Pausanias was impressed by the structures' ruins at a much later date,[197] so one may assume that he saw standing remains rather than heaps of *detritus*. In any event, whatever was left of the Long Walls after Sulla was finished with them might have been plundered in the course of reconstruction efforts following Sulla's attacks on both Athens and Piraeus.[198]

Some modern scholars apparently suppose that the Long Walls regained their defensive function even after the damage done to them in the 80s BC.[199] The mainland Greeks did not build fortification walls during Roman times,[200] however, and convincing evidence for work on the Long Walls is lacking. That a variety of authors writing after that time refer to the Long Walls in the present tense conceivably indicates that the structures were functioning even as they wrote.[201] However, one may suppose that some of these authors either employ the historical present tense or else repeat the usage of their sources. Pliny's statement, for instance, derives from one of his botanical chapters, which are known to contain little original material.[202] Alternatively, later writers who use the present tense may legitimately refer to their own times, but this need not suggest that the walls were actually functioning. In a passage discussed at length in chapter 2, for example, Plutarch reports that Kimon had contributed to building the original two Long Walls, "which they call 'legs'" (*ha skele kalousi*).[203] Yet Pausanias, writing not

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[196] Judeich 1931, 93 n. 1, citing Str. IX.1.15.

[197] Paus. I.2.2.

[198] Burden 1999, 9. There is no specific evidence, however, for the confident statement by Hind 1994, 153 n. 80 that the remains of the Long Walls were "used to refurbish the fortifications of the city and the port."

[199] Kinnard in Stuart and Revett 1827, 7 n. c; Georgiades 1901, 16; Lawrence 1979, 156, who states that the Long Walls to Piraeus were restored on the two occasions when Athens was demilitarized—referring, no doubt, to the walls' destruction in 404 and, one assumes, to Sulla's handiwork; Garland 2001b, 169, 223; Mastrokostas n.d., 694.

[200] According to Camp 2000, 50–51, fortification walls were not built in Greece from the mid-second century BC to the third century AD.

[201] Str. IX.1.24; Liv. XLV.27.11; Prop. III.21.23–24; Plin. *Nat.* 13.129; Plut. *Cim.* 13.6; Arr. *Epict. Diss.* III.24.73; Philostr. *Ep.* 70; schol. *ad* Pl. *Grg.* 455e; Olymp. *in Grg.* 7.3; cf. also Hld. *Aeth.* IX.3.4, which Judeich 1931, 155 n. 1 takes as a reference to Athens' Long Walls.

[202] Plin. *Nat.* 13.129. See Morton 1986, 88–89, 96.

[203] Plut. *Cim.* 13.6.

long afterwards, characterizes the structures as *ereipia*, "ruins."[204] That Plutarch was a devoted observer of Athens' material remains has been noted above, so no doubt he was familiar with the actual condition of the Long Walls. Therefore his use of the present tense need not imply that the structures were in service as he wrote.[205]

What little additional evidence there is for the state of the Long Walls after 87 either does little to indicate that they were ever restored or suggests that they continued to deteriorate. An inscription often dated to the first century BC refers to a sanctuary of Athena Polias "beside the Long Walls."[206] This characterization need not suggest that the structures were still functioning when the inscription was cut.[207] The label had probably existed for centuries,[208] a state of affairs which—for practical reasons, if nothing else—would not have changed right along with the walls' condition. At a later date, probably during Hadrianic times, the northern Athens-Piraeus wall was damaged by the construction of an arcaded aqueduct on its stone substructure.[209] During this operation, much of the surviving mudbrick superstructure will have been removed to make way for the piers of the new construct. That the Long Walls were in ruins when Pausanias saw them not long after the installation of the aqueduct can be confidently accepted, therefore, particularly because he was a reliable reporter of what he saw.[210] Thus, Aristides' mid-second-century observation that the Long Walls had once descended to the sea accurately captures the strategic obsolescence of the structures in the early centuries AD.[211]

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[204] Paus. I.2.2.

[205] It is possible, of course, that Plutarch is referring to the manner in which his sources characterized the Long Walls.

[206] *IG* II$^2$ 1035 line 48: *[temenos to p]ara ta makra tichi Athenas [P]oliados*; for the text, see Culley 1975, 211–15 = *SEG* 26 no. 121. The date of the inscription is a matter of running debate. Suggestions include (1) first century BC: Garland 2001b, 154, 160; (2) second quarter of the first century BC: Baldassarri 1998, 242–46; (3) 74/3–65/4 BC: von Freeden 1983, 157–74, esp. 174; (4) soon after 31 BC: Habicht 1996, 85–86; Kienast 1997, 63 n. 29, 65 n. 38; (5) ca. 19 BC: G. C. R. Schmalz in an announced study of Roman patronage in Athens (*cf.* Burden 1999, 2 n. 4); (6) 10/9–3/2 BC: Culley 1975, 217–23, esp. 221; Schmalz 1995, 48–49; and (7) mid-first century AD: Kapetanopoulos 1976, 375–77; Shear 1981, 366–67 (AD 41–54); cf. Kapetanopoulos 1981, 223–25.

[207] On the toponym, see Culley 1973, 170.

[208] Speaking of Pausanias' time, Wycherley 1963, 159 notes that "one should normally assume that important old shrines and cults continued in existence" at Athens.

[209] Liangouras and Papachristodoulou 1972, 344, plan 2; Travlos 1988, 289; Conwell 1992, 304–5, 538–40.

[210] Habicht 1998, 28–63; Hutton 2005, 19–20, 21.

[211] Aristid. 1.351 L-B.

Useless as the structures may have become, they were never entirely lost. One finds references to the Long Walls in twelfth- to thirteenth-century authors,[212] and eventually early modern travelers observed the physical remains of the structures. In describing his travels from 1675 to 1676, G. Wheler states that:

> From *Porto-Lione* they count it five miles to *Athens*, whence in old time, it had a wall, which from length was called Μακρὰ τείχη. It was destroyed by *Sylla*; but the foundations thereof are yet seen in many places, lying in a streight [*sic*] line, as we observed returning again to the Town: which we did, most part of the way, through woods of Olive-Trees and Vineyards.[213]

Many other early travelers and topographers describe the remains of the Athens-Piraeus walls,[214] so clearly the structures, even in ruins, remained impressive right down to the modern era.

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212 Eust. *Il.* 2.356; Thom. Mag. *Hyper ateleias*, 148 Lenz.

213 Wheler 1682, 420. Since Porto Lione corresponds to the main harbor of Piraeus, the remains described by Wheler lay between Piraeus and Athens. Given both the location and the alignment of the ruins, Wheler rightly associated them with the Long Walls; the statements of later observers, such as Hawkins 1818, 483, 511 n. 2, confirm his judgement.

214 Babin 1674, 10–11, on which see de Laborde 1854a, 189 n. 2 and Wachsmuth 1874, 748 n. 1; Spon 1678, 234–35; Barthélemy 1788, 396; Hobhouse 1813, 361; Sibthorpe 1818, 143–44; Haygarth 1818, 557; Hunt 1818, 559; Dodwell 1819, 418, 467; Leake 1821, 344, 357–60, where one finds fuller description of the remains than in the second edition: Leake 1841a, 399, 417–18; W. Kinnard in Stuart and Revett 1827, 7 n. c; Schaubert 1834, 21–22; de Laborde 1854a, 189 n. 2; de Laborde 1854b, 171; Wordsworth 2004, 204 n. 11.

CHAPTER EIGHT

# STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF THE LONG WALLS

After the Persian Wars, the Athenians famously surrounded Athens with a circuit wall and restarted work on the defenses at Piraeus. While these major fortification projects markedly improved the security of both cities, for nearly two decades thereafter a dangerous paradox threatened the Athenians' safety. In these years, they continued to pursue the naval strategy implemented during the 480s, but at the same time they maintained an urban center located 6 to 7 km inland from its harbors. Should an enemy cut off direct communication between the *asty* and its port cities, the Athenians would lose access to their all-important ships. At the end of the 460s, in a climate of mutual hostility between Athens and Sparta following the Ithome debacle, the Athenians sought to remedy this defensive "Achilles' heel." Resorting to an extraordinary solution, they built two Long Walls (Ia) across the broad coastal plain between Athens and the harbor cities of Phaleron and Piraeus. The coastline between the structures remained unfortified, because ca. 460 the Athenians believed that no enemy could defeat their navy so as to put troops ashore from the Bay of Phaleron. Fundamentally, the new structures would link the *asty* securely with its harbors during an invasion by land. The strategy incorporating the Long Walls (Ia) probably included the expectation of abandoning the *chora*. Nevertheless, when they built the structures, the Athenians possessed a powerful army and maintained an aggressive military posture, so they will not yet have pursued a strategy predicated upon voluntary abandonment of Attika and avoidance of enemy land forces.

Down to the second half of the 440s, when the Athenians built a third structure across the plain, the Long Walls (Ia) never became involved in military developments. In fact, they were probably not even regarded as a priority in strategic planning for most of that period. From the completion of the structures in 458/7 down to 454, the Athenians were actively engaged in warfare abroad, and their control of central Greece meant that an attack by land was highly unlikely. After 454, Athens' shifting naval fortunes likely ruled out a standing defensive strategy based on the Long Walls (Ia). Having recovered from the catastrophe in

Egypt by the late 450s, the Athenian navy demonstrated renewed strength in its victory at Cypriote Salamis ca. 450. It soon became evident, however, that at midcentury the Athenians' naval power was not absolute. At this time they experienced discontent among their Delian League allies (early 440s), the revolt of Euboian cities (446), and further trouble in the alliance (following the Thirty Years' Peace in 446/5). Not long thereafter, the Long Walls (Ia) would again assume the prominent position in Athens' defensive planning which they had occupied at the time of their construction.

By the later 440s, the Athenians had brought their Delian League allies back into line. Although the navy had firmly reestablished its naval superiority by this time, nevertheless the Athenians were a less confident sea power than they had been earlier in the fifth century. Accordingly, they now modified the system of fortifications which depended on control of the sea lanes. The phase Ia Long Walls had improved the Athenians' ability to preserve the vital connection between Athens and its harbors; however, the city's fortification system remained vulnerable. Should a seaborne enemy successfully force a landing along the unfortified coastline of the Bay of Phaleron—i.e. between the walls joining Athens with its harbors—it could sever the link between the *asty* and its ships. In order to rectify this defensive weakness, the Athenians might have walled off the Bay of Phaleron or built a second structure between Athens and Phaleron. Instead, due to the growing importance of Piraeus relative to Phaleron, they built another wall beside the phase Ia Long Wall connecting Athens and Piraeus. This phase Ib structure provided a secondary line of defense behind the Athens-Phaleron Long Wall. In the event of a successful amphibious invasion along the Bay of Phaleron, Athenian troops would fall back to the new structure, the Middle Wall. So long as they held that structure along with the phase Ia wall just to the north, the *asty* would remain securely connected with the ships in the harbors of Piraeus.

After lying dormant down to the end of the 430s, Athens' fortification system was put to the test. With the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians implemented Perikles' radical military strategy, in which the Long Walls (Ia/Ib) played a central role. Originally the Athenians had expected to depend on their fortified connection to Phaleron and Piraeus only after a failed confrontation with enemy troops. According to the new concept, they would abandon the countryside as a first option—conceding primacy on land—while the navy carried out military actions abroad. Thus, with enemy troops preparing to invade

Athenian territory in 431, the residents of Attika retreated to the urban fortification complex. There the swollen population waited out the five Peloponnesian occupations of Attika down to 425; never assaulted in these years, during each invasion the three Long Walls (Ia/Ib) facilitated both the importation of vital supplies and naval endeavors abroad. In 413, the installation of a Peloponnesian garrison at Dekeleia forced the rural population behind the urban defenses again. Now the Athenians would depend for ten years running on the walls stretching down to the harbors, whereas no enemy occupation earlier in the conflict had exceeded forty days. Early on in this period, the Dekeleian War (413–404), they modified the vital system of Long Walls, giving up the phase Ia Phaleric Wall permanently in order to concentrate on securing the two Athens-Piraeus structures and eliminate the open coastline along the Bay of Phaleron. Although the Peloponnesians approached Athens on three occasions, intending in 411 explicitly to take the Long Walls (Ia/Ib), the connection between the *asty* and its ships remained intact. Ultimately, the Peloponnesians conquered Athens only after neutralizing the structures by destroying Athenian sea power at Aigospotamoi (405). In accordance with the terms of the peace treaty imposed on the Athenians in 404, the two surviving Long Walls (Ia/Ib) as well as the circuit surrounding Piraeus were razed.

Less than a decade later, all of those fortifications were under construction once again. Having begun the project in or soon after late summer 395, early in the Corinthian War, the Athenians completed it in or not long after 392/1. Strategically, the project was a top priority because in the later 390s the Athenians faced serious threats on land while seeking to advance their objectives by sea. The phase II Long Walls, which included only the two Athens-Piraeus structures, would still serve primarily to safeguard the connection between Athens and the sea. As the fourth century progressed, however, the Athenians modified their domestic military strategy. The concept developed by Perikles in 432/1 remained an option after the Peloponnesian War, but there is no evidence that it was actually implemented. One element of Perikleian strategy did survive, for, as aptly demonstrated by Athens' investment in the Long Walls on three occasions during the fourth century, city defense remained a central feature of Athenian defensive policy. By the middle of the fourth century, the Athenians had complemented that approach with comprehensive territorial defense. Thus, they sought now to defend both the *chora* and the fortified urban complex.

While the phase II Long Walls were functioning, Athenian naval power was usually able to ensure a continuous supply of seaborne goods. Thus, down to the beginning of work on the phase III structures, relying on the walls joining Athens with Piraeus was generally a realistic option. Only during the period ca. 390–378 and after the later 340s would the navy's inability to control the sea lanes probably have led to the exclusion of the Long Walls (II) from Athenian military planning. As it happened, the Athenians faced no major invasion down to 337, when they began building the phase III Long Walls, so the phase II structures were never actually required to secure the connection between the *asty* and its harbors.

The construction of the third-phase Long Walls occurred in the aftermath of the confrontation with Philip of Macedon at Chaironeia (338). During the general panic which gripped Athens immediately following the disastrous result of that battle, the Athenians hurriedly shored up their walls. Soon, during a major building program carried out from 337 to ca. 334, they systematically renewed the urban fortifications, including the two Long Walls joining Athens and Piraeus. That the Athenians now included these structures in their defensive strategy is initially surprising for two reasons. First, the efficacy of the phase III Long Walls depended on the ability of Athens' navy to control the sea lanes, but in the mid-330s it could not reliably do so. This paradox is only apparent, however, for the new Athens-Piraeus structures belonged to a broad effort to prepare for the time when the Athenians would be in a position to challenge Macedon militarily. Second, the very length and location of the Long Walls (III) meant that they were especially vulnerable to the improving siege techniques of the fourth century. Far from ignorant of the threat, however, the Athenians rebuilt the structures crossing the coastal plain because they were not about to give up their inland *asty* even as the navy remained central to their military strategy. Adapting to the new dangers, in the 330s the Athenians modernized the new fortifications. The result, which combined outmoded characteristics with features designed to counter advanced poliorcetics, conformed to the as yet incomplete response among the mainland Greeks to more powerful methods of siege warfare.

Ultimately the effectiveness of the Long Walls (III) in repelling a siege was never tested. A siege of Athens became a distinct possibility in 322, late in the Lamian War, but to rely at that time on the structures linking the *asty* to its harbors would have been pointless. The reason had nothing to do with the potential weakness of the Long Walls (III) in the

face of current methods of attack. Rather, earlier in the conflict the Macedonians had crushed the Athenian navy at the battle of Amorgos; thereafter, to rely on the defensible connection to the sea would have brought the Athenians no strategic advantage. After the Lamian War, then, the Long Walls (III) would play only a passing role in events. The Athenians, who were independent only briefly between 322 and the beginning of work on the fourth-phase structures in 307, had no chance to employ the structures because the Macedonians controlled Piraeus throughout the period. The Macedonians, for their part, had little interest in the fortified passage between Athens and its harbors. Nikanor, the commander of the Mounychia garrison, did take control of the walls in winter 319/8, but his occupation was brief and had nothing to do with the primary purpose of the Long Walls (III).

During the Four Years' War (307–304), the structures crossing the coastal plain underwent their fourth and final phase of construction as part of a major fortification project led by Demochares. At this time, the two Athens-Piraeus Long Walls were renovated rather than rebuilt. The use of the old phase III structures implies that the Long Walls (IV) were still supposed to secure Athens' connection to its harbors. Given their relative naval weakness at the end of the fourth century, even after the addition of some 100 ships to the fleet ca. 307, the Athenians would have depended on the assistance of a foreign navy to control the sea lanes effectively. Thus, when they began to restore the defensible corridor between the *asty* and its harbors in 307, the Athenians will have relied on the support of their Antigonid patrons, who at that time controlled the most powerful navy in the Aegean. Like the phase III structures, the renovated Long Walls (IV) were vulnerable to the powerful siege methods of the day. However, certain cultural and military priorities forced the Athenians once again to include the structures in their strategy for defending Athens. The flaw in their strategic policy at this time was not the restoration of the Long Walls (IV) per se, but rather a necessary component of that decision: Athenian dependence for real naval strength on a foreign power.

So far as we know, after the Long Walls (IV) were completed in 304, they played at best a marginal role in events down to the year 200, by which time they had begun to deteriorate. The structures may have been damaged during one or more of the sieges at Athens and Piraeus ca. 300, and Demetrios Poliorketes may have garrisoned them from 302 to 301. They are not known, however, to have served their primary function of maintaining a defensible connection between

Athens and its harbors during a siege. Only down to 302, when Demetrios occupied the structures, did the Athenians have the potential to control the sea lanes, but nothing suggests that they actually employed the Long Walls (IV) in those years. Thereafter, whether able to withstand a siege or not, the structures were immaterial to the Athenians, who could no longer call upon the maritime power which justified the Long Walls (IV) and did not even control Piraeus from 295 down to 229. Had Demetrios thought to renovate the structures after 295, he would soon have given up on them because his ability to control the sea lanes declined. From ca. 290 onwards, no power could control the sea lanes reliably enough to incorporate the Athens-Piraeus structures in a strategy for safeguarding Athens, so the Long Walls (IV) could no longer serve their primary function. Recognizing this state of affairs, the Athenians reorganized the defenses of south-west Athens soon after 287. At this time they built the Compartment Wall across the Pnyx Range, a development which marked the abandonment of both the old southwestern city circuit and the Long Walls (IV). Thus, not later than the early 280s—and perhaps already at the very end of the fourth century—the decay of the Long Walls (IV) had begun due to their strategic uselessness.

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[1] In general, this list provides short titles of books, although for clarity certain full titles do appear. Journal abbreviations follow those published annually in *L'Année philologique*. Other abbreviations and short series titles include *CAH* = *The Cambridge Ancient History* and *RE* = *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 2nd ed.

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# FIGURES




Fig. 1. Late-fourth-century fortification wall of Athens (as restored), section drawing. Reprinted, by permission, from the reissue of Travlos 1971: J. N. Travlos, *Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Athens* (New York: Hacker Art Books, 1980) fig. 228.




Fig. 2. The coastal plain at Athens, including the phase Ia Long Walls. Quotation marks identify nomenclature not known to be ancient. By the author and Fred Ley.




Fig. 3. Coastal plain at Athens, including the phase Ia and phase Ib Long Walls. Quotation marks identify nomenclature not known to be ancient. By the author and Fred Ley.




Fig. 4. The coastal plain at Athens, including the phase II, phase III, and phase IV Long Walls. Quotation marks identify nomenclature not known to be ancient. By the author and Fred Ley.

Fig. 5. Long Walls, phases Ia/Ib: trapezoidal masonry of substructures. After Mastrokostas n.d., fig. 3.

Fig. 6. Long Walls, phase II: hammer-dressed masonry of substructures. By the author.

Fig. 7. Long Walls, phase III: solid-block construction of substructures. Reprinted, by permission, from Travlos 1988, fig. 375, © by Ernst Wasmuth Verlag, Tübingen, Germany.

Fig. 8. Southwestern Athens: *1* Pnyx Range, *2* "Compartment Wall" ("White Poros Wall"), *3* Hill of the Nymphs, *4* Mouseion Hill, *5* "Macedonian Fort," *6* Koile, *7 Diateichisma*, *8* "Piraic"/Northern Long Wall, *9* Middle/Southern Long Wall, *10* Road through Koile. North is towards the top of the page. Roman numerals label gates in the fortifications walls, and quotation marks identify nomenclature not known to be ancient. As shown here, the fortification wall crossing the Pnyx Range is composed of several different elements: (1) to the south of gate XIV the illustration depicts the course of the original cross wall, the so-called Compartment Wall; (2) further north, between gates XIV and XV, the line of the structure corresponds to the second-phase cross wall, the "White Poros Wall"—the course of which closely follows, but does not reproduce exactly, the line of its predecessor; (3) between gate XV and the junction with the city wall, the course of the structure is hypothetical (*cf.* Scranton in Thompson and Scranton 1943, 306–7). Reprinted, by permission, from Travlos 1988, fig. 29, © by Ernst Wasmuth Verlag, Tübingen, Germany; with additions by Fred Ley.

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